CD 


ma* 


• ..a,   .    fe     ., 


S3  g        -/-'«• 
I     •     SK 

.  i         *.  « 

jj    -  |   /.-•         '  '      ":•-. 


•    K       ! 
§^^^^^•1 


1     -.•  i  "-  i    ,  '    i 

. .'  ,    -   '-  •       --     '      M          -" 

.-  •  1  B 

I  -    H  . ./'  Hi   i  i 


- 


REVIEW 

i\ 

OF 

.  EMMONS'S 


x.^*         '   * 

^^^*^jL .    "       / 

OF  -  -_£^' 

GOD'S  AGENCY  ON  MANKIND; 

ADDRESSED  TO  TVC 
CO^OBEOATIO.NAL  CLKRfiT  OF  HEW  ENGLAND. 


AISO, 


OF 

THE  VIEWS 

1    THEORY. 
•  KSFECTIitO 


OF 

THE  MORAL  EVIL  EXISTING  IN  THE  UNIVERSE 
TO  A  DISPLAY  OF  THE  PIV1NE  GLORY. 


NEW-YORK  : 
PUBLISHED  BT  JOHN  SAYRE,  146  BROADWAY. 

1821. 


Southern  District  qf  New-York,  ss. 

BT  REMEMBERED,  That  on  the  twenty-sfxlh  day  of  Septem- 
ber, in  the  forty-sixth  year  of  the  Independence  of  the  Unit* •<!  States 
of  America,  JOHN  SATRE,  of  the  said  District,  bath  deposited  in  this  ofllce 
the  title  of  a  book,  the  right  whereof  he  claims  as  proprietor,  in  the  words 
follow  ing,  to  wit: 

"  A  Review  of  Doct.  Emmons's  Theory  of  God's  Agency  on  Mankind; 
A<i('re<.«e<!  to  the  Congregational  Clergy  of  Ne\\ -England.  Also,  a  Refu- 
tation of  the  Views  entertained  by  Advocates  of  that  Theory,  respecting 
the  Necessity  of  the  Moral  Evil  existing  in  the  Universe  to  a  display  of 
the  Divine  Glory." 

In  conformity  to  the  Act  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  en- 
titled "  An  Actforthe  encouragement  ol  Learning,  by  securing  the  Co- 
pies of  Maps,  Charts,  and  Books,  to  the  authors  and  proprietors  of  such 
,  'luring  the  time  therein  mentioned  "  And  also  to  an  Act,  en- 
titled "an  Act,  supplementary  to  an  Act,  entitled  an  Act  forthe  encou- 
ragement of  Learning,  by  securing  the  copies  of  Maps,  Charts,  and  Books, 
to  tin:  auMiors  and  proprietors  of  Midi  copies,  during  the  times  therein 
mention  d,  and  extending  the  hem-Its  thereof  to  the  arts  of  designing1, 
engraving,  aod  etching  historical  and  other  prints." 

JAMKS  DILL, 
Clerk  of  the  Southern  Distric,  q/'Xen-York 


INTRODUCTORY  ADDRESS 

TO   THE 

-,  oi1  M:\V-L::: 


F.NDS, 

.    of  tli,-  Mmi-trrs  of  the    (io^pel    i^ 

not  confiii  n-hes  :    they 

11.  >i  men-ly  to    prea-  11   <'hri-t  to  the 

people  in-  >  "set  for 

Thry,  Bfl  in- 

dividuals,   iiiv  •  liaoi   "1    i 

f.ttlh,  as  well  as  Pastors  of  the  pji  -ti»:.ular  churches 
\\  hirh  th  I.       It 

devol^  \>   M  v\alk  uhout  Zion,to  tell  the 

.  K    \\i-ll  her  bulwark-,  ;iml    con- 

to  extcMid  ;t  eve  over 

her  gciir-ral  in-  to   detect  ami  •    in- 

tni-i.Mis  of  error,  guard  her  purity,  and  defen 
liberties. 

«ed  especially  on  the  Congre- 
gational Clergy  in  t! 

6  not,  like  the  Presbyterian  and  ; 
!,  adopted  a  common  Confess   n  .  t  I  aith,  as  a 

/orthodoxy;    nor  e-tahh-hed  aeon 
.hniicatni-y,   to    \vh  i    the 

faith  once  delivered   to  the  ,.rc  amenable. 

A  lar^e  proportion  of  their  churches  are  entirely 
independent  of  the  others,  and  at  liberty  to  em- 
brao  t  m  whatever  of  doctrine,  and  adopt 

any  peculiarity  of  rites,  without  subjecting  them- 
interference  of  any  judicatory,  or  the 
sacrifice  of  any  immunity.  Their  representative 
assemblies  have  no  power  to  enact  authoritative 
laws  respecting  the  faith,  rites,  and  government  of 
their  churches;  nor  to  pronounce  authoritative 
decrees  of  excommunication,  or  disfranchisement. 


IV 


They  are  not  invested  with  executive  power. 
Their  voice  is  only  advisory  and  monitory  ;  and 
their  decisions  must  be  ratified  by  individual 
churches,  in  order  to  become  law. 

Thence,  the  task  of  correcting  abuses  and  re- 
pressing error  devolves  on  the  clergy  individually, 
in  their  private  capacity  ;  and  the  press  is  the  chief 
medium  of  accomplishing  it.  Nor  is  this  the  least 
important  duty  which  their  office  assigns  them. 
The  dignity  and  influence  of  religion  depend  on 
her  purity.  Error  in  doctrine  is  the  worst  species 
of  irreligion  ;  for  it  attacks  religion  herself,  and 
endeavours  to  conquer  her  dominions  by  annihilat- 
ing her  truth.  The  multitude  embrace  the  views 
of  Christianity  which  are  inculcated  by  their  teach- 
ers ;  arid  if  those  views  are  fraught  with  error,  it 
soon  develops  itself  in  practice.  The  consciences 
of  men  are  not  often  more,  they  are  ordinarily  less, 
rigorous  than  their  creeds. 

Erroneous  exhibitions  of  Christianity  do  more 
than  any  thing  else  to  create  and  strengthen  her  ene- 
mies. Explore  the  origin  of  the  rancour  with 
which  her  modern  opposers  have  persecuted  her  ; 
you  will  perceive  it  was  excited,  in  no  small  degree, 
by  the  ridiculous  rites,  the  absurd  doctrines,  and 
the  intolerance  and  tyranny  with  which  the  folly  and 
impiety  of  men  had  disfigured  her.  Search  for  the 
cause  of  the  disrespect  and  prejudice  with  which 
she  is  viewed  by  many  of  the  intelligent  and  influ- 
ential in  our  country  ;  you  will  discover  that  they 
have  been  awakened  extensively  by  the  distorted 
views  of  her  which  those  individuals  have  been 
called  to  contemplate.  Robbed  of  rur  dignity  and 
consistency  by  the  admixture  of  what  is  contradic- 
tory, ridiculous,  intolerant,  and  weak,  they  have 
not  been  inspired  with  that  reverence  toward  her, 
her  native  majesty  is  adapted  to  awaken  ;  nor 
yielded  her  the  confidence  her  unsullied  truth  is 
fitted  to  command. 


Erroneous  exhibitions  of  the  Gospel  encourage 
its  enemies  in  their  opposition.      Its  enemies  iden- 
tity the  true  Gospel  with  those  pretended  exhibi- 
tions of  it.     They  regard  th^ir  whole  aversion  to  it 
as  just,  because  they  are  justified   in   rejecting  the 
errors  appended   to  it  ;    and  when  they    triumph 
those  errors,  flatter  theu;«rl\  <-  th.it  thej  have 
d  a  victory  over  the  Gospel  itself.       Had  the 

itfl  purity,  we  per- 

ourselves,  th.it  ChnMend.un  h.«d  never  been 
'•one  of  perser'  e  primitive  ages  of 

the  church  :   the  world  had  nev>  i 
»•!*  ns').i«-ni    inlidel-u   ;    n«»r    •  •  I     .i'lt-d 

le  of  *o  large  a  portion   of 
'  are  first  in  mteli  n    and  in- 

fluence, standing  in  the  :  ,  the 

unb'-l:  ,,-teri 

of  the  cross,  theref 

sacred  and  momentous  duties,  when,  in  the  kl  in 

ness  of  wisdom,"  they  expose  and  arrest  the.  drvia- 

from  truth,  to   which  ovory  age  gives  birth  : 

and  they  rn.ike  their  happi-  adorn  the 

of  Zion  with    ia|i  with 

LOtfl  th«  4k  unity 
of  the  1'iith,  and  of  the  knowledge   of  the   Son  of 

1  the  clergy  or  tve  not,  ordi- 

narily, been  negligent  t  Pge  thi-  <iuty.      Her 

churches  hav<  re  intelligent, 

more  pioufl  ind  vigilant,  and  exerting  a  more  pow- 
erful and  .'ifluence,  than  tho^e,  during  the 

:  ;d,  of  any  other  section,  not  only  ol 
own  country,  but  of  the  world.  Her  first  ministers 
possessed  more  of  the  apostolic  character  than  mo- 
dern ages  have  ofttn  seen.  The  venerable  Ed- 
wardses  Del!  -my.  Smaliey,  Lathrop,  the  illustrious 
ig,  and  several  others,  would  have 
added  strength  to  any  church,  and  honour  to  any  na- 


VI 


tion.  Her  clergy  have  done  more  than  all  Christen- 
dom beside,  to  advance  our  knowledge  of  those  sub- 
ject? in  theology  to  which  they  have  devoted  their 
peculiar  attention.  Edwards  instructed  the  divines 
and  philosophers  of  Europe  on  the  subject  of  the 
freedom  of  the  will  ;  and  many  treatises  have  been 
presented  by  them  to  the  world,  which,  for  philoso- 
phical accuracy,  force  of  argumentation,  and  ar- 
dour of  piety,  are  not  surpassed  by  the  publications 
sent  forth  during  the  snme  period  by  any  division 
of  the  Church.  And  no  inconsiderable  part  of  their 
works  has  been  polemical,  and  specifically  design- 
ed to  counteract  the  errors  with  which  the  church- 
es around  them  were  infested.  Such  were  some  of 
President  Edwards's,  most  of  Bellamy's,  Dr.  Ed- 
ward's, part  of  Smalley's,  I)w»ght\s,  and  those  of 
others  ;  and  more  recently,  the  Unitarian  contro- 
versy has  called  forth  several  publications  from  the 
orthodox,  honourable  to  their  authors,  and  worthy 
of  the  churches  which  they  represent. 

The  intelligence,  the  vigilance,  the  promptitude, 
to  meet  and  check  the  encroachments  of  error,  for 
which  the  clergy  of  New-England  have  been  distin- 
guished, have  excited  the  hope  and  expectation 
that  the  subject  of  this  Review  would,  ere  this, 
have  aroused  to  attention,  and  called  forth  to  con- 
troversy, some  one  of  their  number,  more  compe- 
tent to  its  refutation,  and,  from  a  proximity  to  the 
scene  of  its  publication,  more  immediately  interest- 
ed in  it  than  ourselves  We  know  not  whither  to 
look  for  the  cause,  that  so  novel,  and,  in  our  ap- 
prehension, so  heterodox  and  pernicious  a  doctrine, 
should  have  so  long  been  permitted  to  be  taught 
and  diffused,  almost  without  an  effort  to  develop 
to  the  churches  its  character,  arid  arrest  its  pro- 
gress. Whether  the  individuals,  on  whom  the  task 
of  opposing  it  would  properly  have  devolved,  have 


Til 

been  diverted  from   it  by  other  controversies,  of 

which  tii.it  section  of  N  l.md  has  been   the 

scene  ,   <>r  h  ive  h;  ;'rom  it  by  respect 

for  the    talents  nn  I   ricty   of  -»r  ;   whether 

n  (k'U'rr-  i  by  the  hope  that 

tiH-'lnith-i  which    \n*    LntermiDgled,    and    taught   in 

,   with  it,  would  iiii<Tcr|it    itl    «l:i'^.'rous 

ncy  ;   by  the   apprehension,  th  ;  -niity 

-tacle  to  i  i"nce 

or  whrthcrother  c  PI-'^.  in  con- 

^  anted  its  be- 

',n_r  BQ  of  puMic  controversy, 

illy  the  lot  of  i   mnova- 

it  a   lo--   to  drcidr       Th;it  it  has   not 

MI    tin-   p.'j.iil  lio    tficory   we  are 

tin.      ^'.»  cannot  but  re^r«'t.  th  it  some  on» 

not  ap(M-;nt   I  to   controv.-rt  it,   ln>th  tint  wo   might 

have  been  released  from   the    t.«-U,   and   that   the 

churchet  might  bare  cnji>\.  Iier  and  more 

able  \  ludi.   ition  of  the  truth. 

We    have    deomrd    it    our    duty,    however,    to 
pre-ent  to   the  public  our  views  of  its  erroneous- 
nut   to  ^olicit  to  them  the  serious  attention, 
especially    of  you,  Reverend    I  the  Con- 

gregational Clergy  of  N  -nd,  who  arc  - 

guard  the  faith  of  the  chnr  1  to  whom   we 

must  look  for  co-operation,  in  endeavouring  to  give 
supremacy  to  the  truth  as  it  is  in  Jesus. 

We  cannot  but  regard  it  as  claiming  your  most 
solemn  consideration.  Is  it  safe  for  the  church  to 
slumber,  while  even  the  most  harmless  errors  are 
diffusing  their  influence?  And  allow  us  to  a*k, 
whether  this  theory,  if  our  views  of  its  erroneous- 
ness  are  correct,  is  not  fraught  with  an  alarming 
share  of  danger  to  the  cause  of  the  Redeemer? 
How  had  it  been  viewed  had  it  come  from  the  hands 
of  Antinomians,  Unitarians,  or  Infidels  ?  Would  it 


Vlll 

not  have  been  regarded  as  wearing  a  threatening  as- 
pect, and  have  awakened  apprehension  ?  May  not 
many  of  its  principles  be  employed,  by  the  ene- 
mies of  religion,  most  naturally  and  successfully, 
to  perplex  and  subvert  the  faith  of  men  in  the 
truth  of  the  Gospel  ?  Or  at  least,  ifnot  thus  danger- 
ous in  its  tendency,  is  it  not  untrue,  and  to  be  de- 
nied a  place  among  the  acknowledged  doctrines  of 
revealed  religion  ? 

We  entreat  you  deliberately  to  weigh  our  rea- 
sonings ;  and  examine  whether  the  dictates  of  com- 
mon sense,  of  reason,  of  revelation,  do  not  concur 
in  forcing  us  to  the  conclusions  to  which  we  have 
advanced.  If  we  have  established  our  views,  we 
conjure  you  by  the  responsibilities  of  your  office, 
to  unite  with  us  in  suppressing  the  error,  and  call- 
ing back  the  churches  to  soundness  in  the  faith. 

We  have  not  deemed  it  necessary  to  trace  the  his- 
tory of  this  theory,  nor  to  allude  to  any  of  the  pub- 
lications in  whose  pages,  to  a  greater  or  less  ex- 
tent, its  principles  may  have  obtained  a  place,  be- 
sides those  of  Dr.  Emmons  ;  nor  considered  it  im- 
portant to  designate  the  points  in  which  it  resem- 
bles other  errors  in  theology  and  philosophy, 
which  have  obtained  a  currency  in  the  world. 

We  have  not  been  prompted  to  this  work  by 
sectional  feeling,  nor  the  love  of  controversy  ; 
but  by  a  conviction  of  the  truth  of  our  views,  and  a 
solicitude  for  the  welftre  of  the  church.  We  trust, 
that  those  who  shall  patiently  examine  our  pages, 
and  comprehend  the  import  of  our  reasonings,  will 
discern  that  we  have  not  adopted  those  views  with- 
out consideration,  nor  reposed  them  on  a  founda- 
tion which  shall  be  easily  shaken. 


REVIEW, 


OK.  KMMOX-  has- presented  to  the  world, 

in  two  volui:  ^ermons.  the  lirst  pub- 

<1  in  \\\<\(\.  :iiid  the  -econd  in   \\\\'l.   a 

oryof  (jod's  AL  n  Mankind,  by 

AN  hi  eh  1  i<-  gi?C«  exi  N  nee  to  their  agency, 

and  control-  all  its  c\rnts. 

It  is  no\cl  and  prc.ul:  is  a  theory 

of  the  MODK  of  the  divine  a^(-ncy. 

Tht  ^es  of  Oalvini^tic  theologians 

on  tin-  sid»jcct.  afl  tar  as  \ve  possess  an 
acquaintance  with  them,  merely  rc-pect 
the  existence,  the  c.rtnn\  and  the  r//rcte  of 
God's  a^enrv:  le;n  iu^;  the  mode,  at  most 
excepting  the  question  whether,  in  certain 
cases,  it  be  direct  or  indirect,  untouched. 
The  Doctors  is  a  theory  of  the  mode,  and 
seems,  from  his  use  of  it,  to  have  been 
constructed  for  the  purpose  of  solving 
those  difficult  cases  in  metaphysics;  the 
consistency  of  a  divine  influence  on  men, 
with  their  moral  agency;  the  fall  of 
Adam;  the  depravity  of  his  posterity; 
2 


14 

the  renovation  of  the  heart;  and  the 
mixed  character  of  the  saints  in  this  life; 
which  other  theories  leave  unexplained : 
and  did  it  furnish  a  solution  of  those  diffi- 
culties, and  come  sustained  by  competent 
evidence,  it  would  undoubtedly  constitute 
an  important  accession  to  our  knowledge, 
and  entitle  him  to  the  respect  and  grati- 
tude of  the  world. 

Whether  such  is  its  character  or  not,  is 
worthy  the  consideration  of  all.  In  our 
judgment  he  has  ventured  into 


-"A  dark, 


Illimitable  ocean;  without  bound, 

Without  dimension;  where  length,  breadth,  and  height, 

And  time  and  place  are  lost  :7) 

where  he, 

— "  Meeting 

A  vast  vacuity  :  all  unawares 

Fluttering  his  pinions  vain,  plumb  down  has  dropt 

Ten  thousand  fathom  deep." 

He  has  presented  to  us  a.fiction  of  fancy, 
instead  of  a  doctrine  of  revelation  ;  asser- 
tions and  unsound  reasonings,  in  place  of 
indubitable  deductions  from  known 
truths;  and  added  darkness  to  the  sub- 
ject, instead  of  pouring  on  it  the  light  of 
intelligibility  and  consistency. 

To  evince  this,  we  will  present  a  state- 
ment of  his  theory,  and  the  reasonings  on 
wrhich  it  rests;  exhibit  some  considera- 
tions, showing  those  reasonings  to  be  er- 


roneous,  and  the  theory  to  be  false;  and 
point  out  some  of  the  consequences,  which 

iiiii-t  IT  suit  from  its  bring  taught  as  a  part 
of  revealed  theolo 

The  theory  and  the  reasonings  on  which  it 
rests. 

The  theory  is  briefly  expressed  in  the 
following  proposition : 

GOD   CFIEATKS    ALL  THE  ACTS   OF    .VI  v. 

The  mode  of  His  n^rnrt  i-  iliat  ofcrart- 
:ui(l  it  exte:  •//  their  actions. 

The  manner  in  which  the  Doctor  con* 
templates  its  mode  aiu!  extent,  the  u 
motives,  and  the  activity  and  moral  free- 
dom of  men,  shall  be  exhibited  by  quota- 
tions.* 

From  the  following  passages  it  will  be 
:   that  Ii  is   the   mode  of  God's 

as  that  < 

"  Since  all  men  are  dependent  agent:. 
all  their  motions,  exe.rrises,  or  actions 
mu-it  originate  from  a  divine  efficiency, 
We  can  no  more  act,  than  we  can  exist, 
without  the  constant  aid  and  influence  of 
the  Deiu."  Vol.  ii.  p.  31. 

"  The  heart  may  be  created,  as  well  as 

*  T)>  \-oluinec  are  nor  numb- 

we  shall  di-M^u ••.»«•  that  published  in   l:>00  as  Vol.  I.   and  that 
nublishcd  in  1812  as  Vol.  II. 


16 

the  understanding ;  or  moral  exercises,  as 
well  as  natural  faculties.  It  appears  from 
what  has  been  said,  that  the  hearts  of 
saints  are  created;  or  that  their  free  and 
voluntary  exercises  are  the  production  of 
divine  power."  Vol.  i.  p.  231. 

46  It  is  agreeable  to  the  nature  of  virtue 
or  true  holiness  to  be  created"  p.  279. 

"  Holiness,  is  something  which  has  a 
real  and  positive  existence,  and  which 
not  only  may,  but  must  be  created"  p.  280. 

"He,"  God,  "has  the  power  of  pro- 
duction. He  can  create,  or  bring  out  of 
nothing  into  existence,  whatever  he 
pleases.  As  he  can  create  a  body,  and 
create  a  soul,  which  are  lower  kinds  of 
existence ;  so  he  can  create  virtue  or  true 
holiness,  which  is  the  highest  and  noblest 
kind  of  existence."  p.  281. 

"It  is  sometimes  proper  to  ascribe 
men's  good  actions  wholly  to  God,  and 
sometimes  equally  proper  to  ascribe  their 
bad  actions  wholly  to  him.  We  may 
justly  conclude,  that  the  divine  agency  is 
as  much  concerned  in  their  bad,  as  in 
their  good  actions."  Vol.  ii.  p.  39. 

"  If  saints  can  work  out  their  own  sal- 
vation, under  a  positive  influence  of  the 
Deity;  then  sinners  can  work  out  their 


17 

own  destruction,  under  his  positive  in- 
fluence." p.  228. 

"  They  never  do  act  of  themselves. — 
They  live  and  move  and  have  their  being 
in  Cod,  who  constantly  works  in  them, 
both  to  will  and  to  do,  in  every  instance 
of  their  condurt."  p.  210. 

••  Men  are  no  more  capable  of  acting 
independently  of  (!od  in  one  instance 
than  another.  If  they  need  any  kind  or 
decree  of  disi.  ncy  in  doing  good, 

they  need  precisely  the  same  kind  and 
< •<•  of  divine  agency  in  doing  evil. 
Tiii-  is  the  dictate  of  reason,  and  the 
Scripture  says  the  >ame.  It  is  God  who 
workcth  in  men,  both  to  will  and  to  do,  in 
all  cases  without  exception.  He  wrought 
equally  in  the  minds  of  those  who  sold, 
and  in  the  minds  of  those  who  bought, 
Joseph.  He  wrought  as  effectually  in  the 
minds  of  Joseph's  brethren,  when  they 
sold  him,  as  when  they  repented  and  be- 
sought his  mercy.  He  not  only  prepared 
these  persons  to  act,  but  made  them  act. 
He  not  only  exhibited  motives  of  action 
before  theirminds,  butdisposed  their  minds 
to  comply  with  the  motives  exhibited. — 
But  there  was  no  possible  way,  in  which 
he  could  dispose  them  to  act  right  or 
wrong,  but  only  by  producing  right  or 
2* 


18 

wrong  volitions  in  their  hearts.  And  if 
he  produced  their  bad  as  well  as  good 
volitions,  then  his  agency  was  concerned 
in  precisely  the  same  manner,  in  their  wrong 
as  in  their  right  actions.''  Vol.  ii.  p.  40. 

"  If  God  can  work  in  moral  agents  both 
to  wrill  and  to  do  of  his  good  pleasure, 
then  we  may  easily  account  for  the  moral 
depravity  of  infants."  Vol.  i.  p.  235. 

44  He  works  in  them,  as  he  does  in  other 
men,  both  to  will  and  to  do  of  his  good 
pleasure;  or  produces  those  moral  exer- 
cises in  their  hearts,  in  which  moral  de- 
pravity properly  and  essentially  consists." 
p.  238. 

44  Their"  [sinners']  "activity  in  all  cases 
is  owing  to  a  divine  operation  upon  their 
minds :  they  are  not  sufficient  of  them- 
selves to  think  any  thing  of  themselves." 
Vol.  ii.  p.  179. 

44  If  they"  [men]  44  do  any  thing  what- 
ever, it  may  be  truly  said,  it  was  done  by 
the  finger  of  God."  p.  32. 

Many  other  passages  of  similar  import 
might  be  added  from  the  Doctor's  vo- 
lumes ;  but  from  these  it  is  seen  with  suffi- 
cient clearness,  that  he  regards  the  mode 
of  the  divine  agency  as  that  of  creating. 
In  the  passages  from  vol.  i.  pp  231,  279, 
280,  and  281,  he  represents  the  agency 


19 

.  >i  ( .o(L  in  regard  to  the  holy  acts  of  n 

rrtutinir   a^enry  :    and  in  the  pa-- 

from  vol.  ii.  p.  -11),  ho  represents  preci 

tli-"  same  kind  and  degree  of  divine  aj 

i  in  do:  I,   ;i- 

in  doing  good  ;  and  God's  agency  as  con- 
cernod  in  />/•/» /\Y///  the.  .-  in  their 

igaa  in  their  right  act  ions ;  ofco:. 
ii    i-  -ncy.     From    \\\^  \\ 

the  noun  ••  produriion."  in  -everul  ol'thoM- 

j  \\ith  -crea- 
tion ;"  and  in  many  nthrr  -  the 
••  pro  !y  with 
"  cri'atr."  it  \^  apparrnt  that  hr  rmj> 
lh(Mii  in  tho^r  plaros  to  denote  tlie  bame 
kilid  of  agency. 

And  \ve  mi;-t  inter,  that  he  intends  like- 
by 

the   term-,    -divine  efficir  -divine 

operation,"  "divine  agency,"  u  positive 
inlliu-ncr  :"  and  the  phrases,  "  to  work  in 
men  to  will  and  to  do" — "modetbevfr  act" 
— "disposed  their  minds/'  and  others  of 
himilar  import,  if  he  wishes  by  them  to 
denote  any  mode  of  God's  agency.  As 
this  phraseology  itself,  if  you  except  the 
iirst  term,  does  not  determine  what  mode 
of  agency  it  is  employed  to  designate  ;  it 
must  be  interpreted  in  accordance  with 
those  passages,  in  which  the  Doctor  exhi- 


20 

bits  the  mode  of  divine  agency,  as  that  of 
creating. 

He  cannot  consistently  employ  it  to 
denote  any  other  mode,  nor  mean  by  it 
any  thing  few,  than  that  God  creates  the 
acts  of  men. 

He  cannot  mean  by  it,  that  God  merely 
brings  men  into  a  state,  in  which  they  are 
disposed  to  act,  or  to  act  in  a  given  way ; 
leaving  them  to  exert  their  volitions  by 
their  own  power,  instead  of  His  creating 
those  volitions;  for  he  denies  that  any 
disposition  can  exist  in  the  mind,  which  is 
distinct  from  and  the  cause  of  volition. 

u  Some,"  says  he,  "  suppose  that  a  good 
heart  essentially  consists  in  a  good  princi- 
ple, taste,  or  relish,  which  is  totally  inde- 
pendent of  the  will.  But  this  sentiment 
is  totally  repugnant  to  the  law  of  iove. 
This  law  requires  no  dormant,  inactive, 
torpid  disposition,  inclination,  or  taste. 
There  can  be  no  such  thing  as  an  holy 
principle,  disposition,  or  inclination,  which 
is  distinct  from  true  love."  "  Some  sup* 
pose  that  a  bad  heart  consists  in  a  bad 
principle,  disposition,  or  inclination, 
which  is  entirely  distinct  from  sinful,  vo- 
luntary exercises.  But  it  appears  that  all 
sinfulness  consists  in  the  various  exercises 


21 


and  modifications  of  self-love/' 
pp.  265,  :;d  2b7. 

"  Moral   exercises  llow  from 
opei  ,pon  the  m\\A  of  a  moral 

natural  faculty,  princi- 
or  taste,  enabling  him  to  origiirite  his 
o\vn  internal   exercises,  or  external  ac- 
tio:  Vol.  ii.  p.  1 

"  !  no  possible  way  in 

which  he  could  dispose  them  to  act  right 
or  wrong,  but  only  by  producing  right  or 
Wrong  volitions  in  their  hearts."  p.  10. 

As  the  Doctor  thus  denies  that  a  dispo- 
sition, distinct  from  volition,  and  antece- 
dent to  it,  enabling  a  moral  agent  to  origi- 
nate his  own  internal  exercises,  orexternal 
actions,  ever  exists;  and  denies  also,  that 
God  can  possibly  dispose  a  moral  agent 
to  act  rii;I:t  or  wron:;\  in  any  other  \\  ay 
than  b\  Jit  or  wrong  voli- 

tion-; themselves  in  his  heart;  he  cannot 
of  course  mean  by  those  phrases  to  desig- 
nate  an  agency  which  produces  such  a 
disposition.  Besides,  under  such  a  mode 
of  agency,  men,  according  to  the  Doctor, 
id  be  passive.  "We  know  that  love  is 
a  free,  voluntary  exercise,  and  not  any 
.  habit,  or  principle,  which  is  totally 
inactive  and  involuntary.  It  is  absurd  to 
suppose,  that  God  should  require  any 


22 

thing  of  us  in  which  we  are  altogether 
passive."  Vol.  ii  p.  173,  174. 

Bui  the  Doctor  denies  that  men  ever 
are  passive  under  the  divine  influence. 
"  Men  act  while  they  are  acted  upon  by 
a  divine  operation."  Vol.  i.  p.  223. 

"  As  saints  can  act  while  they  are  acted 
upon,  so  sinners  can  act  while  they  are 
acted  upon."  p.  228. 

"  If  the  making  a  new  heart  consists  in 
the  exercising  of  holy,  instead  of  unholy 
affections,  then  sinners  are  not  passive, 
but  active,  in  regeneration."  p.  178. 

If  that  be  true,  and  if  "  the  good  and 
evil  heart  are  both  made  up  of  exercises,'1 
with  no  other  difference  than  that  "  their 
exercises  are  diametrically  opposite  in 
their  moral  quality,"  p.  191,  then  the  con- 
verse of  the  preceding  proposition  is 
equally  true,  viz.  that,  as  the  making  a 
bad  heart  consists  in  the  exercising  of 
unholy  instead  of  holy  affections,  sinners 
are  not  passive  but  active  under  the  divine 
influence,  in  all  their  sinful  agency. 

From  the  first  and  last  of  these  quota- 
tions, as  well  as  from  many  other  passages 
in  the  Doctor's  volumes,  it  is  seen  that 
he  holds,  that  a  taste,  habit,  principle,  or 
disposition,  is  perfectly  inactive  and  invo- 
luntary :  and  that  if  God  exerted  an  agen- 


cy  on  men,  producing  such  a  taste  or  dis- 
position, they  would  be  perfectly  pa 
under  that  agency.  He  infers  from  the 
fact,  that  love  is  a  free,  voluntary  exer- 
cise, and  not  a  taste  or  disposition;  and 
that  the  making  a  new  heart  consists  in 
the  exercising  of  holy  aflections,  and  not 
in  the  production  of  a  disposition;  that 
men  are  not  passive,  but  active  under  the 
divine  agency.  If  thus  hrlmlds.  that  men 
are  wtin  under  that  ai;enr>.  In  eau-e  vo- 
luntary exercises,  ami  not  a  disposition, 
are  produced  hv  it  :  then  he  of  course 
holds,  that  if  a  disposition  u  ere  produced 
by  it,  they  would  \>c  passive  under  it,  and 
not  active. 

As  then  he  holds,  as  stated  in  the  quo- 
tation-, that  men  are  ne\  er  pussirr  under 
the  divine  agency,  lie  cannot  mean  to  de- 
note by  those  phrases  any  agency  under 
which,  according  to  his  own  views,  men 
would  be  p<  He  means  an  agency 

that  produces  the  acts  themselves  of  men.  not 
that  merely  brings  them  into  a  state  in 
which  they  are  disposed  to  act,  or  that 
produces  a  disposition  which  is  antecedent 
to  their  acts,  and  which  leads  to  those 
acts;  and  an  agency  that  produces  the 
acts  themselves  must  be  a  creating  agency. 

Nor  can  he  mean  by  that  phraseology 


24 

to  denote  an  agency  by  which  God  mere- 
Jy  excites  men  to  act,  or  to  exert  a  power 
of  acting,  belonging  to  themselves;  leav- 
ing their  exercises  to  be  the  effects  of 
/heir  power,  and  only  the  indirect  conse- 
quence, not  immediate  production  of  His 
power;  for  that  would  be  producing  no- 
thing more  nor  less  than  a  disposition  to 
act.  But  the  Doctor  affirms,  that  "  there 
is  no  possible  way  in  which  God  can  dis- 
pose men  to  act,  but  by  producing  volitions 
in  their  hearts." 

Besides,  he  denies  that  the  acts  of  men 
ever  are  the  effects  of  their  own  power, 
and  only  the  remote  effects  of  God's  ope- 
ration; and  alsothatmen  have  any  power 
to  originate  and  exert  acts  of  themselves, 
in  such  a  way  as  that  supposed.  u  Our 
moral  exercises  are  the  productions  of  the 
divine  power."  Vol.  i.  p.  224. 

"  There  is  no  occasion  for  a  distinct  fa- 
culty of  will,  in  order  to  put  forth  external 
actions,  or  internal  exercises.  It  is  God 
who  worketh  in  men  both  to  will  and  to 
do.  Moral  exercises  flow  from  a  divine 
operation  upon  the  mind  of  a  moral  agent, 
and  not  from  any  natural  faculty,  princi- 
ple, or  taste,  enabling  him  to  originate  his 
own  internal  exercises,  or  external  ac- 
tions." Vol.  ii.  p.  195. 


.  then,  the  Doctor  hold-,  that  the  ad« 
of  men  never  nre  the  ellecls  of  their  o\vu 
ver,  as  they  would   he   under  such  a 
merely    exciting  BgenCJ  :    ftnd    that    men 
have  no  power  to  put   forth  or  originate 
their  own  acts,  as  they  would  possess  un- 
der such  an  agencv  :    he  of  coiir-e  cannot 
i  (o  de  -   hy  that 

i-eoloiry.     Nor  can   he.  for  the  -ame 
in   an   agency  by  which  ( in  I 
iner  tO  men  the  pm,-  ':mK' 

which  they  tin  exerl    in   origi 

and  putting  forth  acts:   for  if  men  do 
not  /  |)ower   i»f  originating   and 

c\eriin^  acts  ot'  tliem^clve-  ;    and  if,  con- 
'.enlly,    none    of   their    actfl    are    the 
ellects  ot'  their  own  power,   then  no  such 
power  is  communicated,  and  therefore  no 

Biichag  that  bj  which  God  would 

merely  impart  the  power  of  acting,  i- 
eric  1  on  them. 

This  is  obvious  too,  from  the  Doctor's 
argument  derived  from  the  dependence 
of  men  in  support  of  the  position,  that  God 
produces  all  their  actions  by  a  direct  in- 
fluence. He  assumes  it  as  an  indubitable 
dictate  of  reason,  that  a  creature  cannot 
possess  the  power  of  acting.  The  power 
of  exerting  internal  exercises  and  exter- 
nal actions  does  not  arid  cannot  belong  to 
3 


his  constitution.  Power  is  an  incommuni- 
cable attribute,  and  exists  no  where  in  the 
universe,  but  in  God.  These  views  are 
exhibited  in  the  following  quotations: 

"  It  is  the  dictate  of  right  reason,  that 
no  created  being  is  capable  of  acting  in- 
dependently." He  does  not  here  mean, 
acting  with  an  absolute  exemption  from 
all  influence  whatever,  or  control;  but 
acting  with  one's  own  power,  in  distinction 
from  another's,  as  appears  from  his  infer- 
ring, from  the  dependence  of  creatures, 
that  their  actions  must  be  i\\e  production  of 
a  Divine  efficiency.  Since,  if  their  depen- 
dence does  not  consist  in  an  absolute  des- 
titution of  power,  he  cannot  infer  from  it 
that  all  their  actions  are  produced  by 
God's  power.  If  they  possess  power,  it  is 
to  be  inferred,  that  their  actions  are  pro- 
duced by  that  power,  instead  of  God's. 

"  Universal  and  absolute  dependence  goes 
into  the  very  idea  of  a  creature;  became  in- 
dependence is  an  attribute  of  the  Divine  na- 
ture, which  even  Omnipotence  cannot 
communicate."  Vol.  i.  p.  203.  "  And 
since  all  men  are  dependent  agents,  all  their 
motions,  exercises,  or  actions,  must  originate 
From  a  Divine  efficiency.  We  can  no  more 
act  than  we  can  exist,  without  the  constant 
aid  and  influence  of  the  Deity"  Vol.  ii.  p.  3 1 . 


A  thing  "originates  from  a  Divine  effi- 

«  ieney."  \\iicn   the   power  which  u'ives  it 

tence  1-  dod"- :  I'm  "  el  •  "  is  the 

eHic.  '--\ertion  of  po\\  er.    If  men  can 

no   more   wt   than  itho'it    the  con- 

stant aid  and  inlliunee  of  the  Deity  ;  then, 
as  thev  do  not  pos-e<s  within  themselves 
the  :  -I  all  of  e\i.-!ing,  or  arc  not  at 

all  ieU-<  re  kept  in  e 

entirely  by  Di\  so  they  do  not 

:it  all  the  po\\ 

/,  hut  all  t!  d  h}' 

])i\  ine  ;  1.  that  ;dl  their 

I'nun  a  Divine*  cfli- 
i  their  bcini  K!V 

Mute  of  pov 

Sine(\  then,  the  Doctor  i\  i!te  ah- 

sohi 

i  a'»-.lute  destitution  of  pov.er.  and 
inf  r-  from  it  th  :l:ty  nf  their  e\- 

•j;  of  th  \\  hich  are  lh.- 

i'theii-  potter,  he  e:uii: 
raean  by  the  phraseology  in  <pie*lion,  to 
designate  an  agency  by  which  the  power 
of  acting  is  tammttnicatoL  For  if  he  i^rant 
tliat  the  power  of  acting  is  communicated 
at  all,  he  must,  to  be  consistent,  give  up 
his  views  of  the  dependence  of  creatures 
and  abandon  his  argument  erected  on  it. 
to  prove  that  all  the  acts  of  men  are  the 


28 

production  of  Divine  power;  for  it  makes 
no  difference  in  the  nature  of  their  de- 
pendence, nor  in  the  fact  that  their  ac- 
tions are  the  effect  of  their  own  power, 
and  not  God's,  whether  the  power  of  ex- 
erting them  is  communicated  at  the  time 
it  'is  exerted,  or  at  the  commencement  of 
their  existence.  If  they  actually  possess 
power,  they  are  not  absolutely  destitute  of 
it,  as  the  Doctor  teaches; — and  if  they 
possess  the  power  by  which  their  actions 
are  exerted,  then  their  actions  are  the 
productions  of  their  own,  and  not  of  God^s 
power. 

Since,  then,  the  Doctor  could  not  have 
used  the  phraseology  under  considera- 
tion, to  designate  an  agency  by  which  the 
power  of  acting  is  communicated,  without 
contradicting  his  views  and  reasonings 
respecting  the  dependence  of  men,  it  is 
apparent  that  he  cannot  have  employed 
it  to  denote  such  an  agency.  Nor  can  he 
mean  to  designate  by  those  phrases,  an 
agency  by  which  God  merely  governs  men 
in  the  exercise  of  their  power;  since 
merely  to  govern  men,  or  exert  on  them 
an  agency  which  simply  determines  the 
mode  in  which  they  act  or  exert  their 
power,  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  to 
bring  them  into  a  state  in  which  they  are 


20 

disposed  or  choose  to  act  in  a  given  man- 
ner. But  the  Doctor  denies  that  God  can 
dispose  men  to  act  in  any  other  way  than 
by  producing,  that  is,  creating  their  voli- 
tions; and  of  course  denies  that  jle  can 
'  nt  them,  or  determine  the  mode  of 
their  acting,  in  any  other  way  than  by 
,tin^  their  actions.  And  moreover, 
he  denies  that  men  possess  the  power  by 
which  their  action-  a;  ted.  Their 

action-  are.  according  to  his  representa- 
tion, entirely  the  elll-cls  of  (iod's  power. 
Ol'  course  he  cannot  mean  to  denote  by 
the  lan^uaire  referred  to.  an  a^encv  em- 
ployed in  LCovernin::  them  in  the  exercise 
of  power  belonging  to  themselves.  .\or 
can  he.  for  the  >ame  reason,  he  supposed 
to  use  those  phrases  to  designate  an 
a^enc-v  consisting  of  part,  or  all  of  the 
kinds  oi  \  \\hich  have  been  men- 

tioned, united. 

If,  therefore,  as  thus  appears,  he  nei- 
ther employed  it  to  denote  an  agency 
which  merely  produces  in  men  a  disposi- 
tion to  act,  or  exert  their  own  power,  or 
excites  men  to  act,  or  exert  their  own 
power;  nor  an  agency  which  imparts  the 
power  of  acting;  nor  an  agency  consist- 
ing of  part,  or  all  of  those  kinds  of  agen- 
cy ;  then,  if  he  intended  to  denote  by  it 
3* 


30 

any  kind  of  agency,  he  must  have  employ- 
ed it  to  designate  a  creating  agency.  For 
there  are  no  other  conceivable  modes  of 
agency  by  which  God  could,  by  a  direct 
influence,  call  the  volitions  of  men  into  ex- 
istence, than    either  that  by   which    he 
would  merely  produce  in  them  a  disposi- 
tion to  act,  or  excite  them  to  act  or  exert 
their  own  power  in  a  ojiven  way;  in  which 
case  their  actions  would  be  the  produc- 
tion or  effect  of  their  own  power,  and  his 
agency  only   the   cause    or   occasion   of 
their  exerting  their  power  in  such  a  man- 
ner ;  or,  that  by  which  he  would  commu- 
nicate the  power  of  acting;  in  which  case 
their  volitions  would  also  be  the  effect  of 
their  own  power,  and  his  agency  only  the 
cause  of  their  possessing  that  power;  or, 
an  agency  both  imparting  power  arid  pro- 
ducing a  disposition  to  act,  or  governing 
the  exercise  of  that  power ;  or  else  a  cre- 
ating agency;   an  agency  which  is  neither 
employed  in  producing  a  disposition,  nor 
in  governing  men  in  the  exercise  of  their 
own  power,  nor  in  imparting  to  them  the 
power  of  acting,  but  which,   without  the 
intervention  of  any  such  steps,  calls  their 
volitions  immediately  into  existence.   And 
as  he  cannot,  a -\  we  have  shown,  have  de- 
signed to  designate  by  the  language  in 


31 

question,  either  of  the  former  kinds  of 
<  \.  lie  mu-t.  if  he  intended  to  desig- 
iiv  kind  of  agency  by  it,  have  em- 
ployed it  to  denote  the  last — a  creating 
agencs.      And  moreover,  whether  he  in- 
tendrd  hv  the  phr  i«  < >lo^y   under  consi- 
deration, to  de  a  particular  in. 
of  Divine  agency,   or  not,   it    is    perfectly 
apparent,   from    the  Considerations  addu- 
ced, to  show   that  if  he  intruded  to  de-i^- 
an\  mode,  it  muM  he  that  of  creating; 
tint  tluit  is  the  nuide  of  a^enc\    \vhic! 

:-tU  and  mean-  h\   hi-  theory  to  exhi- 

liit  (iod  as  exercising,  For  he  denies,  as 
shown,  that  (iod  exerts  any  other  con- 
reivahle  mode  of  agency  on  mankind,  be- 
side that  of  creating:  and  therefore  must 
trd  and  mean  to  exhihit  (iod  as  exert- 
that,  and  only  that  mode. 
Such,  then,  are  the  Doctors  views  of 
the  Divine  agency  on  men.  He  considers 
ita  mode  as  that  of  creating.  He  repre- 
sents God  as  calling  the  acts  of  men  into 
existence,  as  He  called  the  material  world 
into  existence  at  its  creation.  God  then 
said.  Let  there  be  li<jht,  and  there  iras  li^/tf. 
According  to  the  Doctor,  He  now  says, 
Let  the  acts  of  men  exist,  and  the  acts  of  men 
are. 


32 

The  Doctor  represents  this  agency  as 
extending  to  all  the  acts  of  men,  both  in- 
ternal and  external.  This  the  reader 
must  have  already  discovered.  It  will  be 
seen  more  clearly  from  the  following  quo- 
tations : 

"  Mind  cannot  act,  any  more  than  mat- 
ter can  move,  without  a  Divine  agency. 
There  must  be  the  exercise  of  Divine 
agency  in  every  human  action;  without 
which,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  that 
God  should  govern  moral  agents,  and 
make  mankind  act  in  perfect  conformity 
to  his  own  designs.  This  is  the  only 
scriptural  representation  of  Divine  Pro- 
vidence ;  and,  according  to  this  represen- 
tation, it  is  easy  to  see  that  all  actions,  as 
well  as  all  events,  may  be  traced  up  to 
the  over-ruling  hand  of  God.  It  is  a  gross 
absurdity  to  suppose,  that  the  providence 
of  God  is  more  extensive  than  his  agency, 
or  that  he  ever  governs  men  without  ex- 
erting a  positive  influence  over  them.  It 
is  God  who  worketh  in  men  to  will  and  to 
do  in  all  cases,  without  exception."  Vol. 
ii.  p.  40,41,  42. 

From  this  language,  the  Doctor  obvi- 
ously considers  the  Divine  agency  as  ex- 
tending to  all  the  events  that  ever  take 
place  in  the  minds  of  men ;  not  only  to 


33 

those  acts  of  which,  according  to  hi- 

!  COnsista,    "  r.lli'ctions.  de- 
-.  and  volitions  ;"   hut 
t'  percept!-     .  .  me- 

v.    iarjjiii.if  ion,    const  ;tii<l    all 

is   of  operation   of  which  the 
sect.    He  rcpn  ••  Di- 

ding  to  >•  all  ac- 
Miil  declar- 

'•a  gross  ahsurdity  to  suppose,  that  the 
.  (iod  is  mc»  ilian  His 

•rents  mm  with- 
out c\frtifiL:  a  jK^f1  «  r  them.'' 
If,  then,  (iod  IB  all  actions  and 
events.  He  governs  all  tho.-e  of  which  men 
are  the  subjects:  and  if  He  never  .  >verns 
men  without  a  positive  intluenee  over 
them,  then  He  governs  all  the  actions  and 
events  which  take  place  in  their  mind*  hv 
a  positive  influence  ;  that  is,  according  to 
the  Doctor's  theory,  creates  them. 

The  Doctor  no  where  does,  nor  could 
with  propriety,  separate  the  ••  exercises  of 
the  heart,  affections,  desires,  intentions, 
and  volitions,"  and  4i  the  external  actions,'' 
from  the  other  operations  of  the  mind,  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  denominate  the  for- 
mer, the  actions,  and  the  only  actions  of 
men,  in  distinction  from  the  latter.  The 
mind  acts  as  much  in  perceiving,  judging. 


•34 

recollecting,  imagining,  and  other  similar 
operations,  as  in  loving  or  hating,  desir- 
ing or  intending.  The  difference  in  the 
state  of  the  mind,  when  those  two  classes 
of  operation  occur,  is,  that  the  mode  of  its 
operation  is  different — not  that  it  is  active 
when  the  former,  and  inactive  when  the 
latter  class  takes  place. 

Arjd  had  he  made  such  a  distinction 
between  those  two  classes  of  acts,  his 
views  of  the  dependence  of  men  must 
havr;  led  him  to  regard  the  latter,  as  pro- 
duced by  the  same  kind  of  agency,  as  the 
former. 

His  views  of  mankind,  as  absolutely 
destitute  of  power,  presented  in  his  argu- 
ment on  that  subject,  just  quoted,  employ- 
ed to  prove  the  necessity  of  a  direct  agen- 
cy ;  his  use  of  the  scriptural  passages,  "  In 
him  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being" 
"  we  are  not  sufficient  of  ourselves  to  think 
any  thing  of  ourselves,  but  our  sufficiency 
is  of  God,"  to  prove  the  same  necessity; 
and  his  unequivocal  and  unlimited  de- 
clarations in  the  preceding  quotations 
show,  that  he  considers  God's  agency  as 
extending  in  the  same  manner  to  "  all  the 
actions  and  events,"  both  internal  and  ex- 
ternal, of  which  men  are  the  subjects. 


35 

The  Doctor's  theory  therefore  is  com- 
pactly embodied  in  the  proposition — 

COD  <  i  \LL  TIII:  ACTS  OF  MEN;  or 

all  the  intirnnl  and  (stmml  actions  and  events, 
whidi  iiwy  be  predicated  oj  than. 

According  to  this  th<  rod  en-ales 

nol  only  all  the  internal  exercises  and  ex- 
ternal action-  ihem-elvrsof  men.  hut  also 
oi' course  t!  m  of  those  exen  ud 

actions — the  nature  of  all  their  percep- 
tions, that  is,  that  they  are  perception-  of 
such  ohjecN  a-  the\  are.  and  not  of  others; 
and  such  kinds  of  perceptions  of  those 
objects,  and  not  dillerent  ones;  and  per- 
ception- of  Hieh  dr^rre^  of  strength  and 
clearness,  and  not  of  other  decrees:  and 
so  also  the  nature  o;'  all  their  acts  of  judg- 
ment, memory,  imagination,  conscience, 
be.;  and  like\\i-e  the  nature  of  all  the  ex- 
ercises of  their  IK  arts,  allections, 
intentions,  and  volitions — that  i?. 
thoy  are  virtuous  and  not  vicious,  or  \ 
cious  and  not  virtuous;  and  so  also  the 
nature  of  their  external  actions.  For  as 
the  agency  of  God  is  Ihe  sole  cause  lhat 
Ihose  exercises  and  actions  possess  ex- 
istence, it  must  of  course  be  Ihe  sole  cause 
lhat  they  possess  such  an  existence  as  they 


36 

do.  To  suppose,  that  while  they  owe 
their  existence  solely  to  God's  agency,  they 
owe  their  nature  to  some  other  agency,  is 
to  suppose  that  some  other  agency  than 
God's  is  concerned  in  giving  them  exist- 
ence; since  that,  in  its  nalure,  which  dis- 
tinguishes each  one  of  those  acts  from  all 
others  of  the  same  kind,  is  a  part  of  that 
act,  as  much  as  that  in  its  nature,  which 
distinguishes  one  class  of  those  acts  from 
(fnol/ur,  is  a  part  of  that  class :  and  it  is 
also  to  suppose,  that  God's  agency,  that 
is,  the  exercise  of  His  omnipotence,  is 
controlled  or  modified  by  some  other 
agency;  both  of  which  suppositions  are 
absurd. 

As,  therefore,  according  to  this  theory, 
God  creates  all  the  acts  of  men  and  their 
nature,  the  sole  reasc-i,  that  some  of  those 
acts  differ  from  others  is,  that  the  exercise  of 
God's  poii  r  in  creating  them  is  different ; 
or  rather,  that  God's  volitions,  by  which 
He  exerc»-°s  His  power,  are  different. — 
His  omnipotent  volitions,  being  the  sole 
cause  of  their  nature,  a  difference  in  His 
volitions  must  be  the  sole  cause  of  the  dif- 
ference in  their  nature. 

The  volitions  of  men  are,  according  to 
the  theory,  always  produced  in  the  view 
of  motives.  "  Choice  always  implies  mo- 


In 

37 

Vv  > 


live.  It  is  out  of  the  power  of  the 
to  oblige  men  to  act,  without  making  them 
willing  to  act  in  the  view  of  motives.  Ac- 
cordingly, when  He  works  in  us  both  to 
will  and  to  do,  he  first  exhibits  motives  be- 
fore our  minds,  and  then  excites  us  to  act 
voluntarily  in  view  of  the  motives  exhi- 
bited." Vol.  i.  ±2ti. 

Motive  is<  of  bodily  sensations, 

appetites,  mental  affections,  perceptions 
of  truths  and  of  external  objects,  concep- 
tions of  things,  past  volitions,  and  external 
actions  recollected,  and  perhaps  some 
other  mental  operations.  All  these  mo- 
tives of  course,  according  to  Doctor  E., 
are  created  :  a<  in  hi-  view  all  the  actions 
and  events,  both  internal  and  external,  of 
which  men  are  the  subjects,  are  the  pro- 
ductions of  Divine  power. 

By  his  language,  therefore,  "  when  he 
work?  in  us  both  to  will  and  to  do,  he  first 
exhibits  motives  before  our  minds,  and 
then  excites  us  to  act  voluntarily  in  view 
of  the  motives  exhibited;"  he  means 
that  God  always  creates  motives  in  the 
mind  immediately  antecedent  to  his  cre- 
ating volitions  there  ;  or,  that  the  order 
of  time  in  which  God  creates  motives  arid 
volitions,  is,  that  volitions  always  imme- 
diately succeed  motives. 
4 


38 

But  motives,  according  to  the  Doctor^ 
representation,  have  no  influence  in  excit- 
ing the  mind  to  volition.  Such  is  neces- 
sarily the  fact,  if,  agreeably  to  his  view, 
all  volitions  are  the  immediate  produc- 
tions of  Divine  power.  Whatever  God 
creates,  must  owe  its  existence  solely  to 
His  agency ,  and  not  at  all  to  any  other  agen- 
cy. And  if  "mind  cannot  act,  any  more 
than  matter  can  move  without  a  Divine 
agency"  then  it  cannot  be  excited  to  action 
by  mere  motives.  This  view  the  Doctor 
exhibits  in  the  following  passages: — "The 
bare  perception  of  motive  is  incapable  of 
producing  volition.  He  not  only  ad- 
dresses their  eyes  and  ears  by  external 
objects,  and  their  understandings  and 
consciences  by  moral  motives  ;  but  he  ac- 
tually operates  upon  their  hearts,  and 
there  produces  new  feelings  or  affections 
by  the  same  almighty  power  which  he  ex- 
erted in  creating  the  world."  Vol.  i.  226. 
361. 

The  connexion,  therefore,  of  motives 
with  volitions,  is  not  that  of  a  cause  with 
an  effect,  but  simply  of  an  antecedent  with 
a  consequent. 

It  seems  too,  that  in  the  Doctor's  view, 
motives  do  not  determine  the  mode  of  vo- 
litions ;  that  is,  that  they  are  a  choice  of 


such  things  as  they  are,  and  a  refusal  of 
such  things  as  they  are,  and  not  a  choice 
of  those  things  of  whvoli  they  are  a  refu- 
sal, and  a  refusal  of  those  things  of  which 
they  are  a  choice  :  or.  in  other  word.-,  that 
in  the  case  of  any  given  volition,  it  is  not 
the  nature  of,  nor  any  thing  pertaining  to, 
that  motive  then  before  the  mind,  which 
is  to  the  mind  the  greatest  apparent  good, 
that  is  the  reason  that  tin;  mind  view*  it 
as  ti.  test  good,  and  yields  to  its  in- 

fluence. Nor  is  it  the  nature  of,  nor  any 
thing  pertaining  to,  that  moiix  I  •  the 

mind,  which  is  to  the  mind  the  least  ap- 
parent good,  that  is  the  reason  that  the 
mind  regards  it  as  the  least  <£ood,  and  re- 
il  \  influence:  hut  the  sole  reason  that 
the  one  im>ti\  e  appear-  the  neatest  and 

least  good,  and  the  other  app- 
the  least  and  not  the  greatest  gnud.  is  the 

Divi 

\Ve  are  presented  with  this  \ir\v  in  the 
following  passage: — "Suppose  a  ma 
leisure  desires  to  read,  and  some  person 
pre-ents  him  a  hible  and  a  Novel. 
Though  he  knows  the  contents  of  each 
,cse  books,  yet  it  depends  upon  a  Di- 
vine operation  on  his  mind  which  of  them 
he  shall  choose  to  read  :  for  the  bare  per- 
ception of  motive  is  incapable  of  pro- 


40 

ducing  volition.     If  God  works  in  him  to 
will  to  read  the  Bible,"  &c.    Vol.  i.  226. 

Here  the  two  motives  are,  the  Bible 
and  the  Novel,  of  the  contents  of  each  of 
which  the  man  possesses  a  perfect  know- 
ledge ;  and  it  depends  entirely,  according 
*o  the  Doctor,  upon  the  Divine  operation, 
and  not  at  all  upon  the  nature  of,  or  any 
thing  pertaining  to  the  motives,  which  of 
them  he  shall  choose,  and  which  refuse; 
that  is,  which  he  shall  view  as  the  great- 
est good,  and  which  as  the  least;  and 
which,  therefore,  he  shall  yield  to,  and 
which  resist. 

The  same  view  is^exhibited  in  the  fol- 
lowing passage: — "There  was  a  neces- 
sary and  infallible  connexion  between 
Saul's  actions,  and  the  motives  from  which 
he  acted ;  and  this  certain  connexion 
could  be  owing  to  no  other  cause  than  a 
secret  Divine  influence  on  his  will,  which 
gave  energy  and  success  to  the  motives 
which  induced  him  to  execute  the  designs 
of  Providence."  Page  227. 

Here  the  Divine  influence  is  affirmed  to 
have  given  energy  and  success  to  those 
motives  from  which  he  acted^  and  not  to  the 
others  before  his  mind;  and  that  influ- 
ence is  declared  to  have  been  the  sole 
cause  of  the  infallible  connexion  between 


41 

his  actions  and  those  motives.  It  was  not 
the  nature  of  those  motives,  nor  any  tiling 
pertaining  to  them,  therefore,  that  was  the 
•on  that  Saul  regarded  them  as  the 
greatest  good,  and  yielded  to  their  influ- 
ence ;  hut  it  was  solely  the  </<>r//n/  of  God. 

Motives,  then,  in  the  Doctor's  view,  are 
not  necessary,  and  are  not  employed  to 
determine  the*  mode  of  volition-,  as  ex- 
plained ahove.  They  do  not  hold  the 
relation  to  volitions  of  a  cause  of  their 
mode,  any  more  than  of  their  existence. 
They  are  nere.-sary,  merely  a*  an  <  rnisiou 
to  the  existence  and  the  mode  of  volitions. 
Volitions  cannot  be  created  in  the  mind 
unless  motives  are  before  the  mind;  and 
volitions  of  a  particular  kind  cannot  be 
created,  unless  motives  respecting  the  ac- 
tions, which  are  the  objects  of  the  voli- 
tion-, are  present  to  the  mind,  when  the 
volitions  are  produced.  A  volition  about 
an  apple,  for  instance,  cannot  be  created, 
unless  an  apple  is  present  to  the  mind  as 
a  motive  to  that  volition. 

Thus,  according  to  the  Doctor,  "choice 
always  implies  motive.  It  is  out  of  the 
power  of  the  Deity  to  oblige  men  to  act, 
without  making  them  willing  to  act  in  the 
view  of  motives."  Vol.  i.  p.  226.  And, 
14  It  ought  to  be  considered,  that  a  gene- 

4. 


42 

ral  propensity  to  sin  will  not  lead  any  per- 
son to  any  particular  sin,  without  a  par- 
ticular motive  or  temptation  to  that  sin. 
There  must  always  be  some  objective 
motive  presented  to  the  view  of  the  mind, 
in  order  to  excite  or  draw  forth  the  na- 
tive depravity  of  the  heart."  Vol.  ii.  p.  73. 
That  is,  to  illustrate  the  Doctor's  view  by 
an  example,  all  that  is  necessary,  in  order 
that  a  man  may  have  a  given  volition 
about  an  apple  and  an  orange,  say  a 
choice  of  the  apple  and  a  refusal  of  the 
orange,  is,  that  the  apple  and  orange  be 
both  present  to  his  mind  as  motives.  His 
having  such  a  volition  as  he  has,  that  is, 
his  choice  of  the  apple,  does  not  depend 
at  all  on  any  thing  distinguishing  it  from 
other  apples,  as  its  differing  in  shape, 
size,  colour,  and  taste,  from  the  orange, 
in  a  manner  unlike  any  other  apple; 
or,  that  it  is  a  good  apple  instead  of 
a  bad  one,  or  a  bad  one  instead  of  a  good 
one.  Nor  does  his  refusal  of  the  orange 
depend  at  all  on  any  thing  distinguishing 
it  from  other  oranges.  The  apple  would 
be  chosen  were  it  any  other  apple,  and 
the  orange  rejected  were  it  any  other 
orange.  That  the  particular  volition  in 
questionfshould  take  place,  nothing  is  ne- 
cessary in  regard  to  motives,  but  that  the 


43 

apple  and  orange  should  be  before  (he 
mind  ;  and  nothing  but  that  would  be  ne- 
cessary, in  order  that  any  other  given  \o- 
lition  respecting  them  should  be  pro* 
duced.  as,  the  choice  of  the  orange,  and 
-;il  of  the  apple.  The  ureat<M  pO9* 
sible  variation  in  the  m<>'l<  of  \oli;i<>n  re- 
specting them  might  take-  place.  \\  hile  the 
moth  efl  remained  the  .-ainc. 

And   such,   according   to   the  Doci 
theory,  mu-l  net-charily  be  the  fact.     For 

reeably  to  hi-  \  ie\v.  ^  -h<»\\  n  a! 
motives  do  not  have  any  inilueiic"  in  ex- 
r  the  mind  to  exert  volitions,  they 
cannot  have  any  influence  on  the  ?/Wc  of 
its  volitions,  or  in  determining  \vhich  mo- 
rn e  before  the  mind  shall  be  regard  e 

good,  and  chosen:  and  \\liieh 
as  the  least  good,  and  rejected.  They 
are  oidy  n<  ry  that  volitions  may 

8MjJ  ;  and  do  nothing  more  than  rem. 
possible  that  they  should  be  produced. 

The  Doctor,  notwithstanding  these 
vieus.  holds,  that  men  are  moral  agents 
under  this  agency ;  and  we  deem  it  due  to 
him  to  exhibit  this,  as  well  as  the  other 
part  of  his  scheme,  that  however  incon- 
sistent it  may  be  with  that,  it  may  be 
seen,  that  he  does  not  admit,  nor  perceive 
its  inconsistency,  nor  therefore  admit  any 


44 

of  the  inferences  to  be  drawn  from  its  in- 
consistency. 

They  are  active  under  the  divine  in- 
fluence.— "  Saints  act  and  are  acted  upon 
by  a  divine  operation  in  all  their  holy 
and  virtuous  exercises.  As  saints  can  act 
while  they  are  acted  upon,  so  sinners  can 
act  while  they  are  acted  upon."  Vol.  i. 
pp.  203,  228. 

"  Sinners  are  not  passive,  but  active  in 
regeneration."  "  Men  are  regenerated, 
converted,  and  sanctified  by  the  special 
operation  of  the  divine  spirit,  and  are  al- 
ways equally  active  under  his  gracious 
influence  For  it  is  impossible  that  he 
should  produce  love  or  faith  or  repen- 
tance, or  any  other  gracious  desire,  affec- 
tion, or  volition,  without  their  being  ac- 
tive." Vol.  ii.  pp.  178,  165. 

The  Doctor  holds  it  to  be  equally  im- 
possible that  any  sinful  volition  should  be 
produced  without  men's  being  equally  ac- 
tive. "  It  is  absolutely  impossible  for  any 
to  prove,  that  human  dependence  and  ac- 
tivity are  inconsistent  with  each  other. — 
Vol.  i.  p.  218. 

They  act  freely:  "Men  always  act 
freely  while  God  works  in  them,  both  to 
will  and  to  do  of  his  good  pleasure.  As 
saints  can  act  freely  under  a  divine  in- 


45 

fluence,  so  sinners  can  act  freely  under  a 
divine  iulluence."     Vol.  i.  p.  2i   . 

Their  agency  and  actions  are  their  own. 
16  They  are.  real  and  proper  agents  in  all 
their  voluntary  exercises  and  exertions, 
Their  actions  are  all  their  own,  and  as 
much  their  own,  as  if  they  acted  without 
any  dependence  upon  God,  or  any  other 
being  in  the  universe."  Vol.  i.  p.  33. 

*-lf  it  be  true  that  mm  act,  while  they 
are  acted  upon  by  a  divine  operation, 
tlien  their  actions  are  their  own,  and 
the  actions  of  God.  The  divine  agency 
is  not  human  agency,  nor  human  agency 
the  divine  agei  p.  2:11. 

They  are  under  moral  obligation  to 
obey  all  the  commands  of  God,  and  wor- 
thy of  praise  or  blame  for  all  their  ac- 
tions. "  The  bare  light  of  nature  tear 
that  every  person  ought  to  exercise  uni- 
versal benevolence.  Every  intelligent 
creature  is  capable  of  knowing  the  differ- 
ence between  moral  good  and  moral  evil; 
and  this  knowledge  lays  him  under  moral 
obligation  to  exercise  true  benevolence 
toward  all  proper  objects  of  it."  Vol.  ii. 
p.  176. 

"  If  sinners  are  able  to  act  freely  while 
they  are  acted  upon  by  the  Deity,  then 


46 

they  have  no  manner  of  excuse,  for  neg- 
lecting to  obey  any  of  his  commands." — 
Vol.  i.  p.  246. 

"  Their  actions  are  all  their  own,  and 
constitute  them  either  holy  or  unholy,  vir- 
tuous or  vicious,  and  worthy  of  praise  or 
blame,  reward  or  punishment."  Vol.  ii. 
p.  33. 

They  have  natural  power  to  do  other- 
wise than  they  do.  "  Those  events  which 
God  has  decreed  to  bring  about  by  the 
instrumentality  of  men,  they  have  natural 
power  to  prevent  As  it  is  always  true 
that  men  have  natural  power  to  fulfil  any 
decree,  which  they  are  appointed  to  fulfil, 
so  it  is  equally  true  that  they  always  have 
the  same  natural  power  to  prevent  the  ful- 
filment of  it."  Vol.  ii.  pp.  53,  56. 

"  There  is  nothing,  in  the  whole  circle 
of  created  objects,  which  affords  any  ar- 
gument to  prove,  that  man's  dependence 
destroys  his  moral  agency."  Vol.  ii.  p. 
217. 

Thus  the  Doctor,  as  well  as  other  theo- 
logians, regards  men  as  moral  agents.  It 
would  seem,  however,  that  their  moral 
agency,  according  to  his  theory,  is  a  very 
different  thing  from  what  it  is,  according 
to  the  views  commonly  entertained. — 
Since,  by  the  Doctor's  account,  men  are 


47 

entirely  destitute  of  power,  their  agency 
does  not  consist  at  all  in  the  exercise  of 
power  belonging  to  themselves;  all  their 
actions  arc  fronted  by  divine  power,  and 
cannot  therefore,  did  thc\  possess  ever  so 
inurli,  involve  any  exercise  of  power  be- 
longing to  them>el\<  T\ "hey  are  not 
agents  aa  far  as  it  n  the  exercise  of 
<T  belonging  to  them-elves,  any  more 
than  Adam  wa-  an  a^ent  in  God's  tak- 
ing the  rib  from  his  *idc.  Their  actions, 
like  (hat  effect  in  Adam,  nre  the  cHects 
of  divine  power  solely.  Their  agency, 
therefore,  consists  solely  in  their  being 
the  subjects,  in  which  those  effects  are 
created.  Peter  was  the  agent  in  the  act 
brist,  -imply  because  that  act 
-I  in  bis  mind;  and  was  not  the 
it  ol '  bd,  '  -imply  because 
lhat  act  was  not  created  in  his  mind,  but 
in  another's.  And  their  agency  is  moral, 
simply  because  those  effects,  called  voli- 
tions, are  created  in  the  view  of  motives. 

According  to  the  views  commonly  en- 
terlained,  men  are  agents,  because  they 
exercise  power  belonging  to  themselves  in 
all  their  actions;  and  they  are  moral 
agents,  because  they  exercise  their  power 
voluntarily  in  the  view  of  motives.  Adam 
was  an  agent  in  eating  the  forbidden  fruit, 


48 

because  he  did  it  in  the  voluntary  exer- 
cise of  his  own  power.  He  was  not  an 
agent  in  having  the  rib  taken  from  his 
side,  because  that  was  not  done  by  his 
power,  but  was  done  wholly  by  God's 
power. 

Power,  according  to  the  views  com- 
monly entertained,  is  that  by  which  a 
being  exerts  acts,  or  produces  effects ;  and 
in  nature,  though  not  in  degree,  is  the  same 
in  all  active  beings.  According  to  the 
Doctor's  theory,  however,  it  would  seem, 
that  the  power  of  God  is  entirely  different 
in  its  nature  from  the  power  of  dependent 
beings. 

The  power  of  God  is  that  just  describ- 
ed, by  which  He  produces  effects;  but 
the  power  of  creatures  is  simply  a  capacity 
to  have  effects  produced  in  them  by  God^j 
power. 

When  therefore  the  Doctor,  after  giv- 
ing us  his  theory  of  the  mode  in  which  the 
actions  of  men  are  produced  by  divine 
power,  tells  us,  that  men  are  agents,  and 
act  under  the  divine  operation,  he  must 
be  interpreted  as  merely  meaning  by  that 
language,  in  order  to  render  it  consistent 
with  his  theory,  that  men  are  the  subjects 
of  those  created  effects,  called  actions, 
and  predicated  of  them ;  for  that,  if  those 


49 

effects  are  created,  as  his  theory  repre- 
sents, is  the  only  possible  sense  in  which 
they  can  be  agents.  When  he  says  they 
are  moral  agents,  he  must  be  regarded  as 
merely  meaning,  that  they  are  the  sub- 
jects of  a  class  of  created  effects,  called 
rulitions,  which  are  created  in  the  vh 
motirc*.  When  he  affirms  that  men  havr 
<r  to  act*  he  must  be  considered  as 
meaning  nothing  more  than  that  men  an* 
capable  of  having  those  effect  7  iu 

thrm:   and  when  he  adds,  that  mm  havr 
])0icer  to  do  <  >  than  thrv  </<-.  he  must 

!»<>  understood  as  only  meaning,  that  mm 
sess  such  a  nature  that  God  might  create 
otkcr  effects  in  them  than  He  docs  create  ; 
as  that  is  the  only  possible  meaning  his 
language  can  possess,  consistently  with 
his  theory,  4that  all  their  actions  are  cre- 
ated by  divine  power/ 

It  would  seem  too,  that  the  Doctor  does, 
or  should,  in  accordance  with  his  theory, 
regard  the  mind  as  a  torpid,  inactive  thing 
in  its  nature,  as  much  as  matter  is;  as  in- 
capable of  acting,  as  matter  is  of  moving; 
and  as  indisposed  to  action,  as  matter  is 
to  motion.  "  Mind  cannot  act  any  more 
than  matter  can  move  without  a  divine 
agency."  Vol.  ii.  p.  41. 

The  difference  between  the  natures  of 
5 


50 

mind  and  matter,  therefore,  in  his  view, 
consists  in  this,  that  the  nature  of  mind  is 
such,  that  it  is  capable  of  having  those 
effects,  called  acts  of  perception,  reason, 
conscience,  volition,  and  other  mental 
operations  created  in  it;  and  the  nature 
of  matter  is  such,  that  is  capable  of  having 
those  effects,  called  motions,  created  in  it. 
Each  is  adapted  to  be  the  subject  of  that 
class  of  effects  which  is  created  in  it. 

Such  is  the  Doctor's  theory  of  the  divine 
agency  on  mankind. 

God,  by  his  immediate  efficience,  creates 
all  the  acts  of  men. 

Those  acts,  called  volitions.  He  always 
creates  in  the  view  of  motives. 

Men  are  agents  under  His  influence,  in- 
asmuch as  they  are  the  subjects  of  the 
acts  created  in  them. 

They  are  moral  agents,  inasmuch  as 
they  are  subjects  of  that  class  of  acts 
called  volitions. 

They  are  worthy  of  praise  or  blame  for 
all  their  actions,  inasmuch  as  they  are 
moral  agents. 

The  great  point  in  which  his  theory 
differs  from  the  doctrines  of  the  Calvinis- 
tic  Divines,  on  the  subject  of  the  Divine 
agency,  and  the  point  from  which  the 
other  differences  result,  is,  its  exhibition 


51 

of  the  mode  of  God's  agency.  All  Calvin- 
istic  Divines  agree  with  the  Doctor  in  the 
belief,  that  (Jod's  agency  extends  to  all  the 
actions  of  mm.  It  is  an  article  in  all  their 
ereeds.  that  Cod'-  providence  is,  "His 
i  holy.  wise,  and  powerful  preserving 
and  governing  ail  hi-  creatures  and  all 
their  actions."  Hut  their  d«rlrine  i-  con- 
fined to  the  'hat  Clod  j)/'i?cn-<-s  man- 
kiml,  and  g  all  (heir  acrionx — the 
/'<tct.  that  1  i;  :iinent  ifl  \\  \(\\ 
their  moral  —and  th  ihat  the 
Holy  Spirit  y  on 
the  Mihjecls  of  sanclilication.  They  do 
not  pretend  to  teach  or  know  the  MODK  of 
His  agency. 

Doctor  K/-  is  a  theory  of  the  mode  of 
His.  agency  on  mankind,  or  the  maimer  i;i 
\\liich  lie  hring^  all    the  actions  - 
kind  into  existence  ;    which  he  exhihii 

that  of  creating. 

From  this  \iew  of  the  mode  of  God's 
agency,  the  oilier  parts  of  his  theory,  dif- 
fering from  the  views  commonly  entertain- 
ed, seem  to  result,  viz. — That  men  are  en- 
tirely destitute  of  power.  (We  ought  not, 
perhaps,  to  suppose,  that  this  view  is  a 
consequence  of  the  former;  as  the  Doc- 
tor, in  more  than  one  place,  infers  the 
former  from  this:)  That  God's  agency  is 


52 

concerned  in  precisely  the  same  manner 
in  all  the  actions  of  men,  whether  holy  or 
sinful :  That  the  nature  of  motives  does 
not  determine  what  kind  of  volitions  re- 
specting them  take  place :  His  views  re- 
specting the  nature  of  moral  agency ;  of 
power;  of  mind,  &c.  &c. 

We  are  aware  that  the  pretence  is 
made,  that  the  Doctor's  theory,  though  it 
exhibits  the  mode  of  God's  agency  as  that 
of  creating,  yet  is  not  a  theory  of  the  mode 
of  His  agency.  But  nothing  can  be  more 
futile  than  this  pretence.  For  whether  it 
was  the  intention  of  the  Doctor  or  not,  in 
constructing  his  theory,  to  give  a  theory 
of  the  mode  of  Divine  agency,  it  is  certain 
that  he  has  done  so.  There  is  no  mode 
of  Divine  agency,  of  which  our  concep- 
tions are  so  simple  and  well  defined,  as 
that  of  creating — in  which  the  Most  High, 
by  His  simple  volition,  calls  things  into 
existence,  without  the  co-operation  or  se- 
condary agency  of  any  thing  else  what- 
ever. And  the  Doctor,  in  exhibiting  God 
as  creating  all  the  acts  of  men,  and  events 
of  which  they  are  the  subjects,  has  given 
as  specific  and  well  defined  a  theory  of 
the  mode  of  His  agency,  as  our  language 
can  express,  or  our  minds  conceive  :  and 
hi  his  various  reasonings  to  sustain  his 


53 

theory,  as  we  have  shown  in  the  state- 
ment of  it,  he  has  clone  all  which  lie  coulci, 
to  the  same  purpose,  had  it  been  his  spe- 
cific ohject  to  give  a  theory  of  the  mode, 
by  denying  that  God  exerts  on  mankind 
any  other  conceivable  mode  of  agency 
than  that  of  creating. 

\Ve  are  also  awar'\  that  in  reply  to 
the-e  remark^,  the  pretence  will  he  made, 
that  though  the  theory  exhibit-  the  fluency 
of  God  as  a  cr<  -CIK  \.  \el  it  exhi- 

bits Hi-  a^enev  a-  udmittin^  the  interven- 
tion of  means,  and  that  it  dne-  nut  pre- 
tend to  teach  the  mode  of  His  agency 
through  them,  but  simply  that  lie  acts 
through  them.  But  this  pretence  is 
equally  futile.  For  if  the  agency  of  God 
is  universallv  a  creating  agency,  its  mode 
is  the  same,  whether  it  excludes  or  ad- 
mits the  intervention  of  means.  To  pre- 
tend, while  teaching,  that  God  creates  nil 
the  effects  which  take  place  in  the  mind 
— that  it  is  unknown  how  He  produces 
those  effects  which  take  place  through 
the  intervention  of  means, — is  to  pretend, 
that  it  is  unknown  that  He  creates  those 
effects. 

Besides,  what,  according  to  this  theory, 
are  means?  Are  they  any  thing  besides 
motives  ?  And  what  are  motives  ?  Are 


54 

they  any  thing  but  perceptions,  sensa- 
tions, recollections,  or  other  operations  of 
the  mind,  created  by  God  immediately 
antecedent  to  His  creating  volitions? — 
According  to  this  theory,  means  are 
nothing  more  than  acts  or  effects  in  the 
mind,  created  by  God  immediately  ante- 
cedent to  His  creating  volitions  ;  and  they 
have  no  efficiency  or  influence  whatever 
in  producing  volitions;  nor  do  they  con- 
stitute any  ground  of  certainty  that  voli- 
tions shall  be  created :  they  serve  only  to 
make  the  state  of  the  mind  such,  that  vo- 
litions may  be  created.  The  mind,  when 
motives  are  created  in  it,  is  in  the  cir- 
cumstances necessary,  in  order  that  voli- 
tions may  be  created.  The  acts  of  cre- 
ating motives  and  volitions  are  totally  dis- 
tinct from  each  other;  and  God,  in  cre- 
ating volitions,  does  not  act  through  means 
at  all,  but  only  after  He  has  created  mo- 
tives. Because  God  creates  volitions  im- 
mediftely  after  He  creates  motives,  and, 
while  motives  exist  before  the  mind,  it  no 
more  follows,  that  in  creating  volitions  He 
acts  through  means,  than  because  He  cre- 
ated Adam  after  He  had  created  the 
earth  on  which  he  was  to  exist,  it  follows, 
that  in  creating  him,  He  acted  through 
means.  The  acts  are  totally  independent 


55 

of  each  other ;  and  the  act  of  creating 
volitions  is  totally  independent  of  the  mo- 
tives, as  far  as  it  respects  any  influence 
exerted  by  the  motives  on  the  mode  of 
that  act.  Motives  do  nothing  but  prepare 
the  mind  to  have  volitions  created  in  it. 

Thus,  according  to  the  theory,  God 
never  acts  THROIC.H  means.  Means  arc 
nothing  more  than  a  particular  set  of 
effects  which  lie  creates  in  the  mind;  and 
all  that  pertains  to  them  that  constitutes 
them  mean^,  is,  that  they  are  the  imme- 
diate antecedents  of  another  class  of 
effects  which  He  creates,  and  serve  to  lit 
the  mind  to  have  this  other  class  of  effects 
created  in  it.  The  mode  of  His  agency 
is  the  same  in  each  case.  He  acts  directly 
on  the  mind  in  both  cases,  and  not  through 
the  medium  of  any  secondary  causes. 
The  intervention  of  means,  according  to 
the  theory,  in  the  Divine  agency,  is  no- 
thing more  than  God's  uniformly  creating 
one  set  of  effects  immediately  antecedent 
to  His  creating  another.  Motives  are  an- 
tecedents to  volitions.  Because,  there- 
fore, God  creates  those  effects  in  that  or- 
der, and,  in  that  sense,  admits  the  inter- 
vention of  means,  to  pretend  that  this  the- 
ory, in  exhibiting  the  mode  of  the  Divine 
agency  in  producing  all  the  acts  of  men, 


56 

as  that  of  creating,  does  not  decide  what 
the  mode  of  that  agency  through  means  is. 
is  supremely  futile  and  ridiculous. 

What  now  is  the  basis  on  which  the 
Doctor  has  erected  this  theory  ?  Neither 
all  the  foundation,  nor  all  the  superstruc- 
ture, is  found  united  in  any  single  dis- 
course; but  the  parts,  of  which  they  con- 
sist, are  scattered  through  the  pages  of 
the  several  sermons  already  quoted,  and 
others,  and  left  to  be  gradually  collected 
by  the  reader,  and  united  into  a  whole. 

His  first  step  toward  establishing  the 
theory  is,  to  prove  that  God  exerts  a.  po- 
sitive, direct  influence  ofi  the  minds  of  men 
in  all  their  holy  actions.  Then,  from  some 
of  the  same  and  other  arguments,  he  ad- 
vances to  the  inference,  that  God  exerts 
V  similar  influence  on  men  in  all  their 
sinful  and  other  actions. 

His  .second  step  is,  to  prove  that  the 
mode  of  the  influence  which  God  exerts  on 
men  in  their  holy  actions,  is  that  of  creat- 
ing those  actions.  ;  Then,  from  some  of 
the  same  and  other  arguments,  he  ad- 
vances to  the  conclusion,  that  the  mode  of 
the  influence  which  God  exerts  on  men  in 
their  sinful  arid  other  actions,  is  that  of  cre- 
ating those  actions.  To  sustain  the  posi- 
tion, that  God  exerts  a  direct,  positive  influ* 


57 

ence  on  the  minds  of  saints  in  all  their  holy 
actions,  he  alleges  five  arguments:  one 
derived  from  reason,  thiee  from  the 
Scriptures,  and  one  from  the  prayers  of 
good  men. 

His  first  argument,  denominated  a  dic- 
tate of  reason,  is  founded  on  the  depen- 
dence of  creature 

His  position  is,  that  creatures  are  "  ab- 
solutely drpmrlrnt :"  ili;il  is.  in  his  view, 
destitute  of  the  power  of  acting.  Ilr 
thence  infers  the  necessity  of  a  Divine. 
operation  on  them  to  make  them  act ;  and 
from  that  necessity  deduces  the  conclu- 
sion, that  God  actually  exerts  on  them,  in 
all  their  holy  actions^  such  a  direct  influ- 
ence. See  vol.  i.  p.  203. 

The  three  next,  his  scriptural  argu- 
ments, though  not  thus  formally  divided, 
are  derived  from  the  three  following 
sources : 

His  second  argument  is  founded  on  pas- 
sages asserting  God's  government  of  men: 
and  he  presents  the  fact,  that  He  governs 
them,  as  a  ground  for  the  inference  that 
He  acts  on  them,  in  all  their  holy  actions, 
by  a  Divine  operation  on  their  minds. 
See  p.  203,  204. 

His  third  argument  is  founded  on  pas- 
sages of  Scripture,  teaching  the  dependence 


58 

of  men  on  God.  He  presents  the  fact,  that 
they  are  dependent,  as  a  ground  for  the 
same  inference.  See  p.  203. 

His  fourth  argument  is  derived  from  pas- 
sages teaching  that  men  are  renewed  and 
sanctified  by  the  Holy  Spirit :  and  from 
that  fact  he  draws  the  conclusion,  that  in 
all  their  holy  actions  God  exerts  on  them 
a  positive  influence.  See  p.  204. 

His  fifth  argument  is  derived  from  the 
prayers  of  good  men.  His  position  is,  that 
the  prayers  of  good  men  for  Divine  assist- 
ance, presuppose  the  necessity  of  a  Divine 
operation  on  their  hearts,  in  all  their  holy 
actions:  and  he  thence  deduces  the  con- 
clusion, that  in  all  their  holy  actions  they 
are  acted  upon  by  such  an  operation. 
See  p.  210. 

He  employs  five  arguments  also  to  sus- 
tain the  position,  that  God  acts  on  men, 
in  all  their  sinful  actions,  and  all  (he  other 
events  of  which  they  are  the  subjects,  by  the 
same  kind  of  agency. 

His  first  argument  is  founded  on  the  de- 
pendence of  men  ;  and  is  like  the  other  on 
that  subject.  See  vol.  ii.  p.  39,  40,  41. 

His  second  is  derived  from  passages  of 
Scripture,  teaching  that  God  governs  men  in 
their  sinful  conduct.  He  infers  from  the 
fact  that  He  governs,  that  He  governs  by 
a  direct  influence.  See  vol.  ii.  p.  29. 


59 

His  third  argument  is  derived  from  pas- 
sages teaching  fhe  dependence  oi'men;  and 
is  like  the  other  from  Hint  source.  See 
vol.  ii  p.  H. 

His  fourth  argument  is  derived  from  the 
possibility  of  God's  producing  th"ir  actions 
l»y  Mich  an  agency.  See  vol.  i.  p.  223. 

His  fifth  argument  i>  founded  on  the  as- 

pltoft,  that  h\  such  an  B  we  may 

account  for  the  fall  of  Adam.  See  vol.  i. 
p. -j:n.  237,  -Jm 

He  advances  to  the  conclusion,  that 
the  mode  of  C  v  in  acting  on 

men,  in  their  holy  actions,  bv  a  Divine 
operation,  is  that  of  creating,  in  the  follow- 


ing manner: 


tirst  lakes  it  as  granted,  or  self-evi- 
dent, that  if  in  those  actions  men  are  act- 
ed upon  by  a  Divine  ojurution,  those  ac- 
tions are  created :  or  ihat  proof ,  that  those 
actions  come  into  existence  under  such 
an  operation,  is  proof  that  they  are  cre- 
ated, as  appears  from  the  following  pas- 
sage : 

"  It  appears,  from  what  has  been  said," 
that  is,  from  his  proofs  that  God  acts 
on  men,  in  all  their  holy  actions,  by  a  Di- 
vine operation  on  their  minds ;  for  that 
i-  all  lie  had  said  from  which  he  could 
draw  the  conclusion,  and  all  he  had  at- 
tempted to  prove,  "that  the  hearts  of  saints 


60 

are  created;  or  that  their  free  and  vo- 
luntary exercises  are  the  production  of  Di- 
vine power"  Vol.  i.  p.  231.  See  also  p. 
280,  281. 

In  the  next  place,  he  assumes  the  posi- 
tion, that  it  is  agreeable  to  the  nature  of 
holiness  to  be  created;  and  employ sfour 
arguments  to  prove  it:  First,  That  it  is 
possible  that  it  should  be  created.  The 
argument  is  this:  volitions  are  virtuous  or 
vicious  in  their  own  natures,  \vithout  any 
respect  to  their  cause.  Then  assuming  the 
position,  that  the  first  volition  of  a  created 
agent  must  have  an  involuntary  cause,  arid 
supposing  that  volition  to  be  holy,  he  con- 
cludes that  its  cause  may  be  a  creating 
cause,  and  the  holy  volition  created. — Se- 
condly, He  infers,  from  the  dependence  of 
creatures,  that  their  holiness  must  be  cre- 
ated.— Thirdly,  He  infers  it  from  the  con- 
sideration that  God  is  able  to  create  it. — 
Fourthly,  He  deduces  it  from  passages  of 
Scripture,  ascribing  the  renovation  and 
sanctification  of  the  heart  to  God.  Vol.  i. 
pp.  279,  280,  281,  282. 

His  argument  to  prove,  that  the  mode 
of  God's  agency  is  the  same  in  acting  on 
men  in  their  sinful  actions,  is  founded  on 
their  dependence.  From  their  "absolute 
dependence"  on  God  he  infers,  that  they 
need  the  same  kind  and  degree  of  divine 


1)1 

if  111  doing  evil  as  in  doing  good.  Ami 
again  assuming,  that  the  only  possible  way 
in  which  God  can  dispose  men  to  act  right 
or  wrong  is,  by  producing,  that  is,  creating 
right  or  wrong  volitions  in  their  hear;-, 
he  infers,  that  His  agency  is  concerned  in 
vrccischj  the  same  manner  in  their  a 
their  right  actions.  Vol.  ii.  p.  -SO. 

From  thi^   statement  of  the   Doclt 
iirgumenK  lie  appears  obviously  to  ' 
chosen  a  much  more   n;( nitons   method 
of  estahlUhinif  his    theory,   than  wa-   i,< 
cessary.     Since  he  h;;  <ieh  i-   their 

nature,  he  might  have,  in  consistency 
with  himself,  employed  all  the  arguments 
to  prove  the  single  proposition — God  acts 
on  men  in  all  their  actions.  In  a 

>cy,  including  the  two  propositions,  1st. 
He  acts  on  them  in  all  their  W?y  ad 
by  such  an  agency  :   and,  2d.  He  ac: 
them  in  all  their  sinful  and  other  actions,  by 
such  an  agency — which  he  has  employed 
to  establish  either  of  these   propositions 
separately;  for  his  first,  second,  and  third 
arguments,  to  support  each  are  the  same. 

His  fourth  argument,  to  prove  the  first 
proposition,  he  might  also,  consistently 
with  himself,  have  employed  to  prove  the 
second  proposition;  for  if  his  assumption 
be  correct,  that  such  is  the  nature  of  hu- 
6 


62 

man  dependence,  that  men  need  the  game 
kind  and  degree  of  divine  agency  in  doing 
evil  as  in  doing  good;  and  that  there  can 
be  but  one  mode  of  agency,  by  which  God 
can  bring  their  volitions  into  existence ; 
then  the  texts,  alleged  to  prove,  that  the 
Holy  Spirit  exerts  a  direct  influence  on  the 
minds  of  men,  whenever  they  exert  one 
class  of  volitions,  may  also  be  used  to 
prove,  that  a  similar  agency  is  exerted  on 
them  whenever  they  exert  the  other  class 
of  volitions :  since,  if  there  be  but  one 
mode,  in  which  God  can  exertan  influence 
on  men  to  bring  their  volitions  into  ex- 
istence ;  those  passages,  proving  that  He 
exerts  a  direct  influence  on  the  minds  of 
men,  when  they  exercise  a  given  kind  of 
volitions,  prove  that  He  exerts  on  them 
the  same  kind  of  influence,  when  they 
exert  any  other  kind  of  volitions. 

His  fifth  argument,  to  sustain  the  first, 
might  have  been  used  to  prove  the  second 
proposition;  for  if  the  prayers  of  good 
men,  presupposing  their  need  of  a  divine 
operation  on  their  hearts  in  all  their  holy 
actions,  prove  that  in  all  their  holy  ac- 
tions men  are  acted  upon  by  such  an 
operation;  and  if  there  be  but  one  mode 
of  influence  which  God  exerts  on  men, 
then  those  prayers  prove,  that  men  are 


63 

acted  upon  in  all  their  actions  by  ihesanu 
mode  of  operation. 

! !  is  fourth  argument,  to  prove  the  second. 

:ily  an  inference  or  assumption  from 
his  proof  of  the  first  proposition.  He  as- 
sumes the  possibility  of  Cod's  acting  on 
men  in  all  their  sinful  actions,  by  a  direct 
influence,  from  his  being  able,  then-  e.on- 

i-ed  as  proved,  (third  inference,  vol.  i. 
p.  _i!8)  to  act  on  men  in  their  holy  aci ' 
by  such  an  influence  ;  and  from  that 
ihility  infers,  that  He  does  cxerl  such  ;MI 
influence    on     men    in    all    their    sinful 
agency. 

From  this  assumption  it  would  seem, 
that  the  Doctor  considers  the  arguments, 
alleged  to  prove  the  first  proposition,  as 
iliriii  <  qual  proof  of  the  second;  for 

if  arguments  proving,  that  God  exerts  a 

live  influence  on  men  in  all  their  holy 
actions,  prove  the  possibility  of  His  exert- 

such  an  influence  on  them  in  all  their 
sinful  actions;  and  if  that  possibility 
proves,  as  the  Doctor  means  to  teach  in 
that  inference,  that  He  actually  does 
exert  on  them  such  an  influence  in  all 
their  sinful  actions;  then  those  argu- 
ments, in  proving  that  possibility,  prove 
Ihcfact,  that  God  exerts  such  an  influence 


64 

on  them  in  all  their  sinful  actions,  arid 
may  be  alleged  directly  in  proof  of  it. 

His  fifth  argument,  to  sustain  the  se- 
cond proposition,  may  be  employed  to 
prove  any  proposition  about  the  origin  of 
things,  and  will  yield  as  much  support  to 
one  as  another.  In  like  manner,  all  his 
arguments  to  prove  separately  the  two 
propositions,  1st,  The  mode  of  God's  agen- 
cy on  men,  in  their  holy  actiojis,  is  that  of 
creating  ;  and  2d.  The  mode  of  his  agency 
on  them,  in  all  their  other  actions,  is  the 
same ;  he  might  have  employed  to  prove 
the  single  proposition  including  those  two, 
viz.  that  the  mode  of  God's  agency  on  man- 
kind, in  all  their  actions,  is  that  of  creating. 
For  his  first  step.  viz.  the  assumption  that 
proof,  that  God,  in  all  the  holy  actions  of 
men,  exerts  a  direct  influence  on  their 
minds,  is  proof,  that  the  mode  of  that  in- 
fluence is  that  of  creating,  may  be  takeft 
in  respect  to  the  second  proposition  as  well 
as  the  first :  proof  that,  in  all  their  holy 
actions  He  exerts  on  them  a  direct  in- 
fluence, is  no  better  proof  that  He  creates 
those  actions,  than  proof,  that  in  all  their 
other  actions  He  exerts  on  them  a  direct 
influence,  is  proof  that  He  creates  those 
actions. 

His  second  argument  to  prove  ihe  first* 


and   his   argument   to  prove  the   secomt, 

proposition,  are  the  same  ;  for  the  position 

of  that  second  argument,  to  prove  the  first 

proposition,  is,  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the 

nature  of  holiness  to  be  created.    But  that 

position  is  involved  in  the  position  in  the 

part  of  his  argument,  to  prove  the  *c- 

'  proposition,  and  is  expressed  in  the 

part  of  that   argument;  for  if,  as    ho 

Mies  in  the  first  part,  the  same  kind 

and  decree  of  divine  agency  must  necessarily 

be  exerted  on  men   in  their  sinful  as  jn 

their  Imhj  actions:   the  ''  of  that  ne- 

cessity must  he,  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the 

nature  of  sinful*  as  it  is  of  holy  actions,  to 

be  created;  and  that  is  plainly  expressed 

in  the  assumption  in  the  last  part  of  the 

argument,  vix.   that  t  lie  only  possible  way 

in  which  fiod  can  dispose  men  to  act  right 


or  wrong  is,  by  />/W//r///^  right  or  wrong 
volitions  in  their  hearts;  and  in  the  infer- 
ence from  it,  that  therefore  His  agency  is 
concerned  in  precisely  the  same  manner  in 
the  production  of  sinful  and  holy  actions. 
If  the  only  possible  way,  in  which  God 
can  bring  sinful  and  holy  actions  into  ex- 
istence is,  by  producing  them  in  the  heart, 
it  must  be  agreeable  and  equally  so,  to 
the  nature  of  sinful  and  holy  actions  to  be 
produced  in  that  manner;  and  all  the 
6* 


66 

reasonings  employed  to  prove  that  it  is 
agreeable  to  the  nature  of  holiness  to  be 
-Y/,  may  be  used  with  equal  conclu* 
si  veness  to  prove,  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the 
nature  of  sin  to  be  created. 

Thus,  his  first  reason,  that  it  is  possible 
that  holy  actions  should  be  created,  may 
be  employed  with  equal  propriety,  as  he 
does  indeed  use  it  in  the  inference,  vol.  i. 
p.  228,  to  prove,  that  all  others  are  creat- 
ed. 

His  second,  from  the  dependence  of 
creatures,  is  precisely  the  argument  he 
employs  to  prove,  that  all  sinful  actions 
are  created. 

His  third,  that  God  is  able  to  create  ho- 
liness, is  equally  applicable  to  prove,  that 
He  creates  sin.  He  holds,  vol,  i.  p.  228, 
that  God  is  able  to  create  sin ;  and  if  His 
ability  to  create  holiness  may  be  employ- 
ed to  prove,  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the 
nature  of  holiness  to  be  created — His  abi- 
lity to  create  sin  may  be  also  alleged  to 
prove,  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the  nature 
of  sin  to  be  created. 

His  fourth  argument,  likewise,  he  might, 
consistenly  with  his  views,  have  used  to 
show,  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the  nature  of 
sin  to  be  created;  for  if  a  passage  teach- 
ing, that  God  exerts  an  influence  on  men 


67 

in  their  holy  actions,  may  be  alleged  to 
prove,  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the  nature  of 
holiness  to  be  created  ;  then,  since  the 
Doctor  holds,  that  the  same  kind  and  de- 
gree of  divine  agency  is  necessary  to  the 
production  of  sinful  as  lio/i/  actions,  the 
age  may  he  alleged  to  prove,  that  it 
it  is  agreeable  to  the  nature  of  sin  to  be 
created. 

His  arguments  to  prove,  that  <7//the  ac- 
tions, holy  and  sinful,  of  men,  lake  place 
under  a  ilirim  operation  on  their  minds, 
are  likewise  the  same  with  those  (or  such 
is  their  nature,  that  he  might,  consistently 
with  himself,  have  employed  them  to 
prove  one  of  the  positions,  as  well  as  the 
other,)  which  he  alleges  to  prove,  that  the 
mode  of  God's  agency  on  them,  in  all  their 
actions,  is  that  ot  creating. 

Thus,  in  his  first  step  to  the  conclusion, 
that  all  their  actions  are  created,  he  as- 
sumes it  as  a  tiling  of  course,  that  proof, 
that  actions  are  exerted  under  a  dlcinc 
operation  on  the  mind,  is  proof,  that  they 
are  created.  And  in  his  second  step  ho 
assumes  the  position,  that  it  is  agreeable 
to  the  nature  of  all  actions  to  be  created,  and 
alleges  that  position  as  proof,  that  all  ac- 
tions are  created.  But  the  reasons  he  em- 
ploys to  prove,  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the 


68 

••re  of  all  actions  to  be  created,  viz.  the 
possibility  of  their  being  created ;  the  ne- 
cessity from  human  dependence  of  their 
being  created;  the  ability  of  God  to  create 
them;  and  passages  showing,  that  He 
exerts  an  agency  on  men  in  their  actions, 
are  precisely  the  reasons  he  alleges,  or 
such  is  their  nature,  he  might  with  equal 
propriety  allege  them  to  prove,  that  all  ac- 
tions are  exerted  under  a  divine  operation 
on  the  mind.  If  then  those  reasons,  proving 
that  all  actions  are  exerted  under  a  di- 
vine operation  on  the  mind,  prove  that  it 
is  agreeable  to  the  nature  of  all  actions  to 
be  created;  and  if  its  being  agreeable 
to  the  nature  of  all  actions  to  be  created 
is  proof,  that  they  are  created,  then  those 
reasons,  proving  that  all  actions  are  ex- 
erted under  a  divine  operation  of  the  mind, 
prove  that  all  actions  are  created. 

Thus  it  appears,  that  the  Doctor  em- 
ploys, or  such  is  their  nature,  that  he 
might  with  equal  propriety  employ,  pre- 
cisely the  same  arguments  to  prove  the 
several  propositions,  as  they  are  found 
scattered  in  his  volumes — God  acts  on 
men  in  all  their  holy  actions  by  a  direct 
operation  on  their  minds — God  acts  on 
men  in  all  their  other  actions  by  a  direct 
operation  on  their  minds  precisely  the 


69 

in  X'/W  and  degree — God  creates  all 
the  holy  actions  of  men — and  God  creates 
all  the  of/ifr  actions  of  men. 

Had  he  chosen  therefore  the  most  di- 
rect method  of  establishing  his  theory,  he 
would  have  emhodied  it  in  the  single 
proposition,  including  those  four — God 
-r«il(s  <ill  (lu  actions  «f  mm — and  advanced 
his  arguments  to  prove  his  whole  theory 
at  once,  by  establishing  that  proposition; 
instead  of  repeating  them  to  prove  its  se- 
veral parts,  as  separated  in  those  propo 
-it  ions. 

His  proposition  and  proofs  would  then 
have  assumed  the  following  arrangement: 

The  proposition  expressing  the  theory: 
God  creates  all  the  act  inns  of  n  > 

The  reasonings  in  proof  of  the  propo- 
sition : 

Firs^  The  argument  from  the  depen- 
dence of  creatures. 

Secondly,  The  argument  from  passages 
of  Scripture,  asserting  God's  government 


of  men. 


Thirdly,  The  argument  from  passages 
respecting  the  dependence  of  men. 
Fourthly,  The  argument  from  passages 


70 

teaching  that  men  are  renewed  and  sanc- 
tified by  the  Holy  Spirit. 

Fifthly,  The  argument  from  the  pray- 
ers of  good  men. 

Sixthly^  The  argument  from  the  possi- 
bility of  God's  creating  all  the  actions  of 
men. 

Seventhly,  The  argument  from  the  adap- 
tation of  the  theory  to  account  for  the  fall 
of  Adam. 

These  are  all  the  arguments  the  Doc- 
tor employs  to  support  the  whole,  or  any 
part  of  his  theory  ;  and  he  might,  in  entire 
consistency  with  himself,  as  shown  above, 
have  employed  them  all  to  sustain  the 
four  propositions  separately,  of  which  his 
theory  is  made  up ;  or  to  sustain  the  sin- 
gle proposition  in  which  the  whole  is  em- 
bodied. 

It  is  not  necessary,  therefore,  in  order 
to  the  refutation  of  his  whole  theory,  to 
refute  his  arguments  in  every  instance  in 
which  he  employs  them.  A  refutation  of 
them  in  regard  to  the  one  proposition  ex- 
pressing the  whole  theory,  will  be  a  refu- 
tation of  them  in  regard  to  every  purpose 
for  which  he  employs  them :  For,  in  the 
first  place,  he  employs  the  propositions, 
"  God  exerts,  in  all  the  holy  actions  of  men, 
a  direct  operation  on  their  minds;"  and 


71 

BS  all  the  holy  actions  of  men," 
as  perfectly  syn.  r,  as  appears  from 

his  use  of  the  words  production  and  cre- 
ation synonymously,  and  produce  and  cre- 
ate also;  from  his  taking  it  for  granted, 
that  proof  of  the.  first  proposition  is  proof 
of  ihe  second;  and  from  the  consideration 
that,  as  shown  in  ihe  statement  of  his  the- 
ory, he  cannot  use  the  terms  production, 
produce,  divine  operation,  agency,  &c.  to 
^nate  any  mode  of  agency  l>ut  that  of 
creating.  But  ;e  proposition* Me 

synonymous,  all   the  arguments   he  em- 
ploys to  prove  fithcr  oi'  the  propositi- 
may  be  alleged,  with  precisely  the  s 
conclusiveness,    to    prove  the  other.     If, 
then,  all  his  to  prove  cither  of 

them  arc  considered  in  relation  to  one,  as 
the  psoposition,  "(I\M!  creates  all  the 
holy  actions  of  men,"  a  refutation  of  them, 
in  relation  to  that  proposition,  will  he  a 
refutation  of  them  in  regard  to  both  those 
purposes  for  which  he  uses  them. 

In  the  second  place — As  he  uses  the  pro- 
positions, as  appears  from  the  reasons  just 
stated,  "God  exerts,  in  all  the  other  actions 
of  men,  a  direct  operation  on  their  minds ;" 
and,  "  God  creates  all  the  other  actions  of 
men,"  as  perfectly  synonymous:  and  as 
thence  all  the  arguments  he  employs,  to 


72 

provfe  either  of  the  propositions,  may  be 
alleged,  with  precisely  the  same  conclu- 
siveness, to  prove  the  other,  a  refutation 
of  all  his  arguments  to  prove  either  of 
them,  considered  in  relation  to  one,  as  the 
proposition,  "  God  creates  all  the  other  ac- 
tions of  men,"  will  be  a  refutation  of  them 
in  regard  to  both  of  those  purposes  for 
which  he  employs  them. 

But  in  the  third  place,  he  does  not, 
as  already  remarked,  employ  any  ar- 
guments to  prove  the  proposition,  "  God 
creates  all  the  other  actions  of  men,'7 
which  he  either  does  not,  or  might  not, 
with  equal  conclusiveness,  use  to  prove 
the  proposition,  "God  creates  all  the 
holy  actions  of  men."  For  the  only  con- 
sideration employed  exclusively  to  prove 
the  former,  is  the  adaptation  of  the  the- 
ory to  account  for  the  fall  of  Adam ;  and 
if  that  adaptation  of  the  theory  prove 
the  truth  of  that  proposition,  its  equal 
adaptation  to  account  for  the  renovation 
and  sanctification  of  saints,  may  be  alleg- 
ed, with  equal  conclusiveness,  to  prove 
the  truth  of  the  other  proposition.  Nor 
does  he,  as  already  observed,  employ  any 
arguments  to  prove  the  proposition,  "God 
creates  all  the  holy  actions  of  men,"  which 
he  either  does  not,  or  might  not,  with 
equal  conclusivenees,  use  to  prove  the 


73 

proposition,  "God  creates  all  the  other 
ac.ions  of  men."  For  the  three  first  and 
the  sixth  arguments  viz.  that  from  the  de- 
pendence of  men;  that  from  passages  as- 
verting  Ciod"s  i;oveniment  of  men;  that 
from  passages  teaching  th^ir  dependence; 
and  that  from  the  possibility  of  God's  cre- 
ating holy  aelio!.-.  are  all  employed  to 
prove  both  propositions,  and  with  equal 
conclusiveness;  as  they  rest  on  ground 
which  is  common  to  both  kinds  of  actions, 
and  if  demonstrative  of  one  of  the  propo- 
sitions, must  be  so  of  the  other. 

The  seventh  is  employed  exclusively 
to  sustain  the  proposition,  k4  God  creates 
all  the  other  actions  of  men  "'  The  fourth 
and  fifth  are  the  only  arguments  employ- 
ed exclusively  to  prove  that  God  creates 
all  the  holy  actions  of  men.  And  the  Doc- 
tor might  have  used  them  with  equal  con- 
clusiveness to  prove  the  other  proposi- 
tion. For  in  his  fourth  argument,  from 
Eissages  of  Scripture,  teaching  that  the 
oly  Spirit  renews  and  sanctifies  the 
hearts  of  men,  the  manner  in  which  he 
obtains  the  inference,  that  God  creates  all 
their  holy  actions,  is,  by  the  assumption, 
that  the  only  way  in  which  He  can  bring 
the  holy  actions  of  men  into  existence,  is 
that  of  creating  them.  His  argument  de- 


74 

pends  entirely  on  that  assumption.  Since 
if  there  be  any  other  way  in  which  God 
may  bring  their  holy  actions  into  exist- 
ence, passages  merely  proving  that  He 
brings  them  into  existence,  will  not  prove 
that  the  mode  of  His  bringing  them  into 
existence  is  that  of  creation. 

But  that  assumption  rests  on  the  posi- 
tion in  his  argument  from  the  dependence 
of  creatures,  that  the  onl)  way  in  which 
anij  of  their  actions  can  come  into  exist- 
ence, is  that  of  being  created  by  God. 
There  is  no  other  possible  way  in  which 
lie  can  obtain  the  inference  from  those 
passages.  His  argument,  then,  from  those 
passages,  to  prove  that  all  the  holy  actions 
of  men  are  created,  is  an  inference  from 
the  position  that  all  the  actions  of  men  are 
created ;  or  he  infers,  that  God  creates 
the  holy  actions  of  men,  because  He  cre- 
ates all  their  actions.  It  takes  the  thing 
as  granted  which  it  is  employed  to  prove, 
and  is,  therefore,  without  force,  and  can- 
not be  employed  with  any  more  concln- 
siveness  to  prove  that,  than  to  prove  the 
proposition,  that  all  the  other  actions  of 
men  are  created. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  fifth  argument, 
from  the  prayers  of  good  men.  For  if  their 
prayers  for  divine  assistance  presuppose 


iheir  need  of  having  their  holy  actions  cre- 
ated, it  mu^t  be,  as  before,  on  the  ground 
that  the  o/////  //•</;/  in  which  God  can  bring 
their  holy  actions  into  existence,  is  by 

•>n<r  them  :  and  that  position  also  rests 
on  the  ground,  that  the  anty  inuj  in  which 
ant/  of  the  actions  of  men  can  come  into 
existence,  is  that  of  beinir  r/v//W  by  God. 
Hi-  argument,  then,  to  prove  that  all  the 
hnlji  actions  of  men  are  created,  is  an  in- 
ference from  the  position,  that  nil  the  ac- 
tions of  men  are  created  :  and  as  it  takes 
the  thing  to  be  proved  for  granted,  is 
without  i'orce,  and  cannot  be  employed 
with  any  more  propriety  to  prove  that* than 
lite  proposition,  that  all  the  other  actions  of 
men  are  created.  Thus  the  inference  in 
each  case  presupposes  the  truth  of  the 
second  proposition.  It  is  entirely  imma- 

d,  as  it  respects  the  force  and  propri- 
ety of  these  two  arguments,  whether  the 
position  from  which  they  are  drawn, — that 
there  is  no  other  way  in  which  the  actions 
of  men  can  come  into  existence  than  that 
of  their  being  created, — is  true  or  not.  For 
if  it  be  true,  no  arguments  derived  from 
its  truth  to  prove  its  truth,  or  any  part  of 
it,  can  have  any  force  or  propriety.  If  it 
be  not  true,  no  arguments  to  prove  it  to 
be  true,  or  any  part  of  it  to  be  true,  found- 


76 

ed  on  the  assumption  that  it  is  true,  can 
have  any  force  or  propriety. 

Whatever  then  gnes  propriety  or  con- 
clusiveness  to  any  of  the  arguments  the 
Doctor  uses  to  sustain  either  of  the  pro- 
positions, "God  creates  all  the  holy  ac- 
tions of  men,"  and  uGod  creates  all  the 
other  actions  of  men,"  gives  them  equal 
propriety  and  conclusiveness  to  sustain 
the  other  proposition. 

But  if  they  are  as  entirely  proper  and 
conclusive  to  sustain  one  of  those  propo- 
sitions as  the  other,  then  they  are  as  en- 
tirely proper  and  conclusive  to  sustain 
the  one  proposition  including  those  two 
propositions,  "God  creates  «//the  actions 
of  men,"  as  they  are  to  sustain  cither  of 
those  two  propositions.  For  the  two  pro- 
positions, "  God  creates  all  the  holy"  and 
"God  creates  all  the  other  actions  of 
men,"  are  precisely  equal  to  the  single 
proposition,  "God  creates  all  the  actions 
of  men."  And  thence,  if  all  the  Doctor's 
arguments  are  precisely  as  well  adapted 
to  prove  one  of  those  two  propositions  as 
they  are  the  other,  they  are  as  well 
adapted  to  prove  the  single  proposition 
uniting  the  two,  as  they  are  to  prove 
either  of  the  two.  In  metaphysics,  as  in 
mathematics,  things  equal  to  the  same 
thing  are  equal  to  one  another. 


7? 

As  all  the  Doctor's  arguments  hold,  in 
respect  to  propriety  and  conclusivencss, 
precisely  the  same  relation  to  any  one 
part  of  the  proposition,  "God  creates  all 
the  actions  of  men,"  as  they  do  to  any 
other  part;  they  must  hold  the  same  re- 
lation, in  respect  to  propriety  and  conclu- 
siveness,  to  the  whole  of  it,  as  they  do  to 
any  of  its  parts. 

Thus  the  two  propositions  respecting 
the  ions  of  men,  "God  exerts,  in 

all  the  holy  actions  of  men,  a  direct  opera- 
tion on  their  minds,"  and  "God  o<<//rs  nil 
the  holy  actions  of  men,"  being  synony- 
mous, are  reduced  to  the  proposition, 
"  God  create*  all  the  holy  actions  of  men  :" 
and  the  two  propositions  respecting  the 
other  actions  of  men,  "God  exerts,*'  &c. 
and  "God  creates,"  &c.  heing  synony)» 
are  reduced  to  the  proposition,  "God  cre- 
ates all  the  other  actions  of  men."'  The 
whole  theory  is  thus  reduced  to  the  two 
propositions,  "God  creates  all  the  holy 
actions  of  men,"  and  "  God  creates  all 
the  other  actions  of  men ;"  and  those  two 
propositions,  and  thence  the  whole  theo- 
ry, are  embraced  in  the  single  one, 

God  creates  all  the  actions  of  men. 
7* 


78 

Now,  therefore,  in  respect  to  these,  as 
to  the  synonymous  propositions,  since  all 
the  arguments,  alleged  to  prove  either  of 
the  two  propositions,  of  which  the  theory 
is  made  up,  are  equally  applicable  and 
conclusive  to  prove  the  single  proposi- 
tion— God  creates  all  the  actions  of  men — in 
which  the  two  former  propositions  and 
the  whole  theory  are  embodied  ;  it  is  not 
necessary,  in  order  to  a  refutation  of  the 
whole  theory,  to  refute  them  in  the  several 
instances,  in  which  he  employs  them  to 
sustain  those  two  propositions  separately  : 
a  refutation  of  them  once,  considered  as 
employed  to  sustain  the  whole  theory 
embodied  in  the  proposition — God  creates 
all  the  actions  of  men — will  be  a  refutation  of 
them  in  all  the  instances  in  which  he  em- 
ploys them  to  support  his  theory.  We 
shall  consider  them  as  alleged  to  sustain 
that  proposition,  and  regard  a  refutation 
of  them,  in  respect  to  that,  as  a  refutation 
of  them  in  all  the  instances  in  which  he 
uses  them,  to  prove  the  truth  of  any  part 
of  his  theory. 

We  proceed  therefore  to  show,  that  the 
Doctor's  reasonings  in  support  of  that 
proposition  are  erroneous. 

Hie  labor,  hoc  opus  ist, 


79 

The  Doctors  first  argument  to  support 
his  theory  is  founded  on  the  dependence  of 
creatures 

It  is  presented  in  the  following  manner: 
"It  is  the  dictate  of  right  reason,  that  no 
created  being  is  capable  of  acting  inde- 
pendently. Universal  and  absolute  de- 
pendence goes  into  the  very  idea  of  a 
creature,  because  independence  is  \\\\  at- 
tribute of  the  divine  nature,  which  e\« -L 
Omnipotence  cannot  communicate.  And 
since  saints  are  creature-,  and  creatures 
too  of  an  inferior  order,  they  can  never 
act  othervsUr  than  under  the  powerful 
and  unremitting  energy  of  the  Supreme 
Being.1'  Vol.  i.  p.  203. 

44  Mankind  are  creatures,  and  by  the 
Jaw  oi  nature  absolutely  dependent  upon 
God.  We  cannot  conceive  that  even 
Omnipotence  is  able  to  form  independent 
agents,  because  this  would  be  to  endow 
them  with  divinity.  And  since  all  men 
are  dependent  agents,  all  their  motions, 
exercises,  or  actions  must  originate  from 
a  divine  efficiency.  We  can  no  more  act, 
than  we  can  exist,  without  the  constant 
aid  and  influence  of  the  Deity.  This  is 
the  dictate  of  reason."  Vol.  ii  p.  31. 

Hence  the  inference  obviously  drawn 
from  these  premises :  "  Men  are  no  more 


80 

capable  of  acting  independently  of  God 
in  one  instance  than  another.  If  they 
need  any  kind  or  degree  of  divine  agency 
in  doing  good,  they  need  precisely  the 
same  kind  and  degree  of  divine  agency 
in  doing  evil.  This  is  the  dictate  of  rea- 
son "  And  in  reference  to  a  particular 
case  :  "  If  he  produced  their  bad  as  well 
as  good  volitions,  then  his  agency  was 
concerned  in  precisely  the  same  manner  in 
their  wrong  as  in  their  right  actions."  *;  It 
is  upon  this  ground,  and  only  upon  this 
ground,  that  all  the  actions  of  men,  whe- 
ther good  or  evil,  may  properly  be  ascrib- 
ed to  God."  Vol.  ii.  p.  46. 

"  Since  mind  cannot  act,  any  more  than 
matter  can  move,  without  a  divine  agency, 
it  is  absurd  to  suppase  that  men  can  be 
left  to  the  freedom  of  their  own  will,  to 
act  or  riot  to  act,  independently  of  divine 
influence.  There  must  be,  therefore,  the 
exercise  of  divine  agency  in  every  human 
action,  without  which  it  is  impossible  to 
conceive,  that  God  should  govern  moral 
agents,  and  make  mankind  act  in  perfect 
conformity  to  his  own  designs."  p.  41. 

By  "  universal  and  absolute  depen- 
dence," the  Doctor  means  u  universal  and 
absolute" destitution  of  power.  This  is  seen 
from  his  inferences  from  that  "  absolute 


81 

dependence,"  that  mind  can  no  more  act. 
than  matter  can  wiorr,  without  a  divine 
agency,  to  produce  its  actions;  that  all 
the  motions,  exercises,  or  actions  of  men 
must  oriffint'le  from  a  divine  etliciei-cy; 
and  that  the  constant  aid  and  ii.fluene- 
the  [)eit\  arc  as  neee>sary  to  enable  men 
to  act,  as  to  enahlc  them  to  e\i>t.  For 
if  he  does  not  mean  hy  4i  absolute  and 
universal  dependence"  an  *•  ah-olut^  arid 
universal" destitution  ol  /;O?/Y/.  he  cannot 
infer  from  that  dependence  thai  depen- 
dent beings  cannot  act  without  a  divine 
efficiency  to  originate  or  create  their  ac- 
tions: since  if  they  possess  any  degree  of 
power,  they  pos»e-s  the  power  of  acting 
without  a  divine  efficiency  to  produce 
their  actions;  for  power  is  that  by  which 
a  being  acts  or  produces  effects;  and, 
therefore,  the  being  \vho  possesses  any, 
even  the  least  degree  of  power,  can  act  to 
that  degree  without  a  divine  efficiency  to 
produce  his  actions.  And  if  he  does  not 
mean  by  that  dependence  an  absolute 
destitution  of  power,  he  cannot  infer  from 
it,  that  "  all  the  motions,  exercises,  or  ac- 
tions of  men  do  necessarily  originate 
from  a  divine  efficiency"  For  since,  if  mo- 
ral agents  possess  any  degree  of  power,  they 
possess  the  power  of  acting  to  some  de- 


82 

gree;  some  of  their  motions,  exercises,  or 
actions  may  "  originate"  from  that  power 
of  acting,  and  not  "  from  a  divine  effi- 
ciency." 

If  by  "  universal  and  absolute  depen- 
dence," the  Doctor  does  not  mean  a  total 
destitution  of  power,  he  must  mean  merely 
a  total  inability  to  act  independently  of 
the  divine  control.  But  he  cannot  mean  a 
simple  inability  of  acting  independently 
of  a  divine  control;  because  he  cannot 
infer,  from  such  a  dependence,  that  all 
the  actions  of  men  must  "  originate  from 
a  divine  efficiency;"  since  their  taking 
place  under  the  divine  control  does  not 
involve  their  being  originated  by  a  "  di- 
vine efficiency"  but  simply  their  being  go- 
verned by  a  divine  agency.  Nor  can  he 
infer,  that  men  need  precisely  the  same 
kind  and  degree  of  divine  agency  in  doing 
evil  as  in  doing  good  ;  for  if  all  the  agency 
necessary  is  merely  a  controlling  agency, 
the  kind  and  degree  necessary  in  the  one 
case  may  be  very  different  from  those  ne- 
cessary in  the  other. 

Norcan  heinfer,thattheconstant  aid  and 
influence  of  the  Deity  are  as  necessary  to 
enable  men  to  act,  as  they  are  to  continue 
them  in  existence :  for  it  is  the  power  of 
the  Deity  only  that  continues  them  in  ex- 


83 

istence,  and  if  His  aid  and  influence  are 
as  necessary  to  their  acting  as  to  their 
existing,  His  power  only  must  produce 
their  actions.  But  if  He  exerts  over  them 
only  a  controlling  agency  in  their  actions, 
it  is  not  His  power,  but  the-rs.  which  pro- 
duces their  actions;  and  therefore  His 
aid  and  influence  are  not  as  necessary  to 
their  acting,  as  to  their  existing. 

By  u  universal  and  absolute  depen- 
dence," therefore,  he  cannot  mean  a  mere 
inability  to  act  with  an  entire  exemption 
from  a  divine  control,  but  a  total  destitu- 
tion of  all  power  whatever  to  act.  From 
such  a  dependence  he  may  justly  draw 
the  conclusion,  that  all  the  actions  of  men 
must  originate  from  a  divine  efficiency; 
and  that  the  same  kind  of  agency  is  ne- 
cessary in  all  cases. 

The  position,  then,  from  which  he  ar- 
gues is,  that  creatures  are  universally  and 
absolutely  destitute  of  power.  Men  then, 
he  infers,  cannot  act  without  a  divine  in- 
fluence to  create  their  actions.  All  their 
motions,  exercises,  or  actions,  therefore, 
must  originate  from  a  divine  efficiency, 
or,  in  the  language  of  the  proposition,  are 
created  by  God. 

The  validity  of  his  argument  depends 
on  the  validity  of  his  position.  If  his  po- 


84 

sition  is  proved  to  be  true,  his  conclusion 
is  irrefragable,  and  his  theory  is  esta- 
blished. If  his  position  is  not  proved  to 
be  true,  and  can  be  proved  to  be  false,  his 
conclusion  is  "  lame  and  impotent;"  and 
his  theory,  with  its  seven  pillars,  for  the 
other  six,  like  an  inverted  cone,  rest  en- 
tirely on  this,  is  subverted. 

What  then  is  the  proof  alleged  by  the 
Doctor  of  the  truth  of  that  position  ?  It  is 
presented  in  the  following  quotations. — 

"Universal  and  absolute  dependence 
goes  into  the  very  idea  of  a  creature,  be- 
cause independence  is  an  attribute  of  the 
divine  nature,  which  even  Omnipotence 
cannot  communicate.  Vol.  i.  p.  203. 

"  We  cannot  conceive  that  even  Omni- 
potence is  able  to  form  independent 
agents,  because  this  would  be  to  endow 
them  with  divinity."  Vol.  ii.  p.  31. 

"It  is  absurd  to  suppose,  that  men  can 
be  left  to  the  freedom  of  their  own  will  to 
act,  or  not  to  act,  independently  of  a  di- 
vine influence.  There  must  be  the  exer- 
cise of  divine  agency  in  every  human 
action,  without  which  it  is  impossible  to 
conceive,  that  God  should  govern  moral 
agents,  and  make  mankind  act  in  perfect 
conformity  to  his  own  designs."  p.  41. 

By  "  independence"  the  Doctor,  as  ap- 


pears  above,  does  not  mean,  the  power  of 
acting  without  absolute  exemption  from 
all  control  by  God,  but  the  power  of  act- 
ing of  one's  self,  without  another's  power 
creating  the  action,  not  having  any  consi- 
deration whether  or  not  that  power  of 
acting  is  controlled  by  God.  By  being 
"  independent/'  is  meant  the  pos-e— ion 
within  01  ver  to  act;  and  by 

"acting  independently."  i-  meant. e\erting 
actions  by  pouer  belonging  to  one's  selK 
ad  of  liaving  those  a<  created 

by  the  power  of  some  other  being. 

Tlii-  i-  manifest,  from  his  I:M>  of  the  lan- 
guage, ^absolute  dependei  >  denote, 
Bfl  BOOWn  above,  an  absolute  destitution  of 
power  to  (id :  and  from  the  consideration, 
that  the  object  of  the  argument  is  to 
prove,  that  men  do  not  possess  the  jiower  of 
(irtinir,  without  a  divine  influence  to  create 
their  actions.  If,  by  independence,  he 
means  any  thing  else  than  the  power  of 
acting  of  one's  self,  without  another's 
power  to  create  the  action,  it  is  not  at  all 
pertinent  to  the  thing  in  question.  In 
saying,  that  "independence  is  an  attri- 
bute of  the  divine  nature,  which  even  Om- 
nipotence cannot  communicate;"  and  that, 
44  to  form  independent  agents,  would  be 
to  endow  them  with  divinity,"  he  mani- 
8 


86 

festly  means,  that  to  communicate  inde* 
penderice,  that  is,  the  power  of  acting  of 
one's  self,  without  another's  power  to  cre- 
ate the  action,  is  to  communicate  omnipo- 
tence; for  he  calls  it  "an  attribute  of  the 
divine  nature,"  and  "divinity."  But  there 
is  no  degree  of  power  but  omnipotence, 
that  is  an  attribute  of  the  divine  nature, 
and  is  divinity.  And  he  says,  on  the  sup- 
position that  men  were  made  capable  of 
acting  without  a  divine  influence  to  cre- 
ate their  actions,  it  is  impossible  to  con- 
ceive that  God  should  govern  them,  and 
make  them  act  in  perfect  conformity  to  his 
designs.  But  if,  in  being  made  capable 
of  acting  without  a  divine  influence  to  cre- 
ate the  action,  only  a  limited  degree  of 
power  were  communicated,  it  is  not  im- 
possible to  conceive,  that  God,  who  is 
omnipotent,  should  govern  men,  and  make 
them  act  in  perfect  conformity  to  His  de- 
signs. But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  conceive  that  omnipotence  should 
not,  if  disposed,  govern  a  limited  degree 
of  power  in  perfect  conformity  to  its  de- 
signs. 

That  this  exhibition  of  the  Doctor's 
views,  respecting  dependence  and  inde- 
pendence, is  correct,  is  apparent  from  a 
variety  of  other  considerations.  The 


87 

whole  object  of  his  argume.it  is,  to  prove 
a  necessity  of  a  divine  influence  to  create 
all  the  actions  of  men.     ?>ow  the  perti- 
nency ol  hi-  reasoning  to  prove  it  from  the 
nature  of  dependence  and  indepeiuh 
depends  entirely  on  his  possessing  tl 
views  of  them  \\  hich  we  l:,i\  e  :isc:-ihcd  to 
him.     For  if  those  are  not  his  views — if 
he  r.  endence  of  man  n<  an 

agent,  as  c«-  i   his   heinj^ 

controlled  by  God  in  all   i, 
argunu-nt   is   inconelu -ive.     For   it   does 

,'ullow  from  thai  dependence,  that  (Jod 
must  create  all  hi  us.  The  argu- 

t  then  is,  God  governs  man  in  all  his 
agency  ; — therefore  He  creates  all  his  ac- 
tiun>.  But  this  is  assuming  the  thing  to 

demonstrated.  Proof  that  God  go- 
ia  no  more  proof  that  God  creates 
the  actions  of  man,  than  it  is  that  He  does 
not  create  them.  The  inference,  that  He 
creates  his  actions,  cannot  be  drawn  from 
the  fact  that  He  governs  them,  till  it  he 
proved  that  he  cannot,  or  does  not,  go- 
vern them  in  any  other  way.  But  if  the 
Doctor  regarded  dependence  as  consist- 
ing in  a  destitution  of  power,  then  his  in- 
ference follows  from  his  premise:  if  man 
is  absolutely  destitute  of  power  to  act, 
there  is  a  necessity  that  God  should  cre- 
ate his  actions. 


88 

Again :  no  dependence  but  that  which 
consists  in  an  absolute  destitution  of 
power,  can  constitute  a  necessity  of  a  di- 
vine influence  to  create  the  actions  of  man. 
If  he  possesses  power  to  exert  his  actions, 
there  is  no  need  of  a  divine  power  to  exert 
them ;  no  divine  agency  is  then  neces- 
sary, except  to  control  him  in  the  exertion 
of  his  power. 

Again  ;  the  Doctor  regards  the  depen- 
dence of  the  mind  as  such,  that  it  cannot 
act  any  more  than  matter  can  move  with- 
out a  divine  agency.  But  matter  is  uni- 
versally and  absolutely  destitute  of  the 
power  of  moving  itself.  If,  therefore, 
mind  is  dependent  for  its  actions  in  the 
same  manner  as  matter  is  for  its  motions, 
then  its  dependence  consists  in  an  "  uni- 
versal and  absolute"  destitution  of  power 
to  act.  If  the  Doctor  considers  the  de- 
pendence of  mind  and  matter  as  consist- 
ing simply  in  their  being  controlled  by  a 
divine  agency  in  the  exercise  of  power 
belonging  to  themselves,  then  his  conclu- 
sion from  that  dependence,  that  God  must 
create  all  the  actions  of  the  mind,  is,  as 
in  the  former  cases,  entirely  without  force. 

If  the  Doctor  meant,  by  "  acting  inde- 
pendently," acting  by  one's  own  power,  we 
can  see  how  he  was  led  to  remark,  that 


89 

he  was  unable  to  conceive  that  God  could 
govern  moral  agents :  but  if,  by  "  acting 
independently,"  he  meant  acting  exempt 
from  all  control,  we  should  hardly  expect 
him  to  inform  his  readers,  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  conceive  that  God  should 
vein  moral  agents.  \Vho  needs  to  be  told, 
that  he  cannot  conceive  of  a  being  as.  at. 
the  same  lime,  acting  independently  of  all 
control,  and  not  acting  independently  of 
all  control? 

His  exhibition  of  the  divine  agency  as 
necessary  to  aid,  orl^lnntc.  and  the 

actions  of  men,  has  no  pertinency  to  the 
argument,  if  he  regards  human  depen- 
dence as  consisting  simply  in  a  subjection 
to  the  government  of  God  :  but  it  has  per- 
tinency, if  lie  regards  dependence  as  con- 
sisting in  an  entire  destitution  of  power  to 
act. 

That  we  have  here  interpreted  his  lan- 
guage correctly,  is  moreover  manifest  from 
the  fact,  that  he  exhibits  precisely  the 
same  views  of  man,  and  of  the  origin  of 
his  actions,  in  many  other  passages.  Such 
are  the  following: — "  There  is  no  occa- 
sion for  a  distinct  faculty  of  will,  in  order 
to  put  forth  external  actions  or  internal 
exercises."  What  is  the  faculty  of  will, 
but  the  faculty  of  voluntarily  exercising 
8* 


90 

power  ?  "  It  is  God  who  worketh  in  men 
both  to  will  and  to  do.  Moral  exercises 
flow  from  a  divine  operation  upon  the 
mind  of  a  moral  agent,  and  not  from  any 
natural  faculty,  principle,  or  taste,  enabling 
him  to  originate  his  own  internal  exer- 
cises and  external  actions."  Vol.ii.  p.  195. 
What  is  power  but  "  a  natural  faculty, 
enabling"  a  being  "  to  originate"  and  ex- 
ert "  his  own  internal  exercises  and  exter- 
nal actions  ?"  And  if  man  is  not  abso- 
lutely destitute  of  power,  why  do  all  his 
actions  "  originate  from  a  divine  opera- 
tion on  his  mind  ?"  "  Our  moral  exer- 
cises are  the  production  of  the  divine 
power."  Vol.  i.  p.  224. 

And  furthermore,  it  is  apparent  that  his 
views  of  "  independence"  are  those  which 
we  have  ascribed  to  him,  because,  that 
which  is  peculiar  to  independent  action, 
is  exactly  the  reverse  of  that  which  is  pe- 
culiar to  dependent  action.  As  thence 
dependence,  as  an  agent,  according  to  the 
Doctor,  consists  in  a  total  destitution  of 
power  to  act,  independence,  as  an  agent, 
being  the  reverse  of  that,  must  consist  in 
possessing  the  power  of  acting.  To  make 
it  consist  in  any  thing  beside  that,  is  to 
make  it  something  which  is  not  opposed 
to  dependence,  and  which,  therefore,  is 
not  independence. 


91 

And  thence  as,  according  to  the  Doc- 
tor, independence,  as  an  agent,  consists 
in  possessing  the  power  of  acting;  if  in- 
dependence, that  is,  the  power  of  acting, 
is  a  divine  attribute,  and  divinity,  it  must 
be  Almighty  power;  since  the  attribute 
of  power  in  God  is  omnipotence. 

Such,  then,  being  the  Doctor's  meaning 
in  those  passages,  the  reason  he  assigns  to 
prove  the  truth  of  his  position,  "  that  crea- 
tures are  universally  and  absolutely  • 
titute  of  the  power  of  acting,"  is,  that  to 
communicate  to  beings  the  power  of  art- 
ing  of  themselves,  without  divine  power  to 
create  their  actions,  would  be  to  commu- 
nicate omnipotence. 

The  validity  of  his  position  depends  on 
the  validity  of  the  reason  he  assigns  to  sus- 
tain it.  If  the  reason  is  shown  to  be  false, 
the  position  will  be  left  without  proof,  and 
the  conclusion  drawn  from  it,  in  support 
of  the  theory,  subverted. 

Power  is  that  by  which  a  being  acts, 
and  produces  effects.  A  being,  then,  who 
possesses  any  power  at  all,  possesses 
power  to  act  so  far  without  his  actions  be- 
ing created  by  another's  power.  The 
Doctor,  then,  in  holding  that  God  cannot 
communicate  to  a  being  the  power  of  act- 
ing of  himself,  unless  He  communicates 
omnipotence,  holds,  that  God  cannot  com- 


92 

municate  any  power  at  all,  without  commu- 
nicating omnipotence.  For  if  he  cannot 
communicate  any  power  at  all  to  a  being, 
without  communicating  to  that  being 
power  to  act  of  himself;  and  if  He  can- 
not communicate  power  to  act  of  him- 
self, without  communicating  omnipotence, 
then  He  cannot  communicate  any  power 
at  all  without  communicating  omnipo- 
tence. 

His  proof,  therefore,  of  the  position — 
Creatures  are  universally  and  absolute- 
ly destitute  of  power, — resolves  itself  into 
the  proposition — God  cannot  communi- 
cate any  power  at  all  without  communi- 
cating omnipotence. 

In  refutation  of  this  proposition,  I  allege 
the  consideration — 

In  \hefirst  place — That  it  is  a  gratuitous 
assumption. 

It  is  not  a  self-evident  proposition.  It 
cannot  be  self-evident,  unless  the  word 
power  be  used  synonymously  with  om- 
nipotence. The  proposition  then  would  be 
— God  cannot  communicate  omnipotence 
without  communicating  omnipotence.  But 
the  word  power  is  not  used  synonymously 
with  omnipotence  ;  for  the  thing  in  ques- 
tion is,  whether  God  may  not  communi- 


93 

cate  power,  which  is  not  omnipotence; 
that  is,  whether  power  may  not  be  some- 
thing which  is  not  omnipotence.  The 
proposition,  therefore,  is  not  a  self-evident 
one,  and  cannot  be  made  a  self-evident 
one  by  even  omnipotence  itself;  since  it 
involves  a  contradiction  to  suppose,  that 
words  used  in  a  different  signification  in  a 
given  case,  should  not  be  used  in  a  differ- 
ent but  similar  signification  in  that  case. 
And  since  the  proposition  is  not  self-evi- 
dent, if  it  be  sustained,  it  must  be  by  evi- 
dence external  to  itself.  The  Doctor, 
however,  has  not  alleged  any  evidence  of 
its  truth.  He  has  only  presented  his  na- 
ked declaration,  and  left  us  to  believe  it 
simply  on  his  authority.  Hut  ho  makes 
rather  too  large  a  demand  on  our  credu- 
lity, in  calling  us  to  believe,  merely  on  his 
authority,  a  proposition  so  contradictory 
to  our  ordinary  and  natural  conceptions, 
and  one  upon  which  the  validity  of  his 
argument  entirely  depends,  and  the  va- 
lidity also  of  all  his  other  arguments  to 
support  the  theory,  (for,  as  will  hereafter 
be  shown,  their  validity  depends  on  the 
validity  of  his  first  argument);  and  thence 
the  truth  of  hio  theory  iteelf. 

In  the  second  place — There  is  no  me- 
dium by  which  it  is  possible  to  prove  that 
the  proposition  is  true.  This,  indeed. 


94 

might  be  inferred  from  the  Doctor's  not 
attempting  its  proof;  since,  had  its  proof 
been  practicable,  it  is  not  to  be  conjectur- 
ed that  he  would  have  left  it  unattempted, 
and    thereby    exposed    himself   to    the 
charge  oi  incapacity  to  discover  it;  or  of 
presumption,  in  resting  his  whole  theory 
on  the  basis  of  his  own  authority,  in  pre- 
ference to  that  of  indubitable  proof.     It  is 
not  a  dictate  of  reason,  that  God  cannot 
communicate  any  power  at  all,  without 
communicating  omnipotence.     If  it  were, 
it  must  be  on  the  ground  of  the  nature  of 
power:  but  if  there  be  any  thing  in  the 
nature  of  power,  which  renders  it  impos- 
sible  that   it   should   be   communicated 
without  communicating  omnipotence,  it 
must  be,  that  power  is,  in  its  nature,  om- 
nipotence ;  or,  that  from  its  nature,  there 
cannot  be  any  degree  in  it  but  omnipo- 
tence.    But  it  is  not  a  dictate  of  reason, 
that  power  is  in  its  nature  omnipotence, 
any  more  than  it  is  a  dictate  of  reason, 
that  reason  is  infinite  reason,  affection  in- 
finite affection,  existence  infinite  existence  : 
and  therefore  it  is  not  more  a  dictate  of 
reason,   that   God   cannot    communicate 
power   without   communicating    omnipo- 
tence, than  it  is,  that  He  cannot  commu- 
nicate reason,  without  communicating  in- 
finite reason — that  He  cannot  communi- 


95 

cate  afleetion,  without  communicating  in- 
finite :  ili'iiion — *it'it  He  cannot  commu- 
nicate p\isiepre,  without  communicating 
infinite  existence. 

\\  (   defy  t!io  !  Motor,  and  all  the  meta- 
physici  me  on  earth,  to  that  rca-ni- 

t!i<'lat"S.  (hilt  there;  may  not  be  </• 
pou-f  !!  as  in  UBden  flec- 

tion,  and    existence.     As    far  as 
teaches,  any  thini;  respecting  the  nature 
of  power,   undi  atlection, 

aches,  that  there  may  be 
decrees  in  one  of  them  as  well  as  another. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  dictates  at  least 
a  probability,  that  there  may  be  degrees 
in  power:  for  as  it  does  not  furnish  anj 
ground  to  conclude,  that  there  may  not  be 
er,  as  well  as  ofexi-tence, 
understanding,  and  i.lleetion  :  Mnce  there 
are  degrees  of  exi  understanding, 

and  affection,  there  is  at  least  a  proba- 
bility that  there  may  be  also  of  power. 

If,  then,  it  is  not  a  dictate  of  reason  that 
there  cannot  be  degrees  in  power,  it  is 
not  a  dictate  of  reason  that  God  cannot 
communicate  power  without  communicat- 
ing omnipotence. 

It  is  not  a  dictate  of  common  sense,  that 
God  cannot  communicate  any  power  at 
all,  without  communicating  omnipotence. 
If  it  be  a  dictate  of  common  sense  in  dis- 


96 

tinction  from  reason,  it  must  be  so  on  the 
ground  that  the  existence  of  power  that 
is  not  omnipotent,  is  inconsistent  with 
something  of  which  we  are  conscious,  or 
which  we  experience  or  observe.  But 
there  is  nothing  of  which  we  are  conscious^ 
that  dictates  the  conclusion,  that  no  power 
but  omnipotence  can  exist.  For  we  are 
conscious  of  nothing  but  the  sensations, 
affections,  and  actions  of  our  bodies  and 
minds;  and  they  do  not  dictate,  that  no 
power  but  omnipotence  can  exist,  any 
more  than  they  dictate,  that  no  existence 
but  that  which  is  infinite  can  exist. 

Nor  is  it  dictated  by  any  thing  which 
we  experience  or  observe.  Were  it  dictated 
by  experience  or  observation,  it  must  be 
on  the  ground,  that  we  do  not  experience 
or  observe  any  exertions  of  power  which 
are  not  omnipotent.  But  that  is  not  the 
fact.  We  do  experience  exertions  of  pow- 
er which  is  limited.  The  power  which 
is  only  adequate  to  w75eld  a  quill,  is  not 
adequate  to  raise  the  Andes  to  the  moon. 
It  is  limited  to  the  production  of  only 
small  effects.  In  like  manner,  we  ob- 
serve that  the  power  of  others,  by  which 
they  produce  effects,  is  limited  to  the  pro- 
duction only  of  effects  of  the  same  kind 
as  those  we  are  able  to  produce.  We 


'97 

never  see  the  power  of  creatures  surpass 
very  narrow  limits.  Common  sense,  there- 
fore, does  not  dictate,  that  no  power  can 
exist  but  what  is  omnipotence :  but  it 
dict-iies,  that  power  does  exist,  which  is 
limited  in  degree. 

Nor  can  it  be  proved  by  testimony,  that 
God  cannot  communicate  any  power  at 
all.  without  communicating  omnipotence. 

We  have  indeed  the  testimony  of  the 
Doctor  in  support  (if  the  position:  but  he 
will  please  to  forgive  our  fastidiousness, 
if  we  demur  in  regard  to  I  :iiony,  so 

far  ns  to  con-ider  the  proposition  not 
provc'l*  till  either  angels  or  (Jod  are  found 
to  yield  him  assistance. 

Since  neither  reason  nor  common  sense 
furnish  any  evidence  in  favour  of  the  pro- 
po-ition,  men  are  incompetent  to  furnish 
testimony  in  support  of  it. 

What  the  testimony  of  the  angels,  holy 
and  unholy,  on  that  subject  would  bef 
could  it  be  obtained,  it  is  needless  to  sup- 
pose. How  much  soever  they  may,  with 
each  other,  have 


-"  reasoned  high 


Of  providence,  foreknowledge,  will,  and  fate— 
Fixt  fate,  freewill,  foreknowledge  absolute," 

or  on  this  subject,  they  have  never  ex- 
pressed their  views  respecting  it  to  men. 
9 


98 

And,  finally,  God  has   never  testified 
that  He  cannot  communicate  any  power 
at  all,  without   communicating   omnipor 
tence.     No  such  testimony,  either  direct 
or  implied,  is  contained  in  the  sacred  vo- 
lume.    If  it  exists  there,  the  Doctor  has 
been  guilty  of  a  great  oversight,  in  not 
detecting  it,  or  else  of  great  presumption, 
in  preferring  his  own  testimony  to  support 
the  proposition.    On  the  other  hand,  God 
treats  men  in  all  the  requisitions,  rewards, 
arid   punishments  of  His  moral   govern- 
ment, as  though  they  possessed  only  limited 
power,  or  as  though  the  power,  by  which 
they  produced  effects,  was  limited:  and 
also  in  His  providence,  by  constituting  a 
necessity  of  only  limited  power  to  accom- 
plish the  effects  men  are  designed  to  ac- 
complish.    And  all  the  language  of  the 
Scriptures  concurs  with  experience  and 
observation  in  producing  the  conviction, 
that  the  power  by  which  men  produce  ef- 
fects is  limited  in  degree.  The  testimony 
of  God,    therefore,    on   the   subject,    is 
against  the  proposition,  not  in  its  favour. 
"  And  let  God  be  true,  and  every  man  a 
liar." 

But  if  it  is  neither  self-evident,  nor  a 
Dictate  of  reason,  nor  of  common  sense, 


99 

nor  is  proved  by  testimony,  that  God  can- 
riot  communicate  any  power  at  all,  with- 
out communicating  omnipotence,  then  the 
proposition  cannot  be  proved  to  be  true; 
for  there  is  no  other  medium  by  which  it 
can  be  proved  to  be  true,  than  either  that 
of  self-evidence,  of  reason,  of  common 
sense,  or  testimony. 

And  if,  as  has  been  shown,  it  is  the  dic- 
tate of  reason  and  common  sense,  and  is 
the  testimony  of  God,  that  He  can  and 
does  communicate  power,  without  com- 
municating omnipotence,  then  the  propo- 
sition is  proved  to  be  false. 

Thus  the  proposition,  alleged  by  the 
Doctor  to  sustain  the  position,  that  crea- 
tures are  universally  and  absolutely  des- 
titute of  power,  is  not  only  a  gratuitous 
assumption,  and  incapable  of  being  prov- 
ed to  be  true,  but  is  proved  to  be  untrue. 
It  does  not  yield  any  support  therefore  to 
the  position  it  is  employed  to  sustain. — 
That  position,  thus  left  unsupported,  be- 
comes a  gratuitous  assumption ;  and  the 
conclusion  drawn  from  it,  viz.  that  God 
creates  all  the  actions  of  men,  is  equally 
unsustained.  The  process,  by  which  the 
Doctor  arrived  at  that  conclusion,  seems 
to  have  been  this: — Power  is  in  its  nature 


100 

omnipotence ;  God  therefore  cannot  com- 
municate any  power  at  all,  without  com- 
municating omnipotence.  Creatures  then, 
not  being  omnipotent,  do  not  possess  any 
power  at  all:  God  therefore  creates  all 
the  actions  of  men. 

The  second  and  third  steps  are,  as  we 
have  shown,  contained  in  his  argument. 
The  second  must  be,  as  before  remarked, 
if  it  be  an  inference  from  any  thing,  an 
inference  from  the  first. 

Now  since  it  has  been  shown,  that  the 
first  step  is  not  only  a  gratuitous  assump- 
tion, and  incapable  of  proof,  but  is  false; 
and  likewise,  that  the  second  step  is  not 
only  a  gratuitous  assumption,  and  incapa- 
ble of  proof,  but  is  also  false ;  therefore 
the  conclusion  drawn  from  it,  viz.  that 
creatures  are  universally  and  absolutely 
destitute  of  power,  is  shown  to  be  erro- 
neous ;  and  thence  also  the  inference 
from  that  conclusion,  that  God  creates  all 
the  actions  of  men. 

No  farther  refutation  of  the  Doctor's 
position^  therefore,  unsupported  as  he 
has  left  it,  is  necessary  in  order  to  invali- 
date his  conclusion  from  it  in  support  of 
his  theory;  for  since  the  position  is  left 
utterly  destitute  of  proof,  the  conclusion 
from  that  position  is  also  left  equally  des- 


101 

titute  of  proof,  and  no  ground  is  presented 
for  the  inference  of  the  theory  from  that 
conclusion.  However,  though  "  we  can- 
not conceive  that  even  Omnipotence  is 
al>lev  to  make  the  Doctor's  argument,  un- 
supported as  he  has  left  it,  a  good  one; 
yet  it  may  be  worth  consideration,  whe- 
ther or  not  any  valid  arguments,  unal- 
leged  by  the  Doctor,  can  be  advanced  to 
su-hiin  hi-  position,  that  creatures  are 
universally  and  absolutely  destitute  of 
power,  from  which  be  deduces  his  theory. 
This  proposition  is  essentially  different 
from  the  other,  from  which  he  inferred  it. 
Tknt  proposition  simply  denied  God's 
ability  to  communicate  a  limited  degree  of 
power;  this  merely  denies  that  He  has 
communicated  </////  /><n/'fr  to  men.  Though 
that  proposition  i-  entirely  false,  yet  this 
may^notwithsanding,  although  the  Doctor 
has  neglected  to  prove  it,  be  true. 

In  proof  then,  that  the  proposition — 
man  is  universally  and  absolutely  desti- 
tute of  power — is  incapable  of  being  de- 
monstrated to  be  true  by'any  argumenta- 
tion whatever,  wre  allege,  in  the  first 
place,  the  consideration,  that  reason  does 
not  yield  it  any  support,  but  furnishes 
proofs  of  its  falsehood. 
9* 


102 

If  reason  could  furnish  a  demonstration 
of  its  truth,  it  would  be  either  by  deduc- 
ing it  directly  from  some  other  known, 
indubitable  truth,  or  bj  proving  its  con- 
verse to  be  inconsistent  with  some  known, 
indubitable  truth.  If  there  is  any  truth 
within  the  compass  of  our  knowledge, 
from  which  the  proposition  can  be  de- 
monstratively deduced  as  a  conclusion* 
it  must  be  one  which  respects  either  God, 
or  man,  or  both.  But  there  is  no  such 
known  truth  respecting  either.  It  is  a 
known  truth,  that  man  is  "  absolutely  de- 
pendent" on  God.  But  it  cannot  be  de- 
monstrated from  that,  that  man  is  abso- 
lutely and  universally  destitute  of  power, 
unless  it  be  proved,  that  he  must  be 
universally  and  absolutely  destitute  of 
power,  in  order  to  be  dependent. 

To  determine  whether  or  riot  men 
must  be  absolutely  destitute  of  power,  in 
order  to  be  dependent,  let  us  ascertain 
what  dependence  is. 

A  being  is  "  absolutely  dependent"  on 
God,  who  is  entirely  dependent  on  Him 
for  existence,  and  the  mode  of  exercising 
his  power;  or  whose  existence,  and  the 
mode  in  which  he  exercises  his  power, 
are  entirely  the  consequence  of  God's 
power,  and  not  his  own. 


103 

As  an  existence  simply,  he  is  "  abso- 
lutely dependent"  on  God,  if  it  is  entirely 
by  th*;  power  of  God*  and  not  by  his  own, 
that  he  exists.  It  bcin^  entirely  by  the 
power  of  God  that  he  began -and  conti- 
nues to  exist,  all  his  powers  and  qualities, 
•  n  existence,  are  entirely  the  effects 
of  God's  power.  His  dependence,  there- 
fore, as  an  existence,  on  God,  is  as  abso-  * 
lute  as  it  can  be. 

And  a-  an  a^ent.  he  is  "absolutely  de- 
pendent" on  God,  if  he  is  absolutely  de- 
pendent on  Him  for  the  modes  in  which 
he  exercise-  hi-  power. 

If  it  is  entirely  the  effect  of  God's  ex- 
erting on  him  such  an  agency  as  he  does, 
that  he  rxerci-e^  his  pourr  in  the  mode 
he  does:  then  he  i-  as  dependent  as  he 
can  be  in  that  r<  -pert.  I'ui  these  are  the 
only  respects  in  which  a  being  can  be  de- 
pendent. For  his  existence,  and  the 
powers  and  qualities  belonging  to  him  as 
an  existence,  and  his  exercises  of  those 
powers,  are  all  you  can  predicate  of  him: 
and  if  he  is  entirely  dependent  on  God 
for  all  you  can  predicate  of  him,  he  is  as 
"  absolutely  dependent"  as  he  can  be. 

Let  us  then  see  whether  a  being,  thus 
dependent,  must  be  universally  and  abso- 
lutely destitute  of  power. 


104 

In  the  first  place,  it  does  not  follow 
from  his  absolute  dependence,  as  an  ex- 
istence, that  he  is  universally  and  abso- 
lutely destitute  of  power.  His  power  is 
a  part  of  that,  which  belongs  to  his  con- 
stitution as  an  existence,  as  much  as  any 
other  property,  and  as  much  as  existence 
itself.  It  no  more  follows,  from  his  de- 
pendence on  God  as  an  existence,  that 
he  is  absolutely  destitute  of  power,  than 
it  does,  that  he  is  absolutely  destitute  of 
existence  itself.  It  follows,  that  he  is  ab- 
solutely destitute  of  the  power  of  self- 
existence^  but  not,  that  he  is  desti4ute  ol  all 
power.  If  it  does,  it  must  be  on  the  ground, 
that  God  cannot  preserve  powrer  in  exist- 
ence. But  it  has  been  shown,  that  there 
is  no  proof  that  God  cannot  communicate 
power  to  a  being,  but  proof  that  He  can: 
but  if  God  can  communicate  power  to  a 
being,  he  can  also  preserve  that  power  in 
existence.  As  no  reason  can  be  shown 
why  He  cannot  communicate  power,  as 
well  as  existence,  understanding,  affection, 
or  any  thing  else ;  so  no  reason  can  be 
shown  why  He  cannot  preserve  power  in 
existence,  as  well  as  existence,  under- 
standing, affection,  or  any  thing  else.  It 
follows  from  his  dependence,  as  an  exist- 
ence, for  all  that  pertains,  to  his  constitu- 


105 

tion  as  an  existence,  that  he  is  "  abso- 
lutely dependent"  for  his  power,  just  as 
he  is  for  every  thing  else,  not  that  he  is 
absolutely  destitute  of  power. 

In  the  next  place,  it  does  not  follow 
from  his  absolute  dependence  as  an  agent, 
that  he  is  absolutely  destitute  oi'  poner. 
For  his  dependence  as  an  ayent,  is  not  a 
dependence  lor  the  f.<istcnce  of  any  thing, 
which  makes  up  his  constitution,  as  an 
tence,  but  only  for  the  vnodf,  in  which 
he  exercises  his  power;  that  is,  that  he 
exercises  it  in  exerting  one  train  of  ac- 
tions, and  not  any  another.  Because  it  is 
the  consequence  of  God's  agency,  that 
he  exercises  his  power  in  exerting  a  given 
scries  of  actions,  and  not  any  other,  it  no 
more  follows  that  he  is  absolutely  desti- 
tute of  power,  than  because  it  i^  the  con- 
sequence of  God's  power,  that  he  exists 
in  th©  mo<lo  hp  does,  and  not  in  any  other 
mode,  it  follows  that  he  is  absolutely  des- 
titute of  existence. 

It  does  not  follow  then,  that  a  being 
thus  dependent  must  be  absolutely  des- 
titute of  power. 

%     But  is  it  possible  that  a  being  should 
be  dependent  in  this  manner D 


106 

In  the  first  place,  as  an  existence  he  may 
and  must  be  dependent  in  this  mariner. 
He  must  either  be  thus  dependent  for 
existence,  or  else  be  self-existent ;  but  he 
is  not  self-existent:  since  that  which  is 
self-existent  does  not  owe  its  existence  to 
any  being  external  to  itself;  but  the  being 
in  question  owes  his  existence  to  God. — 
and  a  self-existent  being  can  never  cease 
to  exist,  as  the  cause  of  his  existence 
cannot  possibly  be  destroyed;  but  the 
being  in  question  can  be  annihilated  ;  for 
God's  omnipotence  can  annihilate  any 
thing  which  it  creates.  As  an  existence, 
therefore,  he  may  and  must  be  "abso- 
lutely dependent"  on  God  for  his  exist- 
ence, and  his  nature  as  an  existence. 

In  the  next  place,  he  may  also,  as  an 
agent*  be  dependent  on  God  for  the  mode 
in  which  he  exercises  his  power.  To 

this,    three  things   nnly  aro  requisite,    1st. 

That  his  constitution  be  such,  that  the 
exercise  of  his  power  shall  take  place 
only  under  the  influence  of  motives;  2d. 
That  it  be  such,  that  God  can  determine 
what  degree  of  influence  any  object,  if 
presented  to  his  mind  as  a  motive,  shall 
exert ;  and  3d.  That  it  be  such,  that  God 
can  determine  what  objects  shall  be  pre- 


107 

sented  to  his  mind  as  motives.  For  if  his 
constitution  be  such,  that  he  cannot  exert 
his  power,  except  under  the  influence  of 
motives,  then  the  foundation  is  laid,  by 
that  constitution,  of  a  certainty  that  he 
will  never  exercise  his  power,  except 
when  motives  are  presented  to  his  mind ; 
and  if  his  constitution  be  such,  that  God 
can  determine  what  degree  of  influence 
any  object,  if  presented  as  a  motive,  shall 
exert,  then  lie  will  be  dependent  on  God 
for  the  mfluenee  which  motives  exert: 
arid  if  his  constitution  be  such,  that  God 
can  determine  what  motives  shall  be  pre- 
sented to  his  mind,  then  he  will  be  depen- 
dent on  God  for  the  mode  in  which  he 
exercises  his  power.  Since,  if  the  mode 
of  his  exercising  his  power  depend  on  the 
influence  of  the  motives  presented  to  him, 
and  God  determine  what  motives  are  pre- 
sented to  him,  and  their  influence,  then  the 
mode,  in  which  he  exercises  his  power, 
will  be  entirely  determined  by  God. 

Can  God  then  form  a  being  with  such 
a  constitution  ? 

In  the  first  place,  He  can  form  a  being 
with  such  a  constitution,  that  the  exercise 
of  his  power  shall  always  take  place  un- 
der the  influence  of  motives ;  for  man  in 


108 

such  a  being.  He  never  exercises  his 
power  in  mental  operations,  or  in  exter- 
nal actions,  but  under  the  influence  of 
motives.  If  any  effects  take  place  in  his 
mind  or  body,  which  do  not  take  place 
under  the  influence  of  motives  before  his 
mind,  they  are  not  the  effects  of  the  exer- 
cise of  his  power,  but  of  some  other  being's. 
Since  then  man  is  such  a  being,  God  can 
form  a  being  with  such  a  constitution,  that 
the  exercise  of  his  power  shall  always 
take  place  under  the  influence  of  motives. 

In  the  next  place — God  can  form  a  be- 
ing of  such  a  constitution,  that  He  can 
determine  what  degree  of  influence  any 
object,  if  presented  as  a  motive  to  the  be- 
ing, shall  exert ;  for  man  is  such  a  being. 

It  is  a  fact,  that  every  motive  under 
whose  influence  he  acts,  exerts  on  him  a 
specific  degree  of  influence  ;  and  there  is  a 
cause  that  it  possesses  that  precise  degree 
of  influence. 

It  is  owing  to  the  nature  of  his  consti- 
tution that  he  is  susceptible  of  influence 
from  motives.  It  is  owing  to  the  nature 
of  his  constitution  that  he  is  capable  of 
pleasure  and  pain  ;  and  that  is  tho  ground 
of  his  being  susceptible  of  influence  from 
motives.  Were  his  constitution  like  that 
of  matter,  he -would  be  no  more  suscepti- 


109 

ble  of  influence  from  motives,  than  a  mir- 
ror is  from  the  image  formed  in  it. 

It  is  owing  to  the  nature  of  his  constitu- 
tion likewise,  that  he  is  capable  of  the 
kinds  of  pleasure  and  pain  of  which  he  is 
susceptible;  and  thence,  that  thu 
of  things  are  motives,  which  arc  capable 
of  affording  him  those  kinds  of  pleasure 
and  pain. 

But  the  nature  of  his  constitution,  by 
wl.ich  he  i<  capable  of  plea-ure  and  pain, 
and  thence  sii-ccptihlr  of  influence  limn 
motives,  and  by  uliieh  hr  i-  capable  of 
those  kinds  and  modes  of  pleasut*e  and 
pain,  as  those  of  the  appetiies.  alli'ctions, 
and  passions  of  which  he  i-  capable,  and 
thence  is  susceptible  of  influence  from 
tho-e  kind-  of  things  \\hich  ;ire  capable 
of  affording  those  kinds  of  pleasure  and 
pain, — is  not  the  cause  that  every  parti- 
cular motive  under  whose  influence  he 
acts,  possesses  that  specific  degree  of  in- 
fluence over  him  which  it  does  possess. 

It  is  his  knmrldire  or  estimation  of  the 
capacity  of  an  object,  which  is  a  motive,  to 
afford  pleasure  or  pain,  that  is  the  cause  that 
that  motive  possesses  that  precise  degree 
of  influence  which  it  does  possess.  The 
degree  of  influence  a  motive  possesses, 
depends  on  the  degree  of  pleasure  or 
10 


110 

pain  it  is  regarded  as  capable  of  affording. 
That  motive  possesses  the  greatest  influ- 
ence, which  is  esteemed  capable  of  afford- 
ing the  greatest  quantity  of  pleasure  or 
pain ;  that  motive  possesses  a  less  influ- 
ence, which  is  considered  as  capable  of 
affording  only  a  less  quantity;  and  that 
motive  possesses  the  least,  which  is  re- 
garded as  capable  of  affording  only  the 
least  quantity. 

It  is  the  nature  of  an  object,  or  its  ca- 
pacity to  afford  pleasure  or  pain,  that 
constitutes  it  a  good  or  evil ;  and  it  is  his 
knowledge  or  estimation  of  that  capacity, 
that  is  the  cause  of  its  possessing  the  in- 
fluence it  does  possess  over  him.  If  the 
capacity  of  an  object  be  known,  it  is  his 
knowledge  of  that  capacity  ; — if  its  capa- 
city be  not  known,  it  is  Ins  judgment  respect- 
ing its  capacity,  that  gives  it  that  specific 
degree  of  influence  it  possesses.  The 
truth  of  these  remarks  every  mind  will 
recognise. 

What  all  the  causes  are  of  his  forming 
that  judgment  which  he  does,  respecting 
the  capacity  of  an  object  whose  capacity 
is  not  known,  we  may  be  unable  to  enu- 
merate. They  may  be  the  resemblance 
or  dissimilarity  of  that  object  to  some 
other  object  whose  capacity  is  known. 


in 

the  testimony  of  others,  and,  for  aught 
we  know,  the  influence  of  the  Holy  Spi- 
rit, or  of  the  advc 

No  ifi  knowledge  or  estimation 

of  the  capacity  of  :ocU  which  i-  a 

motive,  to  afford  j»;  or  pain,  is  the 

cau-o  that  that  motive  pOSBe&es  that  pre- 

of  influence  over  him  it  does 

,    il   is  apparent  that  (Joel  may  dc- 

\N  hat  (!  T  inlluenre  any  ob- 

eiited  In  his  mind  a<  ;• 
;  hi-  jii<i  ve-pcct- 

inic  the*  »  object  is  an  fj- 

and    that   eilect,    1:  ry  other,   mu-t 

have  had   a  cause  :  and  that 
have  eon-titnled.  previously  to  the  e 
cncc  of  tho  effect,  a  ground  of  cerl< 
that   the  eli  \ist  at  tlie 

and  in  the  circumstances  in  which  it  does 
•ist  as  any  other  cause  constitutes 
a  ground   of  certainty,    previously  to  its 
lucing  its  ciJI'cl,  that  its  effect  shall 
f.  at  the  time  and  in  the  circumstances 
in  which  it  does  exist 
Now  the  cause*  of  that  judgment,  and 


*  Cause  here  does  not  mean  the  efficient  cause — the  cause 
whose  power  excr  .   judgment  i<  tlit- 

act  of  the  b  .t  Caut.e  of  the  act ;  it  is  his 

power  by  which  the  act  is  exerted  :  but  the  "  cause'1  in  ques- 
tion  is   the    occasional  idgmpnt;  that    i?,    thr 
cause  which  leads  the  being  voluntarily  to  exert  the  juo. 
by  his  own  po-.ver. 


112 

ground  of  previous  certainty  that  it  should 
exist,  may  and  must  be  constituted  by 
God.  For  the  immediate  cause  of  that 
judgment  must  be,  either  the  being's  con- 
stitution, his  previous  acts,  the  agency  of 
some  other  being  on  him,  or  part  or  all 
of  those  combined  together. 

If  his  constitution  were  the  cause  of 
that  judgment,  then  as  God  formed  that 
constitution,  He  formed  the  cause  of  that 
judgment,  and  the  ground  of  certainty 
previously  to  its  production,  that  that 
judgment  should,  as  an  effect,  be  pro- 
duced by  that  cause.  If  the  cause  were 
the  agency  of  God  himself,  then  He  was 
of  course  the  cause  of  that  judgment 

If  the  cause  were  the  agency  of  any 
other  being,  as  the  adversary;  then,  as 
his  agency  is  controlled  by  God,  God 
must  have  constituted  his  agency  that 
cause,  and  made  it  a  ground  of  certainty 
previously  to  its  producing  its  effect,  that 
it  should  produce  that  judgment  as  its 
effect. 

If  the  cause  were  his  own  previous  acts 
— then,  as  those  acts  also  were  effects,  they 
must  have  had  a  cause,  and  a  ground  of 
certainty,  previously  to  their  existence, 
that  they  should  exi«t,  and  be  the  cause  of 
that  judgment — and  the  cause  of  those 


113 

previous  acts  must  have  been  either  his 
constitution,  the  agency  of  some  other 
being,  his  own  previous  acts,  or  some  or 
all  of  them  combined. 

If  his  own  previous  acts  were  the  cause 
in  question,  then  those  acts  also  being 
effects,  must  have  likewise  hail  a  cause, 
and  ground  of  pfevious  certainty  that 
thev  should  exUt,  and  ho  the  cause  of 
those  art-  whirh  arc  the  cause  in  <|ues- 
tion  :  and  so  of  every  step  in  the 
Causes  of  the  Cause  of  that  judgment,  till 
you  10  i he  first  act,  which  was  a 

i  the  series.  'Thai  act  h< 
an  effect,  must  ha\e  had  a  cau-e;  and 
that  cause  must  have  been  cither  his  con- 
stitution, or  the  ugj'ncv  of  some  other  he- 
ing,  or  both  combined.  If  his  con>tiluiiou 
were  the  sole  cause,  then,  as  before, (i»»  I 
the  former  of  that  constitution,  formed 
that  cause;  and  likewise  if  the  agency  of 
God  were  the  cause  of  that  act.  If  the 
agency  of  the  adversary  were  the  cause 
of  that  act,  then  God,  as  before  shown, 
must  have  constituted  that  agency  the 
cause  of  that  act.  And  if,  whether  his 
constitution,  the  agency  of  God  himself, 
or  the  agenry  of  the  adversary,  were  the 
cause  of  that  act,  God  must  have  consti- 
tuted that  cause;  then,  if  either  of  those 
10* 


114 

two,  or  if  the  three  united,  were  the  cause 
of  that  act,  God  must  also  have  constitut- 
ed that  cause,  and  made  it  a  ground  of 
certainty,  previously  to  the  existence  of 
its  effect,  that  that  act  should  exist  as  its 
effect. 

Now,  since  the  first  cause  in  the  series 
was  a  ground  of  infallible  certainty  that 
the  second  should  exist ;  and  the  second 
was  a  ground  of  infallible  certainty  that 
the  third  should  exist ;  and  so  of  every 
cause  in  the  series  till  you  descend  to  the 
last,  which  was  the  cause  of  the  judg- 
ment; God,  in  constituting  the  first  cause, 
viz.  the  cause  of  the  first  act  that  was  a 
cause,  constituted  the  cause  of  the  last 
cause  in  the  series,  viz.  that  which  produc- 
ed the  judgment,  and  made  it  a  ground  of 
certainty  that  that  last  cause  should  exist 
at  the  time  and  in  the  circumstances  in 
which  it  does  exist.  Arid  if,  whether  his 
constitution,  the  agency  of  some  other  be- 
1112:.  or  his  own  previous  acts,  were  the 
cause  of  that  judgment,  Got/,  as  shown, 
must  have  constituted  that  cause  ;  then,  if 
any  number,  or  all  of  these  united,  were 
the  cause  of  that  judgment,  God  must  also 
have  constituted  that  cause. 

Since,  then,  it  is  thus  demonstrable  that 
God  may  and  must  constitute  the  cause 


115 

of  that  judgment,  it  i»  demonstrable, 
He  may  and  must  determine  what  degree 
of  influence  the  object  which  the  judg- 
ment respects,  shall  as  a  motive  possess. 
For  since  the  degree  of  influence  possess- 
ed by  the  object  as  a  motive,  is  determined 
entirely  by  the  judgment  respecting  the 
capacity  of  that  object  to  afford  pleasure 
or  pain:  and  -hire  that  judgment  is  de- 
termined entirely  by  its  cause ;  therefore 
the  degree  of  influence  p<  1  by  the 

motive    is    determined    entirely    by    the 
e  of  that  judgment.     But  >ince  the 
e\i-ter,ee  and  nature  of  the  cause  of  that 
judgment,  as  has  been  demonstrated,  may 
and  must  be  determined  entirely  by  God, 
therefore  the  ilr^nr  oj 
by  the  moti\e.  m  iy  and  must  be  deter 
mined  entirely  by  God. 

God.  then,  can  form  a  being  of  such  a 
-titution,  that  He  can  determine  what 
degree  of  influence  an  object,  if  present- 
ed as  a  motive,  shall  possess;  for  man  is 
such  a  being.  And  if  He  can  determine 
what  degree  of  influence  one  object  shall 
po— ess.  then  He  can  determine  what  de- 
gree of  influence  any  object,  if  presented 
as  a  motive,  shall  possess. 

And  in  the  last  place — God  is  able  to 


116 

determine  what  motives  shall  1>e  present- 
ed to  his  mind :  for  He  does  determine 
what  motives  are  presented  to  the  mind 
of  man.  This  the  Doctor  holds ;  this  all 
Calviriists  hold ;  and  all  others  who  be- 
lieve with  the  Psalmist,  that  "  He  does 
whatever  he  pleases  in  heaven,  and  in 
earth,  and  in  the  seas,  and  in  all  deep 
places;"  and  with  Nebuchadnezzar,  that 
"  He  doth  according  to  his  will,  in  the 
army  of  heaven,  and  among  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  earth ;"  and  that  "  none  can 
stay  his  hand,  or  say  unto  him,  what  doest 
thou  ?"  If  God's  providence  is  "  His  most 
holy,  wise,  and  powerful  preserving  and 
governing  all  his  creatures,  and  all  their 
actions,"  then  He  must  and  does  deter- 
mine what  motives  are  or  shall  be  pre- 
sented to  the  mind  of  man. 

The  existence  of  the  first  motives  be- 
fore his  mind,  concerning  which  he  exert- 
ed a  volition,  is  an  effect,  and,  like  all 
other  effects,  had  a  specific  cause.  That 
cause,  since  he  hod  not  exerted  any  pre- 
vious act,  must  have  been,  either  his  con- 
stitution, or  the  agency  of  some  other  be- 
ing. If  it  were  his  constitution,  then  God, 
in  creating  that  constitution  such,  that  it 
should  be  a  cause  of  that  effect,  formed  a 
ground  of  infallible  certainty  that  that 


117 

effect  should  exist — that  is,  determined 
the  existence  of  that  motive  before  his 
mind,  at  the  time  and  in  the  circumstan- 
ces in  which  it  did  exist.  If  God's  direct 
agency  were  the  cause  of  its  exigence, 
then  God  determined  its  existence  at  the 
time  and  in  the  circumstances  in  which  it 
did  exist;  and  if  the  agency  of  any  other 
being  wa^tlie  eau-e  of  iN  existence,  then, 
since  Goers  agency,  either  directly  or  in- 
directly, as  before  remarked,  constituted 
a  ground  of  certainty  that  that  being 
should  exert  that  agency,  He  determin- 
ed indirectly  the  existence  of  the  motive 
as  its  effect,  at  the  time  and  in  the  circum- 
stances in  which  it  did  exist.  God.  then, 
Me  to  determine  what  motives  shall  be 
presented  to  a  being  posse— ini:  such  a 
constitution  as  the  one  in  question:  for 
man  i-  Mich  a  being;  and  God  does  de- 
termine what  motives  are  ^resented  to  his 
mind. 

Now  these  three  things,  viz.  that  a  be- 
ing's constitution  be  such,  that  the  exer- 
C'IH'-  of  his  power  shall  take  place  only 
under  the  influence  of  motives;  that  his 
constitution  be  also  such,  that  God  can 
determine  what  degree  <  f  influence  any 
object  presented  as  a  motive  shall  pos- 
sess; and,  that  his  constitution  be  more- 


118 

over  such,  that  God  can  determine  what 
motives  shall  be  presented  to  his  mind; 
these  three  things  are  all  that  are  requisite, 
in  order  that  that  being  may,  as  an  agent, 
be  "absolutely  dependent"  on  God  for 
the  mode  in  which  he  exercises  his  power. 

For,  in  the  first  place,  his  constitution 
being  such,  that  the  exercise  of  his  power 
can  take  place  only  under  thf  influence 
of  motives,  he  will  be  entirely  dependent 
on  the  influence  of  motives  for  the  exer- 
cise of  his  power  at  all  in  any  mode  what- 
ever. 

In  the  second  place,  his  constitution  be- 
ing such,  that  God  is  able  to  determine 
what  degree  of  influence  any  object  pre- 
sented as  a  motive  shall  possess,  he  will 
be  entirely  dependent  on  God  for  the  de- 
gree of  influence  exerted  on  him  by  every 
motive  presented  to  his  mind. 

And,  in  the  third  place,  his  constitution 
being  such,  that  God  can  determine  what 
motives  shall  be  presented  to  his  mind, 
ho  will  be  dependent  on  God  for  the  mode 
in  which  he  exercises  his  power. 

The  mode  in  which  he  exerts  his  power, 
depends  on  the  relative  degree  of  the  influ- 
ence exerted  on  him  by  the  several  mo- 
tives under  whose  influence  he  exercises 
his  power.  He  will  exercise  his  power  in 


119 

ihat  mode  to  which  he  is  influenced,  by 
those  motives  which  exert  on  him  the 
greatest  degree  of  influence.  His  con- 
stitution, then,  berni;-  Mich,  that  God  can 
determine,  in  any  g;  hat  motives 

shall  be  presented  to  his  mind,  God,  by 
presenting  those  motives,  can  determine 
uliat  degree  of  influence  shall  be  exerted 
on  him  to  rxerci-e  hi-  |*n\ 

tiiode  of 

power  he  shall  be  excited 
by  the  xlro^fst  influcnc*-. 

But,  since  he  will  exercise  his  power  in 
that  mode  to  whirh  he  is  excited  by  the 
strongest  influence;  if  it  be  d  ined 

by  God  to  what  mode  of  ex<  his 

power  he  shall  he  excited  by  the  strongest 
iniluenee.  (hen  he  \\i\\  be  entirely  de| 
dent  on  God  for  the  mode  in  which  he  ex- 
erci-es  hi-  pov, 

Th«  of  the  effects  produced 

by  his  power,  will  depend  on  the  f/n(t)>li/y 
of  power  with  which  he  is  endowed.  God, 
therefore,  in  endowing  him  with  that 
quantity  of  power  which  he  possesses, 
will  determine  the  magnitude  of  the  effects 
produced  by  the  exertions  of  his  power. 

God,  then,  is  able  to  form  a  being  of 
such  a  constitution,  that  the  exercise  of 
his  power  shall  take  place  only  under  the 


120 

influence  of  motives  :  that  He  can  deter- 
mine what  degree  of  influence  every  mo- 
tive shall  possess ;  and  that  He  can  de- 
termine what  motives  shall  be  presented 
to  his  mind  :  for  man  is  such  a  being. 

And,  since  a  being,  possessing  such  a 
constitution,  will  be  entirely  dependent 
on  God  for  the  mode  in  which  he  exer- 
cises his  power,  God  can  form  a  being  of 
such  a  constitution,  that  he  shall  be  en- 
tirely dependent  on  Him  for  the  mode  in 
which  he  exercises  his  power. 

God,  then,  as  has  been  shown,  can  form 
a  being  of  such  a  constitution,  that  as  an 
existence,  he  shall  be  "  absolutely  depen- 
dent" on  God  for  his  existence,  and  all 
the  powers  and  qualities  that  make  up  his 
existence ;  and  that  as  an  agent,  he  shall 
be  u  absolutely  dependent"  on  God  for 
the  mode  in  which  he  exercises  his  power. 

It  has  been  also  shown,  that  it  does  not 
follow,  that  a  being  thus  depende-nt  on 
God  as  an  existence  and  an  agent,  is  ab- 
solutely destitute  of  power.  Therefore  it 
has  been  showi?,  that  it  does  not  follow, 
from  man's  being  "  absolutely  depen- 
dent" on  God,  that  he  is  universally  and 
absolutely  destitute  of  power. 

From  the  known  truth  then,  man  is 
*  absolutely  dependent"  on  God,  it  can- 


not  be  demonstrated  that  he  is  univer- 
sally and  absolutely  destitute  of  power. 

Again;  it  is  a  known  truth,  that  the  in- 
finitely wise  God  has  formed  and  governs 
man  in  the  manner  that  yields  Him  the 
largest  tribute  of  glory;  but  it  cannot  be 
demonstrated  from  that,  that  man  is  uni- 
illy  and  absolutely  destitute  of  power. 

God  is  glorified  by  the  display  of  his  at- 
tributes. If,  then,  it  follows  from  the  fact, 
that  God  has  formed  and  governs  man  in 
the  manner  that  yields  Him  the  largest 
tribute  of  glory,  that  man  is  destitute  of 
power,  it  must  be  on  the  ground  that  his 
creation  and  government,  if  absolutely 
destitute  of  power,  would  involve  a  larger 
exhibition  of  the  divine  attributes  than 
his  creation  and  L;O\  eminent,  if  endowed 
with  power.  Hut  his  creation  and  go- 
vernment, if  destitute  of  power,  would  not 
involve  so  large  a  display  of  the  divine 
attributes,  as  his  creation  arid  govern- 
ment, if  endowed  with  power. 

In  the  first  place,  his  creation,  if  endow- 
ed with  power,  would  involve  a  larger  ex- 
hibition of  the  divine  attributes  than  if 
absolutely  destitute  of  power. 

For  since,  if  endowed  with  power,  all 
that  belonged  to  his  constitution,  apart 
11 


122 

from  his  power,  would  exactly  resemble 
his  whole  constitution,  if  absolutely  des- 
titute of  power;  as  large  a  display  of  the 
divine  attributes  would  be  made  in  creat- 
ing what  belonged  to  his  constitution, 
apart  from  his  power,  as  in  creating  the 
whole,  if  destitute  of  power.  A  larger  dis- 
play of  them,  therefore,  would  be  made  in 
creating  his  whole  constitution,  if  endow- 
ed with  power,  than  in  creating  the  whole, 
if  destitute  of  power.  For  the  creation 
of  his  power  would  manifest  the  divine  at- 
tributes, as  far  as  we  can  judge,  at  least 
as  much  as  the  creation  of  his  understand- 
ing, affections,  or  any  other  part  of  his 
constitution.  The  power  of  God  would, 
as  far  as  we  can  see,  be  as  luminously 
displayed  ;  and  the  wisdom  of  God,  in 
adapting  the  degree  of  power,  and  the 
mode  of  its  exertion,  to  the  other  parts 
of  the  constitution,  would  be  as  conspicu- 
ouslv  exhibited,  as  in  adapting  the  under- 
standing or  affections  to  the  other  parts  of 
the  constitution. 

In  the  next  place,  his  government  would 
involve  a  larger  exhibition  of  the  divine 
attributes,  if  endowed  with  power,  than 
if  absolutely  destitute  of  power. 

The  power  of  God  would,  in  our  ap- 
prehension, be  more  illustriously  display- 


123 

ed  in  directing  the  vast  and  complicated 
means  of  a  providential  government,  so  as 
to  control  the  power  of  man  in  all  its  ex- 
ertions and  bring  all  his  actions  into  ex- 
istence, conformably  to  His  own  design, 
than  in  simply  creating  all  those  acti 
And  the  contrivance  and  direction  of  the 
s\-iem  of  means  such  a  providential  go- 
vernment would  involve,  would  present  a 
bonndl*  re  fur  d  'manifc.-ta- 

tioii>   of  (u><|V  \\  i-dom.      1  di-phv 

would  be  reMricted  to  comparatively  nar- 
row limit-,  were  all  the  art'mns  of  men 
brought  into  existence  by  God'-  creative 
power;  as  that  would  involve  only  an  in- 
finite repetition  of  the  same  exhibition  of 
His  wisdom. 

Since,  then,  the  creation  and  govern- 
ment of  man.   if  absolutely  destitute 
Id  invol  ^p'ay  of 

divine  attributes  than  if  endowed  with 
power;  the  fact,  that  God  has  formed  and 
governs  man  in  the  manner  that  yields 
Him  the  largest  tribute  of  glory,  does  not 
present  any  ground  for  the  inference  that 
he  is  absolutely  destitute  of  power;  but. 
on  the  contrary,  conducts  us  to  the  con- 
conclusion,  that  he  is  endowed  with 
power. 


J24 

From  neither  of  these  known  truths 
then,  respecting  God  and  man,  can  it  be 
inferred,  that  man  is  universally  and  ab- 
solutely destitute  of  power.  But  there  is 
no  other  known  truth  respecting  either 
God  or  man,  from  which  such  a  conclusion 
can  be  obtained.  If  it  is  neither  neces- 
sary, that  he  should  be  universally  and 
absolutely  destitute  of  power,  that  he  may 
be  "  absolutely  dependent"  on  God,  nor 
that  God  may  be  glorified  to  the  highest 
decree  by  his  creation  and  government; 
then  it  cannot  be  necessary  on  any 
ground. 

Reason^  therefore,  does  not  yield  any 
support  to  the  proposition,  man  is  uni- 
versally and  absolutely  destitute  of  power, 
but  furnishes  proof  of  its  falsehood. 

In  proof  that  that  proposition  is  incapa- 
ble of  being  demonstrated  to  be  true  by 
any  argumentation  whatever,  we  allege, 
in  the  next  place,  the  consideration, 
that  common  tense  does  not  furnish  it  any 
support,  but  concurs  with  reason  in  prov- 
ing its  falsehood.  Were  any  evidence 
afforded  by  common  sense  that  the  pro- 
position is  true,  it  must  be  something  of 
M'hioh  we  are  conscious,  or  which  we 
experience,  or  observe. 


125 

13  ut  our  consciousness  does  not  afford  any 
evidence  of  its  truth.  We  are  not  indeed 
conseious  of  possessing  power;  but  it 
dors,  not  thence  follow  tint  we  are  abso- 
lutely destitute  of  it,  any  more  than  that, 
because^  we  are  not  conscious  of  our  ex- 
istence it  follows  that  we  are  absolutely 
de-titute  of  exi-tence.  \\e  are  conscious 
of  nothing  hut  the  sensations,  allertions, 
and  actions  of  our  bod  ie8  and  mind-.  Our 
not  brina;  conscious  of  possessing  pouer. 
no  more  |,r<>\  e<  (i-  de-tit ute  of  it.  than  our 
not  beinu  consciou>  of  e\  proves 

us  de-tiitile  of  that :  or  our  not  being  con- 
scious of  the  growth  of  our  bodies,  and 
the  circulation  of  our  Mood  pro\es.  that 
neither  of  these  effects  takes  place  in  our 
bodies. 

Nor  does  our  experience  or  observation 
afford  any  evidence  that  \\  e  are  absolute- 
ly destitute  of  power.  \Ve  surely  never 
experience  an  absolute  destitution  of  it. 
We  find  by  experience  that  we  are  d<--ii- 
tute  of  power  to  subvert  the  hills,  calm 
the  tempest,  and  trample  on  empires ;  but 
not  that  we  are  destitute  of  power  to 
think,  to  converse,  and  to  move.  \Y  e  ex- 
perience only  a  limitation  of  our  power, 
not  a  total  destitution  of  it.  In  like  man- 
ner we  observe,  that  others  are  incapable 

n* 


126 

only  of  producing  those  stupendous  ef- 
fects which  surpass  our  own  power,  not 
that  they  are  totally  destitute  of  power. 

No  evidence  therefore  is  furnished  by 
common  sense,  that  man  is  universally 
and  absolutely  destitute  of  power 

But  on  the  other  hand  it  furnishes  proof 
that  he  is  possessed  of  power. 

It  is  the  natural  and  universal  convic- 
tion of  mankind,  that  the  power  by  which 
their  actions  are  exerted,  is  their  own 
power,  and  belongs  to  their  constitution, 
as  much  as  their  actions  and  their  exist- 
ence are  their  own.  This  conviction  is 
as  natural  and  as  strong  as  their  convic- 
tion is,  from  the  fact,  that  they  act,  that 
they  exist;  or  from  the  fact,  that  they 
perceive  external  objects,  that  external 
objects  exist:  and  no  man  can  escape 
this  conviction,  any  sooner  than  he  can 
the  conviction,  that  he  exists,  and  that 
external  objects  exist.  If  any  ever  arrive 
at  the  conclusion  that  they  are  absolutely 
destitute  of  power,  and  that  their  actions 
are  entirely  the  effects  of  God's  power, 
it  is  by  a  course  of  reasoning  against  their 
natural  belief,  just  as  those,  who  deny 
their  own  existence,  and  that  of  external, 
objects,  advance  to  those  conclusions,  by 
arguing  against  their  natural  convictions. 


127 

Mankind  display  this  conviction  in  all 
their  views  of  their  agency. 

They  exhibit  it  in  all  their  endeavours 
to  act.  A  man.  who  attempts  to  lift  a 
weight,  does  it  because  he  believes  him- 
self possessed  of  power  to  lift  it.  Take 
an  ay  the  belief  that  he  lias  power,  and 
he  will  not  attempt  to  raise  it. 

They  display  it  in  all  their  purposes 
and  promise-  to  ;tct.  No  man  forms  the 
purpose  of  walking,  if  convinced  that  he 
doo.  not  possess  pouerto  walk.  No  man 
designs  to  ily.  No  man  promises  to  be 
in  two  places  at  the  same  time* — to  raise 
the  dead — to  detain  the  sun  over  Mount 
(jihcou,  or  the  moon  over  the  vale  of 
Ajalon.  They  purpose  and  promise  to 
do  those  things  only,  which  they  belie\e 
thry  possess  power  to  do.  Every  purpose 
and  promise  rests  on  the  conviction,  that 
thry  can  execute  what  they  \\ill  to  exe- 
cute. 

They  manifest  this  conviction  in  their 
reliance  on  the  purposes  and  promises  of 
each  other.  Take-away  the  conviction, 
that  tin i/  have  power  to  act,  and  you  will 
destroy  all  confidence  in  them,  that  what 
they  purpose  and  promise  will  ever  exist. 
Men  never  will  confide  in  each  other  to  ac- 
complish any  thing,  if  they  do  not  believe 


128 

that  the  power,  by  which  the  thing  is  to 
be  accomplished  belongs  to  themselves*  but 
put  their  confidence  entirely  in  God,  to 
whom  the  power  does  belong.  They  will 
never  confide  in  themselves  to  effect  any 
thirg,  if  they  do  not  believe  it  is  to  be  ac- 
complished by  their  own,  and  not  by 
God's  power,  but  will  confide  entirely  in 
God  to  accomplish  it. 

They  display  this  conviction  in  their 
views  of  obligation.  It  is  held  as  a  first 
principle  in  morals,  that  a  being  must 
possess  natural  powers  to  do  an  act,  in 
order  to  be  under  obligation  to  do  it; 
that  a  being  is  under  no  obligation  to 
obey  a  law,  requiring  a  service  entirely 
above  his  natural  power.  Take  away 
natural  power  to  love,  to  believe,  to  pray, 
and  praise,  and  men  will  not  regard  them- 
selves under  any  more  obligation  to  do 
those  acts,  than  those  who  were  miracu- 
lously healed  of  diseases,  regarded  them- 
selves under  obligations  to  heal  them- 
selves in  the  manner  they  were  healed. 
The  man  who  loses  the  power  of  seeing, 
feels  no  obligation  to  read  the  Word  of 
God  :  the  man  who  has  become  deaf,  feels 
no  obligation  to  hear  it :  the  man  who  has 
lost  the  power  of  going  to  the  sanctuary, 
feels  no  compunction  for  not  entering  its 


129 

gates.  Convince  men  that  the  power,  by 
which  (heir  actions  are  produced,  is 
lodged  entirely  in  the  hands  of  God,  and 
not  in  their  own,  and  you  disarm  their 
consciences  of  power  to  approve  or  con- 
demn. They  never  praise  or  blame 
themselves  for  effects  produced  in  them 
by  another's  power. 

They  exhibit  this  conviction  in  all  their 
language  respecting  the  power  by  which 
their  actions  are  produced.  They  ascribe 
power  to  themM'Iw-  and  other-.  They 
OtEtinguieb  between  etleeU  produced  in 
themselves,  by  their  own  power,  and  by 
the  power  of  God  and  other  beings.  They 
distinguish  the  different  degrees  of  power, 
pn-scsscd  by  different  individuals,  and 
by  themselves  at  different  period.?,  as 
much  as  they  di-tm^ui-h  the  differences 
in  (heir  form  and  mental  qualities  Were 
it  not  for  the  conviction,  that  the  power 
which  exerts  their  actions  is  their  own, 
and  not  any  other  being's,  they  would  no 
more  predicate  the  power  by  which  their 
actions  are  exerted,  of  themselves,  than 
they  predicate  the  power  by  which  a  ma- 
chine is  moved,  of  the  machine  itself;  or 
the  power  by  which  a  thing  is  created,  of 
the  thing  itself. 

Now  this  universal  and  irresistible  con- 


130 

viction  of  mankind,  that  the  power,  by 
which  their  actions  are  exerted,  is  their 
own  power,  and  not  God's,  as  much  as 
their  actions  and  existence  are  their  own, 
and  not  God's,  must  have  some  cause, 
and  that  cause  can  be  no  other  than  their 
constitution.  Now  their  constitution  in 
giving  its  testimony,  that  their  power  is 
actually  their  own  as  they  believe,  testi- 
fies either  in  accordance  with  fact,  or  else 
in  contradiction  to  fact.  But  their  consti- 
tution cannot  give  a  testimony  contradict- 
ing the  truth.  If  it  does,  they  are  totally 
deceived  on  a  subject  of  more  importance 
than  any  other,  and  since  God  made  their 
constitution,  they  are  deceived  by  Him. 

But  God  cannot  be  believed  to  have 
thus  deceived  mankind.  No  reason  can 
be  assigned  for  His  deceiving  them  at  all, 
and  especially  on  a  subject  of  such  bound- 
less consequence  to  themselves.  If  they 
are  totally  destitute  of  power,  no  injury 
can  be  conceived  to  result  from  their 
knowing  it.  It  could  not  affect  their  re- 
sponsibility or  the  mode  of  their  conduct : 
for  their  moral  obligation,  assuredly,  can- 
not he  constituted  by  their  ignorance  of 
themselves;  and  if  their  actions  are  cre- 
ated by  God.  their  knowledge  of  the  fact 
could  Dot  prevent  His  continuing  to  cre- 
ate them. 


131 

And  how  could  God  thus  deceive  men, 
consistently  with  His  rectitude?  Would 
it  be  consistent  with  His  truth  to  work  a 
miracle,  to  lead  men  to  believe  a  false- 
hood ?  But  what  would  that  be  doin^,  but 
merely  placing  ihrm  in  circum<tanees.  in 
which  their  constitution  force1  d  them  to 
believe  a  falsehood  ?  Is  it  any  more  con- 
sistent with  His  truth,  to  place  them  in 
cirrumsi-Mices  in  which  \\iilumt  a  mira- 
cle, their  constitution  forces  them  to  be- 
lieve what  is  total!}  false,  than  it  is  to  em- 
ploy a  miracle  to  brini;  them  into  such 
circumstances?  Qan  it  be  >i«pposed  to 
be  more  justifiable  in  God,  to  employ  the 
arts  of  deception  to  accomplish  liise: 
than  it  is  in  men  to  attain  theirs?  . 

How  is  it  consistent  with  His  wisdom? 
Can  it  be  supposed  that  His  infinite  un- 
derstanding i>  incompetent  to  <!<• 
means  to  attain  His  ends,  without  deceiv- 
ing men  in  what  is  most  momentous  to 
their  well  being? 

But  God  cannot  have  thus  deceived 
men;  since  it  would  lay  a  foundation  for 
an  entire  distrust  of  all  His  declarations. 
If  it  can  be  shown,  that  the  universal  and 
irresistible  conviction  of  all  mankind,  that 
the  power  which  exerts  their  actions,  is 
their  own,  and  not  any  other  being's,  is 


132 

entirely  owing  to  an  illusion  imposed  by 
their  constitution,  and  not  to  the  fact, 
that  that  power  is  their  own;  then  it 
cannot  be  shown,  that  their  belief  of  any 
thing  else  respecting  themselves,  or  God, 
is  not  entirely  owing  to  an  illusion  arising 
from  their  constitution.  And  if  it  can  be 
proved,  that  God  has  deceived  them  in 
regard  to  one  point  of  such  consequence, 
it  cannot  be  shown,  that  He  has  not  de- 
ceived them  in  regard  to  every  other 
point. 

When  therefore  we  are  conducted  to 
the  conclusion,  that  our  belief,  that  the 
power  which  exerts  our  actions  is  our 
own.  is  entirely  owing  to  an  illusion;  we 
consign  our  Bible  to  the  flames — heaven 
and  hell  vanish  from  our  eye — we  anni- 
hilate the  substance  of  things  hoped  for, 
and  the  evidence  of  things  not  seen.  We 
cannot  trust  the  testimony  of  our  senses 
that  we  witness  a  miracle;  nor  the  testi- 
mony of  our  constitution  that  we  exist, 
and  that  our  actions  are  our  own;  unless 
we  can  also  trust  the  testimony  of  our 
constitution,  that  the  power  which  exerts 
our  actions  is  also  our  own  power,  and 
not  the  power  of  some  other  being. 

Common  sense,  then,  instead  of  yielding 
any  support  to  the  proposition,  that  man 


133 

is  universally  and  absolutely  destitute  of 
power,  presents  her  indubitable  testimo- 
ny, that  the  power  by  which  man  acts,  ie 
his  own  ;  in  the  same  manner  that  his  un- 
derstanding, affections,  and  existence  an- 
his  own.     We  cannot  discredit  her  i« 
mony  to  this  any  more  than  to  any  ol 
fact.     If  her  testimony,  that  the  |>o\v< 
which  man  acts   i-   lii-  <>un,   i-   net    i 
tru-ted.  her  testimony,  that  man  i 
his  agency,   that   exlenal  o!>jee; 
that  he  himself  exist-.  i>  not  to  be  credit- 
ed ;   we  are  plunged   amid   the  -dark  il- 
limitable ocean*'  of  skepticism. 

In  the  third  place,  God,  in  the  I 
lume  of  His  revelation,  has  given  His 
testimony,  in  concurrence  with  tint  of 
reason  and  common  sense,  that  man 
possesses  the  power  which  i-  exerted 
in  his  actions.  He  n.->  where  repre- 
sents men  as  universally  and  absolute- 
ly destitute  of  power.  But  He  treats 
them  as  possessing  the  power  of  acting, 
by  requiring  them  to  act;  by  prescribing 
a  mode  of  action,  and  prohibiting  their 
acting  in  any  other  mode ;  and  by 
His  promising  to  rewrard  obedience,  and 
threatening  to  punish  disobedience.  Were 
they  actually  possessed  of  all  the  power 
12 


134 

by  which  their  actions  are  produced,  we 
should  expect  Him  to  treat  them  thus.  But 
were  they  entirely  destitute  of  it,  we  should 
no  more  expect  it  than  we  should  expect 
to  behold  Him  imposing  moral  laws  on 
brutes,  and  machines,  and  unorganized 
matter :  for  we  cannot  discern  the  pro- 
priety of  His  requiring  a  being  absolutely 
destitute  of  power,  to  produce  an  effect, 
which  cannot  be  produced  except  by 
His  own  power.  If  God  produces  all  the 
effects  that  are  produced  in  the  universe, 
and  must  produce  them,  why  does  He 
call  on  other  beings  to  produce  them? 
Why  reward  some  as  though  for  doing, 
and  punish  some  as  though  for  not  doing, 
if  it  is  impossible  for  any  of  them  to  obey 
of  themselves  ? 

In  God's  administration  as  a  moral 
Governor,  in  which  He  thus  treats  men, 
ns  possessing  the  power  by  which  their 
actions  are  exerted,  we  have  therefore 
His  testimony  to  the  fact,  that  they  are 
not  universally  and  absolutely  destitute 
of  power,  but  possess  the  power  by  which 
they  act,  distinctly  from  God's  power,  in 
the  same  manner,  as  they  possess  exis- 
tence distinctly  from  God's  existence,  and 
act  distinctly  from  God's  acting. 

But  if  neither  reason,  common  sense, 


zior  Revelation,  furnish  any  support  to  the 
proposition,  that  man  i-  universally  and 
absolutely  destitute  of  pouer;  but  all 
unite  in  proving  it  to  be  false;  then  it 
cannot  be  proved  to  br  (rue.  by  any  ar- 
-gumentation  whatever;  lor  there  is  no 
other  source  from  which  proof  of  its  truth 
ran  be  derived. 

\Ve  have,  indeed,  ih«  itv  of  the 

Doctor,  against  ihat  trf  reason  and  e<>m- 
mon  sense;  but  wlio  will  hesitate,  that 
the  testimony  of  common  sense  and  rea- 
son is  more  worthy  of  credence.  \Ve 
have  the  authority  of  the  Doctor,  as  we 
apprehend  it,  against  the  testimony  of 
God;  but  the  "testimony  of  God  is  the 
.ter.v  Since  then,  as  has  been  shown. 
neither  the  reasons  alleged  by  the  Doc- 
tor, nor  any  other  reasons  that  can  be 
alleged,  prove  that  man  is  universally  find 
absolutely  destitute  of  power;  and  since, 
as  has  also  been  shown,  reason,  co*nmon 
sense,  and  revelation,  unite*  their  testi- 
mony in  proving,  that  man  is  not  univer- 
sally and  absolutely  destitute  of  power; 
but  actually  possesses  the  power  by  which 
he  acts ;  therefore,  the  position  of  the  Doc- 
tor, that  man  is  universally  and  absolutely 
destitute  of  power,  is  proved  to  be  wholly 
gratuitous  and  without  foundation;  and 


136 

•hence  his  inference  from  it,  that  men  can- 
not act  without  a  divine  agency,  to  pro- 
duce their  actions,  is  proved  to  be  totally 
fallacious  and  unsound ;  and  therefore 
his  conclusion  from  that  inference,  that  God 
creates  all  the  actions  of  men,  is  proved 
to  be  a  false  conclusion. 

So  much  for  the  Doctor's^r^?/  argument, 
founded  on  the  dependence  of  creatures. 
If  our  reasonings  in  refutation  of  it  are 
conclusive,  our  work  is  chiefly  accom-, 
plished;  since,  as  already  remarked,  the 
Doctor  in  all  his  subsequent  arguments 
assumes  the  position,  that  man  is  univer- 
sally and  absolutely  destitute  of  power, 
as  true;  and  their  validity  depends  en- 
tirely on  the  validity  of  that  assumption. 
Our  task  therefore  is  henceforth  circum- 
scribed chiefly  to  -the  narrow  limit  of 
showing,  that  that  assumption  being  gra- 
tuitous and  false,  his  reasonings  depend- 
ing on  it,  are  inconclusive. 

His  scriptural  arguments,  as  before  ob- 
served, are  not  numerically  divided  ;  the 
passages,  however,  which  he  employs, 
present  ground  for  such  a  division  as  has 
been  made,  and  may  be  most  advan- 
tageously considered  in  such  an  arrange- 
ment. 

He  presents  then,  as  the  ground  of  his 


]  3? 

second  argument  to  sustain  the  proposi- 
tion, God  creates  all  the  actions  of  men, 
passages  of  Scripture  asserting,  that  God 
governs  mankind. 

They  are  the  following : — "  The  pre- 
parations of  the  heart,  and  the  answer  of 
the  tongue,  is  from  the  Lord,"  Vol.  i.  pu 
203.  "The  king's  heart  is  if)  the  hand 
of  the  Lord  ;  as  the  rivers  of  water,  he 
turneth  it  whithersoever  he  will/3  P.  380. 
To  these  may  be  added,  the  passages  in 
which  God  is  said  to  have  >enl  Joseph 
into  Egypt;  to  have  hardened  the  hearts 
of  Pharaoh  and  the  Egyptians;  to  have 
sent  Saul  to  Samuel  :  to  have  command- 
ed SLimei  to  cui^e  David  ;  to  have  taken 
away  from  Job  that  of  which  he  was 
stripped  by  the  Chaldeans  and  Sabeans; 
to  have  sent  the  king  of  ASSA  :  .inst 

the  nation  of  Israel;  to  have  hardened 
the  hearts  and  blinded  the  eyes  of  the 
Israelites;  to  have  bruised  the  Redeem- 
er, and  put  him  to  grief.  Vol.  ii.  p.  29., 
30,  31,  and  vol.  i.  p.  229,  230.  To  these 
the  Doctor  might  with  equal  propriety 
have  added  innumerable  others,  teaching 
us,  that  God  "  doth  according  to  his  will 
in  the  army  of  heaven,  and  among  the  in- 
habitants of  the  earth  ;"  that  He  "  governs 
nations  upon  the  earth,"  &c, 
12* 


138 

Now,  what  are  these  and  similar  passa- 
ges more  than  mere  declarations,  that  God 
governs  mankind  in  all  their  agency ?  What 
other  truth  is  conveyed  to  us  by  the  first 
passage,  than  that  "  the  preparation  of  the 
heart,  and  the  answer  of  the  tongue  is 
from  the  Lord ;"  that  is,  that  God  governs 
all  the  exercises  of  the  heart,  and  all  the 
language  of  the   tongue  ?     What   other 
truth  is  conveyed   to  us  by  the  second, 
than  that,  "  the  king's  heart  is  in  the  hand 
of  the  Lord,  and  he  turneth  it  whither- 
soever he  will,"  that  is,  that  the  king's 
heart  is  under  His  control,  and  He  governs 
all  its  exercises  according  to  His  plea- 
sure?   What  other  truth  is  presented  to 
us  by  the  declaration  that  He  sent  Joseph 
into  Egypt;  than  that  He  governed  Joseph 
and  his  brethren,  and  the  Ishmaelites  in 
such  a  manner  that  Joseph  was  conveyed 
into  Egypt  in  the  way  in  which  he  was? 
What  other  truth  are  we  taught,  respect- 
ing God's  agency,  in  the  passages  declar- 
ing, that  God  hardened  the  hearts  of  Pha- 
raoh, the  Egyptians,  and  the  Israelites, 
than  that  God  governed  them  in  such  a 
manner,  that  their  hearts  were  hard  ? — 
and  so  of  the  others.     Do  these  passages 
present  us  with  any  intelligence  respect- 


139 

ing  GoiTs  agency  on  mankind,  except  the 
mere  fad,  that  lie  f*otxf?w  them  ?  Do  they 
utter  a  whisper  respecting  the  mode  of  His 
We  defy  the  Doctor  and  all  his 
disciples  to  advance  a  single  reason  to 
prove,  that  they  teach  us  any  thing  res- 
pecting the  mode  of  God'  that 
shall  not  disgrace  the  merest  sciolist  in 
Biblical  criticism,  or  in  reasoning.  They 
simply  exhibit  Cod  to  us  as  governing  all 
the  of  men;  they  convey  us  no 
information  whatever  of  the  mode  of  His 
agency. 

The  Doctor's  inference  from  these  pas- 
sages is  therefore  a  mere  petitio  prin- 
cipii. 

The  proposition  these  passages  are  em- 
ploy ed  to  sustain  is,  God  all  the 
actions  of  men:  but  the  truth  proved  by 
the  passages  is  merely,  that  ( 
all  the  actions  of  men.  The  inference  of 
the  mode  in  which  He  governs,  from  the 
fact  that  He  governs,  is  obtained  In 
suming  the  position,  that  the  mode  in 
which  He  governs  all  their  actions,  must 
be  that  of  creating  all  of  them;  which  is 
taking  the  thing  to  be  proved  as  granted. 
The  Doctor  seems  to  have  advanced  to 
this  conclusion,  as  in  the  former  argu- 
ment, by  assuming  the  position,  that  man 


140 

i-s  universally  and  absolutely  destitute  of 
power,  and  thence  inferring,  that  as  he 
cannot  act  of  himself,  God  must  create  all 
his  actions.  The  Doctor  would  have 
been  more  obliging  to  his  readers,  had 
he  not  ventured  to  take  it  for  granted 
that  they  were  so  destitute  of  considera- 
tion as  not  to  detect  the  fallacy  of  such 
reasoning. 

It  no  more  follows  from  the  fact,  that 
God  governs  all  the  actions  of  men,  that 
He  creates  all  their  actions;  than  it  fol- 
lows from  the  fact,  that  He  sent  Joseph 
into  Egypt,  that  He  sent  him  in  the  same 
manner  that  David  slang  the  pebbles,  or 
that  Saul  threw  the  javelin,  or  that  Jona- 
than shot  his  arrows ;  or  than  it  follows 
from  the  fact,  that  Solomon  built  the  tem- 
ple, that  he  built  it  entirely  with  his  own 
hands,  and  by  his  own  power.  Let  us 
exemplify  the  absurdity  of  this  method  of 
reasoning;  The  Doctor  infers  from  the 
mere  existence  of  a  fact,  the  mode  in  which 
that  fact  carne  into  existence.  How  will 
it  appear  applied  to  some  other  class  of 
facts  ?  Let  us  apply  it  to  that  class  called 
motions.  Assume  the  position,  then,  that 
£he  mode  in  which  all  beings  move,  is  that 
^f  flying,  and  allege  in  proof  of  it  the  fact 
ihal  they  move.  Thus,  Jacob  went  t& 


141 

Padanaram,  therefore  he  Jhw  to  Padan- 
aram.  Joseph's  brethren  cast  him  into 
the  pit;  therefore  he  flew  into  the  pit. 
His  brethren  drew  him  out  of  the  pit; 
therefore  he  flew  out.  God  sent  Jonah 
to  Nineveh ;  therefore  Jonah  flew  to  Ni- 
neveh, the  incidents  of  his  voyage  in  the 
Mediterranean  notwithstanding.  Paul, 
having  appealed  to  Caesar,  went  from  Je- 
rusalem to  Rome;  therefore  he  flew  to 
Rome  with  all  the  ship's  company.  Is  it 
any  better  reasoning  to  say.  ( 
mankind  in  all  their  actions;  therefore 
He  crcafcs  all  their  actions? 

The  inference  that  God  governs  by  creat- 
ing all  their  actions,  cannot  be  obtained 
from  the  mere  f.n-t  that  He  governs*  until  it 
is  proved,  from  other  sources^  that  the  only 
mode  in  which  He  does  or  can  govern,  is 
that  of  creating.  But  the  Doctor  has  not 
attempted  that,  except  in  hi-  first  argu- 
ment; and,  as  has  been  shown,  did  no- 
thing more  then,  than  to  beg  the  position 
to  be  proved.  He  never  can  prove  it,  till 
he  is  endowed  with  omniscience.  He 
cannot  prove,  that  the  only  mode  in 
which  God  can  govern  mankind,  is  that 
of  creating  all  their  actions,  till  he  has 
discovered  all  the  modes  in  which  God 
can  influence  men:  and  he  cannot  di— 


M2 

cover  that,  till  he  has  found  out  the  Al- 
mighty unto  perfection.  Until  he  has 
proved  that  there  is  no  other  mode  in 
which  God  may  govern,  than  that  of 
creating,  he  cannot  infer  that  God  cre- 
ates all  the  actions  of  men,  from  the  mere 
fact  that  He  governs  all  their  actions,  with 
any  more  conclusiveness,  than  he  can  in- 
fer any  other  proposition  the  English  lan- 
guage can  express.  His  premise  and  his 
conclusion  lie  further  apart  than  "  thrice 
from  the  centre  to  the  utmost  pole." 

He  presents,  as  the  basis  of  his  third 
argument,  passages  of  Scripture  respect- 
ing ihe  dependence  of  men  upon  God. 

They  are  the  following: — "  In  God  we 
live,  and  move,  and  have  our  being." 
46  We  are  not  sufficient  of  ourselves  to 
think  any  thing  as  of  ourselves ;  but  our 
sufficiency  is  of  God."  "I  can  do  all  things 
through  Christ,  which  strengthened!  me." 
44  The  way  of  man  is  not  in  himself;  it  is 
not  in  man  that  walketh  to  direct  his 
Bteps."  Vol.  i.  p.  203,  204.  Vol.  ii.  p. 
165. 

These  passages  are  advanced  as  ground 
for  the  inference,  that  God  creates  all  the 
actions  of  men.  But  how  does  the  Doc- 
tor extort  from  them  that  inference  ?  Ca« 


143 

the  shrewdest  sophist  make  out  that  they 
teach  any  thing  more  than  the  fact,  that 
men  are  dependent  on  God  ?  Nothing  but 
that  fact  is  taught  us  in  the  first  passage, 
obviously  from  the  language  itself,  and 
the  design  of  the  Apostle  in  using  it. 
Look  at  the  language  in  connexion  with 
which  it  occurs.  "God  that  made  the 
world,  and  all  things  therein,  seeing  that 
he  is  Lord  of  heaven  and  rarth,  dwelleth 
not  in  temples  made  with  hands,  neither 
is  worshipped  with  men's  hands,  as  though 
he  needed  any  thing,  seeing  he  giveth  to 
all  life,  and  breath,  and  all  things,  and 
hath  made  of  one  blood  all  nations  of 
men  for  to  dwell  on  all  the  face  of  the 
earth,  and  hath  determined  the  times  be- 
fore appointed,  and  the  bounds  of  their 
habitation,  that  they  should  seek  the 
Lord,  if  haply  they  might  feel  after  him, 
and  find  him,  though  he  be  not  far  from 
every  one  of  us  :  For  in  him  we  live,  and 
move,  and  have  our  being." 

Now  was  it  the  Apostle's  design  in  thifl 
language,  to  teach  the  Athenians  any 
thing  more  than  the  fact,  that  God  is  not, 
according  to  their  absurd  views,  depen- 
dent on  men ;  but  that  men  are  "  abso- 
lutely dependent"  on  Him,  as  their  Crea- 
tor, Preserver,  and  Governor;  and  that 


144 

He  is  a  present  God,  not  a  god  like  those 
they  worshiped  far  off?  Was  it  his  in- 
tention to  instruct  them  at  all  about  the 
mode  of  their  dependence  ?  Has  he  pre- 
sented any  thing  from  which  it  can  be  in- 
ferred, that  the  mode  of  their  dependence 
is  that  the  Doctor  employs  the  passage  to 
teach,  any  more  than  any  other  mode? 
If  the  Doctor  can  discern  any  thing  of  that 
kind,  his  eyes  are  endowed  with  a  much 
keener  perspicacity  than  ours.  He  must 
handle  his  metaphysical  retort  with  magi- 
cal dexterity,  to  transmute  the  declara- 
tion "  in  Him  we  live,  and  move,  and  have 
our  being,"  (employed  by  the  Apostle  to 
show  that  God  is  not  far  from  every  one 
of  us,)  into  the  proposition,  God  creates  all 
the  actions  of  men;  or  to  extort  from  it 
any  testimony  respecting  the  mode  in 
which  He  brings  their  actions  into  exist- 
ence. 

Nothing  is  taught  us  in  the  second  pas- 
sage, taking  it  even  in  its  widest  applica- 
tion, besides  the  simple  fact,  that  we  are 
46  absolutely  dependent"  on  God.  But 
the  declaration  was  made  by  the  Apostle 
merely  in  regard  to  himself,  and  the  other 
Ministers  of  the  Gospel,  who  were  instru- 
ments of  converting  the  Corinthians  ;  and 
was  merely  an  acknowledgment  that  their 


success    in    converting   the    Corinth*, 
was  owing,  not  to  their  own  competency  to 
accomplish  such  a  work,  but  to  the  snfli- 
ciency  of  God.    Tin-  is  manifest  from  the 
connexion.     In  the  17th  verse  <>f  the  se- 
cond chapter  of  :M  Corinthian  erl  3 
the  sincerity  and   faithfuls  —   of  Inm-eli 
and   the  other  Mil               of  the  (i<»pel: 
••  We  are  n                 my,  which  corrupt  the 
word  of (iod  ;    hut  a>  o;                .1  v .  bul 
(iod.    in   the   sight   of 
ChrM."      lit  6r$t 

sks,  ••  !)»>  ire  I*  to  com 

mend    ourselve-  is    BOffiC 

others*  epi-tlc-  oi'cornmendation  tn  jroil,  '>i 
v  of  commendation  from  you?     Y'c 
are    our    c|  in    our    IKV 

\  n  and  read  of  a1!  men ;  manil< 
declared  to  be  the*  epistle  of  Chri-t,  mi- 
red by  u-  :  \\  ritien  not  with  ink.  bin 
with  the  Spirit  of  the  living  (iod:  not  in 
tables  of  stone,  but  in  llc^hy  tables  of  the; 
heart.**  That  is,  you  who  were  converted 
to  Christ  under  our  ministry,  are  prooi 
that  we  are  faithful  and  sincere  ministers;. 
He  then  adds — -And  such  trust  have  we 
through  Christ  to  God-ward:  riot  that  we 
are  sufficient  of  ourselves  to  think  any 
thing  as  of  ourselves;  but  our  sufficiency 
is  of  God  ,  who  hath  made  us  able  minis- 
13 


146 

ters."  That  is,  we  arc  thus  confident  that 
your  conversion  under  our  ministry,  is  a 
proof  of  our  sincerity  and  faithfulness  as 
ministers;  not  because  \ve  regard  our- 
selves as  competent  to  accomplish  your 
conversion  of  ourselves  alone,  but  we  ac- 
knowledge that  our  sufficiency  is  of  God. 
It  is  He  who  made  us  able  ministers  of  the 
INevv  Testament,  not  of  the  letter,  but  of 
the  Spirit. 

The  import  of  the  Apostle's  declaration 
i.s.  we  are  entirely  dependent  on  God  for 
the  success  of  our  ministry.  The  Doc- 
tor's inference  from  it  is,  God  creates  all 
the  actions  of  men.  By  what  route  he 
ed  to  his  conclusion,  it  is  difficult  to 
determine.  We  presume  his  position, 
J\lcu  are  universally  and  absolutely  destitute  of 
pou-cr,  was  the  vehicle  of  his  conveyance. 
His  course,  then,  must  have  been  like  the 
following: — The  Apostle,  and  others  of 
whom  he  speaks,  were  entirely  depen- 
dent on  God  for  their  success  as  minis- 
ters. But  since  they  were  universally 
and  absolutely  destitute  of  power,  they 
must  have  been  equally  dependent  in  all 
their  other  agency.  All  other  men  must, 
lor  the  same  reason,  be  dependent  in  the 
same  manner.  But  if  all  men  are  abso- 
lutely destitute  of  power,  they  cannot  act 


117 

ofthomsr!\'  >d.  therefore,  in'ist  cre- 

ate all  their  .    \\ 'In -re-fore  God  cre- 

ates all  the  action-  of  men. 
What  U  allirmril  in   the    fliir-i 
•  ml  the  i  /  that  Chri-t  Bl : 

i  the  Aposjle  '?      ]-,  any   tl  ; 

?      And  what   more    i  t  US 

in  the  hi-l.  than  that  man  i<  depei, 

!  for  tin  in  which  h< 

The-e.  pa-  land   in    preei-'-ly  the 

predieanimt.   in  i  pro- 

position  they   are   presented   to  | 
did  those  of  the  for  'i'hev 

prove  a  truth,  and  an  important  one — but 
one  whi.-h  has  no  connexion  \vith  the  : 
position,    more    than    any    oilier  trui! 
the  imi\  To  make  them  hear  at  all 

on  t!ie  propo-ilion.  it  mn-t  he  : 
otluM-  source-,  that  the 
arc  dependent  on  (Jo-l.  i-  that  which  the 
Doctors  theory  teacher.      Hut  lie 

nor  can,  as  hefore  shown,  prove  that 
men  are  dependent  in  that  mode.  These 
nply  teach  the  fact,  that  men 
arc  dependent;  they  convey  us  no  infor- 
mation resp<  the  mode  of  their  de- 
pendence. In  alleging  them,  therefore, 
as  a  proof  that  God  creates  all  the  actions 
of  men,  he  begs  the  thing  to  be  proved, 
as  in  the  preceding  cases,  ft  no  more 


148 

follows  from  the  fact,  that  men  are  depen- 
dent on  God — that  He  creates  all  their 
actions, — than  it  follows,  that  He  does  not 
create  all  their  actions. 

It  has  been  shown  in  the  argument  on 
that  subject,  that  man  may  be  "  abso- 
lutely dependent"  on  God,  without  being 
absolutely  destitute  of  power,  and  there- 
fore, without  having  his  actions  created. 

The  Doctor's  third  argument  then  be- 
ing a  mere  assumption,  is,  like  the  first 
and  second, 

Vox,  et  pretcrca  nihil. 

We  pass,  therefore,  to  the  considera- 
tion of  the  next. 

His  fourth  argument  is  founded  on  pas- 
sages teaching  that  men  are  renewed  and 
sanctified  by  the  Holy  Spirit. 

\Ye  will  present  the  reader  with  his 
most  important  quotations: — "A  new 
heart  will  I  also  give  you,  and  a  new  spi- 
rit will  I  put  within  you:  and  I  will  take 
away  the  stony  heart  out  of  your  flesh,  and 
I  will  give  you  an  heart  of  flesh.  And  I 
will  put  my  Spirit  within  you,  and  cause 
you  to  walk  in  my  statutes." — "  You  hnth 
he  quickened  who  were  dead  in  tres- 
passes and  sins." — "  We  are  his  workman- 
ship, created  in  Christ  Jrsus  unto  good 


149 

W0rks." — ;-The  love  of  God  is  shed 
abroad  in  our  heart-  by  the  Holy  (ihosl. 
which  is  given  unto  n->." — "  Him  hatli  (iod 
exalted  to  give  repentance." — M  By  uraro 
are  ye  saved  through  faith,  and  liiai  not 
of  yourselves:  it  i  .  in  of  (iod." — 

-The  fruit  of  the  Spirit  i-  l<>\  e.  joy.  |M 
lorio'-snileni  -.  faith, 

•••." — ••  It     i-     (iod 

which  worketh  in  you  holli  to  will  and  to 
do  of  his  nood  pl<  Vol.  i.  pp.  *2()1, 

200.  206^207,  i!o;;.  2D!>. 

44  Now  he  that  wrought   us   for   the 
same  tiling,  i-  (ioil."' — "Now  the  tioil   of 
peace    make  you   pcrl'ret    to  do  hU  \\ill; 
M'orkini(  in  yon  that  which  is  well  pic;; 
in  hi  pp.  160. 

Th  1C  other 

milar  import,  teacliin^  us  that  (iod  rrn 
and  sanetiiies  the  I.  i'mni.  the  Doc- 

tor presents  as  a  ground  for  the  ioferei 
that  He  create^  .dl  the  actions  of  meir. 
l>ut   they  teach    us  nothing    i  the 

bare  fact,  that  God  renews  and  sanctifies 
men.  They  impart  no  knowledge  of  the 
mode  of  Mis  agency  in  accomplishing  that 
work.  Let  the  reader  review  them,  and 
detect,  if  possible,  the  slightest  allusion 
to  the  mode  of  God's  agency.  What  do 
they  assert,  except  that  God  gives  a  new 


heart,  and  causes  men  to  yield  obedience 
10  His  statutes — quickens  them — creates 
them  in  Christ  Jesus — gives  repentance, 
faith,  love;  and  works  in  them  to  will  and 
to  do  of  his  good  pleasure?  That  is,  re- 
news and  sanctifies  them.  The  passages 
are  employed  wholly  about  the  effects  pro- 
duced by  God's  agency:  they  have  no 
concern  whatever  with  the  mode  in  which 
Ifc  produces  those  effects. 

In  regard  to  these,  therefore,  as  to  the 
preceding  passages,  the  Doctor  proves 
one  thing  and  infers  another.  The  thing 
to  be  proved  is,  that  God  creates  all  the 
actions  of  men.  But  the  Doctor  only 
proves,  that  He  renews  and  sanctifies 
men  ;  and  infers  from  that,  that  He  creates 
all  the  actions  of  men.  His  inference  is  no 
more  involved  in  his  proof,  than  any  other 
inference  which  he  could  have  chosen  to 
append  to  it.  It  is,  like  the  others,  a  mere 
assumption. 

The  exhibition  of  this  fallacy  shows  the 
Doctor's  argument  to  be  wholly  inconclu- 
sive, and  might  excuse  us  from  any  fur- 
ther refutation  of  it;  but  as  he  obviously 
relies  on  it,  as  a  main  pillar  of  his  theory, 
we  deem  it  appropriate  to  present  the 
reader  with  a  fuller  demonstration  of  its 
incorrectness. 


151 

The  ground  of  the  Doctors  argument 
ia,  the  fact  taught  in  those  passages,  that 
'  tiflt.s  men.  lie  bring- 
that  (act  in  support  of  hi-  propo.-n 
that  God  creates  all  the  action-  of  men.  h\ 
gratuitously  .ing.  (hat  the  modi. 

which    lie  renews  and    >;mrli!ies,   i-  that 
of  creating  their  holy  exerciM -.      To   the 
refutation  of  hi-  argument  then,  it  i-  only 
IT  that  it   be   dcmon-irated.   that 
the  position    he    MBUHI6fl    Ml    entirely   gra- 
tuitous, and  incapable  of  bring  pro\edto 
rue.      This  we  will  endea\onr  to  do. 

We  assume  the  position  then — 

That  \c(  itoou  nothing  of  the  mode  of  tin 
.crating  and  sanctify- 
ing /' 

"Uy  thi-  \\e  mean,  that  we  know  notb; 
how  the  Holy  S[)irit  acts  on  the  mind  to 
turn  it  from  sin  to  holiness.     Our  ki 
ledge  respecting   Hi- agency  is   confined 
to  the  mere/art,  that  he  renews  and  sanc- 
tifies it.     Of  the  mode  in  which  He  acts 
to  produce  these  effects  we  are  totally  ig- 
norant. 

In  support  of  this  position,  we  allege, 
in  the  first  place,  the  fact,  that  we  do  not 
possess  any  knowledge  of  the  nature  of 
spirits^  by  which  we  can  determine  what 
the  mode  of  the  Holy  Spirit's  agency  must 


152 

be  in  regenerating  and  sanctifying  the 
mind. 

The  mind  is  a  spirit.  "  That  which  is 
born  of  the  Spirit  is  spirit."  Now  we 
have  no  such  knowledge  of  the  nature  of 
spirits,  that  we  can  decide  how  one  spirit 
must  act  on  another,  in  order  to  produce 
effects  on  it.  Much  more  emphatically 
true  is  it,  that  we  have  no  such  knowledge 
of  the  infinite  Spirit,  that  we  can  deter- 
mine how  He  must  act  on  the  human 
mind,  in  order  to  turn  it  from  sin  to  holi- 
ness. But  we  must  know  the  nature  both 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  and  of  the  human  mind, 
and  all  the  possible  modes  in  which  He 
can  act  on  the  human  mind,  and  all  the 
effects  which  would  be  produced  by  those 
modes  of  action,  before  we  can  determine, 
from  the  nature  of  spirits,  what  the  mode 
of  the  Holy  Spirit's  agency  must  be,  in 
regenerating  and  sanctifying  the  mind. 
That  is,  we  must  by  searching  find  out 
God  ;  we  must  find  out  the  Almighty  unto 
perfection.  The  Doctor,  in  assuming  in 
his  first  and  subsequent  arguments,  that 
the  nature  of  the  mind,  as  a  dependent 
existence,  is  such,  that  even  Omnipotence 
is  not  able  to  make  it  an  agent,  except 
by  creating  all  its  motions,  exercises,  or 
actions — has  virtually  assumed,  that  he 
has  attained  to  that  knowledge. 


Again — we  know  not  what  it  is  peculiar 
pertaining  to  the  unregcnerate  mind,  that 
is  the  cause  of  its  sinning  uniformly;  nor 
what  it  is  peculiar  pertaining  to  the  regene- 
rate mind,  that  i>  li  icling  in 
a  holy  manner;  and  therefore  cannot  in- 
fer, from  any  thing  we  know  of  the  nature 
of  the  unre  :ul  the 
mind,  the  mode  in  which  ihe  Holy  Spirit 
renews  the  one  and  sanctifies  the  other. 

There  must  be  something  peculiar  ? 
taming  to  the   nun  t€  mind,  th 

the  cause  of  its  sinning  uniformly;  and 
something  peculiar  pertaining  to  the  re- 
generate mind,  that  is  the  cause  of  its 
acting  in  a  holy  manner;  but  of  what 
those  causes  are  we  are  universally  and 
absolutely  ignorant. 

We  know  nothing  of  the  unregenerate 
mind,  distinguishing  it  from  the  regene- 
rate, eveept  that  in  all  its  moral  agency 
it  sins.  What  the  peculiar  thing  is  per- 
taining to  it,  which  is  the  cause  of  its  sin- 
ning uniformly,  and  which  is  a  ground  of 
certainty,  that  until  the  Spirit  interposes 
to  renew  it,  it  will  continue  to  sin  uni- 
formly, we  know  not;  nor  do  we  know 
what  it  is  peculiar  pertaining  to  the  re* 
generate  mind,  that  is  the  cause  that  it 
acts  in  a  holy  manner. 


154 

Their  faculties  as  moral  agents  are,  as 
far  as  we  can  discern,  precisely  the  same. 
Those  faculties,  therefore,  will  account 
only  for  their  acting,  and  not  for  their  act- 
ing in  those  different  modes. 

We  may  suppose,  and  it  will  be  a  mere 
supposition,  for  it  is  incapable  of  being 
proved  to  be  a  fact,  that  that  which  is  pe- 
culiar to  them,  and  the  cause  of  their 
acting  in  those  peculiar  modes  is  a  moral 
taste,  the  train  of  motives  under  whose 
influence  they  act,  or  the  agency  of  God, 
or  a  part  or  all  of  them  united.  But  still, 
were  our  supposition  even  admitted  to  be 
correct,  we  should  not  possess  any  know- 
ledge by  which  we  could  decide  what 
must  be  the  mode  of  the  Spirit's  agency 
in  the  work  of  renovation  and  sanctifica- 
tion. 

Were  we  to  assume,  with  some,  that 
that  which  is  peculiar  to  the  unregenerate 
mind,  and  the  cause  of  its  sinning  uni- 
formly is  a  depraved  taste ;  and  that  that, 
which  is  peculiar  to  the  regenerate  mind, 
and  the  cause  of  its  acting  in  a  holy  man- 
ner, is  a  holy  taste;  we  could  not  thence 
determine  what  the  mode  of  the  Spirit's 
agency  must  be,  in  removing  that  deprav- 
ed taste,  and  implanting  the  holy  one; 
for  we  are  utterly  ignorant  of  the  meta- 


J  JJ 

physical  nature  of  those  tastes.  Those 
terms  do  not  present  any  description  of 
tlu1  natun  of  the  things  they  represent. 
They  denote  nothing  more  than  a  state  of 
the  inin<I :  in  the  one  case  such,  that  it 
uniformly  BIDS,  in  the  other  such,  that  it 
sometimes  acts  in  a  holy  manner.  They 
do  not  convey  any  de-eriplion,  nor  any 
approximation  to  a  description,  of  irhn! 
\\hieh  constitutes  those  states  of  mind. 
The  terms  di-po-ition.  l»ia-~.  pn»pr!.-ily, 
reli-h.  if  used  in  an\  definable  H^niliea- 

tion.  mean  nothing  more.     To  say,  that 

the    unn  ••generate    mind    ha.-   a  d. 

rcli-h.  propen-ily.  or  di-[ 
lion.  \\hich  is  the  r  inning  uni- 

formly, is  only  '  talc, 

that  uniformly.      To   >\\\.  that    the 

mind    has   a    holy  ta-le.    I 
reli-h,    pro;  .    or  di-j.n-ition.  \\lsieli 

is  tlu^  cause  of  its  acting  in  a  hol>  manner, 
»nly  to  say,   it  i-  in   >ueli  that 

it  acts  in  a  holy  manner.  That  laninia^e 
conveys  no  intelligence  \vhatcvrr  of  what 
it  is  that  cnns/tlutcs  those  states,  or  of  the 

il  nature  of  that  \vhich  distin- 
guishes thc^  unregenerate  and  regenerate 
mind,  and  is  th  .  that  the  one  acts 

in  the  one  mode,  and  the  other  in  the 
other;  and  therefore  does  not  enable  us, 


156 

in  the  least,  to  determine,  if  the  supposition 
of  their  existence  is  correct,  what  the 
mode  of  the  Spirit's  agency  must  be,  in 
removing  the  depraved,  and  implanting 
the  holy,  taste. 

Were  we,  with  those  who  use  this  lan- 
guage, to  say,  The  Spirit,  in  regenerating 
the  mind,  removes  the  depraved  taste  and 
implants  a  holy  one — we  should  say  no- 
thing more  than  that  He  causes  the  state 
of  the  mind  to  be  &M<?A,  that  it  acts  in  a 
holy  manner,  instead  of  being,  as  before, 
such,  that  it  acts  uniformly  in  a  sinful 
manner,  without  exhibiting  any  descrip- 
tion of  the  metaphysical  nature  of  the  effect 
produced  by  His  agency;  and  therefore, 
without  presenting  any  ground,  from 
which  we  could  infer  the  mode  of  His 
agency,  in  producing  that  effect. 

Were  we  ^to  assume,  with  others,  that 
the  train  of  motives  presented  to  the  unre- 
grnorate  mind,  is  all  that  is  peculiar  to  it, 
and  the  sole  cause  of  its  acting  uniformly 
in  a  sinful  manner;  and  that  the  train  of 
motives  presented  to  the  regenerate  mind, 
is  all  that  is  peculiar  to  it,  and  the  sole 
cause  that  it  acts  in  a  holy  manner;  still 
we  should  not  be  enabled  by  that  assump- 
tion, admitting  it  to  be  correct,  to  decide 
what  the  mode  of  the  Spirit's  agency 


157 

must  be,  in  the  work  of  renovation  and 
sanctification.  For  in  onler  to  determine 
that,  we  must  possess  a  knowledge  of  all 
the  possible  modes  in  which  the  Holy 
Spirit  can  present  motives  to  the  mind. — 
And  that  knowledge  would  involve  ;i  per- 
fect knowledge  of  the  nature  both  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  and  of  the  human  mind,  and 
that  would  involve  omni^ 

\\e  not  only  do  not  know  nil  the  modes 
in  which  the  Holy  Spirit  can  promt  mo- 
tives (n  the  mind,  but  we  do  not  k 
any  of  (hem;  and  therefore  cannot  infer 
umption.  that  the  train  of  mo- 
ii>o  presented  to  it  is  the  cause  of  its 
acting  as  it  doe-,  \\iiat  the  mode  of  the. 
Spirit's  agency  mu-t  he.  in  pre-enti.m 
>ueh  a  train  of  mniiv*  -hall  turn  it 

from  sin  to  holiness. 

Were  we  with  others,  that 

the  absence  of  the  agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
is  all  that  is  peculiar  to  the  unregenerate 
mind,  and  the  sole  cause  of  its  sinning 
uniformly;  and  that  the  agency  of  the 
Spirit  is  all  that  is  peculiar  to  the  rege- 
nerate mind,  and  the  sole  cause  of  its  act- 
ing in  a  holy  manner — we  should  be 
equally  incapable  of  deciding,  from  that 
assumption,  what  the  mode  of  the  Spirit's 
agency  must  be  in  the  work  of  renovating 
14 


and  sanctifying  the  mind  :  since,  in  order 
to  determine  that  it  would,  as  in  the  for- 
mer case,  be  necessary  to  know  all  the 
possible  modes  in  which  the  Holy  Spirit 
can  exert  a  direct  agency  on  the  mind. 

Were  we,  with  others,  to  assume,  that 
men  always  act  under  the  direct  agency  of 
God  ;  and  that  a  peculiarity  in  the  mode  of 
God's  agency  on  it,  is  all  that  is  peculiar 
to  the  unregenerate  mind,  and  the  sole 
cause  of  its  acting  uniformly  in  a  sinful 
manner;  and  that  all  that  is  peculiar  to 
the  regenerate  mind,  and  the  sole  cause 
of  its  acting  in  a  holy  manner,  is  a  peculi- 
arity in  the  mode  of  God's  agency  on  it; 
we  should  still  be  equally  incompetent 
to  pronounce  what  the  mode  of  His  agen- 
cy must  be,  in  renewing  and  sanctifying 
the  mind  ;  since,  as  bofore,  without  omni- 
science, we  are  incompetent  to  pronounce 
what  the  mode  of  His  agency  must  be,  in 
producing  any  effect. 

Or  were  we  to  assume,  that  part,  or  all 
of  these  things,  of  the  one  class,  which  can 
be  united*  were  that  which  is  peculiar  to 
the  unregenerate  mind ;  and  part  or  all 
of  these  things,  of  the  other  class,  which 
can  be  united*  were  that  which  is  peculiar 
to  the  regenerate  mind,  and  respectively 
Che  causes  of  their  acting  in  their  respec- 


139 

live  modes:  we  should  still  be  equally 
unable  to  decide  what  the  mode  of  the 
Spirit's  agency  must  be  in  the  work  of 
renovation  and  sanctification ;  since  a 
knowledge  of  what  must  be  the  mode  of 
his  agency,  in  all  the  preced  ises, 

would  1  -ary  in  order  to  determine 

what  it  must  bo  in  ////*,  in  which  part  or 
all  of  those  would  bo  unitod. 

Since  then,  if  wr  .ihor  of 

the1  siippnM-d  camefl  wo  havo  enumerated 

is  the  rail  cau-o  that  tho  unrogonorato 
and  regenerate  mind  act  in  tL  pec- 

five  modes,  we  are  still   incompetent  to 
determine  what  the  mode  of  the  Spirit's 
icy  must  be,  in  renewing  an-l  <;.ncti- 
g  tho  mind:   and  singe  wo  do  not  knmc 
either  what  it  is,  peculiar  to  tho  un rege- 
nerate mind,  that  is  the  cause  of  its  uni- 
formly sinning  :  nor  what  it  is,  peculiar  to 
tho  Degenerate  mind,  that  is  the  cause  of 
•cling1  in  a  holy  manner;  therefore,  we 
cannot  infer,  from  any  thing  we  know  re- 
specting the  nature  of  the  unregonorate 
and  rate  mind,   what  tho  mode  of 

iho  S<,i;  v    i-.   in    renewing  the 

one,  and  sanctih  ing  tho  other.  For  in 
order  to  determine  haw  the  Spirit  acts  on 
the  mind  to  regenerate  and  sanctify  it.  wo 
must  know  what  He  does  to  regenerate 


160 

and  sanctify  it.  We  cannot  determine 
ihe  mode  of  His  agency  till  we  learn  the 
exact  nature  of  the  effect.  But  the  effect 
of  His  agency  is  the  removal  of  the  cause 
of  the  mind's  acting  in  a  sinful  manner, 
and  producing  the  cause  of  its  acting  in  a 
holy  manner.  Being  then  universally  and 
absolutely  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  those 
causes,  we  are  incompetent  to  decide  on 
i he  mode  in  wljich  the  one  is  removed 
:\nd  the  other  produced. 

In  proof  of  our  position  wre  allege,  se- 
rondly,  That  nothing  is  known  of  the 
mode  of  the  Spirit's  agency  from  feeling 
or  observation.  Those,  who  are  regene- 
rated and  sanctified,  have  no  knowledge 
from  consciousness  of  the  mode  in  which 
the  Spirit  acts  on  them,  in  producing 
those  effects.  They  are  not  conscious  of 
His  agency  at  all,  and  therefore  not  con- 
scious of  the  mode  of  His  agency.  They 
are  only  conscious  of  their  holy  exercises, 
the  consequences  of  His  agency.  They 
do  not  learn  the  fact,  that  He  regenerates 
and  sanctifies  them  from  consciousness, 
but  from  revelation;  and  were  not  the 
doctrine  taught  in  the  Scriptures,  would 
have  no  evidence,  nor  ground  to  conjec- 
ture, that  it  is  the  Holy  Spirit,  that  renews 
and  sanctifies  them.  They  would  sup- 


161 

pose  they  renewed  and  sanctified  them- 
selves This  the*  Doctor  admits.  "  It  is  as 
impossible  that  we  should  fed  the  opera- 
tion of  God  upon  our  hearts,  while  he 
works  in  us  both  to  will  and  to  do,  as  it 
that  Adam  should  have/}.//  the  form- 
ing hand  of  God  in  his  creation. "  Vol.  i. 
p  IT). 

As  then  they  do  not  learn  the  /  >/.  that 
th"  */>irit  renews  and  -met  ilies,  from  feel- 

they  of  cour.-e  do  not  Irani  thr 

of  !Iis  airencv,  in  rene\\in^   and  sanctily- 

inir.   from  that  h'mg 

nt  on  the  subject  tr..m  ul.-rrvation. — 

The  eye  is  unable  to  discern   cither  the 

human    mind,    or    the   divine*    Spirit,  and 

mnot  observe  any  tiling  of  the 

mode    in  which    thr    I  !«»r.    Spirit    ftCtfl    Oil 

the  mind,    in  the  work  of  renovation  and 

ratification. 

To     Mi-tai-i     our     po-i»ion    u~e    all* 
thirdly,  That  Revelation  dors  not   pr< 
us   with    any   knowledge   rrsprriiiiLT    the 
mode    in    which    the  Spirit    r.  and 

sanctifies  the  mind. 

The  Scriptures  merely  reveal  the  / 
that  the  Holy  Spirit  renews  and  sanctifies 
the  mind.     They  convev  to   11-  no  know- 
ledge whatever  of  the  mode  of  His  agency. 
in  producing  those  effects. 
14* 


Thus,  none  of  the  passages  ascribing 
regeneration  and  sanctification  to  His 
agency,  teach  any  thing  more  than  the 
fact,  that  He  regenerates  and  sanctifies. 
Examine  the  following:  "Except  a  man 
be  born  of  water  and  of  the  Spirit,  he 
cannot  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God."' 
"  He  saved  us  by  the  washing  of  regene- 
ration and  renewing  of  the  Holy  Ghost." 
44  Ye  are  washed,  ye  are  sanctified, — by 
the  Spirit  of  our  God."  "The  love  of 
God  is  shed  abroad  in  our  hearts  by  the 
Holy  Ghost."  Do  these  passages  inform 
us  of  any  thing  respecting  the  Spirit's 
agency,  except  the  simple  fact,  that  He 
renews  and  sanctifies?  Can  you,  by  any 
process  whatever,  obtain  from  them  any 
testimony  respecting  the  mode  of  His 
agency  ?  Look  over  all  the  other  passa- 
ges in  the  Sacred  Volume,  and  you  will 
find,  that  none  of  them  convey  us  any 
more  intelligence  than  these. 

No  inference  whatever  can  be  drawn 
from  the  language  employed  to  designate 
regeneration  and  sanctification,  in  regard 
to  the  mode  of  the  Spirit's  agency  in  pro- 
ducing those  effects.  The  language  is 
figurative,  and  very  dissimilar.  The  most 
common  forms  of  expression  employed  to 
denote  them?  are,  to  be  born  again;  to 


163 

be  renewed  in  the  spirit  of  the  mind  ;  to 
be  transformed  by  the  renewing  of  the 
mind ;  to  be  quickened  ;  to  be  created 
anew  in  righteousness  and  holiness;  to 
put  off  the  old  and  put  on  the  now  man; 
to  give  a  new  heart  and  new  spirit:  to 
shed  abroad  love  in  the  heart.  :m<i  to 
work  in  us  to  will  and  to  do.  TflRe 
forms  of  expression  are  derived  from  the 
modes  in  which  effects  are  produced  in 
the  material  world;  and  designate  modes 
of  operation  universally  and  absolutely 
diilrrent  from  each  other.  To  be  l< 
is  a  totally  different  operation  from  that  of 
being  renewed  ;  and  to  be  renewed  is  a  to- 
tally different  operation  from  that  of  be- 
ing transformed  ;  and  to  be  transformed 
i  operation  totally  different  from  that 

of  being  quickened;  to  be  quickened  is 

totally  different  from  beinir  created;  to 
be  created  is  totally  different  from  put- 
ting off  and  putting  on  ;  to  put  off  and 
put  on  are  totally  different  from  giv- 
ing; to  give  is  totally  different  from 
shedding  abroad;  and  shedding  abroad 
is  totally  different  from  working  in. — 
These  forms  of  expression  designate 
modes  of  producing  effects  utterly  unlike 
each  other;  and  therefore  no  conclusion 
can  be  drawn  from  any  one  or  all  of  them, 
respecting  the  mode  of  the  Spirit's  agency 


164 

in  accomplishing  the  renovation  and 
sanctification  of  the  mind.  For  no  rea- 
son can  be  assigned  for  regarding  one  as 
exhibiting  a  literal  description  of  the 
mode  of  the  Spirit's  agency,  which  will 
not  apply  with  equal  force  to  prove,  that 
anjiother  presents  a  literal  description 
of  tne  mode.  There  is  as  much  evidence 
that  the  word  "born"  is  used  literally,  as 
there  is  that  the  word  "renewed"  is  so 
u>ed;  and  as  much,  that  the  word  "re- 
newed" is  employed  literally,  as  there  is 
that  the  word  "  transformed,"  "quicken- 
ed," "created,"  or  any  other  is.  That 
is,  there  is  no  evidence  at  all  that  either 
is  used  literally;  hut  evidence  from  this 
variety  and  dissimilarity  of  the  language, 
which  must  satisfy  every  one  in  the  least 
acquainted  with  the  laws  of  interpreta- 
tion, that  none  of  it  is  employed  literally 
to  denote  the  mode  of  the  Spirit's  agen- 
cy. The  language  is  figurative,  and  em- 
ployed to  convey  to  us  nothing  beyond 
the  fact)  that  the  Holy  Spirit  renews  and 
sanctifies  the  mind. 

But  our  Lord  has  entirely  debarred  the 
hope  of  learning  any  thin<r  on  this  subject 
from  Revelation,  and  rebuked  the  pre- 
sumption, which  attempts  to  explore  it, 
by  expressly  declaring,  in  reply  to  the 


165 

inquiry  of  Nicodemus  respecting  the 
mode  of  regeneration,  that  it  is  entirely 
unknown  to  those  who  experience  it. 
"The  wind  bloweth  where  it  listeth,  and 
thou  hearest  the  sound  thereof,  but  canst 
not  tell  whence  it  cometh  and  whither  it 
goeth." 

This  declaration  was  ail  dressed  to  Ni- 
codemus, in  reply  to  his  inquiry  respect- 
ing the  mode  in  \\hich  regeneration  is 
effected.  Our  Lord  had  remarked  to 
him.  -except  a  man  be  born  again,  he 
cannot  see  the  kingdom  of  O<  Nico- 

demus inferred  from  the  language,  that 
the  body  was  the  subject  of  the  change 
indicated  ;  and  asked,  "How  can  a  man 
be  born  when  he  is  old  ;  can  he  enter  the 
second  time  into  his  mother's  womb,  and 
be  born  ?"  Our  Lord,  in  return,  correct- 
ed in  the  first  place  his  misapprehension, 
by  declaring  the  Holy  Spirit  to  be  the  Au- 
thor of  the  change,  and  not  the  natural  pa- 
rent, and  the  soul  to  be  the  subject  of  the 
change,  not  the  body.  u  Except  a  man 
be  born  of  water  and  of  the  Spirit,  he 
cannot  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God. 
That  which  is  born  of  the  flesh,  is  flesh;'* 
that  is,  it  is  the  body  which  is  the  subject 
of  the  natural  birth;  "and  that  which  is 
born  of  the  Spirit  is  spirit;"  that  is,  it  is 


166 

the  soul,  which  is  the  subject  of  renova- 
tion by  the  Spirit. 

He  then  replied  to  his  inquiry  respect- 
ing the  mode  in  which  it  is  effected ;  by 
declaring  that  the  mode  in  which  the 
Spirit  accomplishes  it,  is  as  entirely  un- 
known to  its  subjects,  as  the  mode  in 
which  the  air  moves  is  unknown  to  those 
who  feel  its  effects.  "  The  wind  bloweth 
where  it  listeth" — the  air  moves  by  laws 
adapted  to  its  own  nature — "  and  thou 
hearest  the  sound  thereof" — and  you  feel 
its  effects — "  but  canst  not  tell  whence  it 
cometh,  and  whither  it  goeth" — but  you 
are  ignorant  of  the  mode  in  which  it 
moves.  "  So  is  every  one  that  is  born 
of  the  Spirit" — so  the  subjects  of  the 
Spirit's  influence  only  feel  its  effrcts; 
they  know  nothing  of  the  mode  in  which 
He  produces  those  effects.  We  have 
then  the  testimony  of  the  Omniscient  Re- 
deemer, that  we  know  nothing  of  the  mode 
of  the  Spirit's  ageMicy. 

It  had  been  happy  for  the  cause  of 
truth,  had  Doctor  E.  and  other  theolo- 
gians and  philosophers  been  satisfied 
with  this-  explicit  decision  of  the  Son  of 
God,  arid  not.  like  Nicodernus,  permitted 
a  r^stlrss  curiosity  to  ask  again,  "  How 
can -these  things  be?"  and  suffered  a  pre- 


167 

sumptuous  fancy  to  fabricate  and  pro- 
mulgate theories  of  the  mode  of  the  Spi- 
rit's agency,  which  contradict  the  truth 
and  perplex  the  faith  and  peace  of  the 
Church. 

These  several  considerations  then,  de- 
monstrate the  truth  of  our  position,  tint 
we  know  nothing  of  the  mode  of  the  Spi- 
rit's agency  in  regenerating  and  sanctify- 
ing the  mind. 

The   only   sources  from   which  we  < 

in  a  IvMoulrdi^  of  the  mode, 
are  tln»-e  we  ha\e  enumerated  ;  that  of 
deducing  it  from  our  kno\\  led^e  of  the 
nature  of  the  mind  and  the  Holy  Spirit; 
that  of  learning  it  from  feeling  or  obser- 
vation; or  lint  nf  learning  it  from  te-ti- 
rtiony.  If  there  i-  no  known  truth 
peeling  the  Holy  Spirit  and  the  mind, 
from  \\hii-h  we  can  infer  it.  we  \\\\\>\  I 
it,  if  at  all.  from  some  of  the  oilier  sources. 
It  we  are  not  taught  it  hy  feeling  or  ob- 
servation, we  must  resort  to  testimony, 
and  to  the  testimony  of  God  only ;  for 
men,  unless  they  learn  it  from  one  of  the 
preceding  sources,  are  incompetent  to 
te-tity  respecting  it.  And  if  God  gives 
us  no  knowledge  on  the  subject,  and 
moreover  declares  us  utterly  ignorant 
respecting  it,  then  we  have  the  most  per- 


168 

feet  demonstration,  that  we  are  univer- 
sally and  absolutely  ignorant  respecting 
it. 

Even  the  Doctor  has,  it  would  seem,  in 
a  moment  of  forgetfulness,  given  his  testi- 
mony to  the  truth  of  our  position,  and  the 
declaration  of  the  Redeemer:  "Our  de- 
pendence on  the  Deity  to  work  in  us  both 
to  will  and  to  do,  is  demonstrable;  but 
God  operates  on  our  minds  in  our 
free  and  voluntary  exercises,  we  are  un- 
able to  comprehend."  Vol  i.  p.  212. 

What,  then,  becomes  of  the  truth  of  his 
theory  respecting  the  mode  of  God's 
agency  on  mankind?  Whose  fire  lighted 
the  torch  with  which  he  penetrated  this 
incomprehensibility  ?  Whose  authority 
encouraged  him  to  announce  to  the  world, 
with  so  bold  a  voice,  that  "  the  heart  may 
be  created  as  well  as  the  understanding,  or 
moral  exercises  as  well  as  natural  facul- 
culties?  that  the  hearts  of  saints  are  cre- 
ated;  or  th;it  their  free  and  voluntary  ex- 
ercises are  the  production  of  divine  pow- 
er?" and,  "  that  the  divine  agency  is  as 
much  concerned  in  the  bad  as  in  the  ^ood  ac- 
tions" of  men,  and  "  in  precisely  the  same 
manner?"  That  is,  that  God  creates  all  the 
actions  of  men? 

The  Doctor's  common  sense,  it  seems 


1159 

from  the  above  confession,  for  once,  eveu 
in  respect  to  this  subject,  triumphed  over 
his  love  of  theorizing ;  and  we  cannot  but 
•et  that  it  had  not  maintained  its  su- 
premacy. 

Since,  then,  it  is  demonstrated,  that  we 
know  nothing  of  the  mode  in  which  the 
Holy  Spirit  renews  and  sanctifies  the 
mind,  it  is  demonstrated,  that  the  Doctor's 
assumption,  from  the  passages  teaching 
that  the  Holy  Spirit  renews  and  sanctilio 
HUM t.  that  the  mode  in  which  he  accom- 
plishes that  work,  is  that  of  cmiting  all 
their  holy  exercises,  is  entirely  gratuitous, 
and  incapable  of  being  proved  to  be  true  : 
and  therefore  his  conclusion  from  those 
passages,  that  God  creates  all  the  actions 
of  men,  i-  a  mere  assumption,  and  inca- 
pable of  being  proved  from  those  pas- 
sages to  be  true. 

Let  us  now  turn  our  eye  to  \\\sfifth  ar- 
gument, founded  on  the  prayers  of  good 
men.  It  is  contained  in  the  following  quo- 
tation : — "  The  prayers  of  all  good  men 
suppose,  that  they  must  be  acted  upon  by 
a  divine  operation  in  all  their  v  irtuous  ex- 
ercises and  actions.  For  when  they  pray 
for  themselves,  that  God  would  give  them 
joy,  peace,  love,  faith,  submission,  or 
strengthen  and  increase  these  and  all 
15 


170 

other  Christian  graces,  their  prayers  pre- 
suppose the  necessity  of  a  divine  opera- 
tion upon  their  hearts,  in  all  their  gra- 
cious exercises  and  exertions.  And  when 
they  pray  for  the  world  in  general,  that 
God  would  suppress  vice  and  irreligion 
every  where,  convince  and  convert  sin- 
ners, comfort  and  edify  saints,  and  spread 
the  Redeemer's  kingdom  through  the 
earth,  their  prayers  are  founded  in  the 
belief,  that  God  must  work  in  men  both 
to  will  and  to  do  of  his  good  pleasure." 
Vol.  i.  p.  209,  210. 

His  argument,  viewed  in  relation  to 
the  proposition  expressing  his  theory,  is 
briefly  this :  The  prayers  of  good  men, 
for  the  influence  of  the  Spirit  on  them- 
selves and  others,  presuppose  a  necessity  of 
a  divine  operation  on  them  in  all  their  ac- 
tions ;  therefore  God  creates  all  their  ac- 
tions— "A  short  cut  to  infallibility." — 
Where  is  your  proof  that  the  prayers  of 
good  men,  for  the  Spirit  to  influence  them- 
selves and  others  to  holiness,  presupposes 
the  necessity  of  a  divine  operation  on 
themselves  and  others  in  all  their  sinful 
agency  ?  Where  is  your  proof,  granting 
that  such  a  necessity  exists,  that  the  mode 
of  that  agency  must  be  such  as  you  re- 
present it  ? 


171 

The  fifth  argument,  like  all  its  prede- 
cessors, is  an  unfledged  petitio  principii. 
It  does  not  follow  from  the  fact,  that  good 
men  pray  for  the  influences  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  to  renew  and  sanctify  themselves 
and  others,  that  there  is  a  natural  neces- 
sity for  His  inlluf  nee  on  them  in  all  their 
holy  exercises  ;  it  may  be  only  a  moral  ne- 
<  v.  li'therc  is  a  natural  necessity  for 
Hi-  influence*  in  all  (heir  holy  action-.  i». 
does  not  thence  follow  that  there  i-  a  si- 
milar necessity  fora  divine  operation  upon 
their  hearts  in  all  their  other  actions:  and  if 
there  be  such  a  necessity,!!  doesnotthence 
follow,  that  the  mode  of  the  agency  i>  such 
as  the  Doctor  represents  it.  He  has  not 
presented  the  slightest  ground  for  his  con- 
rhiMon,  that  God  cr  II  the  actions  of 

men.  There  is  not  a  step  from  his  pre- 
mrn  /tray,  to  his  conclusion, 
God  creates,  that  is  not  ••  universal  and  ab- 
solute" beggary.  His  argument  had  heen 
infinitely  more  correct  and  convincing 
had  he  reasoned  thus:  The  prayers  of 
!  men  presuppose  a  necessity  of  the 
influence  of  the  Spirit  in  their  holy  ac- 
tions; and  therefore  they  do  not  presup- 
pose a  necessity  of  a  "  divine  operation*1 
in  thoir  other  actions  ;  and  therefore  God 
does  not  create  all  the  actions  of  men. 


172 

The  prayers  of  good  men,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  commands  of  the  Gospel,  for 
the  renewing  and  sanctifying  influences  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  on  themselves  and  others, 
prove  the  fact  simply  that  they  need  those 
influences ;  they  prove  nothing  respect- 
ing the  nature  of  that  necessity,  nor  of  the 
mode  of  the  Spirit's  agency.  The  fact,  that 
they  need  a  divine  influence  in  all  their 
other  agency,  and  that  the  mode  of  that 
agency  must  be  such  as  the  Doctor  exhi- 
bits it,  must  be  proved  from  other  sources, 
before  the  conclusion  can  be  drawn  from 
those  prayers,  that  God  creates  all  the  ac- 
tions of  men.  But  the  Doctor  neither  has, 
nor  can  prove  that.  His  fifth  argument 
therefore  yields  no  support  to  his  theory. 
It  "  presupposes"  a  great  dearth  of  mate- 
rials to  sustain  his  theory,  and  exemplifies 
the  miserable  shifts  to  which  a  system 
builder  will  resort  to  rear  his  edifice,  arid 
^ive  it 

uThe  grace  and  gayety  of  nature.'7 

The  Doctor's  sixth  argument  is  founded 
on  the  possibility  of  God's  creating  all  the 
actions  of  men.  It  is  sufficiently  exhibit- 
ed in  the  following  passages  selected  from 
it.  In  endeavouring  to  prove  that  Adam 
was  created  upright  in  heart,  he  assumes 


173 

the  position,  "  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the  na* 
turc  of  virtue  or  true  holiness  to  be  cre- 
ated." In  proof  of  this  he  alleges,  that 
"  the  first  volition  of  every  created  ngent 
must  have  a  cause  altogether  involuntary; 
and  if  it  proceed  from  an  iuwluntanj  can-o, 
it  matters  not  whether  that  cause 
within  or  without  himself."  He  thence 
inters,  -  it  might  hare  been  created,  or  pro- 
duced by  the  Deity."  Then,  after  a  short 
argument  from  the  dependence  of  Adam, 
(who,  he  asserts,  "could  no  more  produce 
>\vn  volitions  than  his  own  existence,") 
to  prove  4-  that  holiness  not  only  inai/^  but 
must  be  created-"  he  prom  <ls  to  observe* 
that  God  is  able  to  create  holiness.  His 
proof  of  it  is,  that  ••Hi4  can  create,  or 
bring  out  of  nothing  into  existence,  \\hat- 
cver  He  pleases.  As  He  can  create  a 
body,  and  create  a  soul,  which  arc  lower 
kinds  of  existence  ;  so  He  can  create  vir- 
tue or  true  holiness,  which  is  the  highest 
and  noblest  kind  of  existence."  Vol.  i. 
p.  279,  280,  281.  And  in  his  third  infer- 
ence, vol.  i.  p.  228,  he  presents  the  possi- 
bility, there  considered  as  proved,  that 
God  can  produce  the  holy  actions  of  men, 
as  proof  that  He  can  produce  their  sinful 
actions  also;  and  thence  infers,  that  He 
does  produce  them ;  and  alleges,  to  sup- 
15* 


174 

port  the  inference,  passages  of  Scripture, 
in  which  God  is  said  to  have  hardened 
the  hearts  of  Pharaoh  and  the  Israelites. 
His  language  is — "If  saints  can  work  out 
their  own  salvation  under  a  positive  influ- 
ence of  the  Deity,  then  sinners  can  work 
out  their  own  destruction  under  his  posi- 
tive influence.     As  saints  can  act  while 
they  are  acted  upon,  so  sinners  can  act 
while  they  are  acted  upon.     Hence  it  is 
just  as  easy  to  see  that  sinners  can  \vork 
out  their  own  destruction,  as  that  saints 
can  work  out  their  own  salvation,  under 
the  operation  of  the  Deity."     He  then, 
after  quoting  the  passages  referred  to,  in- 
ters that  they  do  so.     "  These  different 
applications  of  the  same  text  can  be  re- 
conciled only  on  the  supposition,  that  the 
Prophet,  that  Christ,  and  the  Apostles," 
who  used  it,  "meant  to  convey  the  idea, 
that  sinners  work  out  their  own  destruc- 
tion, under  the  positive  influence  of  the 
Deity." 

This  argument,  then,  is  briefly  this: 
God  can  create  all  the  actions  of  men ; 
therefore  God  does  create  all  the  actions 
of  men.  This  is  an  expeditious  method 
of  proving  propositions.  A  proposition 
may  be  true,  therefore  it  is  true.  We  have 
often  heard  that  whatever  is,  is  j  but  never 


173 

before,  that  whatever  may  be,  is.  Let  us 
apply  this  convenient  method  of  demon- 
stration to  our  author  himself.  The  Doc- 
tor may  have  reasoned  falsely ;  therefore 
he  has  reasoned  falsely.  His  whole  the- 
ory may  be  a  figment  of  "  science  falsely 
so  called  ;"  therefore  such  a  figment  it  is. 
lie  may  have  his  choice,  whether  to  give 
up  the  argument  by  abandoning  the  prin- 
ciple on  which  it  depends |  or  to  retain 
the  argument,  and  permit  its  principle  to 
subvert  his  theory. 

His  theory  is  thus,  if  we  mistake  not, 
left  standing  on  one  pillar  only.  Let  us 
t-x|  lore  the  foundation  on  which  that 
rest-. 

His  seventh  argument  is  founded  on  the 
uda/j/titiifn  of  his  theory  to  account  for  the 
fall  of  Adam.  "Since  God  can  work  in 
men  both  to  will  and  to  do  of  his  good 
pleasure,  it  is  as  easy  to  account  for  the 
first  offence  of  Adam  as  for  any  other  sin." 
"  As  these  and  all  other  methods  to  ac- 
count for  the  fall  of  Adam,  by  the  instru- 
mentality of  second  causes*  are  insufficient  to 
remove  the  difficulty,  it  seems  necessary 
to  have  recourse  to  the  divine  agency, 
and  to  suppose  that  God  wrought  in  Adam 
both  to  will  and  to  do  in  his  first  trans- 
gression." That  is,  we  must  believe  that 


176 

God  created  his  transgression,  because 
we  cannot  satisfactorily  account  for  its 
existence  in  any  other  way.  The  Doctor 
adds,  as  though  his  theory  were  irrefraga- 
bly  proved  to  be  true,  by  its  adaptation 
to  account  for  that  transgression — •'  His 
first  sin  was  a  free,  voluntary  exercise, pro- 
duced  by  a  divine  operation"  Vol.  i.  p.  232. 
234. 

If  this  reasoning  is  good,  the  Doctor  de- 
serves the  humble  and  hearty  thanks  of 
all  infidels  and  theorizing  philosophers 
for  its  discovery.  It  will  make  the  foolish- 
ness of  men  wiser  than  God,  and  the 
weakness  of  men  stronger  than  God.  Let 
us  apply  the  principle  on  which  it  de- 
pends, viz.  that  a  theory  which  will  ac- 
count for  a  fact,  is  correct  because  it  will 
account  for  that  fact. 

Spinoza's  Theory  of  the  World  will  ac- 
count for  its  existence  ;  therefore  his  the- 
ory is  true.  Hume's  Theory  of  Impres- 
sions and  Ideas  will  account  for  impres- 
sions and  ideas ;  therefore  it  is  true.  Des 
Carte's  Theory  of  Vortices  will  account 
for  the  revolutions  of  the  planets;  there- 
fore it  is  true.  The  theories  of  infidels 
respecting  the  forgery  of  the  Scriptures, 
will  account  for  their  existence ;  there- 
fore those  theories  are  true. 


177 

This  principle  will  "prove  all  things." 
but  not  "hold  fast  that  which  is  good," 
with  any  firmer  grasp  than  its  opposite. 
It  is  a  fit  instrument  to  give  authority  to 
"old  wives'  fables,"  "endless  genealo- 
gies/* and  the  "doctrines  of  devil-" 

The  Doctor  must  first  prove  that  his 
theory  will  account  for  the  fall  of  Adam, 
consistently  with  his  moral  agency,  before 
he  can  employ  its  adaptation  to  account 
for  that  fall  to  prove  his  theory  ;  and  must 
also  prove  the  principle  ot  his  argument 
to  be  correc  (,  hHore  he  can  employ  it  to 
prove,  from  that  adaptation  of  his  theory  f 
that  his  theory  is  true. 

If  we  are  not  deceived,  the  Doctor's  se- 
ven arguments  are  shown  to  be  univer- 
sally and  absolutely  erroneous,  and  his 
lofty  edifice  reared  on  them  subverted. 

The  reader  may  well  be  astonished 
that  this  theory,  so  novel,  so  contradic- 
tory to  the  common  views  of  mankind,  is 
published  with  such  dauntless  dogmatism; 
and  that  having  enjoyed  so  wide  a  cur- 
rency, and  gained  so  many  advocates,  it 
should  be  found  to  rest  on  no  other  foun- 
dation than  the  Doctor's  ipse  ducit. 

He  valiantly  begs  the  whole  theory 
from  the  beginning;  to  the  end.  He  com- 


178 

mences  the  goodly  work,  by  assuming  in 
his  first  argument,  without  offering  a  par- 
ticle of  proof  but  his  own  authority,  that 
God  cannot  communicate  power  to  a  be- 
ing without  communicating  omnipotence. 
Man,  therefore,  not  being  omnipotent,  he 
concludes  is  universally  and  absolutely 
destitute  of  power.  But,  his  next  step  is, 
if  thus  destitute  of  power,  man  "  can  no 
more  act  than  he  can  exist  without  a  di- 
vine efficiency."  Therefore,  the  mighty 
conclusion  is,  God  creates  all  his  actions. 
This  position,  that  the  dependence  of  men 
is  such,  that  God  must  create  all  their  ac- 
tions, he  employs  to  bring  all  his  subse- 
quent arguments  to  bear  upon  his  theory. 
None  of  them  have  a  shadow  of  conclu- 
siveness,  unless  the  truth  of  that  position 
is  granted. 

It  does  not  follow  from  the  fact,  that 
God  governs  all  the  actions  of  men,  that 
He  creates  all  their  actions;  unless  it  is 
true  that  He  must  create  them  all  in  order 
to  govern  them.  He  begs  that  position 
therefore  in  his  second  argument. 

It  does  not  follow  from  the  fact,  that 
men  are  "absolutely  dependent"  on  God, 
that  he  creates  all  their  actions,  unless  it 
is  true  that  there  cannot  be  an  "  universal 
and  absolute  dependence,"  without  an 


179 

absolute  destitution  of  power  to  act.  He 
therefore  begs  that  position  in  his  third 
argument. 

It  does  not  follow  from  the  fact,  that 
the  Holy  Spirit  renews  and  sanctifies  n 
that  God  creates  all  their  holy  actions, 
unless  it  is  true,  that  He  cannot  bring 
their  holy  actions  into  existence,  by  any 
other  kind  of  ag<.  ui  that  which 

creates. 

Nor  does  it  follow  from  the  faet,  grant- 
ing it  to  be  one,  th;it  G<  ites  the 
holy  of  men,  that  He  also  creates 
all  their  actions:  unlcs*  il  is  true,  that 
He  cannot  briiig  their  other  actions  into 
:rn('p  liy  any  other  kind  of  agency, 
th:n  that  uhieh  creates.  He  begs  that 
position  therefore  in  his  fdirlh  argument. 

It  does  not  follow  from  their  ;/ «L  f 
suj/j*'>sr<l  in  ////  /trat/ff  ior  them- 

selves and  others,  of  the  inlluenccs  of  the 
Spirit,  that  God  create  -  ;ill  their  actions; 
unless  it  is  true,  that  He  cannot  r  ring  any 
of  their  actions  into  existence,  except  by 
creating  them.  He  begs  tfcit  position, 
therefore,  in  his  fifth  argument 

It  does  not  follow  from  the  possibility  of 
God's  creating  al  the  actions  of  men.  that 
He  does  create  them  ;  unless  it  is  true,  that 
He  cannot  bring  them  into  existence  in 


180 

an  j  other  way  than  that  of  creating  them, 
He  therefore  begs  that  position  in  his 
sixth  argument. 

It  does  not  follow  from  the  fact,  grant- 
ing it  to  be  a  fact,  that  the  Doctor's  theo- 
ry is  adapted  to  account  for  the  fall  of  Mam  ; 
that  God  creates  all  the  actions  of  men ; 
unless  it  is  true,  that  He  cannot  bring 
their  actions  into  existence  in  any  other 
way.  He  begs  that  position  in  his  se- 
venth argument  therefore. 

His  six  last  arguments,  like  a  hexa- 
gonal tub-pulpit  on  its  pillar,  rest  entire- 
ly on  the  first.  If  that  is  erroneous  they 
are  without  force ;  and  if  that  holds,  they 
are  utterly  useless.  For  as  they  possess 
no  force,  but  what  they  borrow  from  the 
first  argument,  they  can  yield  no  support  to 
the  theory,  which  that  argument  does  not 
afford. 

His  first  argument  rests  entirely  on  the 
broad  circumference  of  his  own  dogmati- 
cal declaration.  Those,  if  there  be  such, 
who  regard  the  Doctor  as  gifted  with 
omniscience-and  infallibility,  will  believe 
his  theory;  and  none  others  : 


-Credat  Judaus  Appella ; 


Non  ego — 

To  this  refutation  of  the  Doctor's  ar- 


181 

guments,  we  subjoin  several  other  consi- 
derations, evincing  his  theory  to  be  er- 
roneous. 

In  the  first  place  we  allege,  as  aground 
of  jtrobnljlUhj   that    his  theory  is  entirely 
erroneous,    the    consideration,    that    the 
Doctor  is  unable  to  discover  any 
its  truth.    None  of  the  arguments  adv, 

rd  by  him  to  support  it.  arc  valid.  lie 
scarclied  thr  Scripture-  :  lie  has  re- 
sorted to  the  dictates  of  r<  id  com- 
mon sense;  he  has  laid  heaven,  earth, 
and  "the  dark  world  beneath."  under 
contribution,  for  testimony,  without  suc- 

1  lis  theorv.  after   all.  is  left  to 
solely  on  his  own  authority. 

Now  it  is  in  our  apprehension  an  oini- 
DOUfl  circum-lanrr.  that  nothing  belter 
than  gratuitous  a66UID|  contradict- 

ing  the  uimci>al  judgincnt  of  mankind, 
hold  assertions,  and  the  illusions  of  so- 
phistry, can  be  obtained  alter  so  much 
labour,  to  yield  their  support  to  his  theo- 
ry. Did  the  Scriptures  furnish  any  proof 
of  its  truth,  the  eager  eye  of  the  Doctor 
would  surely  have  detected  it.  Were  it 
demonstrable  from  the  dictates  of  reason 
and  common  sense,  we  have  too  high  an 
opinion  of  his  sagacity  to  believe  it  could 
have  escaped  him.  Had  any  evidence 
16 


182 

of  its  truth  existed,  he  or  his  disciples 
would  have  discovered  it,  and  given  it  to 
the  world.  This  "  universal  and  abso- 
lute" dearth  of  evidence,  that  his  theory 
is  true,  presents  a  sturdy  probability,  that  it 
is  entirely  erroneous.  It  makes  shipwreck 
of  our  faith  in  it.  We  cannot  credit  such 
a  theory  without  evidence. 

Secondly.  We  present  in  proof,  that  the 
Doctor's  theory  is  groundless,  the  consi- 
deration, that  it  contradicts  the  decisions 
of  common  sense.  We  have  before  dwelt 
on  this  topic,  but  hope  the  repetition  will 
not  be  thought  wholly  superfluous. 

It  is  the  natural  and  universal  convic- 
tion of  mankind,  that  the  power  by  which 
thrir  actions  are  exerted,  is  their  own; 
and  belongs  to  their  constitution,  as  much 
ate  do  their  understanding,  affections,  and 
existence  itself.  This  conviction,  as  was 
remarked  in  the  answer  to  the  Doctor's 
first  argument,  to  which  the  reader  is  re- 
quested to  refer,  is  as  natural  and  invin- 
cible, as  is  their  conviction  from  the  fact 
that  they  act,  that  they  exist ;  or  from  the 
fact  that  they  perceive  external  objects, 
that  those  objects  exist;  and  no  one  can 
devest  himself  of  it  any  more  than  he  can 
persuade  himself  that  neither  he  nor  ex- 
ternal objects  exist.  This  conviction  dis- 


183 

itself  in  all  their  conduct,  and  e\- 
tend-  o'rr  them  us  wide  and  important 
an  inline  any  con\iclion  \\iiatever; 

it  is  a  first   principle.     Tli<-v  evMbit  it  in 
all  their  ex'  to   produce  eilects  in 

themselves,  and    other  in   their 

pm-j.  -eting  futurity;   in  their  re- 

:i  the   purposes  of  one   anot! 
in  their  view-,  of  obligation  ;   and  in  their 

gc. 

'(•eiHon  of  «  .  we 

innsi  admit  to  he  according   to  trntli;   or 
plur  ;ell  C8    ml-)    the  ahyss  of  uni- 

rersal    -!,fptirisin.     For   this   conviction 
is  a  i  ry  ell'ect  of  our  constitution; 

and  it'  we   cannot  trust  the  testimony  of 
our  constitution  in  one  case,  we  cannot 
trust   it   in  another.     No  reason  can   be 
-hould  trust  the  testimony 
of  our  constitution,  that  external  objects 
.  which  will  not  oblige  us  to  trust  its 
testii..  .!.\    in   i;  p.      None    can    be 

given,  that  we  should   confide  in  it>  te-li- 
mony   to   our   existence,  which    will   not 
to  credit   its   testimony   to  this 
Our  existence  is  no  more  a  subject 
of  consciousness,   than   power  is;  nor  is 
the  existence  of  external  objects.    What- 
ever our  constitution   obliges  us  to   be- 
lieve,  we   must    believe   to   be  true.      I< 


184 

then  we  would  not  doubt  of  our  own  ex- 
istence, the  existence  of  external  object?, 
or  any  other  truths,  whose  evidence  is 
furnished  by  common  sense,  we  must  re- 
gard her  testimony  as  indubitably  true, 
that  the  power  by  which  we  act  is  our 
own,  in  distinction  from  God's  power,  as 
our  existence  is  our  own,  in  distinction 
from  His. 

Besides,  if  we  admit  that  our  constitu- 
tion deceives  us  in  this  case,  since  God 
made  our  constitution,  we  must  regard  Him 
as  deceiving  us.  But  if  He  has  deceived 
us  on  a  subject  of  such  pre-eminent  impor- 
tance, by  our  constitution,  we  cannot 
prove,  nor  present  any  probable  reason, 
that  He  has  not  deceived  us  on  every 
other  subject.  We  must  therefore  aban- 
don all  our  confidence  in  Him. 

But  God  is  true.  He  has  not  deceived 
us.  Our  constitution  gives  a  testimony 
in  accordance  with  fact,  The  power  by 
which  we  act  is  our  own,  and  not  God's, 
in  the  same  manner  that  our  existence  is 
our  own,  and  not  His.  God  then  does 
not  create  all  our  actions.  The  Doctor's 
theory  therefore  is  untrue. 

Thirdly.  The  Doctor's  theory  is  con- 
tradictory to  the  representation  of  the 
Scriptures,  that  the  Spirit  of  God  influen* 


185 

ces  men  only  in  the  work  of  conviction, 
regeneration,  and  sanctification  ;  or  that 
the  influence  of  the  Spirit  on  men  is  a 
peculiarity  of  the  work  of  redemption; 
and  is  therefore  untrue. 

Every  reader  of  the  Scriptures  gains 
from  them  the  impression,  that  mankind 
are  subjects  of  the  influences  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  in  conviction,  regeneration,  and 
Rectification  only;  and  in  all  their  other 
'  v  ;u*t  without  If  is  influence.  This 
impression  i>  produced  by  the  influence 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  being  promised  as  an 
extraordinary  and  peculiar  influence. — 
Thus  it  was  promised  to  the  ancient 
church,  "I  will  put  my  Spirit  within  you, 
and  cause  you  to  walk  in  my  statutes.  In 
th<»  hM  da\-.  -nith  (Hod.  I  \\ill  pour  out 
of  my  Spirit  upon  all  flesh/'  And  Christ 
promised  the  di-riplr>.  ••  If  I  depart,  I 
will  send  him,"  the  Comforter,  "  unto  you ; 
and  when  he  is  come,  he  will  reprove  the 
world  of  sin,  and  of  righteousness,  and  of 
judgment."  Now  these  promises,  if  they 
tees  anv  significance,  imply,  that  the 
influence  promised,  was  extraordinary; 
that  mankind  do  not  all  enjoy  it;  nor  do 
its  subject  at  all  times.  If  they  were 
always  equally  the  subjects  of  the  Spirit's 
influence,  these  promises  would  have  no 
16* 


186 

more  significance,  than  would  a  promise 
of  future  activity,  or  sensibility,  or  any 
thing  else,  which  is  involved  in  existence. 

This  impression  is  produced  'by  the 
prayers  of  prophets  and  apostles  for  the 
influences  of  the  Spirit.  The  prayer  of 
the  Psalmist  is — "  Take  riot  thy  Holy 
Spirit  from  me;  uphold  me  with  thy  free 
Spirit."  In  like  manner,  the  Apostle 
prays  that  the  Corinthian  Church  may 
enjoy  "  the  communion  of  the  Holy 
Ghost;"  and  that  God  may  make  the  He- 
brews "  perfect  in  every  good  work, 
working  in  them  that  which  is  well 
pleasing  in  his  sight."  Arid  with  these 
accord  all  the  prayers  contained  in  the 
sacred  volume,  for  a  divine  influence. — 
They  all  proceed  on  the  ground,  that 
such  an  influence  is  not  enjoyed  by  all, 
nor  by  any  at  all  times. 

This  impression  is  produced  by  the  re- 
presentation, that  the  children  of  God 
alone  enjoy  the  sanctifying  influences  of 
the  Holy  Spirit.  "  As  many  as  are  led 
by  the  Spirit  of  God,  they  are  the  sons  of 
God"  "  If  any  man  have  not  the  Spirrt 
of  Christ,  he  is  none  of  his."  The  saints, 
individually,  are  represented  as  temples, 
and  the  Church,  collectively,  as  an  habi- 
tation, in  which  the  Spirit  of  God  dwells. 


187 

The  reason  and  propriety  of  this  repre- 
sentation cannot  be  seen,  if  the  Spirit  in- 
fluences others  as  much  as  the  children 
of  God,  and  dwells  in  them  equally. 

This  impression  is  produced  by  the 
ascription  of  all  the  holiness  of  men  to  the 
influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit:  and  all  the 
wickedness  of  men  to  then  and  the 

agency  of  the  devil.  They  ••  are  washed 
and  sanctified  by  the  Spirit."  Their  va- 
rious holy  affection-  are  the  -fruits''  of 
Hi-  inllurnees.  Hut  the*  \\ieked  -walk 
after  the  ilesh.  and  mind  the  things  of  the 
fle>li."  *•  They  walk  according  to  the 
course  of  this  world,  according  to  the 
prince  of  the  power  of  the  air.  the  spirit, 
that  now  workcth  in  the  children  of  diso- 
bediem 

Tin-  I  e  is  utterly  inexplicable, 

unless  the  iniluence  of  the  Spirit  on  men 
is  extraordinary  and  peculiar,  and  confin- 
ed to  the  work  of  convicting,  renewing, 
and  sanctifying  them. 

Thus  all  the  language  of  the  Scrip- 
tures, on  this  subject,  conveys  the  impres- 
sion, that  the  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
on  men  is  extraordinary,  and  employed 
'entirely  in  the  great  work  of  convicting 
them  of  sin,  and  turning  them  from  it  to 
:  holiness.  Strike  out  the  passages  relating 


188 

to  this  influence  from  the  Scriptures,  and 
no  one  would  obtain  the  impression,  that 
men  were  subject  to  "a  divine  influence,'' 
essentially  like  that  exerted  by  the  Holy 
Spirit. 

Now  the  Doctor's  theory  is  entirely 
contradictory  to  this  representation  of  the 
Scriptures,  so  palpable  to  the  eye  of  every 
reader.  According  to  his  representation, 
men  need  precisely  the  same  kind  and 
degree  of  divine  agency  in  doing  evil,  as 
in  doing  good;  and  the  agency  of  God  is 
concerned  in  precisely  the  same  manner 
in  their  wrong,  as  in  their  right  actions. 
Vol.  ii.  p.  40.  Now  both  of  these  repre- 
sentations cannot  be  correct.  If  God  pro- 
mises His  Spirit,  as  a  peculiar  gift,  to 
some,  and  not  to  others;  if  He  gives  Him 
to  some,  and  not  to  others;  if  His  Spirit 
influences  men  to  holiness  only,  and  not 
to  sin ;  if  all  who  are  not  Christ's,  have 
not  the  Holy  Spirit;  then  men  do  not 
need  the  same  kind  and  degree  of  divine 
agency  in  doing  evil  as  in  doing  good  ; 
and  the  agency  of  God  is  not  concerned 
in  precisely  the  same  manner  in  their 
wrong  as  in  their  right  actions. 

The  Doctor  may  perhaps  attempt  to 
escape  from  this  argument  against  his 
theory,  by  the  pretence,  that  his  repre- 


189 

;,  without  a  personal  desig- 
nation, as  creating  all  the  sinful  actions  of 
men.  is  consistent  with  the  doctrine  of  the 
Scripture  -.  and  his  admission  of  it,  for  he 
admit-  it,  that  the  agency  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  on  mankind  is  a  peculiarity  of  the 
work  of  redemption.  But  by  resortiii 
that  pretence.  li<1  will  only  embarra  —  his 
theory  by  another  equal  inconsistency 
with  the  sacred  volume. 

For   in  the  lir-l  place,   if    H  a  mere 
sumption,   and    equally   contr  y  to 

the  doctrine  in  qi:;  that    (*»'!   < 

exefta    such    an  agency  on  man,  as  the 
Doctor  designates  by  the  terms  "div  i 
"  direct,"  "  positive  indue;  |)t  it 

be  by  the  llolv  Spirit  in  comic -tins:,  re- 
newing and  -anctiiying  them.  We  chal- 
lenge th^  Doctor  to  produce  a  passage 
from  the  sacred  volume  in  which  it  U 
asserted,  or  ii(H:e^arily  implied,  that  God 
exerts  on  men  such  an  influence  in  their 
wicked  actions.  He  will  undoubtedly 
turn  his  eye  to  those  passages  in  which 
God  is  said  to  have  In  the  hearts  of 

Pharaoh,  the  IVLO  ptians.  and  the  Israel- 
ites. God  is  in-.1.  id  to  have  harden- 
ed their  hearts:  but  He  is  not  said  to 
have  done  it  in  a  "divine,"'  ;'  direct,"  or 
" .positive  influence ;"  that  is,  an  influence 


190 

essentially  like  that  exerted  by  the  Holy 
Spirit. 

The  mode  in  which  he  accomplishes  it 
is  not  declared. 

It  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to  account 
for  their  being  hardened,  to  suppose  He 
exerted  such  an  influence.  It  was  not 
necessary,  (and  the  Doctor,  in  deciding 
this  question,  cannot  assume  it  as  neces- 
sary, unless  he  chooses  to  be  as  faulty  as 
he  has  been  in  begging  the  thing  to  be 
proved  in  all  his  other  arguments,)  that 
God  should  have  exerted  a  "divine  in- 
fluence" on  them,  in  order  that  they  should 
wt ;  for  we  have  shown,  (hat  men  are 
possessed  of  power  to  act,  and  are,  as 
agents,  dependent  on  God  only  for  the 
mode  in  which  they  act.  Nor  can  it  be 
proved,  nor  is  it  needful  to  suppose,  that 
it  was  necessary  that  He  should  have  ex- 
erted on  them  a  u  divine  influence,"  to 
have  produced  that  effect  in  their  hearts, 
which  is  denoted  when  they  are  said  to 
have  been  hardened.  What  is  a  hard 
heart  ?  Is  it  any  thing  more  than  a  heart, 
that  resists  strong  motives  presented  to 
induce  it  to  obey  the  divine  will  ?  A  per- 
verse, rebellious,  incorrigible  heart? — 
Conceive  of  the  hearts  of  Pharaoh,  the 
Egyptians,  and  the  Israelites,  when  bar- 


191 

dened,  and  will  you  conceive  of  any  thing 
more  than  this  ?  What  then  is  it  to  harden 
a  heart  ?  Is  it  any  thing  more  than  to 
bring  it  into  a  slate,  in  which  it  shall  resist 
strong  motives  to  obedience;  be  per- 
verse, incorrigible,  and  rebellious  ?  What 
then  is  necessary  to  harden  a  heart?  Is  it 
any  thing  more  than  to  bring  it  into  ci'r- 
i  \\hicli  the  motives  to  >///  pre- 
sented to  it  are  stronger  than  those  to  ho- 
:  thai  is.  in  \\hich  of  the  obi- 
iituting  the  t\v<>  classes  of  motives 
pn-MMited  to  the  mind,  //lo.sr.  which 
motives  to  >///.  are  such  as  arc  regarded 
by  the  mind  as  ha\  in^  a  gTMI/er  capacity  to 
ailbrd  pleasure,  than  ik-mc  \\hich  are  mo- 
tives to  Im/iiKM'*  .NothhiL:  mure  than  \\\\< 
is  necessary,  if,  as  ha-  been  -hown,  man 
has  j)ower  to  act,  and  the  mmlr  in  wliicli 
he  acts  may  be  determined  by  ihemof 
presented  to  his  mind.  Invest  Pharaoh 
with  power  to  act,  and  present  such  a 
train  of  considerations  to  his  mind,  a- 
should  lead  him  to  feel  that  it  would  con- 
tribute more  to  his  good,  to  detain  the 
Israelites  than  to  let  them  go,  and  you 
harden  his  heart  as  much  as  God  did.  Is 
it  asked,  Could  such  a  series  of  consider- 
ations be  presented  to  his  mind  ?  We 
answer,  yes ;  for  there  was.  He  actually 


192 

viewed  the  disadvantages  of  letting  the 
Israelites  go,  as  greater  than  the  disad- 
vantages of  retaining  them ;  and  therefore 
would  not  let  Israel  go.  His  pride,  his  ab- 
solute authority,  the  considerations  aris- 
ing from  the  long  slavery  of  Israel,  and 
the  advantages  accruing  from  it  to  the 
Egyptians ;  the  provocations  ari&ing  from 
the  injuries  he  had  suffered  in  conse- 
quence of  his  former  refusal  to  let  them 
go;  the  influence  of  priests,  anxious  lest 
the  triumph  of  Moses  should  destroy  their 
reputation:  these  and  other  circumstan- 
ces of  his  condition  furnished  abundant 
materials  for  motives  to  secure  his  choice 
to  detain  the  Israelites. 

But  can  a  heart  be  brought  into  cir- 
cumstances, in  which  the  motives  to  sin 
are  stronger  than  to  holiness ;  or  can  such 
a  series  of  motives  be  presented  to  the 
mind,  without  a  "divine  influence"  is  ex- 
erted on  it?  We  answer — it  is  impossible 
to  prove,  or  render  it  probable,  that  it 
cannot.  And  if  a  heart  can  ever,  without 
a  "  divine  operation,"  be  brought  into 
circumstances,  in  which  the  motives  to 
sin  presented  to  it  are  stronger  than  those 
to  holiness,  no  reason  can  be  given  why  it 
might  not  in  the  case  in  question.  And 
to  assume  that  it  could  not  in  that  case, 


193 

is  to  assume,  that  it  cannot  in  any;  and  is 
therefore  to  assume  the  thing  in  question, 
and  to  be  proved. 

Did  not  the  daughters  of  Moab,  by 
bringing  the  Isiaclites  into  circum- 
stances, in  which  the  motive  to  sin 
were  stronger  than  those  to  holiness,  iu 
the  same  manner  harden  the  hearts  of  the 
In  the  same  manner  did  not 
and  Princes  harden  the 
heart  of  Darius,  to  cast  Daniel  into  the 
den  <>f  lions?  And  did  not  the  n-wiirds 
olli-red  to  the  Prophet  by  Naaman,  harden 
the  heart  of  Gehazi  to  ask  of  the  Assyrian 
two  talents  of  silver,  and  two  changes  of 
garments? 

It  is  not  therefore  necessary,  n<»r  at  all 
proper,  to  -uppo-e.   that  (-ml  e\<  rtrd  on 
Pharaoh,  the  Kgyptians,    ai:<I    tiie    Israel 
Ues,    a  ••  direct."   -divine,"   or  -positive 
influence,"  inorder  to  hardentheir  IK 
for  the  supposition  must  he  made  without 
any  reason  to  support  it.     We  can  as  ea- 
sily   conceive    of    His    hardening    their 
hearts  without,  as  with,  such  an  agency. 

Since,  then,  there  is  reithcr  proof  nor 
probability  that  God  ever  exerts  a  "di- 
vine influence''  on  men,  except  by  the 
Holy  Spirit,  in  the  work  of  redemption, 
the  Doctor,  were  he  to  teach  that  God. 
17 


194 

without  any  personal  designation,  cre- 
ates all  their  sinful  actions,  would  con- 
tradict the  doctrine  of  the  Scriptures, 
as  universally  as  though  he  had  represent- 
ed the  Holy  Spirit  as  the  agent  who  cre- 
ates all  their  sinful  actions.  The  doctrine 
oi'the  Scriptures  is,  that  God  never  exerts 
a  "  divine  influence"  on  mankind,  except 
by  the  Holy  Spirit. 

The  representation  of  the  Doctor,  if  he 
assumes  the  ground  we  have  supposed 
him  to  assume,  is,  that  He  does  exert  on 
them  a  divine  influence  in  all  their  agen- 
cy, besides  that  in  which  they  are  influ- 
enced by  the  Spirit.  The  doctrine  of  the 
Scriptures  is,  that  God  exerts  on  them  no 
"  divine  influence,"  except  that  by  which 
they  are  convicted,  renewed,  and  sancti- 
fied. The  Doctor,  by  making  that  as- 
sumption, would  represent  His  agency  to 
be  as  much  concerned  in  their  bad  as  in 
their  good  actions,  and  in  precisely  the 
same  manner. 

In  the  second  place,  the  Doctor,  in  as- 
suming that  ground,  will  greatly  endanger 
his  own  craft.  He  represents  men  as 
needing  the  same  kind  and  degree  of  di- 
vine agency  in  doing  evil  as  in  doing  good: 
and  thence  infers,  that  the  agency  of  God 
is  concerned  in  precisely  th-c  same  manner  in 


19  j 

their  wrong  as  in  their  right  actions.  But 
if  the  Spirit  is  the  sole  agent  in  creating 
their  holy  actions,  and   is  not  the  agent, 
or  not  the  sole  agent,  in  creating  th'/ir  sin- 
ful actions,  then  the  agency  of  God  is  not 
concerned  in   precisely  the  same  manner 
in   their  \\rong  as   in  their  right  actions, 
and  therefore  they  do  not  need  t! 
kind  of  agency  in  duinpj  evil  as  in  d 
good. 

ain:  the  Doctor,  in  his  fourth  and 
fifth  argtttni  tltS,  from  the  f:ict  that  the  //<>/// 
S/,ii-.-  tfl  a  -divine  iniluence"  on  men 

in  the  work  of  conriction  and  sanctificoti<M% 
infers,  that  (*'<td  exert-  a  ••  divine  inllu- 
enee*'  on  men  in  all  their  It 
Put  if  he  admits  that  the  iiifluenee  <>f  the 
holy  Spirit  is  a  peeuliarity  of  the  work  of 
redemption,  and  owe-  it 
tirelv  to  that,  he  r.Minot  inter  from  that 
peculiarity,  that  (iod  exertfl  an  influence, 
the  same  m  kind  and  degree,  on  all  n 
kind  in  all  their  sinful  conduct.  No  infer- 
ence whatever  can  he,  with  any  propriety, 
drawn  from  what  is  peculiar  to  one  part 
of  liis  administration,  in  respect  to  an- 
other part  of  it.  The  impropriety  of  that 
mode  of  inference  will  be  seen  by  an  ex- 
emplification. It  is  a  peculiarity  of  the 
work  of  redemption,  that  the  Word  was 


196 

made  flesh  and  dwelt  among  us;  there- 
fore, in  all  His  other  administration,  God 
is  made  flesh,  and  dwells  among  us.  It  is 
a  peculiarity  of  the  work  of  redemption, 
that  Jesus  Christ  is  Mediator  between  God 
and  man ;  therefore  God,  in  all  His  other 
administration,  is  Mediator  between  God 
and  man.  Is  it  any  better  reasoning  to 
say,  it  is  a  peculiarity  of  the  work  of  re- 
demption, that  the  Holy  Spirit  exerts  a 
"  divine  influence*'  on  mankind  in  convict- 
ing and  sanctifying  them ;  therefore  God 
rxrrts  a  "  divine  influence"  on  them  in  all 
their  sinful  agency?  If  the  Doctor,  then, 
avails  himself  of  the  pretence  we  have 
supposed  him  to  make,  he  must  abandon 
his  fourth  and  fifth  arguments,  as  far  as  he 
employs  them  to  prove  that  God  creates 
the  sinful  actions  of  men. 

In  the  third  place,  if  God  exerts  a  "  di- 
vine influence"  on  men  in  all  their  sinful 
agency,  precisely  the  same  in  kind  and 
degree  as  the  Holy  Spirit  exerts  on  men 
in  their  holy  agency,  why  are  we  not 
taught  it  in  the  Scriptures  as  explicitly? 
Why  are  we  not  told,  that  God  works  in  the 
wicked  both  to  will  and  to  do,  in  all  their 
sinful  agency,  by  a  "  divine  influence,"  as 
we  are,  that  He  works  in  the  saints  "  both 
to  will  and  to  do  of  his  good  pleasure?" 


197 

Why  are  we  not  told,  that  the  wicked  are 
His  workmanship,  created  not  after  Christ 
Jesus  by  a  "divine  influence;''  that  He 
creates  them  not  after  God  in  unrighteous- 
ness and  true  sinfulness  by  the  same  influ- 
ence ?  Why  are  we  not  told,  that  they 
are  unwashed  and  unsanctiiied,  and  con- 
demned by  the  -direct  influence"  ofCiod  ? 
And  that  haired,  sorrow,  enmity,  impa- 
t idicr,  severity,  male\  olence,  unbelief, 
pride,  and  h. temperance.  ;tre  fruits  of  that 
influence,  afl  «f€  ftFC  that  the  opposite  vir- 
tues are  the  fruits  of  the  Spirit *  Why  do 
we  not  hear  the  P.-almi-t  deprecating — 
Create  not  in  me  a  polluted  heart,  and 
renew  not  in  me  a  wrong  spirit:  do  not 
btain  me  thoroughly  with  iniquity,  and 
pollute  me  not  \\ith.sin.  by  a  -direct  in- 
fluence.*" This  language  would  be  per- 
fectly natural,  were  the  Doctor's  repre- 
sentation correct.  We  should  as  much 
expect  the  doctrine  of  God's  "  divine  in- 
fluence" to  be  explicitly  taught,  as  the 
doctrine  of  the  Spirit's  influence.  It  is  as 
important  a  doctrine.  The  Doctor  holds 
it  to  be  of  the  first  consequence  that  it  be 
known. — "  He  is  really  concerned  in  all 
their  actions;  and  it  is  as  important  that 
his  agency  should  be  brought  into  view, 
as  that  theirs  should.  For  his  character 


198 

can  no  more  be  known  without  ascribing 
his  agency  to  himself,  than  their  charao 
ters  can  be  known  without  ascribing  their 
agency  to  themselves."  Vol.  ii.  p.  35. 

If  it  is  thus  necessary  that  His  agency 
should  be  known,  in  order  that  His  cha- 
racter may  be  known,  it  obviously  is 
equally  necessary  that  the  exact  nature  of 
His  agency  should  be  known,  in  order 
that  His  real  character  may  be  seen.  If 
(iod  exerts  any  agency  on  men,  it  must 
be  "  true  and  righteous  altogether,"  and 
adapted,  if  known,  to  promote  His  glory. 
Why,  then,  is  not  this  doctrine,  if  true, 
revealed  to  us  ?  why,  at  least,  are  there 
not  some  hints  of  it?  Were  prophets  and 
apostles  ignorant  of  it  ?  Was  it  left  "  hid 
from  the  foundation  of  the  world"  till  this 
late  age,  for  our  author  to  discover? 

But  how  unlike  the  Doctor's  represen- 
tation, are  the  views  of  the  divine  agency 
exhibited  in  the  sacred  volume!  How 
entirely  would  the  aspect  of  the  divine 
government  and  character  be  changed,  i 
were  that  doctrine  inserted  in  its  holy 
pages?  What  could  the  hand  of  infidel- 
ity inscribe  there,which  should  more  "  ab- 
solutely" "  change  the  truth  of  God  into 
a  lie,"  and  "  the  glory  of  the  incorrupti- 
ble God  into  an  image,  made  like  to  cor- 
ruptible man  ?" 


199 

The  Doctor,  then,  if  he  avails  hiraseli 
of  the  pretence  to  which  we  have  suppos- 
ed him  to  resort,  to  reconcile  his  theory 
with  the  doctrine  that  the  agency  of  the 
I  l<-ly  Spirit  is  extraordinary  and  peculiar, 
must  encounter  diiliculties  as  great  as 
though  he  left  the  contradiction  without 
attempting  to  obviate  it. 

Since,   therefore1.  his  theory  i-  thus  en- 
tirely contradictory  to  the 
of  the  Scripture •-   respecting  the?  agency 
of  the  Spirit,  his  theory  is  untiii:  . 

Fourthly.  The  Doctor's  theory  is  con- 
tradictory to  the  doctrine  of  the  Scrip- 
tures, that  the  devil  exerts  an  agency  on 
mankind. 

The  Scriptures  represent  the  devil  as 
an  imi-ihlr  and  powerful  agent,  employ- 
ed continually  in  intluencing  men  to  MM. 
The  Apostle  declares,  "  Your  adversary, 
the  devil,  as  a  roaring  lion,  walketh  about 
king  whom  he  may  devour/'  He  is 
exhibited  as  blinding  the  minds  of  men  ; 
working  in  the  children  of  disobedience, 
and  taking  men  captive  at  his  will;  as 
employing  snares,  and  wiles,  and  devices, 
to  seduce  and  destroy  them.  Thus,  ac- 
cording to  our  author  himself,  "The 
Scripture  represents  this  enemy  of  all 
righteousness  as  having  access  to  the 


200 

minds  of  men,  and  possessing  a  power  of 
tempting  their  hearts,  and  leading  them 
into  all  manner  of  moral  evil."  Vol.  ii. 
p.  67. — "  He  is  constantly  endeavouring 
to  blind  their  minds,  harden  their  hearts, 
and  stupify  their  consciences."  p.  81. — 
He  represents  him  as  capable  of  suggest- 
ing motives,  temptations,  thoughts,  doubt?, 
and  arguments  to  the  mind.  "  Why  is  the 
chain  of  our  thoughts  so  suddenly  broken? 
Why  do  new,  unconnected,  and  unexpect- 
ed thoughts  so  frequently  rush  into  our 
minds?  Why  do  thoughts  which  the 
mind  abhors,  and  endeavours  to  banish 
for  ever,  so  repeatedly  and  repeatedly 
recur?  Those  tilings  favour  the  account 
which  the  Scripture  gives  of  Satan's 
tempting  power  over  us."  p.  71. — "  He 
is  capable  of  suggesting  the  most  sophis- 
tical arguments  against  divine  revelation. 
How  often  does  he  suggest  doubts  to  the 
minds  of  both  saints  and  pinners,  respect- 
ing the  inspiration  of  the  Scriptures?  How 
often  does  he  help  the  promoters  of  infi- 
delity to  the  most  plausible  and  delusive 
arguments,  to  pervert  the  doctrines  and 
subvert  the  first  principles  of  Christiani- 
ty ?  His  agency  is  often  very  visible  in 
the  writings  and  reasonings  of  infidels/' 
p.  76. 


201 


Now,  with  this  representation  of  the 
Scriptures,  as  presented  by  the  Doctor 
himself,  his  theory  is  entirely  at  variance. 
His  theory  teaches,  that  "  mind  cannot 
act,  any  more  than  matter  can  move,  with- 
out a  divine  agency  :"  that  "  all  their  mo- 
tions, exercises,  or  actions,  must  originate 
from  a  t/n-uic  rHicirnry  :""  that  k»  there 
must  be  the  cxcrci-c  oi  divine  a^rnry  in 
C\<T\  human  action,  without  v\  Inch  ii  ifl 
impossible  to  conceive  that  God  should 
rn  inoi'. .1  agetltft,  and  make*  mankind 
BCl  in  perl.  >rmily  to  his  dr-i^ns;" 

th.'t   "  tlii^  |g  thr  oiilv  M-riptural  rrpn^rn- 
tation    of  divine  proridcnrc  C    that    ^  his 
h  uid  is  to  be  seen  and   acknowledged  in 
v  event,  without  a  single  exception  ;" 
and,  that   k'  it  is  across  ahsurdilv  to  sup- 
that   tht1  /  re  of  Ciod    i-   i 

c  than  hi-  •  i  Ic  ever 

governs  men  without  exerting  H  jtoxitiuc  in- 
fluence over  them." 

His  theory  thus  represents  God  as 
creating  all  the  actions  and  events  that 
tako  place  in  the  minds  of  men,  or  of 
which  they  are  the  subjects;  and  dei 
that  any  of  their  motions,  exercises,  or 
actions  can  exist  unless  He  creates  them. 
It  denies  that  God  could  govern  men,  un- 
less He  created  all  their  actions:  denies 


202 

that  the  Scriptures,  which  exhibit  His 
providence  as  extending  to  all  events, 
give  any  representation  of  it  but  that; 
and  declares  it  to  be  absurd  to  suppose, 
that  God  should  govern  men,  unless  He 
governed  them  in  that  way. 

Now  if  the  Doctor's  theory  is  true,  the 
Scriptural  representation  of  the  agency 
of  the  devil  on  mankind  cannot  be  true. 
If  the  providence  of  God  extends  to  all 
the  actions  and  events  of  which  men  are 
the  subjects  ;  and  if  He  neither  does,  nor 
can  exercise  a  providence  over  them,  in 
any  other  way,  than  that  of  creating  all 
the  actions  nnd  events  of  which  they  are 
the  subjects;  then  it  is  not  true,  accord- 
ing to  the  Scriptural  account,  that  some 
of  the  actions  and  events  of  which  they  are 
the  subjects, as "  temptations,"  "  thoughts," 
"  doubts,"  "  sophistical,  plausible,  and  de- 
lusive arguments,"  should  be  produced 
by  the  agency  of  the  devil.  The  Doc- 
tor's theory  cuts  the  devil  oflTfrom  access 
to  the  minds  and  bodies  of  men,  and 
"quenches  all  his  fiery  darts."  It  is 
God  alone,  who  suggests  "  temptations," 
"  thoughts,"  "  doubts,"  "  sophistical,  plau- 
sible, and  delusive  arguments"  to  men. — 
It  is  "  His  agency,"  which  "is  aften  very 
visible  in  the  writings  and  reasonings  of 


203 


mlidels  »  There  is  not  a  being  in  the 
universe  more  harmless  to  men,  than  the 
dev-.  "That  wicked  one"  has  never 
touched  them.  How  much  soever  he 

>v,  as  a  roaring  lion,  have  walked 
about  seeking  whom  he  might  devour,  he 
has  only  beat  the  air.  Men  ncvor  live 
been  the  subjects  of  an  event  whidi  the 
dev.l  a  agency  produced. 

But  if  the  Scriptard  .-rprr<r,,tation  of 

teagencjoflhe  devil  is  tree,  the  Doc- 

•<'Vh«,JI7lsnotM>:  '"''  "'"*  ™,tra,lic-t 
each  other.'!  here  is  ,,o  a/enae  of  es- 
cape from  tbifl  conclusion.  U  ,  cannot 
c-oiu-cive  ol  M»y«  sophistical,  ,lau-ible, 
r  delqsive  arguinctHs,"  by  «hJd,  to  rcs.' 

CUP    it. 


bai|«    («„,   much   rnMcnre   ,,f     l(. 
of  th,  devil  on  mankind,  to  dis- 

it.  uhaU-v,-r  I,  ;H.O 

rv  we  oppose.      II,  ot 

t 


8,nwc"ti8 

common  enemy  of  mankind  is  n,on 

quentlj  mentioned   than  any  other  parti- 
cular person  or  agent,  except  the  man 

/esus;    ,s  more   than   fifty   ,j. 
called  the  do  ii:  more  than  for(y  times 
Oatanj  and  very  often  ted   IM 

yeral  other  names;"  i,,  u|ll(.fl  hi<  histor? 
is  completely  interwoven  with  the  hi^torv 


204 

of  the  Saviour,  of  "  our  first  parents," 
"Job,"  "  David,"  "Judas,"  and  "  Anna- 
nias,"  (Vol.  ii.  Sermon  4.)  and  in  which 
the  doctrine  of  his  agency  is  taught  in  a 
great  variety  of  declarations,  exhorta- 
tions, and  warnings ;  but  strong  proofs  of 
its  truth  may  be  seen  in  other  quarters. 
We  think  u  his  agency"  is  often  very  visi- 
ble in  the  writings  and  reasonings  of  pre- 
sumptuous theorisers.  And  "  as  he  is  an 
acute  and  subtle  reasoner,"  we  are  not 
slow  to  believe  that  the  credit  is  due  to 
him,  "  of  helping  to  the  most  sophistical" 
and  "  most  plausible  and  delusive  argu- 
ments," employed  in  aid  of  false  assump- 
tions and  monstrous  hypotheses. 

Fifthly.  The  Doctor's  theory  entirely 
devests  the  actions  of  men  of  moral  cha- 
racter, and  releases  mankind  from  all 
moral  obligation. 

It  is  a  first  principle  in  morals,  that  a 
being  is  responsible  only  for  those  effects, 
which  are  produced  by  his  own  power. 
If  any  "  motions,  exercises,  or  actions," 
take  place  in  his  mind  or  body,  which  are 
produced  not  by  his  own,  but  by  the 
power  of  some  other  being,  he  is  not  re- 
sponsible for  them;  nor  is  he  responsible 
for  any  events,  of  which  other  beings  are 
the  subjects,  if  those  events  are  not  the 


205 

production  of  his,  but  some  other  beingV- 
power.  This  truth  even  the  Doctor  ad- 
mits. "  No  man  feels  that  any  motion  of 
body  or  mind  is  his  action,  unless  his  heart 
is  concerned  in  it.  If  his  eye,  or  head, 
or  hand,  or  foot,  should  move  without  the 
concurrence  of  his  heart,  he  would  not 
call  that  motion  ///,v  avtinn*  nor  led  in  the 
JeaM  decree  accountable  for  it.  Or  if  his 
intellectual  p(*v\rrs  \vere  put  in  motion, 
without  the  choice  of  his  heart,  he  uould 
not  call  those  mental  motion-  /Wx  act 
nor  feel  either  praise  or  Name  worthy 
for  them."  -  The  /«•<//•/  ronsUts  in  volun- 
tary exercises."  and  ••  volitions  arc*  impe- 
rative acts  of  the  will,  and  products 
external  actio  Vol.  i.  | 

\n  imperati  pFOOUH  live   ol' ex- 

ternal action-/"  c  »n  he  QpthlOg   e!-e  ; 
an  act  involving  ai  on  of  po\\i'i\    If 

that  act  is  an  act  of  the  will  or  he  irt, 
then  the  power  exerted  in  it  mu>t  be  me 
power  of  the  will  or  heart,  which  exerts 
it.  A  man,  then,  according  to  the  Doc- 
tor's own  a<lmi>-ioii.  dues  not  call  any 
bodily  or  "menial  motion-  ;<>ns,  nor 

feel  either  praise  or  bhme  worthy  for 
them,"  unless  they  are  the  production  of 
his  own  power.  lie  is  utterly  exerrtpt 
from  responsibility  for  any  effects  which 
18 


206 

are  produced  by  the  power  of  other  be- 
ings. 

This  representation  is  undoubtedly  ac- 
cording to  truth.  Men  universally  dis- 
tinguish between  those  effects  which  they 
produce  by  their  own  power,  and  those 
of  which  they  are  only  the  passive  sub- 
jects; and  regard  themselves  as  worthy 
of  praise  or  blame  only  for  the  former. 
No  man  feels  to  blame  for  the  effect 
which  thunder  produces  on  his  ear,  and 
lightning  on  his  eye;  no  man  feels  wor- 
thy of  praise  for  being  warm  in  summer 
and  cold  in  winter.  If  a  man's  eyes  are 
forced  open,  and  objects  presented  to 
them,  he  does  not  feel  responsible  for  his 
perceptions.  It  is  the  dictate  of  com- 
mon sense,  that  a  man  is  not,  and  of  rea- 
son that  he  cannot  be,  worthy  of  praise 
or  blame  for  any  effect  which  is  not  pro- 
duced by  his  own,  but  the  power  of  an- 
other being;  and  for  the  obvious  reason, 
that  he  is  not  the  agent  in  producing  such 
an  effect,  nor  in  any  sense  the  cause  of  its 
existence.  Let  the  effect  be  a  perception 
or  sensation;  that  effect,  if  it  is  not  pro- 
duced by  his  own  power,  does  not  owe 
its  existence  at  all  to  the  man  himself, 
who  is  the  subject  of  it,  any  more  than  a 
similar  effect,  of  which  some  one  else  is 


207 

tic  subject.  It  is  not  the  consequence, 
.n  any  sense,  of  his  understanding,  or 
will,  or  any  thing  that  pertains  to  him. 
It  came  into  existence  entirely  by  the 

•  icy  of  another  being,  and  belongs  to 
him.  who  is  the  subject  of  it,  in  no  other 

-".  than  that  he  is  the  being  in  whom 
it  was  produced.  lie  is  not  the  agent, 
-my  more,  than  Adam  v  ;.t.  \\hen 

,t  rib  v.  n  from  his  Bide  by  divine 

power:  or  than  Paul  v.  ,i. \\hen 

forty  stripes,  -aye  one,  were  thrice  inflict- 
ed on  him.  The  bring,  who  produces  the 
•••llrct.  is  the  agent.  It  is  his  pou  er  whieh 
produces  the  effect,  and  it  is  he  who  e\- 
erta  the  power.  This  is  the  distinction 
which  common  sense  and  reason  establish 
betv  \  being 

et'ne,   when    lie    produces  effects  in 

-elf  b\  \\\<  own  pn\\er;  he  is  passive 
M  fie  are  pro  'need  on  him  by  the 

power  of  another  being.  Nnee  ilien  the 
man  is  not  the  n^ent  of  the  effect  in  ques- 
tion, but  only  ihc  pas-ive  subject  of  that 

(.  which  is  prodneed  by  another's 
•  ot  be  worthy  of  praise  or 
blame  for  it.  The  effect  does  not  owe  its 
'  \istence  nor  its  nature  to  him?  and  the 
praise  or  blame  of  it  therefore  cannot  be 
predicated  of  him,  any  more  than  though 


208 

he  had  not  been  the  subject  of  it.  The 
praise  or  blame  of  it  can  be  predicated  of 
the  agent  only.  We  trust  the  common 
sense  and  reason  of  every  reader  will  re- 
cognise this,  as  the  true  distinction  be- 
tween activity  and  passivity,  and  the  true 
line  between  responsibility  and  irrespon- 
sibility. 

The  Doctor's  theory,  therefore,  devests 
the  actions  of  men  of  moral  character  en- 
tirely, and  releases  mankind  from  all  re- 
sponsibility. For  it  teaches,  that  God 
creates  all  the  actions  of  men.  Men  are  en- 
tirely destitute  of  power.  None  of  their 
actions  can  come  into  existence  by  power 
belonging  to  them.  They  are  not  in  any 
sense  the  cause  of  their  actions,  and 
therefore  are  not  agents,  nor  worthy  of 
praise  or  blame  on  account  of  them. — 
They  are  nothing  more  than  passive,  ir- 
responsible subjects,  in  whom  those  ef- 
fects are  produced  by  divine  power. 

The  Doctor  will,  peradventure,  deny 
this  conclusion,  on  the  ground,  that  those 
effects,  which  God  creates  in  men,  are 
"  voluntary  actions,"  acts  of  choice,  or 
acts  of  will.  But  that  does  not,  in  the 
least,  intercept  that  conclusion.  The  na- 
lure  of  the  effects  produced  in  men  by  the 
power  of  God,  is  not  at  all  concerned  in 


209 

the  question,  whether  men  are  active  01 
passive,  as  it  regards  the  existence  oi'  those 
effects.  If  an  effect,  which  \ve  denomi- 
nate a  voluntary  action,  be  produced  in 
a  man  solely  by  divine  power,  that  man 
is  as  universally  and  absolutely  passive, 
as  it  respects  that  effect,  as  he  is  or  can 
be,  in  respect  to  any  effect,  which  divine 
power  can  create  in  him.  For  he  is  not 
in  any  sense  the  cause  of  that  action.  It 
.e  into  e  e  entirely  without  his 

scy.  will,  or   purpose,      lie  is  not  in 
any  sense  the    cause  of  its   nature.      It    is 
solely  the  consequence  of  divine  pen 
that  it  is  a  voluntary  action,  and    no! 
o|M  ration  of  a  dillerent  kind.      It  is  solely 
the  <  'iriice  of  divine  power,  that  it 

:  act  of  love  or  of  hatred,  a  elmier  nf 
T  that.      There   U  nothing 
pertaining  to  it.   of  \\liieh  (iod  i- 
sole  author.     iV  Q  |,f» 

assigned,  that  t:  -hould  be  regard- 

ed the  agent  of  this  *•  voluntary  action," 
any  more  than  of  any  involuntary  Hfeet 
which  might  have  been  produced  in  him. 
No  reason  can  be  assigned,  uhy  fje 
should  be  responsible  \  more 

than   for   any   involuntary    Hlect    which 
might  have  been  produced  in  him.     The 
action  having  been  produced  entirely  by 
18* 


210 

divine  power,  its  being  of  a  particular 
kind,  does  not  constitute  the  man  the 
agent  of  it,  or  render  him  worthy  of  praise 
or  blame  on  account  of  it.  We  challenge 
the  Doctor,  and  the  whole  host  of  meta- 
physicians, with  all  the  "  sophistical, 
plausible,  and  delusive  arguments"  in  the 
world,  to  allege  a  reason  to  prove,  that  a 
man  is  the  agent  of  an  action,  and  respon- 
sible for  it,  which  is  produced  solely  by 
divine  power,  whether  that  action  be  de- 
nominated a  "  voluntary  action,"  or  not, 
that  will  not  prove  him  to  be  the  agent  of 
any  other  action  or  effect,  which  Omni- 
potence can  produce  .in  him,  and  equally 
responsible  for  it.  All  effects  produced 
in  that  manner,  whether  they  are  called 
acts  of  perception,  will,  affections,  sensa- 
tions, motions,  or  any  thing  else,  stand, 
and  must  stand,  on  precisely  the  same 
ground.  No  action  can  have  more  than 
one  agent.  The  action  is  his,  who  pro- 
duces the  effect.  And  all  the  responsibi- 
lity, connected  with  the  effect,  belongs  to 
him. 

The  truth  is,  God  cannot  create  a  "  vo- 
luntary action"  in  a  being.  It  is  the  most 
"  absolute"  impossibility.  It  would  be 
making  passivity,  activity;  and  that  which 
'^involuntary,  voluntary;  whichever)  Dm- 


211 

•iipotence  cannot  accomplish.  A  volun- 
tary action  is  that  of  which  the  being,  who 
is  the  subject  of  it.  is  the  agent;  and  a 
being  is  the  agent  of  an  action,  which  he 
produces,  or  exerts  entirely  by  his  own 
power.  An  effect  is  not  voluntary,  if  the 
subject  of  it  is  not  the  agent ;  and  the  sub- 
ject of  it  is  not  the  agent,  if  he  does  not 
produce  it  wholly  by  his  own  power.  God 
therefore  cannot  create  a  voluntary  action 
in  a  being ;  since  in  order  to  be  voluntary, 
it  must  be  exerted  solely  by  the  power  of 
the  being  who  is  the  •:  of  it. 

These  views  of  voluntary  actions,  both 
Arminians  and  Calvinists,  in  all  their  elis- 
ions  on   moral  agency,  have,   in  our 
apprcheu-inn.    entertained.        We     I; 
never  regarded  it  a-i  an  agitated 

\een    them,   whether    the    //<>//.'/•.    by 
which  the  voluntary  actions  of  r: 

;>ower,  or  God's.    T\ 

have  alike  contemplated  man  as  eiulou  ed 
with  power  to  act  voluntarily,  or  exert 
volition-;  and  considered  his  voluntary 
actions  as  solely  the  exertion  of  his  own 
power,  and  not  of  God's.  The  question 
disputed  by  them  is.  whether  his  exercise 
of  that  power  is  controlled  by  any  cause. 
It  was  not  the  subject  of  President  Ed- 
wards' consideration  in  the  section  on 


212 

causes,  in  his  Inquiry  respecting  the  Free- 
dom of  the  Will,  whether  or  not  the  voli- 
tions of  men  have  an  efficient  cause ;  and 
whether  the  power  of  men,  or  the  power 
of  Gorf,  is  that  cause.  He  concurred  en- 
tirely with  Arminians  in  the  unquestion- 
able position,  that  their  volitions  have  an 
efficient  cause,  and  that  their  power  is  that 
cause.  The  subject  disputed  between 
him  and  Arminians  is,  whether  men  are 
controlled  in  the  exercise  of  their  power  by 
any  cause.  President  Edwards  took  the 
position,  that  they  are.  He  proved  by 
infrustrable  argumentation,  that  there 
must  be  a  cause,  that  men  exert  their 
power  in  the  mode  they  do,  and  not  in 
any  other  mode;  that  their  agency  is  made 
up  of  a  given  train  of  volitions,  and  not 
of  any  other  train;  as  much  as  there  is  a 
cause  that  any  thing  else,  which  begins  to 
exist,  exists  as  it  does,  arid  not  in  some 
other  way.  What  that  cause  was  he  did 
not  undertake  to  determine.* 


*  We  have  shown,  fn  the  remarks  respecting  the_  nature  of 
dependence,  that  the  immediate  cause^  that  the  mind  exerts  such 
a  Volition  as  it  does,  in  any  given  case,  is  its  judgment  of  the 
ity  of  the  objects,  which  are  motives  to  the  volitions,  to 
afford  pleasure  or   pain  ;  and  that  God  is  the  cause,    more  or 
;notely,  of  the  existence  of  that  judgment.    Motives  them 
undoubtedly  the  cause   or  occasion  that  the   mind 
exerts  volition?,  or  exercises  its  power.     Man  then,  is  the  effi- 
cient cause  of  his  volitions,  or  voluntary  exercises;  that  is,  it  i<- 


21S 

In  proving  that  there  must  be  a  cause, 
that  men  exercise  their  power  in  the  mode 
they  do ;  or  that  they  exert  that  series  of 
voluntary  actions,  which  make  up  their 
;cy,  and  not  some  other  series,  lie 
proved,  that  a  ground  of  certainty  exists, 
previously  to  their  volitions,  that  their  vo- 
litions will  exist  at  the  time,  and  in  the 
manner  in  which  they  actually  do:  and 
thence  subverted  the  reasonings  of  the 
Arminians  the  Calvini-tic  doc- 

trines, which  involve  the  existence  of  such 
a  certaii 

The  Arminians.  on  the  other  hand,  held 
that  men  are  not  controlled  in  the  exor- 
cise of  their  power  hy  any  cause;  that 
they  possess  a  self-determining  power: 
is,  the  po\\  \crtin^  their  power 

of  acting,  in  any  mode  whatever,  inde- 
pendently of  a  control  In  xtenial 
rjin^r.  They  ilen:  ee  n!  n 
certainty  or  necessity  of  their  acting  in  a 
given  mode,  or  exerting  a  given  train  of 
volitions. 


hi*  po, 

' 

tion  ;  that  i  .  mcnt  of  the  capa- 

city of  the  ol 

exerting  such  volitions  as  he  docs; 
that  is. 

the  cause,   t  ,  it  is  w  hat  God  does 

that  is  the  occasion  that  he  forms  those  judgments  resp 
the  capacities  of  objects. 


214 

The  whole  course  of  their  controversy 
demands  this  construction.  The  whole 
subject  of  difference  was  the  certainty 
or  necessity  of  men's  acting  or  exercising 
their  power  :a  the  mode  they  do,  pre- 
viously to  their  acting.  They  agreed,  in 
regarding  men  as  exerting  their  actions 
entirely  by  their  own  power;  and  used 
the  term  agent,  to  denote  a  being  who 
acts  by  his  own  power;  and  volition,  or 
voluntary  action,  to  denote  a  being's  vo- 
luntary exertion  of  his  power,  or  an  act 
w?hich  a  being  voluntarily  exerts  by  his 
own  power.  When  therefore  President 
Edwards  assumed,  that  a  volition  is  vir- 
tuous or  vicious  in  its  own  nature,  and  not 
in  its  cause,  he  contemplated  a  volition  as 
exerted  by  the  power  of  the  being  wrho  is 
the  subject  of  the  volition ;  and  not  by  the 
power  of  some  other  being;  and  thence, 
regarding  the  subject  of  the  volition  as  the 
efficient  cause  of  it,  he  intended  by  the  cause 
which  did  not  constitute  the  virtue  or  vice 
of  the  volition,  that  cause  which  constituted 
the  ground  of  certainty  that  it  would  exist, 
that  is,  the  cause,  which  governed  the  being*s 
exercise  of  his  power,  or  led  him  to  exert 
that  volition.  They  have  thus,  in  the  most 
explicit  manner  defined  'he  subject  of 
their  controversy ;  and  their  views  of  map 


as  an  agent,  and  of  his  voluntary  actions 
as  the  productions  of  his  own  power. — 
Whoever  lias  not  entertained  these  views 
when  reading  their  volumes,  has  never 
comprehended  the  design  of  President 
Edwards,  nor  known  the  nature  of  the 
Arminian  controversy. 

The  Doctor  therefore  cannot  assume, 
as  he  does  in  his  argument,  to  prove,  that 
it  i-  agreeable  to  the  nature  of  hold 
to  be  created  ;  that  a  volition  is  virtuous 
or  vicious  in  its  own  rutfur*,  without  any 
consideration  whether 
the  being  who  is  the  subject  of  the  voli- 
tion, or  another  1)  nice  there  nei- 
ther is,  nor  can  be  a  volition,  of  which 
the  being  in  whom  it  takes  place  is  not 
the  ellicicnt  cause,  it  constitutes  a  par! 
of  the  nutur'  »lition,  that  it-  cllicicnt 
cause  is  the  bein^  who  i-  the  suhj<  * 
the  volition.  And  he  cannot,  in  order  to 
escape  the  conclusion,  that  his  theory 
strips  the  actions  of  men  of  their  moral 
character,  and  releases  mankind  from  all 
moral  obligation,  make  the  assumption 
we  have  supposed  him  to  make,  that  the 
actions  of  men  are  not  devested  of  their 
moral  character,  nor  men  of  their  respon- 
sibility, because  the  effects  produced  in 
them  by  divine  power,  are  "  voluntary 


216 

actions ;"  since,  as  has  been  shown,  if  a 
voluntary  action  were  produced  in  that 
way,  it  would  be  a  mere  mechanical  ef- 
fect. Thus  from  the  acknowledged  prin- 
ciple, that  a  being  is  responsible  only  for 
those  effects  which  are  produced  by  his 
own  power,  or  of  which  he  is  the  efficient 
cause,  it  is  seen,  that  the  Doctor's  theory 
subverts  the  whole  foundation  of  moral 
obligation. 

Again:  it  is  a  first  principle  in  morals, 
that  a  being,  in  order  to  be  responsible 
for  his  actions,  must  possess  natural  pow- 
er to  act  otherwise  than  he  do^s.  i  hat 
is,  that  he  must  act  from  a  moral  xud  not 
from  a  natural  necessity.  A  being  who 
should  act  only  from  a  natural  or  physi- 
cal necessity,  would  be  a  mere  machine. 
The  Doctor  holds,  that  men  must,  in  or- 
der to  be  agents,  and  that  they  do  pos- 
sess natural  power  to  act  otherwise  than 
they  do  act.  fc<  Two  tilings  are  absolutely 
necessary  in  order  to  men's  acting:  one 
is  to  be  able — the  other  is  to  be  willing. 
By  being  able  is  meant  a  natural  power 
to  act,  and  by  being  willing,  a  moral 
power  to  act."  "When  men  have  natu- 
ral power  to  do  any  thing,  they  always 
have  natural  power  to  neglect  it."  "God 
knows  that  men  have  natural  power  to 


217 

act  contrary  to  his  designs."  Vol.  ii.  p. 
5/>.  57.  And  the  ground  of  this  reason  is 
obvious.  A  being  who  has  not  natural 
power  to  act  otherwise  than  he  does, 
must  act  from  a  physical  necessity. — 
There  must  be  a  physical  necessity 
against  his  acting  differently  from  the 
mode  in  which  he  does  act;  and  there- 
fore a  physical  necessity  of  his  acting:  as 
he  does  act.  And  if  he  acts  from  a  phy- 
sical necessity,  he  is  a  mere  machine,  and 
not  a  voluntary  agent  ;  since  a  voluntary 
agent  acts  from  a  moral  necessity  only, 
or  from  mere  choice. 

The  Doctor's  theory,  therefore,  dc\  < 
the  actions  of  men  of  their  moral  nature, 
and  exempts  them  from  all  moral  ol» 
tion.     For  it  rcj,n  -cuts  men  as  nil, 
destitute  of  power;   as  utterly   inrapablc 
of  acting,  except  by   a  divine   inilucncc 
creating  all  their  actions.      Bm  if  they  are 
universally  and  absolutely  destitute  o(  , 
cr^  they  plainly  have  no  natural  power  \ 
otherwise  than  they  do  act  ;  and  ii'  they  are 
utterly  i/icttjmftlc  of  acting  but  by  a  divine 
influence,   they    certainly   hav<  lured 

•'   than  t!ie\  aft  influenc- 
ed to  act.     Natural  power  to  act  other- 
wise than  they  do  act,  and  than  they  are 
influenced,  would  be  natural  power  to  act 
19 


218 

without,  and  in  opposition  to  a  divine  in- 
fluence. His  theory,  therefore,  in  repre- 
senting men  as  destitute  of  natural  power 
to  act  otherwise  than  they  do;  and  as 
destitute  of  all  power,  represents  them  as 
mere  machines ;  makes  their  actions 
merely  mechanical  effects,  and  releases 
them  from  all  moral  obligation. 

This  is  true  by  his  own  confession  in 
regard  to  Adam.  "  If  by  being  left  to  the 
freedom  of  his  own  will  be  meant,  that 
God  withdrew  some  aid  or  support  which 
he  had  given  him  before,  and  which  was 
necessary  in  order  to  resist  temptation ; 
then  such  a  suspension  of  divine  aid  or 
support  must  have  excused  him  for  eat- 
ing the  forbidden  fruit;  since  there  could 
have  been  no  criminality  in  his  not  re- 
sisting temptation,  which  was  above  his 
natural  power  to  resist.  Vol.  i.  p.  233. 
Here  the  Doctor  .declares  that  Adam 
could  not  have  been  criminal  in  yielding 
to  the  temptation,  unless  he  had  natural 
power  to  resist  it.  And  if  it  be  true  in 
his  case,  it  must  be  so  in  all  others.  He 
also  declares,  that  if  God  withdrew  any 
aid  or  support  from  him,  which  he  had 
given  him  before,  and  which  was  neces- 
sary in  order  to  resist  temptation ;  then 
such  a  suspension  of  divine  aid  or  support 


219 

must  have  excused  him  for  eating  the  for- 
bidden fruit.  But  the  Doctor's  theory 
represents  the  agency  of  God  as  the  We 
cause  of  Adam's  not  resisting  the  tempta- 
tion, and  of  his  eating  the  forbidden  fruit. 
For  he  represents  His  agency  as  the  sole 
cause  of  all  the  actions  of  men,  and  of  the 
nature  of  their  actions;  and  thence  re- 
gards it  as  such  in  the  case  of  Adam. 
And  he  expressly  declares,  that  "all  me- 
thods to  account  for  the  fall  of  Adam 
the  instrumcntnlihi  of  second  eotfjetj  are  in- 
suliicicnt  to  remove  the  difficulty  ;"  and 
that  therefore,  "it  seems  necessary  to  have 
recourse  to  the  divine  agency,  and  to 
suppose  that  Got  I  wrought  in  Adam  both 
to  \\ill  and  to  do,  in  his  first  Uransg 
sion.1'  "Hi-  lirM  -in  \vas  a  free  volunta- 

\   exerei   e  produced    by  a  divine  op: 
lion."     Vol.  i.  p.  234. 

But  if  God  wrought  in  Adam  in  his  first 
transgression,  and  His  agency  was  the 
sole  cause  of  his  eating  the  forbidden 
fruit;  and  if  His  agency  was  also  the  sole 
cause  of  all  his  previous  actions,  then  in 
his  !ran.^ression  God  must  have  with- 
drawn from  Adam  some  aid  or  support 
given  him  before,  and  necessary  to  resist 
the  temptation.  For  as  the  agency  of  God 
the  sole  cause  of  his  actions,  the  na- 


220 

lure  of  the  divine  agency  must  have  been 
the  sole  cause  of  the  nature  of  his  actions ; 
and  thence  a  difference  in  the  divine  agen- 
cy must  have  been  the  cause  of  the  differ- 
ence in  his  actions;  and  God,  therefore, 
in  exerting  on  him  that  different  agency, 
which  produced  transgression,  withdrciv 
from,  him  some  aid  and  support  which  He 
had  previously  given  him,  and  which  was 
necessary  to  resist  temptation. 

And  since,  then,  according  to  the  Doc- 
tor, "  such  a  suspension"  or  withdrawment, 
fc-  of  divine  aid  or  support,  must  have  ex- 
tuscdlmu  for  eating  of  the  forbidden  fruit," 
the  Doctor's  theory,  in  teaching  that  God 
did  withdraw  from  him  His  aid  or  support 
in  that  manner,  entirely  releases  Adam 
from  moral  obligation,  and  devests  his 
transgression  of  all  moral  character.  And 
if  this  be  true  of  Adam  in  that  case,  it  is 
equally  true  of  him  and  all  mankind,  in 
respect  to  every  one  of  their  actions. 

But  men  are  not  thus  mere  machines. 
We  have  the  testimony  of  the  Doctor, 
that  "  it  is  undoubtedly  true,  that  we  are 
all  conscious  of  activity ;  arid  intuiiively 
know,  that  we  are  free  moral  agents." 
Vol.  i.  p.  215.  The  Doctor's  theory, 
therefore,  which  represents  men  as  mere 
machines,  is  altogether  erroneous. 


221 

Sixthly.  According  to  the  Doctors  the- 
ory, God  is  the  only  agent  of  the  actions 
of  men,  and  their  praise  and  blame  be- 
longs to  Him  only.  His  theory  is  there- 
fore incorrect. 

It  is  a  first  principle,  that  the  efficient 
cause  or  agent  of  an  action  is  alone  re- 
sponsible for  it.  He  alone  gives  it  exist- 
ence;  he  alone  gives  it  its  nature.  If  its 
nature  is  such  that  it  is  vicious,  he  is  the 
sole  cause  of  its  viriousness,  and  its  vice 
belongs  to  him.  If  its  nature  is  such 
that  it  is  virtuous,  he  is  the  sole  cause  of 
its  virtue,  and  its  virtue  belongs  to  him. 
Its  virtue  or  vice  can  no  more  be  predi- 
cated of  any  other  being,  than  the  agency 
can  which  produced  it.  For  to  predicate 
virtue  or  vice,  praise  or  blnme,  of  a  being, 
is  nothing  else  than  to  predicate  the 
tion  which  involves  the  virtue  or  virr, 
praise  or  blame,  of  him  as  the  a^ent.  No 
being  can  be  conceived  to  be  worthy  of 
praise  or  blame  for  an  action,  unless  he  is 
the  agent  of  that  action.  To  deny  that  a 
being  is  the  agent  of  an  action,  the  praise 
or  blame  of  which  is  predicated  of  him,  is 
to  deny  that  the  praise  or  blame  belongs 
to  him;  and  to  deny  that  the  praise  or 
blame  of  an  action  belongs  to  the  being 
19* 


222 

who  is  the  agent  of  that  action,  is  to  deny 
that  he  is  the  agent  of  that  action. 

That  being  is  the  agent  of  an  action, 
who  is  the  efficient  cause  of  that  action; 
that  is,  owns  and  exerts  the  power  which 
produces  the  action,  or  of  which  the  ac- 
tion is  an  exertion.  The  agent  is  the  be- 
ing who  acts;  and  the  being  who  acts,  is 
he  who  exerts  the  power  which  is  exert- 
ed in  acting.  We  have  the  Doctor's  tes- 
timony to  this  effect:  "Two  things  are 
absolutely  necessary  in  order  to  men's 
acting;  one  is,  to  be  able.  By  being 
able,  is  meant  a  natural  power  to  act." 
That  is,  a  man  cannot  act  unless  he  has 
power  to  act.  But  there  is  no  need  of  his 
possessing  power,  unless  that  power  is 
exerted  in  acting.  A  man  cannot  act  then, 
unless  he  possesses  power,  and  exerts  it 
in  acting ;  and  "  no  man  is  capable  of  do- 
ing that  which  he  has  not  natural  power 
to  do."  That  is,  a  man  is  not  capable  of 
acting  in  a  given  way,  unless  he  has 
power  to  act  in  that  way;  that  is,  unless 
he  possess  power,  and  exert  it  in  acting. 

According  to  the  Doctor's  theory,  there- 
fore, God  is  the  only  agent  of  the  actions 
of  men,  and  their  praise  and  blame  be- 
longs to  Him  alone.  For  his  theory  re- 
presents God  alone  as  possessing  power. 


223 

Power,  according  to  his  theory,  is  omnipo- 
tence, and  an  incommunicable  attribute 
of  the  Deity.  Men  neither  do,  nor  can 
possess  it,  and  therefore  neither  are  nor 
can  be  agents.  It  is  divine  pmrer  which 
produces  all  their  actions.  God  exerts 
that  power  alone;  and  is  therefore  the 
agent  and  only  agent  of  their  actions. 
And  as  He  is  the  only  agent,  He  is  the 
only  moral  agent ;  and  nil  the  praise  and 
blame  of  their  actions  belong  solely  to 
Him.  Men  are  therefore  universally  and 
absolutely  p-i  — ive  in  all  their  aetions, 
and  universally  and  absolutely  exempt 
from  praise  and  blame. 

Surh  is  the  frightful  conclusion  to  which 
tliH  theory  conducts  us.  God  is  the  only 
it  in  the  world.  Men  are  mere  ma- 
chines, destitute  of  power  and  destitute 
of  rcs|)<)ii-il>ili!\ .  ( -od  is  not  only  the 
Author  of  all  the  holiness  in  the  world, 
but  all  the  holiness  in  the  world  is  His. 
He  is  the  only  holy  being.  And  He  is 
not  only  the  Author  of  all  the  sin  in  the 
world,  but  it  is  all  His  likewise.  He  is 
the  only  sinful  being.  Men  are  totally 
deceived  in  the  belief  that  they  are 
agents,  and  that  they  are  holy  and  sin- 
ful, worthy  of  praise  and  blame.  If  this 
theory  be  true,  God's  government  is  de- 


224 

ceitful  and  unjust.  He  reaps  where  He 
has  not  sown,  and  gathers  where  He  has 
not  strawed.  All  the  happiness  He  be- 
stows, as  the  reward  of  holiness,  is  no 
more  merited  by  those  who  receive  it,  than 
it  is  by  others,  and  no  more  appropriate- 
ly bestowed  on  them  than  it  would  be  on 
others.  The  misery  he  inflicts  as  the  re- 
ward of  sin  is  utterly  unmerited,  and 
might  with  equal  justice  and  propriety 
be  inflicted  on  any  other  beings!  We 
have  sat  down  to  many  metaphysical 
dishes  prepared  by  theorising  philoso- 
phers and  theologians,  but  never  before 
to  one  wrhich  meditated  such  horrible  re- 
sults as  these. 

We  might  add  other  proofs  that  this 
theory  is  devoid  of  truth.  We  might  di- 
rect the  eye  of  the  reader  to  the  nume- 
rous contradictions  which  it  involves — 
such  as,  that  men  have  power,  and  have 
no  power;  are  agents,  and  are  not  agents; 
are  free,  and  are  not  free  in  their  agency; 
are  worthy,  and  are  not  worthy  of  praise 
and  blame;  and  also  the  contradictions 
to  other  parts  of  the  Doctors  volumes, 
which  it  involves;  such  as,  that  the  devil 
exerts,  and  does  not  exert  an  influence 
on  men;  that  the  agency  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  on  men  is  a  peculiar  agency,  and 


223 

is  not  so;  &c.  &c.  But  it  is  unnecessary. 
What  further  need  have  we  of  witnesses? 
We  apprehend  that  we  have  both  refuted 
the  arguments  employed  hy  the  Doctor 
to  support  his  theory,  and  demonstrated 
the  theory  to  be  groundless. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  some  of  the  baleful 
consequences  which  must  result  from  this 
theory  bring  publicly  taught,  by  the 
ministers  of  the  gospel,  as  a  part  of  re- 
vealed theology. 

I.  It  will  render  their  discourses  con- 
tradictory, and  thence  tend  to  destroy 
the  confidence  of  their  hearers  in  their 
instructions. 

No  man  can  preach  this  theory,  and 
preach  the  go.-pel  of  the  grace  of  God 
too,  without  entangling  himself  in  the 
mo-t  i^ross  and  appalling  contradictions, 
The  theory  is  palpably  selt-contradicto- 
ry;  and  it  breathes  out  threatening^  and 
slaughter  against  every  part  of  the  gos- 
pel. Does  its  teacher  preach  that  God 
creates  all  the  actions  of  men?  He  de- 
that,when  he  preaches  that  men  are 
agents,  and  their  actions  their  own.  Does 
he  teach,  that  men  are  absolutely  desti- 
tute of  power,  and  incapable  of  acting 
but  by  a  divine  efficiency?  He  contra- 


226 

diets  that,  when  he  asserts  that  men  have 
power  to  act,  and  must  have  power  in 
order  to  act.  Does  he  announce  to  his 
hearers,  that  men  can  no  more  act  than 
matter  can  move,  without  a  divine  effi- 
ciency ?  He  retracts  that,  or  addresses 
to  them  the  grossest  insult,  when  he  calls 
on  them  to  repent,  believe,  love,  and 
obey ;  and  presents  the  promise  of  hea- 
ven to  allure,  and  the  threatening  of  per- 
dition to  constrain.  Does  he  hold,  that 
men  have  natural  power  to  act  otherwise 
than  they  do  act  ?  He  falsifies  that,  when 
he  teaches  that  they  cannot  act  except 
by  ni  divine  efficiency.  Is  it  a  part  of  his 
creed,  that  the  agency  of  the  Spirit  on 
men  is  a  peculiarity  of  the  work  of  re- 
ption?  He  abandons  that  position 
when  he  assumes  that  the  agency  of  God 
is  concerned  in  precisely  the  same  man- 
ner in  the  wrong  as  in  the  right  actions  of 
men.  Is  it  a  part  of  his  faith,  that  "  the 
devil,  as  a  roaring  lion,  walketh  about 
seeking  whom  he  may  devour;"  has  "ac- 
cess to  the  minds  of  men,"  is  "capable  of 
leading  them  into  all  manner  of  moral  evil," 
and  is  employed  in  suggesting  to  them 
"  temptations,"  "  motives,"  u  thoughts," 
-'  doubts,"  and  in  "  helping"  them  to  "  the 
most  sophistical"  and  "  most  plausible 


227 

and  delusive  arguments  ?"  He  excul- 
pates the  devil  from  all  this,  when  he 
teaches  that  God,  who  creates  all  the 
actions  of  men,  is  the  only  agent  by  whom 
men  are  influenced.  Does  he  hold  that 
men  are  responsible  for  their  conduct, 
and  that  the  praise  and  blame  of  their 
actions  belongs  entirely  to  them?  His 
theory  contradicts  that,  and  transfers  all 
their  virtue  and  vice  to  God.  These 
contradictions  and  others,  to  which  the 
theory  leads,  are  obvious  and  palpable*. 
They  are  so  flagrant  that  a  hearer  must  be 
exceedingly  stupid,  not  to  perceive  them  : 
for  these  dogmas  of  the  theory  contradict 
the  dictates  of  common  sense,  the  deci- 
sions of  reason,  and  the  doctrines  of  re- 
velation. 

Now  to  publish  such  contradictions 
from  the  desk,  must  tend  entirely  to  dis- 
possess the  hearer  of  confidence  in  his 
teacher.  It  will  force  him  either  to  re- 
gard his  instructer  as  incompetent  to  un- 
oerstefftd  religion,  or  as  dishonest,  or  to 
consider  the  Gospel  as  made  up  of"  things 
hard  to  be  understood."  No  man  can  be 
believed  to  comprehend  a  subject  which 
he  cannot  teach  with  consistency. 

Not  a  few  of  mankind  are  disposed  to 
charge  the  inconsistencies  of  the  teachers 


228 

of  religion  to  religion  itself;  and  to  shel- 
ter themselves  under  that  persuasion 
from  all  rebukes  of  conscience  for  their 
neglect  to  understand  its  doctrines,  and 
their  disregard  of  its  known  truths. 

This  course  of  preaching  naturally 
makes  shipwreck  of  the  hearer's  confi- 
dence in  the  teacher.  The  hearer  sees, 
that  he  is  not  fairly  treated  ;  that  he  is 
perpetually  plunged  into  artificial  per- 
plexities; that  what  is  simple,  is  con- 
founded ;  and  what  is  true,  is  involved  in 
doubt.  He  becomes  averse  to  the  man  ; 
a  film  of  prejudice  spreads  itself  over  his 
eye,  discolouring  even  the  truths  which 
are  taught,  and  depriving  them  of  power 
to  delight  or  persuade.  The  preacher's 
influence  dies"away.  He  robs  the  Gospel 
of  its  consistency  and  dignity,  and  him- 
self of  the  respect  arid  trust  which  his 
oOice  properly  procures  him.  He  is  view- 
ed with  the  irreverence  and  distrust 
which  other  men  incur,  who  are  inconsis- 
tent in  their  principles,  and  erroneous  in 
their  reasonings;  and  his  ministry,*  not 
"commending  itself  to  every  man's  con- 
science in  the  sight  of  God,"  is  unfruitful. 

Nor  will  he  have  much  occasion  to  as- 
sume to  himself  the  credit  of  it,  if  some  of 
his  hearers  are  not  driven  by  his  ministry 


229 

into  the  regions  of  infidelity.  There  are 
minds  which  are  more  easily  plunged  into 
the  gulf  of  skepticism  by  what  in  their 
apprehension  is  contradictory  or  incom- 
prehensible in  religion,  than  by  any  thing 
else  ;  and  a  ministry,  in  which  this  theory 
is  taught,  would,  in  our  judgment,  furnish 
"  the  devil"  with  ample  materials  from 
which  he  could  ^help"  such  minds  "  to 
the  most  sophistical,  plausible,  and  delu- 
sive arguments  to  pervert  the  doctrines. 
and  ^uhxert  the  firsUprinciples  of  Chris- 
tianity." 

The  preaching  of  this  theory  will  not 
produce  these  ellects  in  every  individual; 
but  the  laws  of  human  nature  assure  us  it 
will  in  some.  Were  we  able  to  cast  our 
eye  over  the  congregations,  in  which  it 
has  been  taught,  and  trace  it-  influence, 
we  doubt  not,  that  we  should  detect  many 
minds,  whose  history  we  have  delineated. 

II.  The  preaching  of  this  theory  must 
tend  to  produce  a  contentious  disposition 
in  the  community,  and  to  propagate  dis- 
sensions arid  sectarianism  in  the  Church. 
No  man  can  teach  it  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  command  the  faith  of  all.  There  are,  in 
every  congregation,  some  whose  common 
sense  is  toodisceming,not  to  reject  its  con- 
tradictory dogmas :  and  whose  understand- 
20 


230 

iiig  is  too  sound,  not  to  detect  the  fallacy 
of  the  reasonings,  by  which  it  is  attempted 
to  be  sustained.  However  it  may  be  with 
the  multitude,  there  are  many,  who  will 
not  decide  without  investigation,  nor  be- 
lieve without  evidence ;  and  neither  those 
who  reject,  rior  those  who  embrace  the 
theory,  will  regard  their  decision  as  of 
slight  consequence.  It  is  a  question  of 
pre-eminent  consequence,  and  fitted  more 
than  almost  any  other,  to  arouse  the  sen- 
sibilities. Who  can  be  indifferent,  when 
gravely  called  by  a  teacher  of  religion  to 
decide  whether  he  is  a  moral  agent,  or  a 
machine;  and  whether  justice  or  injustice 
is  the  habitation  of  God's  throne  ? 

Those  who,  departing  from  the  com- 
mon paths  of  speculation,  descry,  as 
they  imagine,  some  truth,  "  which  in 
other  ages  was  riot  made  known  unto 
the  sons  of  men,"  and  broach  new 
doctrines,  are  prone  to  regard  their  pe- 
culiar views  as  the  most  important  por- 
tion of  the  Gospel,  and  to  contend  for 
them  more  "earnestly"  than  "for  the 
faith  once  delivered  to  the  saints." — 
Teachers,  who  "  have  sought  out  such  in- 
ventions," feel  constrained  by  the  up- 
braidings  of  conscience,  and  the  yearn- 
ings of  philanthropy,  to  address  them- 
pcjves  immediately  to  the  "  wood,  hay, 


231 

and  stubble''  of  their  systems,  and  ;i  omii 
the  weightier  matters  of  the  law,  judg- 
ment, mercy,  faith,"  "  and  the  love  of 
God/'  The  very  quintessence  of  religion 
is  in  their  apprehension,  embodied  in 
their  peculiar  dogmas;  and  the  ark  is  in 
jeopardy  till  they  are  embraced  with  "all 
lowliness  and  meekness."  They  there- 
fore perpetually  drag  them  before  the 
public  rye,  and  M  niggle  to  beat  down 
other  systems,  and  uivr  support  to  theii 
own.  The  natural  influence  of  such  a 
course  of  preaching  is  to  *•  gender  strifes" 
•'  about  words  to  no  profit,  but  to  the  sub- 
verting of  the  hearers."  They  are  brought 
to  "dote  about  questions,  and  strifes  of 
words,  whereof cometh  envy,  railings,  evil 
surmisings,  perverse  disputings."  A  pug- 
nacious, sectarian  spirit  :  tted.  One 
<>f  Paul,  one  of  A  polios,  and  another  of 
Cephas,  till  Christ  ••  is  Irit  alone."  The 
cry  is  raised,  "  Who  is  on  the  Lord's  side? 
Put  every  man  his  sword  by  his  side,  and 
slay  every  man  his  brother,  and  every 
man  his  companion,  and  every  man  his 
neighbour."  The  advocates  of  the  theo- 
ry "  breathe  out  threatening  and  slaugh- 
ter" against  their  adversaries,  as  "  un- 
orthodox," mere  "  heretics,"  "  sons  of  Be- 
lial," "  men  who  hold  the  truth  in  un- 


232 

righteousness."  In  the  mean  time,  the 
meekness  and  gentleness  of  Christ  are 
extinguished.  Severity,  dogmatism,  a 
spirit  of  unsparing  condemnation  become 
prominent  features  of  the  character.  Re- 
ligion is  transformed  into  "vain  bab- 
blings," "  foolish  and  unlearned  ques- 
tions," "  contentions  and  strivings  about 
the  law,"  and  "  giving  heed  to  Jewish  fa- 
bles, and  commandments  of  men  that  turn 
from  the  truth."  The  theory  is  made  the 
standard  of  orthodoxy.  Every  man  is 
stretched  upon  that  bed ;  and  if  "  found 
wanting"  in  exact  coincidence  with  it,  is 
rejected  as  an  heretic.  Faith  in  it,  is 
made  the  test  of  piety ;  and  on  the  pre- 
sumption, that  without  that  faith  it  is  im- 
possible to  please  God,  all  who  do  not 
possess  it,  are  cast  "without"  among 
"  dogs  and  sorcerers."  None  but  "  the 
thorough  going,"  to  use  their  own  lan- 
guage, are  "  sound  in  the  faith." 

On  the  other  hand,  those  who  re- 
ject the  theory,  are  aroused  to  more 
warmth  and  severity  in  defending  their 
opinions;  and  are  fortunate  if  they  do 
not,  in  the  contention,  revert  into  the  op- 
posite error.  Hot  disputation  always 
produces  extremes.  Some,  who  would 
otherwise  have  "held  fast  the  form  of 


233 

sound  words,"  retreat  into  low  Calvinism. 
Multitudes  people  the  regions  of  Armin- 
ianism.  Uriitarianism  here  and  there  culls 
a  disciple.  And  many,  disgusted  with  re- 
ligious contentions,  resolve  to  "live  with- 
out God  and  without  hope  in  the  world." 

It  needs  not  the  eye  of  prophecy  to  dis- 
cover that  these  must  be  the  consequen- 
ces of  such  a  course  of  preaching.  Any 
one,  who  has  read  a  single  chapter  of  hu- 
man nature,  may  ^oe  that  they  are  inevi- 
table. We  appeal  to  the  ministers  who 
have  taught  this  theory;  we  appeal  to 
the  congregations  who  have  heard  it,  whe- 
ther we  have  not  accurately  depicted  the 
history  of  their  experience.  If  we  wi-!i- 
cd  to  discover  the  most  deperate  vota- 
ries of  error,  Arminians.  Unitarians.  Uni- 
vcrsalists,  Swedenborgians,  Nothingari- 
an-, we  would  search  lor  them  in  the  re- 
gion where  this  theory  has  prevalence. 
It'  we  wished  to  find  a  region,  where  piety 
is  chilled  and  stinted  by  contention,  and 
religion  is  resolved  into  abstract  specula- 
tion, we  should  turn  our  eye  to  that. 

The  advocates  of  this  theory  are  a  sect, 
and  as  distinctly  defined,  and  as  tena- 
cious of  their  peculiarities  as  any  sect 
whatever.  It  is  thence  natural  to  expect 
that  they  will  avail  themselves  of  all  prac- 
20* 


234 

ticable  means  to  give  currency  to  their 
views  and  supremacy  to  their  party;  that 
their  ministers  will  associate  with  each 
other  more  intimately  than  with  those 
who  dissent  from  their  creed ;  and  that 
their  members  in  vacant  congregations 
will  demand  that  their  sentiments  should 
prevail,  and  make  a  difference  between 
their  own  and  the  opinions  of  candidates 
for  settlement,  a  ground  of  rejecting 
them. 

The  question  of  their  settlement,  it  may 
be  expected,  will  in  many  places  come 
to  depend  on  their  views  of  this  theory, 
and  the  gates  of  the  sanctuary  be  barred 
against  those  who  cannot  embrace  and 
teach  its  revolting  dogmas.  We  appeal 
to  the  common  sense  of  all  whether  these 
consequences  are  not  to  be  apprehended. 
We  appeal  to  those  whose  condition  has 
allowed  them  to  notice  the  influence  of 
this  theory,  whether  facts  of  this  kind 
have  not  often  passed  under  iheir  eye. 

Are  not  these  things  to  be  deprecated  ? 
Is  it  a  matter  of  small  consequence,  that 
the  Church  is  rent  with  divisions;  that 
44  the  meekness  and  gentleness  of  Christ" 
are  supplanted  by  the  bitterness  of  con- 
tention and  the  zeal  of  party;  that  secta- 
rianism and  error  are  propagated ;  and 


235 

that  faith  in  this  theory  is  made  a  test  of 
qualification  for  the  ministry,  and  the 
ground  of  the  decision  whether  or  not 
men  shall  be  admitted  to  its  labours? 

III.  The  prevalence  of  this  theory  must 
prepare  the  way  for  the  reception  of  other 
human  doctrines.  It  rests  entirely,  as  we 
have  seen,  on  the  authority  of  the  Doc- 
tor. He  has  not  obtained  the  aid  of 
either  common  sense,  reason,  or  revela- 
tion to  support  it;  but  all  these  unite 
their  testimony  against  it.  Now  the  suc- 
cess of  one  innovation  of  the  truth  pre- 
pares  the  way  for  the  success  of  others. 
Those  who  yield  their  faith  to  the  mere 
authority  of  men  in  one  instance,  do  not 
surprise?  us  when  tin  \  vield  it  in  others. 
If  their  common  sen^e  i-  not  sniliciently 

rigorous  to  preserve  them  \\itliin  the  ii- 

ii;il  belief;  if  thev  fail  to  dis- 
tinguish those  subjects,  of  which  a  know- 
ledge mav  l»e  obtained  from  human  t( -ti 
mony,  from  those  of  VN  hich  our  knowledge 
mu>t  be  derived  entirely  from  God;  if 
they  overlook  the  distinction  betu  • 
•ertioris  and  proofs,  "  the  most  sophistical 
arguments,"  and  the  most  fair,  we  an*  pre- 
d  to  see  them  "make  shipwreck  con- 
cerning the  faith,"  and  •>  blown  about,'1 
the  mere  disciples  of  men,  "  by  every 


236 

wind  of  doctrine."  Whatever  is  present- 
ed to  them  with  a  show  of  proof,  recom- 
mended by  novelty  arid  enforced  with  a 
dogmatical,  authoritative  air,  is  a  fair 
candidate  for  their  unwavering  faith. 

Now  we  cannot  but  regard  the  disci- 
ples of  this  theory  as  exposed  to  this 
danger.  They  have  called  a  man  their 
Father  upon  the  earth.  They  have  made 
him  their  oracle.  They  have  reposed 
the  same  confidence  in  his  testimony  as 
in  the  testimony  of  God  sustained  by  mi- 
racles and  prophecies.  They  have  on 
his  authority  believed  dogmas,  which  all 
the  miracles  and  prophecies  of  revelation 
could  never  prove  to  be  true,  while  such 
things  as  impossibilities  have  no  exist- 
ence. What  then  shall  prevent  them 
from  yielding  their  faith  to  other  human 
doctrines,  which  chance  may  bring  with- 
in their  knowledge?  We  cannot  con- 
ceive that  either  human  sagacity  or  ob- 
tuseness  can  devise  a  scheme,  that  shall 
involve  grosser  contradictions  to  itself, 
and  to  the  truth,  than  are  embodied  in 
this  theory.  We  cannot  conceive  that 
sophistry  itself  can  furnish  a  selection  of 
more  "  sophistical  arguments"  to  sustain 
any  doctrine,  than  those  are  on  which 
this  theory  leans  for  support.  No  doc- 


trine  can  be  offered  to  their  considera- 
tion, which  for  abundance  of  contradic- 
tion and  dearth  of  proof,  can  present  more 
formidable  obstacles  to  their  credence, 
than  this  theory  presented. 

We  cannot  feel  surprised,  therefore, 
should  we  behold  the  votaries  of  this 
theory  exchanging  it  for  some  other  com- 
mandment of  men,  commended  by  its  no- 
velty, abstr  -,  dogmatism,  or  so- 
phistry. We  shall  not  be  surprised, 
should  we  see  some  giving  their  creduli- 
ty to  the  winds.  aiul  retreating  into  tlio 
region  of  universal  skepticism ;  and  others 
beguiled  by  the  craft  of  Unitarian  philo- 
sophy:  some,  abandoning  a  creed  of 
tenor  and  denunciation  for  the  elysian 
d minis  of  Universalism;  and  others  plung- 
ing into  the  gulf  of  S\\«  ;^i;in  mysti- 
fi-m  and  lk<  s.  Not  brrausp  we 
regard  this  theory  as  at  all  resembling 
those  errors  in  its  principle- :  nor  because 
we  suspect  the  teachers  and  advocates 
of  it  as  at  all  friendly  to  those  errors: 
but  simply  l>ee,ni-e  they  are  the  disciples 
of  a  man.  and  have  given  him  "dominion 
over  their  faith/-  We  doubt  not  that 
many,  who  teach  and  who  embrace 
this  theory,  are  men  of  eminent  piety, 
sense,  and  learning;  but  we  cannot  per* 


suadc  ourselves,  that  either  their  lean, 
r,  or  piety,  contributed  much  to 
thrir  1'aith  in  this  theory;  and  they  will 
|»lr;»  <  to  exeuse  us,  it',  when  we  behold 
them  embarked  on  the  tide  of  error,  we 
eannol  refrain  from  indul«;in<;  the  apprc- 
hrnsion,  that  they  may  not  prove  invin- 
cible by  the  influence  of  its  ebbs  and 
eoiinter  currents. 

IV.      The  publication  of  this  theory  is 
obviously  calculated  to  lead  men  to  adopt 
ir\\-.  nu)st  injurious  toliod,  aiul  dan^er- 
OUS  to  themselves. 

friiere  are  many  persons,  especially 
amon«;  the  \onni;,  who,  from  early  eduea- 
tion,  from  their  confidence  in  the  public 
teacher  ;  of  religion,  and  tlie  faith  of  tho> .r 
around  them,  will  be  led  to  a  loose  pcr- 
SUasion  that  the  theory  is  true,  and  >et 
will  be  forced  by  their  common  sense  and 
reason  to  thr  conclusion,  that  it  blots  out 
the  morality  of  thru  artion-,  and  annihi- 
I  ilr-.  thrir  responsibility,  \\iiat  views 
then  will  they  naturally  form  of  (Jod  and 
themselves  ?  Will  they,  after  hein«j;  con- 
viiu-ed  that  (u)d  creates  all  their  a<'tions, 
be  prrparrd  to  brlirx*  that  they  act  vo 
luntanl\,  and  arc  not  machines  ?  \\\\\ 
they,  after  beini;  taujjht  that  they  can  no 
more  act  than  matter  can  move  without. 


239 

*  divine  *  fheieru  \,    he   j»repaml  to  Ii 
(..  ihe  twice   "i    the    divine    hnv,  rr 


them  I"  I   l<»  <>hr>     \\illmnl  :in\   -ill 

of  ili.     nreessary  inlltK  \\  ill    I!K  >, 

' 


afler    hrm^    .i-^nrrd    thai    the    ;i^eiie>    oi' 

(;<>d  is  ,,ni  111  ,  \  ihr  lama 

inannrr   in    ilirir  \\  i'»;ii;    M    in    llirir    i 
iCtlOJ         l»r  ;\s   i  *  -    thai    tlir 

<•!]•  ctl    "1    ll':''    ;«;:«  IN  \    INT  n\      nch    n    na 
lurr,    lhal     the 

i-    \\!i.i    are     I'M  u    h. 

>;il    hlr  ;    and    il.  ,    rla  ,  i   |.iTri|»i 

\\  hu:n  i  •      |>ri.di,i  ,-d, 

inh)    ihr   ^iih   <>r  eternal   d<  ,  v\  ill 

(hr\  -    i.\     Ii  i\  illg    ''cm    inducl    d    i        i    ihr 

liC    'IN  ,    IM-    filled 
!,MI»ht,     lh:it     (  M»d     i  OOU        ill 

all  Hi  id  h..|N   in  all   I  Ii 

m  hi  ii  ten  to  IH 

and    hi   dr  >ci  I   '        \\  |||     i-nt    ihr   CODCll 

i;   i  ;,  M  God  i 

not 

P6     I  !<'    li:i  I     u.,!. 
ihr      \  I. 

rrsal  di  In  .  1  l!i;it  ihr  l>l 

'  <     l<)O  JpVBIMAM"  . 

h.»p'  I  en  too  d;u  L  10 

l>r  •  .d    Ihrni 

Of  the  palhulion  d'  Ihcir  |;nill,  I'm 


240 

wished  by  the  doctrine  of  the  theory  that 
they  are  powerless"  machines,  as  an  ex- 
cuse for  abandoning  the  purpose  of  refor- 
mation? Will  they  not  be  led  to  con- 
ceive of  God  as  an  almighty  and  inflexi- 
ble enemy,  whose  love  they  have  no  as- 
surance they  can  conciliate,  and  whose 
wrath  they  have  no  certainty  they  can 
avoid ;  and  give  themselves  up,  therefore, 
to  the  licentious,  unprincipled  rein  of  fa- 
talism? If  this  theory  is  not  admirably 
adapted  to  release  a  certain  class  of  man- 
kind from  the  restraints  of  religion,  to  dis- 
arm their  consciences,  and  give  them  li- 
cense and  appetite  to  "  commit  iniquity 
with  greediness,"  we  have  totally  mis- 
read the  volume  of  human  nature;  and 
when  it  shall  be  proved,  will  confess  our- 
selves to  have  been  "  in  great  fear,  where 
no  fear  was."  Men  who  wish  an  excuse 
for  sin,  may  certainly  find  it  in  this  theo- 
ry; and  we  have  never  yet  discovered, 
that  "  the  bands  of  the  wicked"  were  slow 
to  discern,  or  negligent  to  embrace,  any 
"  plausible  and  delusive"  means  of  silen- 
cing the  monitions  of  conscience,  and 
casting  the  veil  of  justification  over  guilt. 
We  are  not  apprehensive  that  these 
unhappy  consequences  will  result  to  eve- 
rv  individuaj,  or  extensively  to  every  con- 
* 


ill 

gregation,  on  whom  the  theory  is  success- 
fully inculcated.  We  are  aware  that  the 
truths  of  the  Gospel  intermingled  with  it, 
arid  taught  in  connexion  with  it,  and  the 
influence  of  common  sense,  w  ill,  to  a  great 
extent,  intercept  its  deleterious  influence. 
Such  is  the  fact  with  all  errors.  Their 
influence  is  repressed  and  modified  hy 
opposing  influences.  A  small  share  of 
truth  often  does  much  to  neutrali/o  a 
large  mass  of  error.  Vrt  after  all.  error 
lias  a  proportion  of  influence.  We  see 
in  every  seel,  triits  of  character  corres- 
ponding to  the  peculiarities  of  their  cived  ; 
and  shall  not  fear  that  we  risk  our  credit 
for  discernment  in  exprcs-inir  the  appre- 
hension, that  this  theory  will,  more  or 
abundantly,  j  ihr-e  conse- 

tjuenccs  ftfl  it-  natural  fruits.      We  appeal 
to  those  who  have  witnessed  it-  m!lu< 
whether  e\[>rr.'  is  not  alread  v  c\  in- 

ced  the  propriety  of  our  apprehension-. 

The  Doctor  has  probably  been  betray- 
ed into  the  invention,  as  far  as  he  is  the 
author  of  it,  and  the  publication  of  this 
theory  as  a  part  of  revealed  theology,  as 
with  most  errorist-.  l>\  forget- 
ting the  duty  of  confining  his  public  in- 
structions, in  respect  to  facts,  to  the  facts 
which  the  Scriptures  reveal,  and  not  ven- 
21 


242 

turing  to  inculcate,  nor  attempting  to  con- 
struct, theories  of  the  mode  in  which  those 
facts  exist.  The  sacred  volume  presents 
us  with  nothing,  in  respect  to  facts,  but  a 
simple  statement  that  certain  facts  exist. 
It  conveys  to  us  no  intelligence  whatever 
respecting  the  modus  operandi  of  God,  of 
men,  or  of  other  causes,  by  which  those 
facts  come  into  existence.  And  it  is  the 
business  of  the  minister  of  religion  to 
teach  those  truths,  and  those  alone,  which 
he  is  taught  by  the  volume  of  Revelation. 
The  Gospel  of  the  grace  of  God  comprises 
the  whole  of  his  commission  as  an  ambas- 
sador for  Christ.  The  question  about  the 
modus  existentiae  et  operandi,  is  a  mere 
question  of  philosophy.  The  mode  of 
God's  agency  on  mankind,  in  either  their 
holy  or  sinful  conduct,  has  no  more  con- 
nexion with  revealed  theology,  than  the 
mode  of  His  agency  on  matter.  The  mi- 
nister who  ventures  to  construct  and  in- 
culcate a  theory  respecting  it,  is  charge- 
able with  mistaking  the  business  of  his 
office,  and  assuming  that  of  the  mere  phi- 
losopher, as  much  as  though  he  gave  a 
theory  of  electricity,  or  craniology.  It 
was  not  the  purpose  of  God,  that  men 
should  learn  the  modus  existentise  et  ope- 
randi from  Revelation.  He  has  confined 


243 

His  revelation  to  those  truths,  a  know- 
ledge of  which  is  necessary  or  useful  to 
them,  as  the  subjects  of  His  government. 
He  has  revealed  those  facts  respecting 
His  being,  character,  purposes,  will,  and 
agency,  and  those  only,  which  need  to  be 
known,  in  order  to  obedience  and  salva- 
tion. 

The  insatiable  curiosity  of  men  asks, 
How  there  exists  a  threefold  distinction  in 
the  divine  nature  which  constitutes  a  pro- 
per foundation  for  the  personal  title-, 
ther,  Word,  and  Spirit,  and  for  their  seve- 
ral agencies,  \\hiir  yet  they  are  but  one 
Cod,  and  one  Being  ?  Hut  God,  in  place 
of  gratifying  that  curiosity,  merely  reveals 
'he  /'i/rt  that  such  a  distinction  cxi-ts,  and 

tturc  unknown. 

An  .hie   and   irreverent  curiosity 

.  How  the  Word  was  united  to  the 
man  Jesus,  so  as  to  lay  a  proper  founda- 
tion for  the  personal  titles  and  agency 
ascribed  to  the  complex  nature.  But 
God,  revealing  only  the  fact  that  such  n 
union  existed,  leaves  the  mode  unknown. 

\  re.tle-s  curiosity  asks,  How  does 
God  govern  the  universe,  so  as,  in  respect 
to  all  events,  to  execute  His  purposes, 
and  yet  leave  intelligent  beings  to  act  as 
moral  agents  ?  But  God  only  reveals  the 


244 

fact  that  He  exercises  such  a  government^ 
and  leaves  the  mode  unknown. 

A  presumptuous  curiosity  asks,  How 
are  the  dead  raised,  and  with  what  bodies 
do  they  come?  But  God  only  reveals 
the  fact  that  they  are  to  be  raised,  and 
leaves  the  mode  unknown. 

And  a  presumptuous  curiosity  asks, 
How  does  the  Holy  Spirit  act  on  the 
mind  in  turning  it  from  sin  to  holiness? 
But  God  only  reveals  the  fact,  that  the 
Holy  Spirit  influences  the  mind  in  the 
work  of  renovation  and  sanctification,  and 
leaves  the  mode  unknown. 

A  knowledge  of  the  modes  of  these  se- 
veral facts,  if  indeed  they  are  such  that 
we  are  capable  of  knowing  them,  could 
be  of  no  utility  to  us  as  subjects  of  God's 
government.  It  could  neither  alter  oui4 
views  of  His  character,  nor  furnish  any 
new  motives  to  love  and  obey  him.  And 
God,  therefore,  has  not  made  any  provi- 
sion, by  revealing  it,  for  the  gratification 
of  a  vain  desire  to  comprehend  what  can 
make  us  neither  better  nor  happier. 

Since,  then,  God  has  confined  His  re- 
velation to  a  simple  statement  of  facts,  the 
ministers  of  that  revelation  are  bound  to 
confine  their  instructions  to  those  facts. 
"  Secret  things  belong  unto  God."  The 


ihmgs  which  "  are  revealed"  are  all  that 
belong  "  to  us  and  to  our  children."  If 
any,  persuading  themselves  that  infinite 
wisdom  in  giving  a  revelation  has  over- 
looked things  essential  to  its  perfection, 
attempt  to  complete  the  work,  by  adding 
their  own  "  psalm,''  or  -;  doctrine,"  or 
44  revelation,"  or  "  interpretation,"  they 
-intrude  into  things  which  they  have  not 
seen,"  and  fall  into  "  the  Miare  of  the  de- 
vil/* What  are  all  the  theories  of  men 
respecting  the  of  revealed  i 

worth  ;  They  do  not  yield  us  any  know- 
ledge of  God,  or  His  agency.  They  are 
the  fictions  of  the  imagination,  not  indu- 
bitable deductions  from  known  truth. 
They  do  not  break  off  the  fetters  of  our 
nor  aid  our  ascent  to  heaven. 
Insi<  Qlightening,  they  obscure;  in 

plae(!  of  aiding  piety,  they  obstruct  it  by 
giving  perplexity,  or  endanger  it  by  in- 
spiring presumption.     What  are  all  the 
-heories  of  men  respecting  the  mode  of 
jlod's  agency  on  mankind  worth  ?    Have 
thev  imparted  any  knowledge  on  the  sub- 
ject?    Have  any  of  them  been  sustained 
by  any  evidence?     Have   any  had   the 
praise  of  not  contradicting  many  impor- 
tant truths?    Have   not   some  virtually 
21* 


246 

denied  the  agency  of  God,  and  some  the 
agency  of  men  ?  Have  not  some  cast  a 
cloud  of  discouragement  over  piety,  and 
some  given  the  rein  to  licentiousness ; 
and  have  not  all  tended  to  embarrass  and 
confound  ?  What  better  effects  have  re- 
sulted from  the  Doctor's  theory?  Are  he 
and  his  hearers,  and  his  disciples,  any 
wiser  on  the  subject  than  others  ? 

These  theories  of  the  modus  existentice  et 
operandi,  are  the  field  where,  in  every  age, 
fancy  has  revelled  and  dogmatism  rav- 
ed ;  but  over  which  religion  has  wept,  as 
the  stumbling  place  of  many  of  her  chil- 
dren, and  the  grave  of  many  of  their  joys 
and  hopes.  They  have  produced  incal- 
culable mischief  to  the  Church  in  every 
period  of  her  existence.  They  began  in 
the  days  of  the  apostles,  in  the  inquiry, 
"  How  are  the  dead  raised,  and  with  what 
bodies  do  they  come?"  And  what  of 
consequence  were  the  heresies  of  the 
Gnostics  and  preceding  sects,  but  theo- 
ries respecting  the  modes  of  things,  design- 
ed to  accommodate  the  doctrines  of  the 
Gospel  to  »those  of  the  philosophy  and 
mythology  of  the  heathen  ?  To  what  did 
the  contention  respecting  the  Son's  eter- 
nal generation  relate,  but  the  mode  of  the 


217 

divine  existence  ?  And  on  what  rock  but 
that  is  it,  that  the  Arian  and  Socinian 
make  shipwreck  of  the  faith  ?  On  what 
have  all  the  objections  to  the  doctrine  of 
God's  agency  on  mankind  by  His  Spirit, 
or  of  His  providential  government,  rested, 
but  on  theories  of  the  ?nodc  of  His  agency, 
exhibiting  it  as  subversive  of  the  moral 
freedom  of  man  ?  And  to  what  el>e  have 
tlio  error<  and  contentions  of  P< 
and  Arminian-  related  ? 

Mm  have  not  hren  -alisfied  with  u  the 
wisdom  which  i-  from  above."  It  has  not 
-atiah-d  the  thirst  of  curiosity,  nor  allord- 
ed  -nflicient  scope  for  the  revels  of  fancy. 
They  have  chosen  to  -draw  water  out 
of  their  own  eiMem,"  and  have  done  it  at 
the  e\|><  -he  Chinch  in  a 

of  broil-  and  persecutions  >\  ho  can 
appreciate  the  injuries  which  have  rcMih- 
ed  from  their  theories  to  th  -c?  of 

Christ?  And  who.  let  u-  a-k.  ran  esti- 
mate the  injury  which  may  result  to  the 
cause  of  Christ,  from  the  inculcation  of 
a  theory  like  that  we  have  been  consider- 
\Vho  can  estimate  the  injury  to  the 
Church  which  may  arise  from  teaching, 
as  a  part  of  revealed  theology,  a  mere 
fiction  of  the  imagination  ?  Jesus  Christ 


248 

reprobated  the  Jewish  teachers  for  incul- 
cating the  traditions  of  the  elders.  We 
reproach  the  Roman  Catholic  for  incul- 
cating the  "doctrine  of  devils,"  of  purga- 
tory, arid  transubstantiation.  We  are 
shocked  at  the  impiety  of  Swedenborg,  in 
publishing  his  dreams,  as  the  visions  of 
inspiration.  May  it  not  be  equally  inju- 
rious to  the  Church,  to  exhibit  the  Gospel 
as  teaching  a  religion  of  paradoxes  and 
contradictions,  and  subverting  all  the 
foundations  of  belief,  by  devesting  the 
dictates  of  consciousness,  of  common 
sense,  and  reason,  of  their  authority  ? 
May  not  more  than  an  ordinary  injury 
arise  from  teaching  a  system  of  religion, 
professedly  derived  from  the  Scriptures, 
which  represents  men  to  be  mere  ma- 
chines, and  God  as  pretending  to  exer- 
cise over  them,  as  machines,  a  moral  go- 
vernment; as  infinitely  loving  some  of 
their  actions,  which  He  creates,  and  infi- 
nitely haling  others;  as  giving  His  Son, 
in  the  exercise  of  boundless  grace,  to  re- 
deem them  from  that  guilt  which  He  cre- 
ated in  them,  and  His  Spirit  to  transform 
them  from  that  character  in  which  He 
created  them ;  and  as  assigning  to  some, 
on  account  of  their  characters,  the  re- 


249 

ward  of  eternal  life,  and  to  others  the  re- 
tribution of  eternal  death;  a  scheme 
which  exhibits  God  as  the  only  agent  in 
the  universe,  and  the  author  of  all  the  ho- 
liness and  sin  \vhich  are  predicated  of 
creatures  ?  May  it  not  involve  more  than 
a  common  injury  to  the  cause  of  Christ 
to  teach,  as  a  part  of  the  Gospel,  n 
scheme  which  thus  jp.-tilies  the  guilt  of 
men,  and  encourages  their  depravity? 
And  may  it  not  inllict  on  it  more  than 
a  rdight  injury  too,  to  induce  other 
embrace  and  inculcate  such  a  scheme. 
and  to  involve  the  children  of  God. 
this  theory  may,  in  error — darken  their 
views  of  God — perpU  \  their  hope-,  and 
obstruct  them  with  thr  temptations  of 
doubt,  disputation,  and  -triie  : 

If  the  Mim-ter.-  of  the  ( io-pcl 
sponsible  for  the  e\  il  conse<|iiehci  B  to  ihc 
cause  of  Christ,  which   result   from  their 
dereliction  of  dul\  •   ma\  it    not   become 
the    Doctor  to  t,  whether  weighty 

responsibilities  may  not  be  devolved  on 
him  by  the  publication  of  this  theory? — 
Let  us  not  be  understood  as  impeaching 
his  motives.  We  have  neither  reason 
nor  inclination  to  do  that.  We  only  wish 
his  caution  had  equalled  his  zeal;  and 
that  we  had  as  satisfactory  evidence  of  his 


250 

wisdom,  as  we  have  of  his  conscientious- 
ness. In  attempting  to  explore  this  sub- 
ject, he  has  ventured  beyond  the  legiti- 
mate bounds  of  human  investigation. — 
Without  the  light  of  Revelation,  it  is  in- 
scrutable to  us ;  and  God,  by  not  granting 
us  any  revelation  respecting  it,  has  suffi- 
ciently indicated  that  he  neither  requires 
nor  wishes  us  to  attempt  its  comprehen- 
sion. "  We  cannot  by  searching  find  out 
God.  We  cannot  find  out  the  Almighty 
unto  perfection."  "  His  ways  are  not  as 
our  ways,  nor  his  thoughts  as  ourthoughts; 
for  as  the  heavens  are  higher  than  the 
earth,  so  are  his  ways  higher  than  our 
ways,  and  his  thoughts  than  our  thoughts." 

Should  the  Doctor  deem  our  remarks 
worthy  of  a  public  notice,  we  hope,  that 
from  regard  to  his  reputation,  and  a  de- 
sire to  give  the  victory  to  truth,  he  will 
present  us  with  something  possessing 
more  of  sound  argumentation  than  that 
which  we  hove  been  called  to  consider. 
We  assure  him  we  hold  a  mere  assertion 
"a  vain  thing  for  safety;"  that  a  petitio 
principii  will  never  convince  us;  and 
that  the  <4  illusions  of  sophistry  will,  in  our 
eye,  only  render  a  desperate  cause  more 
desperate.  If  he  will  vindicate  his  theo* 


251 

ry,  he  shall  receive  our  loudest  applause. 
If  he  will  show,  that  we  have  committed 
any  essential  error  in  the  statement  of  his 
theory,  or  that  the  arguments,  by  which 
we  have  oppose*!  it,  are  u  sophistical/7 
merely  "  plausible  and  delusive."  he  shall 
receive  our  unfeigned  thank-.  We  have 
endeavoured  on  all  occasions  to  discrimi- 
nate between  those  consequences  which 
he  deduces  from  the  theory,  and  tl 
which  \s  e  believe  legitimately  follow  from 
it;  and  we  doubt  not  that  lie.  \\ere,  he 
convinced  that  these  consequence's  are 
fairly  deduced,  would  reject  it  with  as 
much  abhorrence  as  we  do. 

We  have  not  been  prompted  to  this 
work  by -the  apprehension,  that  his  theory 
likely,  unless  formally  refilled,  to  en- 
joy a  very  wide  or  permanent  currency. 
\\  e  have  e\er  regarded  it  as  destined  to 
only  a  brief  existence.  It  rests  on  too 
slight  a  foundation,  and  is  fraught  with 
too  gross  absurdity,  and  too  deleterious  a 
tendency,  to  triumph  long  over  the  s< 
and  piety  of  the  Church.  We  have  ima- 
gined we  long  since  beheld  symptoms  of 
its  decline*;  in  the  desertion  of  some,  who 
were  once  its  warm  advocates,  and  the 
fluctuation  of  others 

If  by  these  pages  we  shall  call  to  it  the 


252 

attention  of  those,  who  are  the  guardians 
of  the  public  faith,  and  arouse  their  exer- 
tions to  suppress  it;  if  we  shall  reveal  its 
character  to  some,  who  had  not  detected 
its  erroneousness,  nor  suspected  its  inju- 
rious influence ;  if  we  shall  convince 
some,  who  have  embraced  it,  that  they 
have  departed  from  "  the  faith  once  de- 
livered to  the  saints ;"  and  shall  thereby 
contribute  to  its  earlier  extinction ;  espe- 
cially should  we  be  so  happy  as  to  per- 
suade the  Doctor  himself,  that  in  his 
views  of  human  dependence,  he  has  mis- 
taken the  suggestions  of  fancy  for  the  dic- 
tates of  reason,  and  thence  been  betrayed 
into  erroneous  views  of  the  language  of 
Revelation,  and  incorrect  argumentation 
from  it;  we  shall  regard  ourselves  as  hav- 
ing performed  a  work  not  unuseful  to  the 
Church,  nor  unfriendly  to  him.  We  con- 
fess ourselves  to  have  been  often  both 
much  instructed  and  delighted  with  many 
portions  of  his  discourses,  and  deem  them 
worthy  a  frequent  perusal ;  and  persuade 
ourselves  we  cannot  make  him  a  more 
benevolent  return,  than  to  assist  him  to 
abandon  what  is  incorrect,  and  expunge 
what  is  injurious. 


A 

REFUTATION 


ENTERTAINED  BT 


ADVOCATES  OF  DR.  KMMONS'S  THEORY 


RESPECTING 


or  THE 

MORAL  KVIL  KXI-TlN'i  IN    III!  ^E, 

TO  A 

DISPLAY  OF  THE  DIVINE  GJ.ORY. 


22 


REFUTATION,  &c. 


M  ANV.  and  perhaps  all  the  advocates  of 
the  theory  which  has  passed  under  oili- 
ng iew.  hold,  a-  an  obvious  iniei  -ence  from 
the  view-  il  rxhibii-  of  the  agency  of  (iod 

in  gi  to  -MI.  tint  tht*  moral 

evil  whieh   exists   i:i    the   U  i-  ne- 

ir\  to  the  ylory  oi'  God    by  a  natural 
necessity. 

We   are  taught  by  the  voice   both  of 

on  and  revelation,  that  Ili>  own  ijory 

is  the  end    pursued   hy   il"'    Most  Hi-h  in 

all  lli-\vork<;   and  His  attrib1  i-iite 

^ent 

to  us    ,i    peri    i:ity  that   He   p'.:;  0  all 

His  n^eiiev    -i  r  ;,.,]  i,,  a  |)(M 

manner  to  secure  tl.  u  end.  His  know- 
ledge being  perfect.  He  discerns;  His 
goodness  beinjr  boundless,  he  must 
choose  ;  and  His  power  oeiiM-  unlimited, 
He  is  able  to  eveute  that  scheme  of 
agency  which  shall  give  existence  to  a 
perfect  system  of  materials,  consisting  of 
inanimate  objects,  animals,  intelligent  be- 
ings, and  events,  for  the  promotion  of  His 


256 

glory.  The  whole  scheme  of  His  agency 
in  calling  into  existence  and  controlling 
His  works;  and  the  whole  series  of  events, 
natural  and  moral,  of  which,  under  His 
providential  and  moral  government  His 
works  are  the  subjects,  constitute  a  sys- 
tem of  materials  perfectly  adapted  to 
glorify  Him ;  and  the  result  is  as  large  a 
sum  of  glory  as  could  arise  from  any  sys- 
tem of  agency  Hf  could  pursue. 

From  these  premises,  and  from  the  pe- 
culiar views  exhibited  by  Doctor  Em- 
mons's  theory  of  the  mode  of  God's  agen- 
cy on  mankind,  the  inference  is  drawn  by 
advocates  of  that  theory,  that  the  moral 
evil  existing  in  the  universe  is  necessary 
to  the  glory  of  God,  by  a  natural  necessi- 
ty; that  in  a  system  of  materials  perfect- 
ly adapted  to  glorify  God,  moral  evil  must 
be  a  constituent,  and  to  precisely  the 
extent  to  which  it  actually  exists,  and 
shall  exist  in  the  universe;  that  from  its 
nature  it  is  the  best  material  to  occupy 
such  a  portion  of  the  system;  and  that 
neither  moral  good,  nor  any  thing  else, 
could  be  stfbstituted  in  its  place,  without 
deteriorating  the  system,  and  preventing 
a  perfect  display  of  the  divine  glory. 

To  sustain  this  position,  they  advance 
an  argument  like  the  following  : 


257 

The  Most  High  has  chosen  a  plan  of 
procedure  which  will  glorify  Him  in  a 
perfect  manner.  But  He  has  chosen  a 
plan  which  involves  the  existence  of  such 
a  sum  of  moral  evil.  He  must  therefore 
have  chosen  that  plan,  because  such  a 
sum  of  moral  evil  is  necessarily  a  con- 
stituent in  a  system  of  means  to  glorify 
Him  in  a  perfect  manner.  And  since 
God  creates  all  the  actions  holy  and  sin- 
ful of  mankind,  that  sum  of  moral  evil 
must  be  nece.-sury  by  a  natural  nere<>ity« 
or  a  necessity  arising  from  its  nature, 
arid  not  merely  l»v  a  moral  necessity.  For 
if  it  were  necessary  only  by  a  moral  ne- 
ri'-^ity,  that  is,  if  its  necessity  did  not 
arise  from  its  nature,  and  it  were,  in  that 
•ect,  no  better  adapt*  d  to  glorify 
God  than  moral  good,  but  its  necessity 
arose  entirely  from  the  di-pn-itinn  of  men 
to  exercise  MM  in-trad  of  holiness:  then 
AN  hat  reason  could  be  assigned  for  God's 
creating  that  disposition?  It  is  He  who 
creates  the  disposition  and  constitutes 
the  moral  necessity.  We  must  look, 
therefore,  for  the  reason  of  His  constitut- 
ing that  moral  necessity,  not  in  the  moral 
necessity  itself,  but  in  something  antece- 
dent to  it;  and  that  can  be  nothing  else 
than  the  nature  of  moral  evil.  If  moral 
22* 


258 

evil  is  in  its  nature  no  better  a  material 
than  moral  good  for  occupying  that  por- 
tion of  the  system  of  means  for  promoting 
His  glory,  no  reason  can  be  discerned 
for  His  creating  it  as  a  part  of  the  system, 
instead  of  moral  good.  If  moral  evil  had 
not  been  a  better  means  than  moral  good 
to  attain  the  end,  then  as  moral  evil  is  the 
object  of  His  hatred  and  moral  good  the 
object  of  His  love,  He  must  have  chosen 
to  employ  moral  good  instead  of  evil. 
But  He  has  created  moral  evil  instead 
of  good.  He  must  have  done  it  there- 
fore, because  from  its  nature  it  is  a  bet- 
ter means  than  moral  good  to  occupy  such 
a  portion  of  the  general  system;  because 
it  is  an  indispensable  constituent  in  a  per- 
fect system :  that  is,  because  it  is  neces- 
sary by  a  natural  necessity. 

And  from  these  views  of  the  necessity 
of  moral  evil,  as  a  means  of  displaying  the 
divine  glory,  some  important  conclusions 
are  drawn  respecting  the  feelings  with 
which  moral  evil  is  to  be  contemplated. 
Thus  it  is  inferred,  that  as  moral  evil  is  a 
good  to  the  Most  High,  and  not  an  evil, 
a  benefit  to  His  kingdom  and  not  an  in- 
jury; it  is  a  subject  of  joy  and  not  of  re- 
gret that  it  exists.  It  is  argued  that  it  is 
supremely  desirable,  that  a  perfect  dis- 
play should  be  made  of  the  divine  glory; 


269 

and  a  subject  of  the  highest  joy,  that  God 
is  display  ing  it  by  a  system  of  means, 
which  is  perfectly  adapted  to  display  it 
in  such  a  manner.  And  as  moral  evil 
constitutes  of  necessity  a  part  of  that  sys- 
tem, it  is  a  subject  of  joy  that  it  exists. 
Since  God  has  chosen  to  create  and  em- 
ploy it  as  a  means  of  display  inir  Hi*  i^lory, 
we  should  rejoice  that  He  rrratr-  and 
employs  it  for  that  purpose.  A-  we  r-hould 
rejoice  in  the  exi-tence  of  the  end,  ue 
should  equally  rejoiee  in  the  cxi-tenee 
of  the  means  of  attaining  that  end.  All 
mankind,  therefore,  contemplating  moral 
evil  as  an  instrument  of  displaying  the 
divine  glory,  are  bound  noi  I  .  but 

to  rejoice  at  it-  exigence.  Each  indivi- 
dual is  bound  to  rejoice  that  he  is  him- 
self the  subject  of  that  exact  -urn  of  mo- 
ral evil  of  which  he  is  the  subject:  and 
that  he  shall  hereafter  be  the  -ubject  of 
precisely  that  additional  sum  of  it  of  \\hich 
he  shall  be  the  subject;  and  is  bound 
also  to  rejoice,  that  all  other  sinful  be- 
ings are  the  subjects  of  precisely  that 
aiiioiint  of  moral  evil  of  which  they  are 
the  subject 

And  since  the  existence  of  moral  evil 
is  thus  a  subject  of  joy,  evangelical  re- 
pentance or  godly  sorrow  for  sin  cannot 
consist,  to  any  extent,  in  sorrow  for  the 


260 

existence  of  sin.  The  godly  sorrow  of  a 
person  for  his  sins  cannot  at  all  involve 
any  sorrow  that  he  committed  those  sins  ; 
but  is  perfectly  consistent  with  joy,  that 
they  came  into  existence,  and  that  he 
committed  them. 

That  these  conclusions  follow  irresis- 
tibly from  the  position,  that  moral  evil  is 
necessary  to  the  divine  glory  by  a  natu- 
ral necessity,  none  can  be  at  a  loss  to  de- 
cide; nor,  it  would  seem  to  us,  can  any 
who  contemplate  them  with  an  unpreju- 
diced eye,  be  at  a  loss  to  decide,  that 
they  and  the  position  from  which  they 
are  deduced,  are  essentially  erroneous; 
at  variance  with  the  dictates  of  reason ; 
inconsistent  with  the  actual  views  and 
feelings  of  the  children  of  God  when  ex- 
ercising godly  sorrow  for  sin:  and  licen- 
tious in  their  tendency. 

If  such  be  in  fact  their  nature,  should 
we  succeed  in  an  attempt  to  subvert  that 
position,  and  intercept  these  conclusions 
from  it,  we  shall  perform  a  task,  we  trust, 
not  unwelcome  to  such  who  have  adopt- 
ed these  sentiments;  arid  should  we  be 
successful  in  endeavouring  to  collect 
additional  light  on  a  subject  hitherto  less 
perfectly  understood  than  many  other 
parts  of  theology,  the  task,  we  hope,  will 


261 

not  be  uninteresting  nor  unprofitable  to 
the  Church.  And  sueh  will  be  the  result 
of  our  attempt,  if  we  are  able  to  establish 
the  following  proposition : 

Did  mankind,  in  the  circumstances  in  which 
they  arc  placed,  yield  a  perfect  obedience  to  the 
divine  government,  their  obedience  would  con- 
stitute as  good  materials  as  their  disobedience 
docs  for  a  perfect  di*i>laij  of  tht  divine  glory  ; 
and  the  same  sum  of  glory  would  result  in  the 
Most  Hi^/i  from  tin  fy  whith 

would  then  exist,  as  /v  to  Him  from 

the  system  of  ( rails  which  now  r.rists. 

The  proposition  is  restricted  to  man- 
kind, for  the  convenience  of  confining  our 
reasonings  to  them.  It'  it  br  established 
in  regard  to  them,  it  is  equally  applicable 
to  all  other  sinful  beings. 

It  is  proper  to  remark,  in  order  that 
the  proposition  may  not  be  misappre- 
hended, that  we  do  not  mean  by  it,  that 
any  obedience  whatever  from  mankind 
would  constitute  as  good  materials  for 
displaying  the  divine  glory,  as  their  pre- 
sent disobedience  does;  but  we  mean  a 
perfect  obedience,  yielded  in  precisely 
the  circumstances  in  which  they  stand  in 
yielding  their  disobedience.  An  obe- 
dience rendered  in  other  circumstances, 
as  in  circumstances  of  much  less  tempta- 


262 

tion,  or  of  entire  exemption  from  tempta- 
tion, would  be  of  much  less  value,  than 
an  obedience  in  those  circumstances  in 
which  they  are  now  placed.  In  order  to 
be  of  the  value  required  by  the  proposi- 
tion, their  obedience  must  be  rendered 
in  the  precise  circumstances  in  which 
mankind  are  now  placed. 

By  yielding  an  obedience  in  the  cir- 
cumstances in  which  they  are  placed,  is 
meant, 

First.  Their  yielding  an  obedience 
with  only  that  quantity  of  means  or  of  in- 
fluence, which  is  now  employed  by  the 
Most  High  to  excite  them  to  obedience : 
that  is,  with  precisely  that  quantity  of 
knowledge  of  the  Divine  Being,  of  His 
will,  of  their  obligations,  and  of  the  con- 
sequences of  their  conduct;  and  with 
precisely  that  quantity  of  means  to  en- 
force on  them  that  knowledge,  and 
prompt  them  to  comply  with  their  obli- 
gations, which  is  now  employed  to  ex- 
cite them  to  obedience.  Were  they  in 
this  respect  placed  in  circumstances  dif- 
ferent from  those  in  which  they  are  now 
placed,  namely,  circumstances  in  which  a 
h  more  powerful  influence  should  be 
;oyM  to  excite  tbern  to  obedience;  as 
their  circumstances  would  be  essentially 


263 

changed,  the  value  of  their  obedience 
would  be  changed  also,  arid  the  proposi- 
tion would  then  be  inapplicable  to  them. 

Secondly.  By  their  yielding  obedience 
in  the  circumstances  in  which  they  are 
placed,  is  also  meant,  their  yielding  obe- 
dience while  subjected  to  preci-ely  that 
amount  of  difficulties,  or  of  inil'ience  ope- 
rating to  deter  them  from  obedience,  to 
which  they  are  now  subjected  ;  namely, 
that  precise  (jiiantity  of  temptation  or 
citement  to  sin,  arising  from  ignorance, 
ion,  the  examples  and  pe;-  is  of 

men,  the  adver-arv.  and  oilier  .  to 

which  they  are  now  subjected.  \\  ere 
they,  in  this  respect,  placed  in  circum- 
-tanees  of  less  difficulty  than  those  in 
which  they  are  now  placed,  that  i-,  in 
which  they  \\onld  I,*'  -uhjrcied  to  a  much 
(piantily  of  excitriiH'F.T  to  sin  :  their 
obedience  would  be  of  much  le-s  value, 
than  an  obedience*  in  the  circumstai 
in  which  they  are  now  placed;  and  the 
proposition  would  then  be  inapplicable 
to  them. 

Their  circumstances,  therefore,  include 
every  tiling  which  has  any  iniluence  on 
their  conduct,  whether  it  be  an  excite- 
ment to  obedience,  or  a  temptation  to 
disobedience;  and  yielding  obedience  in 


264 

the  circumstances  in  which  they  are 
placed,  would  be  yielding  obedience 
while  subjected  to  all  the  influences  of 
every  kind  to  which  they  are  now  sub- 
jected. 

The  proposition  respects  all  mankind. 
It  respects  Adam  when  he  committed  the 
first  and  all  his  other  transgressions ;  and 
it  respects  all  his  posterity,  whether  Jews, 
Heathens,  or  Christians,  at  the  time  of 
committing  all  their  transgressions. 

In  support  of  the  proposition,  we  allege, 
in  the  first  place, 

The  nature  of  the  divine  law. 

The  divine  law  requires  from  mankind 
a  course  of  conduct  adapted  to  glorify  the 
Most  High  in  a  perfect  manner.  This  is 
seen,  first,  from  the  Character  of  the  Most 
High.  He  possesses  infinite  perfection  ; 
and  He  not  only  has  the  attributes,  which 
constitute  infinite  perfection,  but  they  are 
of  course  exercised  and  displayed  in  all 
His  works.  All  His  works  are  consistent 
with,  and  expressive  of  His  character. 
Now  from  His  infinite  perfection  it  is  ap- 
parent, that  His  law  requires  a  service 
adapted  to  glorify  Him  in  a  perfect  man- 
ner; for  it  would  be  inconsistent  with 
that  perfection  to  impose  on  mankind  a 


265 

law   requiring   a   service,   that  was  not 
adapted  to  glorify  Him  in  a  perfect  man- 
ner.     A  law,  requiring  a  service  that  is 
not  adapted  to  glorify  Him  in  a  perfect 
manner,  requires  a  service  that  is  adapted 
to  dishonour  Him  to  that  extent  to  which 
it  fails  of  glorifying  Him  perfectly.  And  it 
surely  is  not  consistent  with  the  perfec- 
tion of  God  to  impose  a  law,  requiring  a 
service  that  will  dishonour  him.     No  law 
can  be  worthy  of  Him,  which  does  not 
require  a   service   perfectly   glorious    to 
Him.     To  impose  a  law,  requiring  a  ser- 
vice which  dishonours  Him,  must  arise 
from  a  want  either  of  disposition,  or  capa- 
city to  impose  a  law,  requiring  a  service 
that  should  he  perfectly  glorious  to  Him. 
Hut  the  want  of  a  <li-pn  ition  to  impo 
law,  demanding  a  service  that  should  glo- 
rify Him  perfectly,  would  he  inconsistent 
with  His   infinite  wisdom,   which  would 
lead    Him  to  impose   a   law  requiring  a 
service  adapted  to  glorify  Him  in  a  per- 
fect manner;  and    the  want  of  capacity 
to  impose  such  a  law,  would  be  inconsist- 
ent with  His  infinite   understanding      If 
the  nature  of  mankind  is  such,  that  a  law 
might  be   devised  demanding  a  service 
adapted  to  glorify  Him  in  a  perfect  man- 
ner, then  not  to  be  able  to  devise  suchalaw 
23 


266 

must  arise  from  a  want  of  understanding, 
If  the  nature  of  mankind  is  such,  that  in- 
finite understanding  cannot  devise  such  a 
law,  then  God  must  have  created  them 
with  such  a  nature,  either  from  a  wrant  of 
capacity  or  disposition  to  create  them 
with  a  nature  such,  that  a  law  might  be 
imposed  requiring  a  service  which  would 
be  adapted  to  glorify  Him  in  a  perfect 
manner.  If  His  creating  them  with  such 
anature,thatnosuchlaw  could  be  devised, 
arose  from  a  want  of  capacity,  it  must  be 
a  want  of  understanding  to  contrive,  or  of 
power  to  create  a  nature,  by  which  it 
would  be  possible  to  impose  on  them 
such  a  law.  To  be  unable  to  contrive 
such  a  nature  would  be  inconsistent  with 
His  infinite  understanding;  to  be  unable  to 
create  it,  would  be  inconsistent  with  His 
infinite  power.  If  His  creating  them  with 
such  a  nature,  that  no  such  law  can  be 
devised  by  an  infinite  understanding, 
arose  from  a  want  of  a  disposition  to  cre- 
ate thorn  with  such  a  nature,  the  want  of 
vhat  disposition  is  inconsistent  with  His 
infinite  wisdom;  for  it  surely  is  inconsist- 
ent with  infinite  wisdom  to  create  an  or- 
der of  beings  whose  nature  would  be 
such,  that  if  they  were  disposed  to  glorify 
Him  perfectly,  they  could  not  from  such, 


267 

a  disposition  pursue  a  course  of  conduct 
which  should  glorify  Him  perfectly. 

Since  then  it  would  be  thus  inconsistent 
with  the  divine  perfections  to  impose  on 
mankind  a  law,  requiring  from  them  a 

ice  which  would  not  glorify  the  V 
High  in  a  perfect  manner,  it  is  manifest 
from  His  perfections,  th:it  the  sen  ire  re- 
quired by  the  law.  which  lie  ha*-  imposed 
on  them,  is  adapted  to  glorify  Him  in  a 
perfect  manner. 

Secondly.  This  i-  apparent  al-o  from 
the  consideration  that  the  divine  law  re- 
quires of  mankind  all  the  service  \\hich 
C<od  can  of  ri^ht  require  of  them.  For  it 
requires  them  to  lu\e  Him  with  all  their 
heart,  and  soul,  and  -tren^th.  and  mind. 
It  requires  them  to  >iel<l  Him  the  m 
intense  love  which  their  facilities  enable 
them  to  exerci-e,  and  to  yield  it  at  all 
times,  and  it  in  all  their  :«  ft 

And  it  requires  them,  \\hether  they  eat 
or  drink,  or  whatever  thej  do,  to  do  all 
to  I!:-  ^lory.  It  thci.  la  of 

them  all   the  service  which   <  !i  of 

rij^ht    demand    el'   them:    for   He    cannot, 
:itly    with    rectitude,    demand    oi 
them  a  servi  '  than  their  iiicul- 

lies  enable  them  to  \iel-l. 

Now,  from  the  fact  that  the  divine  law 


268 

thus  requires  of  mankind  all  the  service 
which  God  can  of  right  demand  of  them, 
it  is  apparent  that  the  service  it  requires 
of  them,  is  adapted  to  glorify  Him  in  a 
perfect  manner.  For  God  surely  has  a 
right  to  require  of  them  a  service  that  is 
perfectly  glorious  to  himself.  If  not,  then 
He  has  no  right  to  require  of  them  a  ser- 
vice which  is  not  dishonourable  to  Him- 
self; for  a  service  that  is  not  perfectly 
glorious  to  Him,  as  far  as  it  fails  of  being 
perfectly  glorious,  is  dishonourable  to 
Him.  But  God  surely  is  not  destitute  of 
a  right  of  requiring  of  them  a  service 
which  is  not  dishonourable  to  Himself;  for 
it  is  inconsistent  with  His  perfections  to 
create  an  order  of  beings,  of  whom  He 
shall  not  have  the  right  of  requiring  a 
service  that  is  not  dishonourable  to  Him- 
self. 

And  moreover,  if  God  has  no  right  to 
require  of  mankind  any  service  but  what 
is  dishonourable  to  Himself,  then  mankind 
have  the  right  or  privilege  of  pursuing, 
with  perfect  innocence,  a  course  of  con- 
duct which  is  dishonourable  to  Him.  But 
mankind  -  *"Hy  cannot,  with  innocence, 
pursue  any  such  course  of  conduct,  for 
they  are  bound  to  do  whatever  they  do 
to  His  glory. 


269 

Since,  then,  God  has  the  right  of  de- 
manding of  mankind  a  service  which  is 
perfectly  glorious  to  Himself;  and  since, 
by  His  law,  He  has  demanded  all  the  ser- 
vice which  He  can  of  right  require,  it  is 
manifest  that  the  service  required  by  His 
law,  is  adapted  to  glorify  Him  in  a  per- 
fect manner. 

Tkirtllif.     It  is  apparent,  likewise,  fn>m 

the  consideration  that  the  divine  l:iw  re- 
quires mankind  to  be  actuated,  in  all  their 
conduct,  bv  perfect  benevolence  towards 
Cod.  They  are  commanded  to  love  Him 
with  all  their  heart,  and  soul,  and  strength, 
and  mind,  and  to  do  whatever  they  do  to 
His  olorv.  That  i-.  ihev  are  required  to 
exercise  towards  Him,  at  all  limes,  the 
most  inlen-e  bene\olmce  \\bich  their  iii- 

calties  will  enable  them  to  exercise;  to 

e  all  the  value  on  His  infinite  inter- 
.  and  cherish  all  the  respect  for  His 
rights,  and  all  the  delight  in  His  well-be- 
ing, and  to  make  all  the  eJlorts  to  pro- 
mote His  glory  of  which  they  are  ca- 
pable. 

Now,  from  the  fact  that  the  divine  Liw 
thus  requires  mankind,  at  all  times,  to  ex- 
ercise perfect  benevolence  towards  God, 
and  to  pursue  a  course  of  conduct  which 
shall  be  a  proper  expression  of  that  be- 


270 

I 

nevolence,  it  is  obvious  that  the  service  it 
requires  is  adapted  to  glorify  God  in  a 
perfect  manner.  For  to  be  actuated  to- 
wards God  by  perfect  benevolence,  is  as- 
suredly adapted  to  glorify  Him  in  a  per- 
fect manner.  To  place  all  the  value  on 
His  interests,  and  cherish  and  express  all 
the  regard  for  His  rights,  and  all  the  de- 
light in  His  well-being,  and  to  make  all 
the  efforts  to  promote  His  glory  which  are 
possible,  is  to  conduct  towards  Him  ac- 
cording to  His  character,  and  to  regard 
Him  as  He  ought  to  be  regarded  ;  and 
that  must  certainly  be  perfectly  glorious 
to  Him.  Perfect  benevolence  towards 
Him  can  never  do  any  thing  which  is  not 
perfectly  glorious  to  Him.  Nothing  but 
malevolence  can  violate  His  rights  and 
dishonour  Him.  Perfect  benevolence  to- 
wards Him  will  pursue  a  course  of  con- 
duct which  is  perfectly  benevolent  to- 
wards Him ;  but  nothing  can  be  perfectly 
benevolent  towards  Him,  which  is  not 
perfectly  glorious  to  Him.  Perfect  be- 
nevolence, therefore,  will  pursue  a  course 
of  conduct  which  is  perfectly  glorious  to 
Him. 

Since,  then,  the  divine  law  requires 
mankind  to  exercise  perfect  benevolence 
towards  Him,  at  all  times,  it  is  plain  that 


271 

the  service  it  requires  is  adapted  to  glo- 
rify Him  in  a  perfect  manner. 

Fourthly.  Is  it  not  preposterous  to  sup- 
pose, that  the  service  demanded  by  the 
divine  law  is  not  adapted  to  glorify  the 
Most  High  in  a  perfect  manner?  and  to 
suppose,  that  were  mankind,  in  the  cir- 
cumstances in  which  they  exist,  to  yield  a 
perfect  obedience  to  His  law,  would  not 
be  perfectly  glorious  to  Him?  That  if 
they  yielded  Him  the  highest  tribute  of 
glory  their  endowments  enabled  them  to 
yield,  it  would  not  be  a  perfect  tribute? 
Is  it  not  preposterous  to  suppose,  that  it 
would  be  a  real  injury  to  the  Most  High 
for  them  to  do  their  duty?  that  it  would 
cast  a  veil  over  the  lustre  of  His  attri- 
butes, and  be  prejudicial  to  the  gent-mi 
good?  \Vr  have  never  imagined,  thai 
holiness  has  or  can  do  any  misc  hirt  in  the 
divine  kingdom;  but  on  the  contrary, 
have  regarded  it  as  a  perfect  good ;  per- 
fect, considered  abstractly  from  its  influ- 
ence; and  perfect  in  its  influence  on  the 
interests  of  the  universe.  We  have  always 
conceived,  that  all  the  natural  ev  il  which 
exists,  or  can  exist,  must  have  its  origin 
from  sin.  Can  it  be,  that  were  all  man- 
kind to  yield  a  perfect  obedience  to  the 
divine  law,  it  would  rend  away  the  robef 


272 

of  glory  which  invest  the  Holy  One  of  Is- 
rael, and  quench  the  effulgence  of  His 
throne  ? 

Fifthly.  We  add  once  more,  that  these 
views  of  the  divine  law  are  correct,  is  ob- 
vious from  the  fact,  that  that  law  consults 
the  interests  of  mankind  in  a  perfect  man- 
ner. It  is  perfectly  glorious  to  them.  It 
secures  their  well-being  in  a  perfect  man- 
ner. The  service  it  requires  is  such,  that 
if  yielded,  it  will  exalt  them  to  absolute 
perfection  of  character  and  absolute  hap- 
piness. In  rendering  an  entire  obedience, 
they  will  ascend  to  a  state  of  the  highest 
glory  and  blessedness  of  which  their  na- 
ture is  capable. 

Now.  from  the  fact  that  the  divine  law, 
if  obeyed,  is  thus  glorious  to  them,  arid 
consults  their  honour  and  happiness  in  a 
perfect  manner,  it  is  manifest,  that  the 
service  it  requires  is  adapted  to  be  per- 
fectly glorious  to  the  Most  High;  that  it 
secures  His  glory  and  blessedness  in  a 
perfect  manner.  For  if  not,  if  while 
that  law  makes  a  perfect  provision  for  the 
good  of  mankind,  it  does  not  make  a  per- 
fect provision  for  His  good;  then,  in  im- 
posing it,  He  has  consulted  the  good  of 
mankind  more  than  He  has  His  own  good. 
He  has  placed  a  higher  value  on  their  in- 


273 

terests  than  on  His  own  ;  He  has  made  a 
better  provision  for  their  honour  and  hap- 
piness than  lor  His.  But  it  cannot  he 
that  the  Most  High,  in  imposing  that  law, 
exalted  the  finite  interests  of  mankind 
above  His  infinite  interests,  and  consulted 
their  honour  and  happiness  more  thai-  I!  is 
own.  It  is  inconsistent  with  His  im 
perfections  to  act  as  though  He  were  not 
an  infinite  Being,  by  placing  a  higher  va- 
lue on  them  than  on  Himself!  It  is  incon- 
sistent with  His  making  Hi  lory  the 
great  end  of  all  His  \\orks.  to  consu^,  in 
any  instance,  the  good  of  His  creatures 
more  than  His  own  glory. 

From  these  several  considerations  then, 
it  is  apparent,  that  the  law  of  God  requires 
of  mankind  a  service  adapted  to  glorify 
Him  in  a  perfect  manner.  And  from  that 
fact  it  is  manifest,  that  if  mankind  yielded 
a  perfect  obedience  to  that  law,  that  obe- 
dience would  glorify  Him  in  a  perfect 
manner.  Therefore  it  is  manifest,  that  if 
mankind  yielded  a  perfect  obedience  to 
that  law,  their  obedience  would  be  as 
good  materials  as  their  disobedience  is, 
for  a  perfect  display  of  His  glory;  and 
that  the  same  sum  of  glory  would  result 
to  Him  from  the  system  of  events  which 
would  then  exist,  as  redounds  to  Him  from 


274 

the  system  of  events  which  now  exists. 
For  their  disobedience  neither  is  nor  can 
be  good  materials  for  any  thing  more  than 
a  perfect  display  of  His  glory;  and  their 
obedience  would  be  good  materials  for 
that.  And  the  sum  of  glory  which  results 
to  the  Most  High,  from  the  system  of 
events  now  existing,  is  only  a  perfect  sum; 
and  the  sum  which  would  redound  to  Him 
from  the  system  of  events  which  would 
exist,  if  they  yielded  that  obedience, 
would  also  be  a  perfect  sum. 

H 

In  the  Second  place — 

The  Proposition  is  seen  to  be  true, 
from  the  fact  that  God  desires  all  man- 
kind, in  the  circumstances  in  which 
they  exist,  to  yield  a  perfect  obedi>  ce 
to  His  law.  He  really  and  perfectly 
desires  all  mankind,  in  the  circumstan- 
ces in  which  they  arc  placed,  to  yic»Iil 
Him  a  perfect  obedience.  He  as  really 
desires  them  all  to  yield  Him,  in  the  cir- 
cumstances in  which  they  exist,  a  perfect 
obedience  in  all  those  instances  in  which 
they  disobey  Him,  as  He  does  His  chil- 
dren, in  the  circumstances  in  which  they 
exist,  to  yield  Him  such  an  obedience  in 
all  those  cases  in  which  they  do  yield  it. 

This  is  seen  from  the  fact,  that  He  has 
most  clearly  and  strongly  expressed  such 


275 

a  desire.  Thus  He  has  expressed  that 
desire,  by  requiring  them  to  yield  Him  a 
perfect  obedience.  His  law  is  not  a  mere 
statement  to  them  of  what  their  duty  is; 
but  it  is  an  authoritative  requisition.  He 
commands  mankind  to  yield  a  perfect  obe- 
dience to  His  law.  But  why  does  He  so- 
lemnly require  them  to  obey,  if  He  has  no 
desire  that  they  should  obey  ?  Why  a-k 
that  which  1  le  does  not  wish  to  receive  ? 

He  ha-  expressed  that  de-ire,  by  em- 
ploying a  vast  system  of  inr.ans  to  induct: 
them  to  render  a  perfect  obedience.  Why 
does  ll<'  enforce  the  requisition  of  Hi< 
law  by  infinite  sanctions,  if  He  has  no  de- 
sire that  all  should  yield  such  an  obcdi- 
6?  Why  docs  He  ur^e  them  by  the 
1110*4  p.  e\po-tula- 

tions,  and  entn  Hi-  word?     Why 

iccession  of  messengers  to  per- 
suade  them?     Why  adapt  the  di-p< 

tionsofllis  providence  to  that  end?   Why 
send  down  His  Holy  Spirit  to  strive  with 
them,  by  an  influence  adapted  to  excite 
them  to  obedience  ?     Would  1  le  add 
to  them,  as  moral  a  the  mighty  in- 

fluence of  i\}\<  .-y^tem  of  mean-,  if  1 1  •  }n<! 
no  desire  that  they  should  yield  to  their 
influence,  and  obey  His  will;  but  on  the 
contrary,  desired  that  they  should  no( 
render  him  a  perfect  obedience? 


276 

He  has  expressed  that  desire  in  expli- 
cit declarations.  "As  I  live,  saith  the 
Lord  God,  I  have  no  pleasure  in  the  death 
of  the  wicked,  but  that  the  wicked  turn 
and  live."  If  God  has  wo  pleasure  in  the 
death  of  the  wicked,  He  cannot  have  any 
pleasure  in  their  sinning,  which  is  the 
cause  of  their  death.  For  He  cannot  de- 
sire their  sinning  for  any  other  reason, 
than  that  it  may  furnish  an  occasion  for 
that  display  of  His  attributes  which  is 
made  in  their  death.  But  if  His  pleasure 
is,  that  they  turn  and  live,  then  He  desires 
them  to  yield  Him  a  perfect  obedience. 
And  if  His  desire  respecting  all  the  wick- 
ed is,  that  they  turn  and  live,  then  He 
does  not  desire  any  of  them  to  continue 
to  sin,  that  He  may  make  that  display  of 
His  attributes  which  would  be  involved  in 
His  turning  them,  that  they  may  live. 
Why  did  Christ,  weeping  over  Jerusalem, 
utter  so  pathetic  a  lamentation,  if  He  had 
no  desire  that  its  inhabitants  should  yield 
a  perfect  obedience  to  the  divine  law? 
"  If  thou  hadst  known,  even  thou,  at  least 
in  this  thy  day,  the  things  which  belong 
unto  thy  peace !  but  now  they  are  hid  from 
thine  eyes."  And  why  did  the  Most  High 
express  a  similar  lamentation  over  the  re- 
bellious antedeluvians  and  the  Israelites  ? 


277 

And  why  did  the  Holy  Spirit  declare  by 
Paul,  uthat  God  will  have  all  men  to  be 
saved,  and  to  come  unto  the  knowledge 
of  the  truth?" 

In  regard  to  those  measures  of  His  ad- 
ministration, God  has  certainly  acted  pre- 
cisely as  though  He  had  the  most  earnest 
desire  that  all  mankind  should  yield  Him 
a  perfect  obedience:  and  has  therefore 
virtually  dcrlarfd  by  tho-e  measures,  that 
i  is  Hi>  de-ire;  and  the  passages  of 
Scripture  <|uoted  and  referred  to.  an 
plicit  declarations  to  that  effect. 

God   has  then,  in  the   imM   clear  and 
strong  manner,  exp  desire  that  all 

mankind  should  yield  Him  a  perfect  obe- 
dience. 

Now.  from  hi-  ha\  ;hat  de- 

sire, it  is  manifest  that  He  really  j 
it.  For  if  He  does  not  reallx  and  per- 
fectly desire  them  to>ield  Him  -uch  an 
obedience,  He  cannot  be  sincere  in  r.r- 
j)rcssin*r  such  a  desire.  But  God  cannot 
be  insincere  in  making  that  expression  of 
a  desire,  that  they  should  yield  Him  such 
an  obedience.  Need  we  adduce  reasons 
proving  it  ? 

/-V/'.sY.    That  such  insincerity  i-  not  con 
sistent  with  ill-  infinite  pcrfeciions.      It  is 
inconsistent  with  His  veracity  to  declare, 
21 


278 

that  He  really  and  perfectly  desires  a 
thing  to  exist,  when  he  does  not  desire  it 
to  exist,  l>ut  really  and  perfectly  desires 
that  it  should  not  exist.   But  in  command- 
ing mankind  to  yield  Him  such  an  obedi- 
ence,   in   employing   such    a   system   of 
means  to  excite  them  to  yield  it,  and  in 
expressing  such  a  displeasure  with  them 
for  not  yielding  it,  He  has  acted  certainly 
as  though  He  really  and  perfectly  desir- 
ed them  to  render  such  an  obedience; 
and  has  therefore  virtually  declared,  that 
He  does  really  desire  them  to  render  it; 
and  He  has  also  made  the  same  declara- 
tion in  explicit  language.  In  making  such 
a  declaration,  therefore,  if  He  does  not 
really  desire  it,  He  has  made  a  declara- 
tion which  does  not  mean  what  it  says. 

And  by  those  measures  of  His  adminis- 
tration and  declarations  in  his  word,  he 
has  led  mankind  to  regard  Him  as  declar- 
ing, that  He  really  desired  them  to  yield 
Him  a  perfect  obedience.  When  He  im- 
posed His  law  on  our  first  parents,  they 
undoubtedly  interpreted  Him  as  declar- 
ing, that  He  had  such  a  desire.  So  did 
the  Israelites  at  Mount  Sinai ;  for  they 
entered  into  a  solemn  covenant  with  Him, 
promising  to  do  all  which  Fie  command- 
ed them.  And  such  unquestionably  have 


279 

been  the  views  of  all  in  every  age  who 
have  received  the  ;.  s  of  Prophets, 

of  the  Messiah,  and  of  Apostles,  as  mes- 
sages from  God.  And  such  are  the  views 
of  all  who  now  receive  the  sacred  vo- 
lume as  a  revelation  of  the  divine  will. 
How  could  the  children  of  God  yield 
obedience  to  ilis  law  in  am  in-l 
whatever,  if  they  did  not  lee  I  the  must 
ab-oliite  assurance  ilia  lie  realiy  and 
perf»'ctlv  d£Sin  a  to  \ield  Him  a 

?    I  low  could  they  sor- 
row   with    a   irodly    sorrow,  thai    the\ 
not    render    Mich   an   obedience?      How- 
could   they  employ   means   to   induct*   all 
mankind    to    render    Him   such    an   - 
dience?  How  could  the\  expresti  io  Him 
in    prayer    the    desire    that    all    mankind 
should,  if  they  did    not   feel  the  ^am< 
surance.  that  He  desirefi  them  all  in  yield 
Him    a    perfect    obedi  They    act 

most  inconsistently  in  the-e  respects,  it 
thev  do  not  feel  the  most  absolute  assur- 
ance, that  God  really  desires  all  man- 
kind to  yield  Him  a  perfect  obedience. 
Hut  that  they  are  led  by  the  < 
His  admini  i  and  declarations  of 

His  word  to  feel  such  an  assurance,  there 
can  be  no  doubt:  nor  can  there  be  any, 
but  that  assurance  is  perfectly  authoriz- 


280 

ed  by  those  measures  and  declarations. 
For  if  it  is  natural  and  rational  to  inter- 
pret Him  as  declaring  by  those  measures 
of  His  administration  and  declarations  of 
His  word,  that  He  has  such  a  desire,  then 
those  measures  and  declarations  in  fact 
devolve  on  mankind  an  obligation  to  re- 
gard Him  as  possessing  that  desire;  for 
mankind  are  under  obligation  to  re- 
gard Him  as  possessing  the  desire  in  re- 
gard to  them,  which  he  really  expresses 
in  His  conduct. 

As  then  God  has  devolved  on  them  an 
obligation  to  regard  Him  as  really  desir- 
ing that  all  mankind  should  yield  Him  a 
(>(  iicct  obedience;  if  He  does  not  de- 
sire it,  He  has  totally  deceived  them:  He 
has  devolved  on  them  an  obligation  to  be- 
lieve what  is  not  true,  and  to  entertain 
views  of  Him  which  are  entirely  errone- 
ous. But  that  is  inconsistent  with  His 
veracity  and  all  His  other  moral  perfec- 
tions. 

And  moreover  in  these  measures  of  His 
administration,  He  has  acted  in  respect 
to  a  perfect  obedience  from  all  mankind, 
as  though  He  placed  on  it  all  the  value 
which  He  would  if  He  really  desired 
them  to  yield  Him  such  an  obedience ; 
and  therefore  has  virtually  declared  by 


281 

those  measures  that  He  does  place  on  it 
all  the  value  which  He  would  if  He  per- 
fectly desired  it.  And  He  has  made  the 
same  declaration  in  those  passages  refer- 
red to  of  His  word.  If  then  He  does  not 
really  desire  it,  He  has  declared  that  He 
places  on  it  a  value  ahove  that,  which 
lie  really  does  place  on  it:  and  has, 
therefore,  made  a  declaration  which  is 
not  true. 

Secondly.  It  is  apparent  that  God  is  per- 
fectly sincere  in  rxproHn^  that  de>ire. 
that  mankind  should  render  a  perfect 
obedience  to  His  law,  fiom  the  fart  that 
He  requires  them  to  >ield  Him  such  an 
obedience,  for  precisely  the  reason  for 
which  He  would  de-ire  and  require  them 
to  yield  it  it'  He  had  such  a  desire. 

Thus  the  reason  which  he  a>si«{ri<  for 
requiring  them  to  render  Him  a  perfect 
obedience  is,  that  He  is  (iod,  their  crea- 
tor, preserver,  and  benefactor,  and  has 
thence  the  right  of  establishing  over  them 
a  government;  and  that  His  government 
i.-  holy,  just,  and  good  ;  the  service  u  tiich 
it  requires  being  a  service  of  which  He 
is  supremelv  worthy,  and  which  they  are 
able  and  under  obligation  to  yield. 

And  the  fact,  that  the  service  He  re- 
quires is  precisely  the  service  which  He 
24* 


282 

is  worthy  to  receive;  and  precisely  that 
which  they  are  bound  to  render;  is  the 
reason  precisely  which,  if  He  really  de- 
sired them  to  render  that  service,  would 
constitute  the  proper  ground  of  His  de- 
siring it,  and  the  proper  ground  to  be  as- 
signed for  His  requiring  it.  And  from  the 
fact  that  the  reason  He  assigns  for  re- 
quiring it  is  the  reason  for  which,  if  He 
really  desired  them  to  yield  that  obe- 
dience, He  would  desire  it,  and  the  rea- 
son which  He  would  assign  for  requring 
it,  it  is  apparent  that  He  does  really 
and  perfectly  desire  them  to  yield  that 
obedience.  For  if  He  does  not  really  de- 
sire that  obedience,  why  does  He  act  as 
though  He  desired  it  by  assigning  that 
reason  for  requiring  it?  And  why  does 
He  thereby  entirely  deceive  mankind  in 
regard  to  His  desire?  It  is  entirely  na- 
tural and  rational  for  them  to  infer  from 
His  assigning  that  reason,  that  He  really 
desires  their  obedience;  and  the  obliga- 
tion therefore  rests  on  them  to  regard 
Him  as  really  desiring  it.  If  then  He 
does  not  desire  it,  He  has  devolved  on 
them  an  obligation  to  believe  what  is  not 
true,  and  to  entertain  an  erroneous  view 
respecting  Him.  But  He  surely  cannot 
have  imposed  on  them  such  an  obligation. 


283 

Thirdly.  We  are  bound  to  draw  the 
conclusion,  that  He  is  perfectly  sincere 
in  expressing  that  desire,  from  the  mode 
in  which  He  has  expressed  it.  For  the 
mode  in  which  He  has  expressed  it  hears 
every  mark  of  perfect  sincerity,  and  is 
eminently  adapted  to  make  on  mankind  a 
deep  impression  that  He  is  perfectly  bin- 
cere. 

Thus  He  has  expressed  the  desire  in 
the  most  clntr  manner.  His  law  is  not  a 
simple  declaration  that  the  course  which 
it  delineate-  is  the  course  which  it 
would  he  well  for  mankind,  as  rational 
beings,  to  pursue,  without  any  command* 
that  they  should  pursue  it,  and  leaving 
them  in  uncertainty  whether  or  not  it  is 
lli>  will  that  they  should  pursue  it  :  hut  it 
i>  an  authoritative  requisition,  an  e\f 
demand  of  them  of  the  -ervice  it  pre- 
scribes; and  no  one  ever  h<  -ilaled  at  all 
whether  it  is  an  expression  of  His  will; 
or  only  mere  advice,  or  a  mere  statement 
of  what  it  would  be  well  for  them  to  do, 
without  any  expression  of  His  wilt  in  re- 
gard to  it. 

He  has  expressed  the  desire  in  a  man- 
ner peculiarly  solemn  and  impressive.  Thus 
He  seems  to  have  revealed  Himself  to 
our  first  parents,  and  to  some  of  the  patri- 
archs and  prophets,  in  a  visible  form,  and 


284 

audibly  addressed  to  them  His  law.  And 
on  Mount  Sinai  He  manifested  himself  to 
the  whole  nation  of  Israel,  by  the  most 
awful  displays  of  power  and  majesty,  and 
proclaimed  to  them  His  law  by  His  own 
almighty  voice.  He  has  inspired  a  mul- 
titude of  prophets  and  apostles  to  be  the 
messengers  of  His  will.  He  sent  down 
His  Son  to  announce  the  glad  tidings  of 
the  Gospel.  He  has  wrought  innumera- 
ble miracles  to  convince  mankind  that 
the  prophets,  that  Christ,  and  the  apos-* 
ties,  were  His  messengers,  and  to  excite 
attention  and  respect  to  their  messa-  rs. 
He  has  committed  all  His  requisitions  to 
writing,  that  they  may  be  transmitted  to 
every  generation,  and  known  to  every  in- 
dividual; and  He  has  employed,  in  every 
age,  an  order  of  men  to  teach  and  enforce 
thorn,  and  consecrated  one  day  in  seven 
to  be  at  least  partly  employed  in  that 
work. 

He  has  also  strongly  expressed  that  de- 
sire, by  enforcing  all  His  requisitions  by 
the  most  weighty  motives,  the  rewards  of 
heaven  and  hell ;  and  employing  a  vari- 
ety of  powerful  instruments  to  give  influ- 
ence to  those  motives,  as  the  most  allur- 
ing invitations,  the  most  cogent  reason- 
ings, expostulations,  warnings,  rebukes, 


285 

and  the  smiles  and  frowns  of  His  provi- 
dence. 

He  has  strongly  expressed  it  by  incur- 
rinXi  if  the  language  may  be  used,  a  vast 
f.t/Hnse  in  expressing  it.  How  many  mira- 
cles has  He  wrought !  How  many  pro- 
phets and  apostles  has  He  inspired  !  How 
many  other  messengers  has  He  employ- 
ed !  What  an  act  was  it  to  employ  His 
Son  as  a  messenger  of  His  truth  and  grace ! 
How  many  other  stupendous  acts  of  con- 
descension, power,  wisdom,  and  grace, 
has  this  work  involved !  At  what  infi- 
nite pains,  in  these  various  respects,  has 
He  been  to  express  the  desire  ! 

He  has  expressed  that  desire  very 
strongly  also,  by  {he frequency  of  His  urg- 
ing on  mankind  the  requisitions  of  His 
la\v. 

Thus,  in  all  respects,  the  mode  in  which 
He  has  expressed  the  desire,  that  man- 
kind should  yield  a  perfect  obedience  to 
His  law,  bears  every  mark  of  perfect  sin- 
cerity ;  and  is  eminently  adapted  to  make 
on  mankind  the  impression  that  He  does, 
with  perfect  sincerity,  desire  them  to  ren- 
der Him  such  an  obedience. 

If  He  were  perfectly  desirous  that  they 
should  render  Him  that  obedience,  He 
could  not  have  displayed  more  earnest- 


286 

ness  in  requiring  and  urging  them  to  yield 
it,  than  He  actually  has.  As  then  He  has, 
in  this  respect,  acted  precisely  as  though 
He  was  perfectly  sincere,  we  are  bound 
to  regard  Him  as  perfectly  sincere.  In 
these  considerations  then,  we  have  so 
many  proofs  that  God  is  perfectly  sin- 
cere in  expressing  a  desire,  that  all  man- 
kind should  yield  Him  a  perfect  obedi- 
ence. And  if  He  has  sincerely  express- 
ed such  a  desire,  then  He  of  course  has 
a  real  and  perfect  desire  that  they  should 
yield  Him  such  an  obedience. 

Jlgain.  It  is  obvious  that  God  really 
and  perfectly  desires  all  mankind  to  yield 
Him  a  perfect  obedience,  from  the  fact, 
that  His  law  is  an  expression  of  His  will 
respecting  their  conduct.  Our  Lord,  in 
the  form  of  prayer  which  He  taught  His 
disciples,  and  in  many  other  passages, 
designates  the  divine  Jaw  as  the  will  of 
God. 

Now  if  the  divine  law  is  an  expression 
of  the  will  of  God  respecting  the  conduct 
of  mankind,  then  it  is  clear  that  He  de- 
sires them  to  yield  it  a  perfect  obedience; 
for  the  will  of  a  being  is  His  choice.  No 
being  can  will  a  thing  which  he  does  not 
choose  ;  and  no  being  can  choose  a  thing, 
unless  for  some  reason  or  other  he  desires 


287 

it.  If  the  law  of  God  then  expresses  His 
will  respecting  the  conduct  of  mankind,  it 
expresses  His  choice,  and  therefore  His 
desire,  in  regard  to  their  conduct.  If  in 
that  law  He  expresses  a  will,  that  all  man- 
kind should  perform  all  the  service  which 
it  requires,  then  He  expresses  a  desire 
that  they  should  perform  all  that  service. 
If  it  is  His  will  that  they  should  yield  it  a 
perfect  obedience,  it  i-  His  dosiie  that 
they  should.  Can  we  conceive  of  Hi^ 
having  a  will  that  they  should  yield  that 
obedience,  without  having  a  desire  that 
they  should  ? 

Let  the  reader  revolve  this  argument. 
He  will  find  there  is  no  method  of  escape 
from  its  conclusion,  irile  —  it  he  cither  by 
denying  that  thr>  law  of  Ciod  i>  1 1\<  //•///, 
(in  which  rase  he  will  contradict  the  Son 
of  God,)  or  by  <Ii*n\ing  that  what  God 
wills  He  desires,  (in  which  case  He  will 
contradict  the  plainest  dictates  of  con- 
sciousness and  reason.)  If  a  being  de- 
sires what  He  wills,  then  it  is  as  really 
and  perfectly  the  desire  as  it  is  the  will 
of  the  Most  High,  that  all  mankind  should 
yield  Him  a  perfect  obedience.  It  is  as 
really  and  perfectly  His  desire,  that  all 
mankind  should  yield  Him  a  perfect  obe- 
dience in  all  those  instances  in  which  they 


288 

disobey  Him,  as  it  is  that  His  children 
should  yield  Him  a  perfect  obedience  in 
those  instances  in  which  they  do  yield 
Him  such  an  obedience. 

We  are  aware,  that  the  advocates  of 
the  sentiment  we  are  opposing  will  object 
to  the  whole  of  this  argumentation;  that 
we  have  disregarded  in  it  a  distinction 
which  they  and  many  others  make,  and 
hold  as  exceedingly  important,  between 
God's  desiring  a  thing,  in  itself  consider- 
ed, and  desiring  it,  all  things  considered. 
We  have  indeed  disregarded  that  distinc- 
tion, and  for  reasons  which,  we  hope,  will 
induce  our  readers  henceforth  to  disre- 
gard and  banish  it  for  ever  from  their 
reasonings  on  theological  subjects. 

First.  It  is  a  distinction  without  a  dif- 
ference. 'There  is  no  difference  between 
a  thing,  in  itself  considered,  and  all  things 
considered. 

A  thing,  in  itself  ronsidered,  is  the 
whole  of  that  thing.  It  is  that  thing  con- 
templated in  respect  to  all  which  pertains 
to  it,  and  constitutes  its  nature.  And  a 
thing,  all  things  considered,  is  also  the 
whole  of  that  thing.  It  is  that  thing  con- 
templated in  all  its  relations  to  other 
things;  exerting  all  the  influence  it  does 
and  will  exert,  and  is  capable  of  exerting, 


on  all  other  tilings  ;  and  receiving  all  the 
influence  of  which  it  is  and  will  be,  and  is 
capable  of  being,  the  subject  from  all 
other  things. 

Now  \ve  affirm,  that  there  is  no  differ- 
ence between  contemplating  a  thing  in 
respect  to  all  which  pertains  to  it,  and 
constitutes  its  nature,  and  contemplating 
it  in  respect  to  all  its  relations  to  all  other 
things,  and  in  respect  to  all  the  influence 
which  it  exerts,  and  is  capable  of  exert- 
ing, and  of  which  it  is  and  is  capable  of 
l)ein<r  the  suhject.  For  it  is  its  nature 
which  constitutes  its  relations  to  all  other 
tilings:  and  we  cannot  contemplate  the 
whole  of  its  nature,  without  contemplat- 
ing all  its  relations  of  which  that  nature 
if!  ihe  ground,  or  contemplating  its  nature 
as  sustaining  those  relations  ;  nor  can  \ve 
contemplate  the  whole  of  its  relat: 
without  contemplating  the  whole  of  its 
nature,  which  is  the  ground  of  those  rela- 
tions. We  cannot  contemplate  the  whole 
of  its  nature,  without  contemplating  the 
whole  of  the  influence  which  it  exerts,  and 
is  capable  of  exerting,  by  its  nature  ;  and 
the  whole  of  the  influence  of  which,  in 
consequence  of  its  nature,  it  is  and  is  ca- 
pable of  being  the  subject.  Nor  can  we 
contemplate  the  whole  of  the  influence 


290 

which  it  exerts,  and  is  capable  of  exert- 
ing, and  of  which  it  is  and  is  capable  of 
being  the  subject,  without  contemplating 
the  whole  of  its  nature  by  which  it  exerts, 
and  is  capable  of  exerting,  and  is  the  sub- 
ject, and  is  capable  of  being  the  subject, 
of  that  influence. 

Thus,  in  respect  to  the  case  in  ques- 
tion, there  is  no  difference  whatever  be- 
tween God's  desiring  all  mankind  to  yield 
Him  a  perfect  obedience,  in  itself  consi- 
dered, and  His  desiring  them  to  yield  Him 
such  an  obedience,  all  things  consider- 
ed. For  in  desiring  it,  in  itself  consider- 
ed, He  would  desire  it  as  being  precisely 
such  a  thing  as  it  would  be ;  as  having 
precisely  such  a  nature  as  it  would  have, 
that  is,  as  being  precisely  such  a  service 
as  He  requires  of  them,  and  is  worthy  to 
receive  from  them,  and  they  are  under 
obligations  to  render  to  Him;  and  as  ca- 
pable of  exerting  precisely  all  the  influ- 
ence which  it  would  be  capable  of  exert- 
ing; and  of  being  employed  to  produce 
all  the  effects  which  it  might  be  employ- 
ed to  produce;  and  in  desiring  it,  all 
things  considered,  He  would  desire  it  in 
precisely  the  same  manner.  For  He 
would  then  desire  it  as  being  precisely 
such  a  thing  as  it  would  be ;  as  having 


291 

precisely  the  nature  which  it  would  have ; 
and  as  thence  capable  of  being  employed 
to  produce  all  the  effects  which  it  might 
be  employed  to  produce.     We  challenge 
all  the  advocates  of  the  supposed  distinc- 
tipn  in  question,  to  point  out  a  shadow  of 
difference  between  God's  desiring  from 
all  mankind  a  perfect  obedience,  in  itself 
considered,  and  His  desiring  it,  all  tin 
considered. 

The  advocates  of  this  supposed  distinc- 
tion, without,  it  would  seem,  being  auar< 
of  it,  use  the  phrase  "  a  thing  in  itself  consi- 
dered," to  denote  only  a  part  of  a  thing, 
or  a  thing  considered  in  respect  to  only 
a  part  of  its  nature  ;  and  employ  the  other 
phrase  to  denote  the  whole  of  a  thing,  or 
a  thing  considered  in  respect  to  the  whole 
of  its  nature  ;  and  have  imposed  on  them- 
selves in  that  way.  This  is  appatrn; 
from  the  whole  of  their  reasonings  and 
illustrations  respecting  it. 

They  endeavour,  for  instance,  to  ill 
trafe  and  prove  the  distinction  in  the  fol- 
lowing manner: — A  sick  man  learns  that 
a  certain  medicine  will  restore  him  to 
health ;  but,  that  being  odious  to  the  taste, 
and  painful  in  its  operation,  it  will,  in 
curing  him,  subject  him  to  a  given  quan- 
tity of  pain.  Now,  contemplating  it.  in 


292 

itself  considered,  as  odious  to  the  taste, 
and  painful  in  its  operation,  he  does  not 
desire  it;  but  contemplating  it,  all  things 
considered,  as  being,  besides  the  cause  of 
such  a  quantity  of  pain,  a  certain  remedy 
for  his  disease,  he  does  desire  it. 

Now  it  is  plain,  in  this  case,  that  the 
man,  in  contemplating  the  medicine  sim- 
ply as  the  cause  of  so  much  suffering, 
contemplates  only  a  part  of  its  nature ; 
namely,  only  that  part,  which  is  the  cause 
of  that  suffering;  and  it  is  not  till  he  con- 
templates it  as  the  cause  of  health,  as  well 
as  of  that  suffering,  that  he  contemplates 
its  whole  nature.  To  desire  a  thing  there- 
fore, in  itself  considered,  according  to 
their  use  of  the  language,  is  only  to  desire 
a  part  of  that  thing,  namely,  that  part  of 
it  by  which  it  produces  part  of  the  effects 
which  it  produces;  and  to  desire  a  thing, 
all  things  considered,  is  to  desire  the 
whole  of  that  thing;  that  is,  to  desire  it, 
considering  its  whole  nature,  by  which  it 
produces  all  its  effects.  And  there  is  un- 
doubtedly a  vast  difference  between  a 
part  of  a  thing  and  the  whole  of  it,  and 
between  desiring  a  part  of  a  thing  and 
desiring  the  whole  of  it:  but  it  is  su- 
premely preposterous  to  talk  of  God's  de- 
siring a  thing,  in  itself  considered;  mean 


293 

ing,  by  "  itself  considered,"  only  apart  of 
that  thing;  since  the  thing,  that  is,  the 
whole  of  it,  is  very  different  from  that  part 
of  it  which  is  denoted  by  "in  itself  consi- 
dered;" and  desiring  only  that  part,  is 
not  desiring  the  thing  as  a  whole.  If  we 
can  say,  He  desires  a  thing,  by  desiring 
only  a  given  part  of  it,  we  may  also  say, 
He  desires  that  thing  by  not  desiring  the 
other  part  of  it;  and  if  we  can  say  either, 
we  may  say.  that  any  part  of  a  thing  is 
the  whole  of  that  thing. 

Since  then  there  is  no  difference 
between  desiring  a  thing,  in  itself  consi- 
dered, and  desiring  it,  all  things  consi- 
dered, it  is  to  the  last  degree  contradic- 
tory to  hold,  that  (iod  desires  from  all 
mankind  a  perfect  obedience,  in  itself 
considered,  but  does  not  de-ire  it,  all 
things  con-idered;  for  desiring  it,  in  it- 
self considered,  is  desiring  it,  all  things 
considered.  If  God  desires  from  all  man- 
kind a  perfect  obedience,  in  itself  consi- 
dered, He  desires  the  whole  of  that  obe- 
dience. He  desires  it  as  precisely  such 
a  thing  as  it  is,  as  having  precisely  the 
nature  which  it  has,  and  as  capable  from 
that  nature  of  being  employed  to  produce 
all  the  effects  which  it  is  capable  of  being 
employed  to  produce.  And  to  hold,  that 
25* 


294 

while  he  thus  desires  it,  in  itself  consider- 
ed, He  does  not  desire  it,  all  things  con- 
sidered, is  to  hold,  that  he  does  not  desire 
the  whole  of  that  obedience,  and  as  having 
precisely  such  a  nature  as  it  has,  and  as 
capable  from  that  nature  of  precisely  that 
of  which  it  is  capable ;  that  is,  it  is  to  de- 
ny that  he  desires  it,  in  itself  considered. 
If  He  desires  from  all  mankind  a  perfect 
obedience  at  all,  He  desires  it  as  such  a 
thing  as  it  is,  taking  into  view  all  which 
pertains  to  it,  and  constitutes  its  nature; 
for  it  is  being  such  a  thing  as  it  is,  and  hav- 
ing its  nature  consist  of  precisely  all  that 
of  which  it  does  consist,  that  constitutes 
it  a  perfect  obedience. 

Secondly.  Another  reason  for  which 
we  disregarded  that  supposed  distinction 
is,  that  even  if  it  were  admitted,  that  it 
exists  in  regard  to  other  things,  yet  it  is 
demonstrable  that  it  has  no  existence  in 
respect  to  the  subject  under  considera- 
tion. God  not  only  desires  from  all  man- 
kind a  perfect  obedience,  in  itself  consi- 
dered, but  He  also  desires  it,  all  things 
considered.  This  is  apparent  from  the 
fact,  that  He  requires  them  to  yield  Him 
that  obedience,  all  tilings  considered. 

What  things  are  to  be  considered  in 
requiring  of  all  mankind  a  perfect  obe- 
dience, in  order  that  that  obedience  may 


295 

be  required,  nil  things  considered ?  \Vhat? 
besides  Jehovah,  but  mankind,  their  obe- 
dience and  disobedience,  and  the  conse- 
quences of  their  yielding  and  not  yielding 
a  perfect  obedience  ?  But  God  consider- 
ed all  these  things  in  requiring  of  man- 
kind a  perfect  obedience.  He  considered 
himself  perfectly.  In  requiring  that  obe- 
dience. He  contemplated  himself  as  pre- 
cisely such  a  bring  as  I  i 
the  character  which  He  ]><>— r-ses,  the 
-  in  i  < -peel  to  mankind  and  all  other 
beings,  which  He  has;  and  the  capacity 
of  employing  the  obedience  and  cli-obe- 
dience  of  mankind  to  promote  His  glory, 
which  He  has;  and  a^>  having  precisely 
the  end  in  view,  in  all  Hi-  v.  which 

He  lias.  He  considered  mankind  also 
perfectly.  He  contemplated  them  as  ex- 
actly such  beings  as  1 1  ;  as  having 
just  the  capacity  which  they  actually 
possess ;  sustaining  toward  Him  and  all 
other  beings  all  the  relations  they  do  sus- 
tain; (Acting  in  exactly  the  circumstances 
in  which  they  do  exist,  and  as  under  all 
the  obligations  which  actually  rest  on 
them. 

He  likewise  considered  their  obedience 
and  disobedience,  and  the  consequences 
of  their  obedience  and  disobedience  per- 


296 

fectly.  He  contemplated  the  precise  na- 
ture of  their  obedience  and  disobedience, 
and  all  the  effects  which  He  could  and 
should  employ  them  to  produce.  This 
is  seen  from  the  fact,  that  He  promised  a 
reward  to  obedience,  which  is  an  appro- 
priate reward  of  it  throughout  eternity; 
and  threatened  a  punishment  to  disobe- 
dience, which  is  an  appropriate  punish- 
ment of  it  throughout  eternity.  And  in 
thus  considering  Himself,  all  mankind, 
and  the  nature  and  the  consequences  of 
their  obedience  and  disobedience,  He 
considered  all  things. 

That  He  must  thus  have  considered  all 
things,  is  manifest  from  the  consideration, 
that  it  would  have  been  inconsistent  with 
His  infinite  perfection  to  have  imposed 
on  mankind  a  law,  without  considering 
all  things  with  which  it  had  any  con- 
nexion; since  without  such  a  considera- 
tion of  all  things,  He  could  not  have  had 
the  assurance  the  law  was  a  wise  one. — 
Since  then,  all  things  considered,  He  re- 
quired of  all  mankind  a  perfect  obedience, 
it  is  plain  that,  all  things  considered,  He 
desired  all  mankind  to  yield  Him  a  perfect 
obedience;  for  the  requisition  of  that 
obedience  is,  the  expression  of  His  will 
And  since,  as  before  shown,  it  is  His  witt. 


297 

all  things  considered,  that  all  mankind 
should  yield  that  obedience,  it  is  His  de- 
sire* all  things  considered,  that  they 
should;  because  whatever  it  is  His  will 
mankind  should  do,  it  is  His  desire  they 
should  do. 

And  moreover  having,  by  requiring 
that  obedience,  all  thing*  considered, 
acted  precisely  as  though  He  desired  it, 
all  things  considered,  Ifr  has  virtually 
declared  that  he  does  dosire  it,  all  things 
considered.  He  must  therefore  so  desire  it, 
for  otherwise  He  must  have  made  a  decla- 
ration that  is  not  true,  which  He  cannot 
have  done.  If  He  had  only  desired  it.  in 
itself  considered,  and  not  .-ill  things  con- 
sidered, supposing  the  di>tinriion  to  c\i-t, 
which  that  Ian:  <-m|>l<>\  <  d  to  de- 

note, He  would  onlv  have  required  it.  in 
itself  considered ;  and  thrrcb\  declared, 
that  He  desired  it  onlv  in  h-Hf  consider- 
ed ;  since  if  he  only  dr-ircd  it,  in  it-elf 
considered,  no  possibl*  i  could  ex- 

ist for   His  requiring   it    in  any  older  re- 
spect thon  in  itstlf  considered.     For  why 
should  He  require  more  than  He  d»  -• 
We   challenge  all   the  advocates  of  this 
iod  distinction  to  furnish   us  .1  single 
-on,   proving  that  it   is   po-^ible  that 
God  could  require  from  all  mankind  a 


298 

perfect  obedience,  all  things  considered, 
for  any  other  reason,  than  that  he  desired 
it,  all  things  considered. 

And  furthermore,  in  requiring  it,  all 
things  considered,  He  has  virtually  de- 
clared, that  it  is  its  being  such  a  thing  as 
it  is,  all  things  considered,  that  is  the  rea- 
son of  His  requiring  it;  and  has  therefore 
declared,  that  it  is  its  being  such  a  thing 
as  it  is,  all  things  considered,  that  is  the 
reason  that  he  desires  it.  If  then,  he  does 
not  desire  it,  all  things  considered,  He 
has  made  a  declaration  that  is  not  true, 
which  he  cannot  have  done.  If  God  in  re- 
quiring it  looked  at  it  in  all  respects,  who 
has  authority  to  say,  that  in  desiring  it, 
He  did  not  also  look  at  it  in  all  respects? 

Whether  then,  any  such  distinction  as 
that  in  question  exists,  or  not,  it  is  certain 
that  God,  all  things  considered,  desires  all 
mankind  to  yield  Him  a  perfect  obe- 
dience. 

We  are  also  aware,  that  to  these  views 
the  objection  will  be  made  by  those  whom 
we  oppose,  that  if  God  as  really  and  per- 
fectly desired  all  mankind,  in  the  circum- 
stances in  which  they  exist,  to  yield  Him 
a  perfect  obedience,  as  He  does  His 
children,  in  the  circumstances  in  which 
they  exist,  to  yield  Him  obedience  in  all 


299 

the  instances  in  which  they  obey  Him, 
then,  since  that  which  He  really  and  per- 
fectly desires  should  take  place,  does  riot 
take  place,  He  must  be  unhappy. 

To  this  objection  we  reply,— First,  That 
God  is  not  disappointed  at  all  by  the  dis- 
obedience of  mankind,  and  is  not  there- 
fore made  unhappy  by  that  means.  For 
though  He  desires  them  to  yield  Him  a 
perfect  obedience,  yet  He  does  not  expect 
that  they  will.  He  knows  perfectly  that 
in  the  circumstances  in  which  they  arc 
placed,  they  will  not  yield  Him  obedi- 
ence, but  will  disobey ;  and  is  therefore 
no  more  disappointed  by  their  disobedi- 
ence than  He  would  be  if  He  had  no  de- 
sire that  they  should  obey. 

Secondly.  The  objection  may  be  m; 
with  as  much  propriety  to  the  view  of 
GodV  de-ire  entertained  by  the  objec- 
tors, as  to  the  view  which  we  have  exhi- 
bited. For  if,  as  they  hold.  God  really 
and  perfectly  desires  all  mankind  to  yield 
Him  a  perfect  obedience,  in  itself  consi- 
dered; then  it  must  be  as  true,  that  he- 
cause  that  which,  in  itself  considered,  He 
really  and  perfectly  desires  should  take 
place,  does  not,  in  itself  considered,  take 
place,  He  is  made  unhappy  by  it ;  as  it 
can  be  that  because  that  which,  all  thing? 


/  300 

considered,  He  really  and  perfectly  de- 
sires should  take  place,  does  not,  all 
things  considered,  take  place,  He  must 
be  made  unhappy  by  its  not  taking  place. 
Let  the  objectors  then  remove  the  ob- 
jection from  their  own  views  before  they 
urge  it  against  ours. 

Thirdly.  But  the  objection  has  no  force 
against  either  of  those  viewrs.  It  no  more 
follows  that  God  is  unhappy  because 
mankind  do  not  render  Him  the  perfect 
obedience  He  desires  them  to  render, 
than  it  follows  from  the  fact  that  He  loves 
holiness  really  and  perfectly,  that  there- 
fore He  is  unhappy  because  it  does  not 
exist  in  every  instance  in  which  it  might, 
and  from  the  fact,  that  He  hates  sin  really 
and  perfectly,  that  He  is  unhappy  because 
it  exists  as  it  does. 

jQgain.  Those  whom  we  oppose  will 
probably  ask  by  way  of  objection  to  the 
views  we  have  presented,  why,  if  God 
thus  really  and  perfectly  desires  all  man- 
kind to  yield  Him  a  perfect  obedience, 
does  He  not  make  them  yield  such  an 
obedience  ?  And  remark,  that  He  is  able 
to  make  them  yield  a  perfect  obedience; 
and  if  He  desired  they  should,  it  is  to  be 
presumed  He  would  cause  them  to  ren- 
der it. 


301 

To  this  we  reply,  that  our  proposition 
is,  that  God  desires  mankind  in  the  circum- 
stances in  which  they  arc  now  placed,  to  yield 
Him  a  perfect  obedience  ;  that  is,  in  cir- 
cumstances in  which  He  employs  only 
that  specific  quantity  of  means  to  induce 
them  to  yield  such  an  obedience  which 
He  does  employ,  and  which  obedience 
i-  attended  with  all  the  difficulties  with 
which  it  is  attended.  Our  proposition 
does  not  affirm  that  He  desires  them  to 
yield  Him  a  perfect  obedience,  without 
any  consideration  whether  or  not  He 
must  place  them  in  different  circumstan- 
ces from  those  in  which  they  nuw  exist, 
in  order  to  lead  them  to  yield  that  obe- 
dience; that  is,  whether  or  not  He  inu^; 
use  a  much  greater  quantity  of  means 
than  He  now  employs  to  induce  them  to 
yield  that  obedience.  He  rannol  U86 
any  more  means  than  He  now  rmplo\> 
to  induce  them  to  yield  a  perfect  obedi- 
ence, without  placing  them  in  different 
circumstances  from  those  in  \\hich  they 
now  exist.  And  since,  if  they  are  not 
disposed  to  yield  Him  obedience  under 
the  influence  of  that  quantity  of  means 
He  now  employs,  He  cannot  lead  them 
to  yield  Him  obedience  without  employ- 
ing a  larger  quantity  of  means ;  He  can- 
26 


302 

not  lead  them  to  yield  Him  obedience 
without  placing  them  in  new  circumstan- 
ces. The  reason,  therefore,  that  Godr 
although  He  desires  them  to  yield  Him  a 
perfect  obedience  in  the  circumstances 
in  which  they  exist,  does  not  actually  lead 
them  to  render  a  perfect  obedience,  is 
that  He  cannot  lead  them  to  yield  a  per- 
fect obedience,  without  placing  ihem  in 
different  circumstances.  The  obedience 
which  He  desires  is  an  obedience  in  the 
circumstances  in  which  they  now  exist; 
an  obedience  therefore,  rendered  in  any 
other  circumstances,  were  He  supposed 
to  lead  them  to  render  itr  would  not  be 
the  obedience  which  He  desires. 

The  proposition  then  is,  we  trust,  esta- 
blished, that  God  desires  all  mankind,  in 
the  circumstances  in  which  they  are  pla- 
ced, to  yield  Him  a  perfect  obedience. 
And  the  truth  of  that  proposition  involves 
the  truth  of  the  general  proposition  we 
have  alleged  it  to  sustain  ;  that  if  man- 
kind were  in  the  circumstances  in  which 
they  exist,  to  yield  a  perfect  obedience 
to  the  divine  law,  that  obedience  would 
be  as  good  materials  as  their  disobedience 
is,  for  a  perfect  display  of  the  divine  glo- 
ry; and  that  the  same  sum  of  glory  would 
result  to  the  Most  High  from  the  system 


303 

\)i  events  which  would  then  exist,  as  re- 
dounds to  Him  from  the  system  of  events 
which  now  exists  ;  since  He  could  not 
really  and  perfectly  desire  them  to  yield 
that  obedience  unless  it  would  be  as  good 
•materials  as  their  disobedience  is,  for  a 
perfect  display  of  His  glory;  and  unless 
the  same  sum  of  glory  would  redound  to 
Him  from  the  system  of  event-  which 
would  then  e\i-t.  n  re-uks  to  Him  from 
the  <vsteiu  of  events  which  now  e\Ut-. 
For  n  perfec.t  display  of  His  .glory,  is  the 
object  of  I  in  supreme  desire,  and  the 
end  pursued  by  Him  supremely  in  ail  Mis 
i^riiey:  and,  ilier.>f)re,  as,  if  their  obe- 
dience would  not  be  as  good  materials 
as  their  di>ob*  ilience  is  fora  perfect  dis- 
play of  I  Ii-  i^ory,  their  yielding  that  obe- 
dience would  be  iiieon  uith  a  per- 
fect display  of  Hi-  ir'ory,  He  coulil  not 
desire  them  to  yield  it.  But  since  a  per- 
fect display  of  His  glory  is  the  object  of 
His  supremo  desire;  and  since,  at  the 
same  time,  He  really  and  perfectly  de- 
sires all  mankind,  in  the  circumstance-  in 
which  tliev  exist,  to  yield  Him  a  perfect 
obedience,  it  is  certain  that  it  would  be 
entirely  consistent  with  a  perfect  display 
of  His  glory  for  them  to  yield  that  obe- 
dience ;  and,  therefore,  it  is  certain  that 


304 

were  they  to  yield  that  obedience,  it  would 
be  as  good  materials  as  their  disobedi- 
ence is,  for  a  perfect  display  of  His  glory ; 
and  that  thence  the  same  sum  of  glory 
would  result  to  Him  from  the  system  of 
events  which  would  then  exist,  as  re- 
dounds to  Him  from  the  system  of  events 
which  now  exists. 

In  the  third  place — 

The  proposition  derives  support  from 
the  consideration  that  a  perfect  obedi- 
ence from  mankind,  in  the  circumstances 
in  which  they  exist,  would  be  peculiarly 
glorious  to  God. 

The  greater  the  difficulties  are  which 
are  overcome  in  rendering  an  obedience, 
the  more  glorious  will  that  obedience  be 
to  God;  for  the  greater  the  difficulties 
are  which  are  overcome  in  rendering  an 
obedience,  the  stronger  is  the  expression 
of  love  to  God,  which  is  made  in  that 
obedience.  A  being  who  performs  an 
act  of  obedience  against  the  influence 
of  powerful  temptation,  makes  a  much 
stronger  expression  of  love  to  God  in  that 
act,  than  is  made  in  performing  an  act  of 
obedience  when  entirely  exempt  from 
temptation,  or  under  the  influence  of  only 
a  light  temptation.  And  a  being  who 


305 

performs  a  long  series  of  acts  of  obe- 
dience against  the  influence  of  powerful 
temptation,  makes  a  much  stronger  ex- 
pression of  his  love  and  devotedness, 
than  would  be  made  by  the  same  number 
of  acts,  when  entirely  free  from  tempta- 
tion, or  when  subjected  to  only  a  small 
influence  from  it.  Thus  Abram,  in  offer- 
ing up  Isaac,  gave  a  much  stronger  proof 
ot  his  confidence  in  God  than  he  would 
have  made  in  an  act  of  obedience  to  any 
requisition  which  was  not  like  that,  ap- 
•ntly  inconsistent  with  a  divine  pro- 
ini-e;  and  Job  di  played  submission  to 
the  divine  will  ranch  more  strongly  in 
enduring  with  patience  the  -evcre  alflic- 
with  whieli  IK  led,  than  he 

could  have  .c  season  of  his 

prosperity,     \\h-n   a  .iled   by 

the  violence  of  temptation,  struggles 
through  the  -tr)rtn  with  a  heart  unyield- 
ing in  its  attachment  to  God,  with  a  holj 
fearfolnese  spurning  all  the  alluring  joys 
of  sin,  cleaving  lo  Cod  as  the  only  object 
worthy  of  his  love,  and  preferring  His 
service,  amid  all  the  bulletin^  of  trial,  to 
the  promised  pleasures  of  rebellion,  all 
his  holy  affe<  lion-  rise  to  a  more  vigor- 
ous and  lofty  exercise  than  when  he  is  in 
a  state  of  interior  temptation,  or  of  entire 
26* 


306 

freedom  from  it.  They  show  more  indu- 
bitably the  reality  and  strength  of  his  de- 
votion to  God;  and  form  a  much  more 
visible  and  striking  expression  of  it.  His 
obedience  in  those  circumstances,  there- 
fore, is  much  more  glorious  to  God.  It 
is  a  muchmore  strong  and  impressive  tes- 
timony to  His  worthiness  of  a  perfect 
obedience  from  His  creatures.  It  pro- 
claims much  more  loudly  how  infinitely 
lovely  He  is  above  all  things  else ;  and 
how  sacred  are  all  His  rights,  and  how 
just  and  holy  are  all  His  commands;  and 
how  unspeakably  the  pleasures  of  His 
service  surpass  all  others;  and  how  rich 
a  privilege  it  is  to  serve  Him  even  when 
amid  the  most  trying  scenes  those  plea- 
sures are  the  least.  And  it  is  of  much 
more  worth  to  other  beings  as  an  exam- 
ple, adapted  to  inspire  those  who  are  as- 
sailed with  similar  temptations  with  equal 
resolution,  to  encourage  their  hopes  and 
prompt  them  to  suppress  the  thought  of 
turning  from  the  service  of  God ;  and 
fitted  to  quicken  those  who  are  exempted 
from  trial  in  their  attachment  to  the  Most 
High,  and  exciting  them  to  greater  zeal 
in  expressing  their  love. 

Thus  an  act  of  obedience  is  glorious 
.to  God  in  proportion  to  the  degree  of  love 


307 

to  Him  which  is  exercised  in  it;  and  the 
degree  of  love  involved  in  an  act  of  obe- 
dience, is  proportioned  to  the  difficulties 
which  oppose  the  exercise  of  that  act. 

From  these  Considerations  it  is  appa- 
rent that  a  perfect  obedience  from  all 
mankind  in  the  circumstances  in  which 
they  are  placed,  would  be  peculiarly 
glorious  to  God.  For  it  would  be  per- 
formed against  the  opposing  influence  ol 
powrrful  temptation,  and  therefore  in- 
volve an  exalted  exercise  and  expression 
of  love  to  Him.  How  glorious  to  the  Most 
fli<;h  would  it,  for  example,  have  been, had 
our  first  parents,  when  assailed  by  all  the 
tempting  influence  from  their  own  senses, 
and  the  subtle  and  powerful  adversary, 
to  which  they  were  subjected,  risen  in  all 
th'Mr  native  purity  superior  to  those 
temptations,  and  maintained  an  unbroken 
and  an  invincible  attachment  to  God? 
What  a  tribute  of  glory  would  have  been 
presented  to  Him  by  an  obedience,  per- 
formed as  that  would  have  been,  while 
the  voice  by  which  He  spake  them  into 
being  had  scarcely  died  away  in  the  vales 
of  Eden;  and  declaring,  as  that  would  have 
declared,  that  though  emerged  but  a  mo- 
ment, as  it  were,  from  the  abyss  of  non- 
existence,  the  visions  of  His  presence  they 


308 

had  beheld,  had  chained  to  Him  for  ever 
all  the  energies  of  their  affection ;  that 
they  had  seen  so  much  of  His  infinite 
excellence,  that  all  things  else  had  no 
power  to  attract  their  love;  that  they  had 
been  touched  with  such  reverence  of  His 
majesty,  that  nothing  could  tempt  them 
to  forget  His  rights,  or  disrespect  His  will; 
that  they  had  been  so  ravished  with  the 
joys  of  His  presence  and  service,  that  all 
other  joys  were  unable  to  allure  their 
hearts,  or  turn  away  their  eye  from  His 
glory  ? 

Arid  with  what  emotions  of  admiration 
and  joy  would  they  have  been  beheld  by 
the  habitants  of  other  worlds?  How,  while 
their  eye  watched  the  new  created  pair, 
buffeting  their  way  through  the  tempestu- 
ous scenes  of  their  trial,  resisting,  with 
the  shield  of  faith,  all  the  fiery  darts  of 
their  mighty  tempter,  and  turning  away, 
^vith  a  holy  self-denial,  from  all  the  attrac- 
tions of  the  forbidden  tree,  would  the  uni- 
verse of  holy  beings  have  felt  a  more  ar- 
dent flame  of  love  to  the  Most  High,  kind- 
ling their  own  hearts,  and  a  more  pro- 
found reverence  of  His  will,  and  a  deeper 
sense  of  the  guilt  of  rebellion  against  Him, 
and  firmer  purposes  of  eternal  fidelity 
taking  possession  of  their  minds  ? 


309 

And  how  glorious  to  the  Most  High  had 
Jt  been,  had  all  the  descendants  of  the 
first  pair,  amid  all  the  scenes  of  their  trial, 
yielded  Him  a  perfect  obedience  !  How 
glorious,  had  they  never  listened  to  the 
solicitations  of  the  adversary,  nor  indulg- 
ed the  calls  of  inordinate  passion,  nor 
stooped  to  forbidden  joys;  had  they  ne- 
ver swerved  from  the  service  of  God,  but. 
amid  all  the  opposing  influences  which 
have  been  exerted  on  them,  ^iven  their 
whole  heart  to  Him,  clio-en  Him  as  their 
only  portion,  and  proved  that  no  storms 
of  temptation  could  quench  the  ardour  of 
their  love,  nor  shake  their  purpose  of 
constant  obedience  to  His  will!  How 
glorious  to  Him  would  it  bave  hren.  if  all 
the  heathens  \\liom  He  l.:i-  <jivrn  to  be- 
hold only  faint  visions  of  Hi-  c\c<  11< 
and  to  hear  the  sound  only  of  Hi-  distant 
footstep,  had  still  been  wholly  attached  to 
Him,  and  rendered  Him  the  full  oblation 
of  their  hearts!  How  glorious  to  Him  would 
it  have  been,  had  the  Israelites,  to  whom 
He  more  clearly  revealed  His  perii  <  i  i 
and  proclaimed  His  will,  ever  render^  1 
Him  the  hi^h  homage  of  love  and  faith 
which  lie  required  !  How  glorious  to 
Him,  when  the  Saviour,  having  finished 
His  mighty  work,  published  the  call  .of 


310 

mercy,  had  all  the  tribes  of  men  render- 
ed  Him  thenceforth  the  tribute  of  a  joy- 
ous and  undeviating  obedience  ! 

How  glorious  to  Him  would  it  be,  should 
all  the  millions  who  are  now  descending 
the  ways  of  death,  turn  at  His  call,  and 
surrender  themselves  to  His  will  and  ser- 
vice !  And  how  happy  an  influence  would 
it  spread  over  other  worlds ! 

Thus  a  perfect  obedience  from  all  man- 
kind, in  the  circumstances  in  which  they 
are  placed,  would  be  peculiarly  glorious 
to  God ;  and  in  that  fact  we  are  present- 
ed with  ground  for  the  inference,  that  did 
they  yield  that  obedience,  it  would  be  as 
good  materials  as  their  disobedience  is 
for  a  perfect  display  of  His  glory ;  and 
ihat  the  same  sum  of  glory  would  redound 
to  Him  from  the  system  of  events  which 
would  then  exist,  as  results  to  Him  from 
the  system  of  events  which  now  exists. 

In  the  fourth  place — 

The  proposition  is  corroborated  by  the 
consideration,  that  did  mankind  yield  a 
perfect  obedience  to  the  divine  law,  none 
of  the  misery  to  which  they  are  now  sub- 
jected in  punishment  of  their  rebellion 
would  exist.  The  sum  of  glory  which  re* 
suits  to  God  from  the  system  of  events 


31 1 

that  now  exists,  depends  on  the  sum  of 
happiness  arising  from  it;  and  the  sum  of 
glory  which  would  redound  to  Him  from 
the  system  of  events  that  wrould  then  ex- 
ist, would  depend  also  on  the  sum  of  hap- 
piness which  should  result  from  it.  God 
is  glorified  by  doing  good,  and  happiness 
only  is  an  absolute  good ;  other  things 
are  good  only  as  means  of  happiness. 
God,  therefore,  is  glorified  by  a'ninjj  ex- 
istence to  happiness :  and  the  sum  of  glo- 
ry resulting  to  Him  from  a  system  of 
events,  must  depend  on  the  sum  of  happi- 
arising  from  that  system;  and  He 
will  be  glorified  by  one  system  of  events 
as  much  as  by  any  other,  if  the  sum  of 
happiness  arising  froin.it  will  be  the  ^ame. 
Such  at  least  are  our  viev\s.  If.  a-  others 
hold,  the  sum  of  glory  redounding  to  God 
from  a  system  of  evenN.  doe-  not  depend 
on  the  sum  of  happinc.-s  M>!< >ly.  but  on 
the  sum  of  moral  excellence*  and  happi- 
ness jointly  which  that  system  involves, 
(he  principle  on  which  we  should  reason, 
were  that  our  view  of  the  subject,  and  the 
conclusion  to  which  we  should  advance, 
would  be  the  same  as  now. 

We  are  presented  then,  by  these  con- 
siderations, with  ground  for  the  inference, 
that  did  mankind  render  a  perfect  obedi- 


312 

ence  to  the  law  of  God,  as  great  a  sum  oi 
happiness  would  result  from  the  system 
of  events  which  would  then  exist,  as  re- 
sults from  the  present  system. 

To  ascertain  the  net  sum,  if  we  may 
use  the  language,  of  happiness  under  the 
present  system,  we  must  subtract  from  the 
whole  sum  of  happiness  existing  under  it, 
all  the  misery  which  it  includes  :  arid  how 
vastly  does  that  reduce  the  net  amount 
of  happiness  below  the  whole  sum  of hap- 
ness!  For  how  immense  is  the  sum  of 
misery  in  the  present  system  !  How  num- 
berless the  beings  who  suffer — how  great 
their  capacity — how  deep  their  miseries  ! 
Count  up  the  woes  of  which  our  world  is 
now  the  scene — unfold  the  doors  of  hell, 
and  sum  up  the  miseries  of  that  world! — 
Turn  the  eye  back  through  every  hour 
since  the  fall — look  down  through  the 
scenes  of  eternity — and  add  up  the  awful 
sum  of  suffering  which  results,  and  will 
result,  from  sin.  Subtract,  then,  an  equal 
sum  of  happiness  from  the  whole  which 
exists,  and  how  diminished,  comparative- 
ly, is  the  balance ! 

And,  to  ascertain  the  sum  of  happiness 
which  would  exist  were  mankind  obedi- 
ent to  God,  we  must  conceive  of  them  as 
exempted  from  all  the  misery  to  which 


313 

they  are  subjected  under  the  present  sys- 
tem, and  as  crowned  with  all  the  happi- 
ness which  would  be  the  reward  of  obe- 
dience. The  results  of  these  two  systems 
of  events  must  be  viewed  also  in  respect 
to  their  influence  on  all  other  created 
beings. 

And  who,  contemplating  them  thus, 
does  not  rind  the  impres-ion  -tealing  over 
him,  that  did  mankind  yield  the  Most 
High  a  perfect  obedience,  the  sum  of  hap- 
piness resulting  from  it  must  be  as  great 
as  that  which  now  exists?  Pluck  away 
from  mankind,  by  the  hand  of  perfect  obe- 
dience, those  chains  of  misery  which  op- 
press our  world — extinguish  those  tires  of 
hell — annihilate  that  deathless  worm — 
arrest  those  atonic-  ofdespair — e\<  h 
all  the  suffering  of  eternal  death  for  life 
and  happiness  everlasting. — and  who 
shall  grieve  that  misery  has  /.  /,  or 

who  shall  imagine  that  the  sum  of  happi- 
ness must  be  less  than  now  exists?  These 
views  apply  equally  to  any  portion  of 
mankind  who  should  yield  a  complete 
obedience  to  the  divine  law. 

These  riewfl  then  corroborate  our  pro- 
position.    For   if,  under   the    system    of 
events    which    would    exist    were    man- 
kind entirely  obedient,  the  sum  of  happi- 
27 


314 

ness  would  be  as  great  as  under  the  pre- 
sent system  of  events ;  then  as  great  a 
sum  oi'  glory  would  redound  to  the  Most 
High  from  that  system  of  events  as  results 
from  this. 

In  the  fifth  place — 

The  proposition  is  corroborated  by  the 
consideration,  that  no  greater  good  will 
result  to  the  universe  from  those  sins  of 
mankind  for  which  they  w  ill  be  punished, 
than  would  have  resulted  from  a  perfect 
obedience,  rendered  in  the  circumstances 
in  which  those  sins  are  committed. 

This  is  demonstrable  from  the  justice 
of  God.  The  good  which  will  result  from 
those  sins  will  arise  entirely  from  their 
punishment,  by  the  manifestation  thereby 
made  of  the  evil  of  sin,  and  the  divine  ab- 
horrence of  it.  And  that  good  will  result 
to  God  and  to  His  holy  subjects,  by  the 
vindication  of  His  rights,  and  the  display 
of  1 1  is  attributes,  involved  in  the  infliction 
of  that  punishment. 

The  sum  of  evil  which  will  be  inflicted 
in  punishment  of  those  sins  will  corres- 
pond to  the  sum  of  their  guilt;  and  the 
sum  of  their  guilt  will  depend  on  the  sum 
of  evil  to  the  universe  which  they  are  na- 
turally adapted  to  occasion,  and  which 


315 

would  arise  from  them  were  they  never 
visited  with  punishment. 

\\  ere  they  left  unpunished,  they  wouM 

be  to  the  universe  the  n  of  natural 

evil,  consisting  in  a  di«  »  of  happi- 

,  or  in  positive  misery,  or  in  both. — 

Sin  consists  in  the  e 

in  preferring  private  or  individual  happi- 
ness above  the  ' 
and  pui'Miin^  a  COU1 

that  pri\  ate  happii  v,  ith 

tho  happiness  of  the  \\hote.      It  i-  adapt- 
ed, therefore,  to  produce  natural  e\  il.    It 
it  also   prove   the  :i   of  moral 

evil.      The  degnr   of  if-  wickedness  de- 
pends on  the  diirrec   of  its  ir 
witi'i   tlie   good   of  the  whole;  or  on   tho 
cpiajitiiy    c»f  natural   and   moral   c\  il    it   i  ^ 
adapted  to  pmduoc. 

As  then  the  iruilt  of  those  Bind  will  cor- 
respond to  the  sum  of  injury  they  are  na- 
turallv  adapted  to  occasion  to  the  uni- 
ver-f.  and  which  would  result  from  them 
were  the;  left  unpunished  ;  and  a>  the 
sum  of  evil  \\hich  \\ill  he  inilictrd  in  pu- 
nishment of  them  will  correspond  to  their 
guilt,  it  is  apparent  that  the  sum  of  evil 
which  will  be  indicted  in  punishment  of 
them,  will  he  precisely  such,  and  only 
such,  as  shall  prevent  every  injury  to  the 
universe  which  would  result  from  them 


316 

were  they  left  unpunished.  For  it  is  ma- 
nifest, from  the  justice  of  the  Most  High, 
that  He  will  not  punish  mankind  beyond 
their  desert  of  punishment  on  account  of 
those  sins  :  and  as  their  desert  of  punish- 
ment corresponds  to  the  injury  to  the  uni- 
verse, which  would  result  from  those  sins 
if  left  unpunished  to  exert  their  natural 
influence,  it  is  manifest  that  He  will  not 
inflict  any  punishment  beyond  what  is  ne- 
cessary to  prevent  that  injury.  He  can- 
not, in  the  exercise  of  justice,  inflict  any 
greater  punishment  than  that,  unless  He 
can,  consistently  with  justice,  punish 
mankind  beyond  their  guilt;  or  unless 
the  guilt  of  their  sins  exceeds  the  injury 
they  are  adapted  to  occasion.  But  He 
cannot  justly  punish  mankind  beyond 
their  guilt.  For  that  would  involve 
the  right  of  punishing  them  for  some- 
thing besides  their  guilt,  as  for  holi- 
ness, or  something  independent  of  their 
moral  conduct,  or  for  nothing  at  all.  But 
it  cannot  be  consistent  with  justice  to  pu- 
nish them  for  what  does  not  involve  any 
guilt.  It  would  be  unjust  to  inflict  evil 
which  is  not  merited.  Nor  does  the  guilt 
of  sin  exceed  the  injury  it  is  adapted  to 
occasion  to  the  universe.  To  affirm  that 
it  does,  is  to  charge  with  guilt  that  which 
is  granted  to  be  harmless,  which  is  nb- 


317 

surd.  And  were  such  a  species  of  harm- 
less guilt  admitted  to  exist,  it  would  not 
be  consistent  with  the  justice  of  God  to 
punish  it,  for  it  is  inconsistent  with  justice 
to  punish  what  is  harmless.  If  sin  were 
not  a  violation  of  the  rights,  and  conse- 
quently, if  left  to  produce  its  natural  ef- 
fects, inconsistent  with  the  happiness  of 
the  universe,  it  cannot  be  possible  that  it 
should  involve  any  £iiilt.  And  therefore 
the  sins  of  mankind  do  not  involve  any 
guilt  beyond  the  injury  which  they  arc 
adapted  to  occasion  to  the  nniveive.  As 
then  the  guilt  of  sin  con-i-u  entirely  in  its 
injuriousness  to  the  universe,  and  •>' 
cannot,  consistently  with  justice,  puni>h 
it  beyond  its  <niilt.  it  i-  apparent  that  lie 
will  not  punish  mankind  on  account  of 
their  sins,  beyond  what  ia  required  to  pre- 
vent their  BlOfl  doin^  any  injury  to  Him 
and  His  kingdom.  To  punish  them  more 
than  that,  would  be  to  punish  them  be- 
yond their  injuriousness,  and  therefore 
beyond  their  guilt. 

The  design  of  God  in  punishing  man- 
kind is  by  an  exhibition  of  the  evi1  of 
tht-'.i  :;i  iii-  :  -if  them,  to  pre- 

vent   the  injury  to    the    universe    which 
would  result  from  them  were  they  permit- 
ted to  go  unpn^i  >h  id.     The  evil  of  their 
27* 


318 

sins,  and  thence  God's  hatred  of  them, 
correspond  to  the  injury  they  are  adapted 
to  occasion.  He  cannot,  therefore,  con- 
sistently with  justice,  punish  mankind  to 
any  greater  extent,  than  to  prevent  their 
sins  doing  Him  and  His  kingdom  any  in- 
jury. For  to  punish  them  beyond  that, 
would  be  to  exhibit  those  sins  as  more 
evil  than  they  actually  are,  and  to  ex- 
press a  greater  degree  of  hatred  of  them 
than  they  actually  deserve. 

And  as  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  justice 
of  God,  so  it  is  with  the  good  of  the  uni- 
verse, for  Him  to  inflict  upon  mankind 
any  more  punishment  than  is  necessary  to 
prevent  the  injury  which  their  sins  are 
adapted  to  occasion.  He  can  have  no 
pleasure  in  the  punishment  of  sin,  on  any 
other  ground  than  its  promoting  the  good 
of  the  universe ;  and  but  for  that  effect, 
would  never  punish  it.  But  it  cannot  pro- 
mote the  good  of  the  universe  to  punish 
men  to  a  greater  degree  than  would  cor- 
respond with  the  evil  which  their  sins 
were  adapted  to  produce  ;  nor  to  express 
a  greater  abhorrence  of  their  guilt  than 
it  merits,  for  that  would  be  unjust  in  God, 
and  therefore  inconsistent  with  His  glory 
and  the  good  of  His  kingdom. 

God  will  therefore  inflict  on  mankind 
only  so  much  punishment  as  shall  prevent 


319 

their  sins  occasioning  any  injury  to  the 
universe.  The  universe  will  only  be  pla- 
ced, by  that  punishment,  in  as  favourable 
circumstances  as  those  in  which  it  would 
have  been  had  mankind  never  committed 
the  sins  for  which  the  punishment  will  be 
inflicted.  And,  as  all  the  good  which  will 
result  to  the  universe  from  the  existence 
of  those  sins  will  arise  from  their  punish- 
ment: and  as  only  the  same  sum  of  good 
will  result  from  their  punishment  \\hich 
would  have  existed  had  they  never  been 
committed;  it  is  apparent  that  the*  sum 
of  good  which  will  arise  from  the  exist- 
ence of  those  sins,  will  not  exceed,  but 
will  exactly  equal,  the  sum  which  would 
have  existed  had  mankind  yielded  a  per- 
olx'diene.e  in  the  circumstances  in 
which  those  sins  are  committed.  And 
this  fact  corroborates  the  position,  that  no 
greater  good  will  result  from  any  of  the 
sins  of  mankind,  than  would  have  existed 
had  they  yielded  a  perfect  obedience  in- 
stead of  committing  those  sins.  If  any 
greater  good  will  result  from  the  exist- 
ence of  any  of  their  sins,  it  must  result 
from  those  which  shall  be  forgiven.  But 
whence  can  it  be  proved,  or  rendered  pro- 
bable, that  they  are  better  materials  for 
a  display  of  the  divine  glory,  than  a  per- 


320 

feet  obedience  rendered  in  their  place 
would  have  been  ? 

Whence  can  it  be  shown,  that  the  ex- 
ercise of  'His  grace  in  pardoning  them, 
will  be  more  glorious  to  God  than  the  ex- 
ercise of  His  justice  in  punishing  the 
others  ?  There  is  no  ground  from  which 
to  infer  the  conclusion,  that  those  sins 
which  shall  be  forgiven,  constitute  better 
materials  for  manifesting  the  divine  glory, 
than  those  which  shall  be  punished;  and 
in  the  fact,  therefore,  that  those  which 
are  to  be  punished,  are  no  better  materi- 
als for  the  display  of  the  divine  glory, 
than  a  perfect  obedience,  rendered  in 
their  place,  would  have  been,  we  are 
furnished  with  at  least  probable  ground 
for  the  inference,  that  those  also  which 
are  to  be  forgiven  are  no  better  materi- 
als for  the  same  end,  than  a  perfect  obe- 
dience in  their  place  would  have  been. 

In  the  sixth  place — 

The  proposition  is  demonstrated  to  be 
true  by  the  fact,  that  unless  it  be  true,  no 
godly  sorrow  can  be  exercised  for  sin. 

If  it  be  not  true,  that  were  mankind 
to  yield  in  the  circumstances  in  which 
they  exist,  a  perfect  obedience  to  the  di- 
vine lawr,  their  obedience  would  be  as 
good  materials  as  their  disobedience  is, 


321 

(or  a  perfect  display  of  the  divine  glory; 
and  if  thence  it  be  not  true,  that  the  same 
sum  of  glory  would  redound  to  God  from 
the  system  of  events  which  would  then 
exist,  as  results  to  Him  from  the  system 
which  now  exists;  then  it  follows,  that  all 
their  sin  must  be  necessary  to  the  glory  of 
God  by  a  natural  necessity.  A  necessity 
must  arise  from  its  nature  of  admitting  it 
to  precisely  such  an  extent  into  a 
that  shall  secure  a  perfect  display  of  His 
glory.  The  substitution  of  holiness  in  its 
place  would  injure  the  system,  and  pre- 
vent a  perfect  display  of  His  glory.  And 
it  would  therefore  be  a  real  and  an  un- 
speakable disadvantage  to  the  Most  High 
and  to  the  universe,  were  mankind  to 
yield  Him  a  perfect  obedience:  for  if  it 
be  the  nature  of  sin,  and  not  the  mere 
fact,  that  mankind,  in  the  rireum>tances 
in  which  they  arc  placed,  elmi.M  to  exer- 
cise it  instead  of  holiness,  that  makes  it 
necessary  to  a  perfect  display  of  the  di- 
vine glory;  then  it  is  necessary  to  the 
divine  glory  by  a  natural  necessity,  a  ne- 
cessity which  it  is  impossible  to  obviate. 
And  if  mankind,  by  yielding  a  perfect 
obedience  to  the  divine  law,  would  pre- 
vent a  perfect  display  of  the  glory  of  God, 
then,  were  they  to  render  that  obedience, 
it  would  be  an  unspeak^'  -  -^sadvanta<re 


322 

to  Him  and  to  the  universe.  And  if  a  per- 
fect obedience  from  mankind  would  be 
such  an  unspeakable  disadvantage  to  the 
Most  High  and  to  the  universe,  then  it  is 
an  unspeakable  advantage  to  the  Most 
High  and  to  the  universe,  that  they  do 
not  yield  that  obedience,  but  disobey 
Him  precisely  as  they  do.  And  if  it  be 
such  an  unspeakable  advantage  to  the 
Most  High  and  to  the  universe,  that  man- 
kind disobey  Him  precisely  as  they  do; 
because  their  disobedience  enables  Him 
to  make  a  perfect  display  of  His  glory, 
which  without  that  disobedience  Pie 
could  not  make;  then  it  is  a  subject  of 
unspeakable  joy,  that  mankind  disobey 
Him  precisely  as  they  do;  and  it  should 
iill  r'very  heart  that  is  friendly  to  Him  with 
exultation ;  and  the  thought,  that  they 
will  continue  to  rebel  against  Him  pre- 
cisely as  they  will,  should  fill  every  such 
heart  with  the  most  exalted  satisfaction. 
And  had  any  of  mankind  refused  to  dis- 
obey Him  precisely  as  they  have,  it 
should  be  to  all  His  friends  a  subject  of 
deep  and  everlasting  regret;  and  the 
thought,  that  any  of  them  should  not 
hereafter  disobey  Him  precisely  as  they 
will,  should  be  unspeakably  painful.  For 
since  all  mankind  are  under  obligation  to 


323 

desire  supremely  a  perfect  display  of  the 
divine  glory,  they  are  also  under  obliga- 
tion to  rejoice  supremely  in  the  exig- 
ence of  precisely  that  sum  of  moral  evil 
which  is  necessary  by  a  natural  necessity 
to  such  a  display  of  that  glory,  and  bound 
supremely  to  shrink  from  the  de-'ne.  that 
precisely  such  a  sum  of  sin  should  not 
exist,  And  each  individual  is  bound  to 

ice  in  the  existence  <»f  all  the  sins 
which  he  commits  as  well  as  in  the  exist- 
ence of  all  tlie  sin<  the  re-t  of  mankind 
eoiiimii:  and  to  rejoice  that  all  the  -ins 
shall  exist  which  he  -hall  hereafter  com- 
mit, as  \\ell  as  that  all  those.  \\  hich  others 
^hall  commit,  shall  e\ 

Now  if  Midi  are  the  obligations  of  m;m- 

'.  it  is  ohviouslv  impn-sihie  that  any 
aodlv  MMTOW  for -in  should  be  exerei 

\\hat    then  can    godly  sorrow  for  Sin 
I-  it  sorrow  for  the  exi-t(  nee  of  sin 

eneral?     Or  i-  it  Borrow  for  the  exist- 

of  one's  own  -ins?    Or  is  it  sorrow 

Ihut   the  overt  acts  of  sin  are  committed 

>    <uch  motives?    Or  i>  it   sorrow  for 

1    red  ?     ( )r  is  it  hatred 

part  or  all  of  these  united? 

\\  e  do  not  mention  each  of  thr-c.  because 

we    regard    tin  in    as    so   man  .    ditlerent 

kinds  of  sorrow,  but  merely  because  those 


324 

whom  we  oppose  are  accustomed  to 
speak  of  them  as  such. 

If  men  are  under  obligation  to  rejoice 
supremely,  that  mankind  commit  precise- 
ly that  quantity  of  sin  which  they  do 
commit,  then, 

First.  Godly  sorrow  for  sin  cannot 
consist  in  sorrow  for  the  existence  of  sin 
in  general. 

Godly  sorrow  for  sin  is  a  holy  sorrow 
for  it;  a  sorrow  involving  right  views  and 
feelings  respecting  it,  and  exercised  in 
compliance  with  an  obligation;  and  sor- 
row for  sin  in  general,  is  sorrow  for  all  the 
sin  of  mankind,  contemplated  as  a  whole. 
If  then  men  are  under  obligation  to  re- 
joice in  the  existence  of  sin  in  general, 
godly  sorrow  for  sin  cannot  consist  in  sor- 
row for  the  existence  of  sin  in  general. 
First,  because  it  is  impossible  that  the 
same  identical  thing  should  be  to  them, 
at  the  same  time,  an  object  both  of  su- 
preme joy  and  sorrow.  It  is  absurd  to 
suppose,  that  precisely  the  same  thing, 
which  is  a  ground  of  joy,  should,  at  the 
same  time,  be  a  ground  of  sorrow.  Next, 
because,  if  they  are  under  obligation  to 
rejoice  in  the  existence  of  sin  in  general, 
they  canirjt  be  under  obligation  to  exer- 
cise sorrow  for  the  existence  of  sin  in  ge- 


325 

neral;  for  in  order  that  that  might  be  the 
case,  precisely  the  same  thing,  which  was 
the  ground  of  the  one  obligation,  must  be 
the  ground  of  the  other.  But  it  is  absurd 
to  suppose  the  same  identical  thing  to  be 
the  ground  of  two  opposite  obligations; 
since  that  in  it,  which  would  make  it 
the  ground  of  one  of  the  obligations, 
would  prevent  ii>  bt-in^the  ground  of  the 
other.  And  it  is  absurd  too,  to  supj 
they  could  obey  two  such  opposing  obli- 
gations: since,  as  both  ohliiMiions  would 

on  them  at  all  times,  it  would  be  im- 
possible to  comply  with  one  without  \io- 
lating  the  other.  Thirdly,  l>eeause  if 
right  views  re-perting  sin  would  lead 

!i    to    rejoice    in    it-    existence,    ri^ht 
views  respecting   it  could  not  lead  t* 
to  sorrow  on  ruv-H"  existence.    As 

then,  from  tlir  nature  of  the  ihing.^  it  is 
impossible  that  men  should,  at  the  same 
time,  both  rejoice  in  the  <•  «i  >\\\ 

in  general,  and  exercise  sorrow  f  r  it  :  and 
impossible  also,  that  they  should  he  un- 
der obligation,  at  the  same  time,  both  to 
rejoice  in  its  existence,  and  e\erci>e  sor- 
row for  it :  it  is  manifest  that,  if  men  are 
under  obligation  to  rejoice  in  the  cxi.-l- 
ence  of  sin  in  general,  godly  sorrow7  for 
28 


326 

sin  cannot  consist  in  sorrow  for  the  exist- 
ence of  sin  in  general. 

Secondly.  Nor  for  the  same  reasons  can 
it  consist  in  sorrow  for  the  existence  of 
their  own  sins.  It  is  undoubtedly  a  fact, 
that  when  men  exercise  godly  sorrow  for 
sin,  their  sorrow  respects  their  own  sins, 
and  not  the  sins  of  others;  yet  if  they  are 
under  obligation  to  rejoice  at  the  exist- 
ence of  all  the  sin  which  exists,  their  sor- 
row cannot  consist  in  sorrow  for  the  exist- 
ence of  their  own  sins;  for  they  are  un- 
der as  high  obligation  to  rejoice  at  the 
existence  of  all  the  sins,  which  they  have 
committed,  as  they  are  to  rejoice  at  the 
existence  of  any  of  the  sins  which  others 
have  committed.  Their  sins  are  as  ne- 
cessary to  the  glory  of  God,  as  the  sins  of 
others;  and  whatever  exists  in  respect 
to  the  sins  of  others,  to  constitute  a  reason 
for  rejoicing  at  their  existence,  exists 
equally  in  regard  to  their  own,  to  consti- 
tute a  reason  for  rejoicing  at  their  exist- 
ence. And  it  is  equally  as  irnposs-ble 
for  them,  at  the  same  time,  to  rejoice  in 
the  existence  of  their  own  sins,  and  exer- 
cise sorrow  for  their  existence,  as  it  is  to 
rejoice  at  the  existence  of  the  sins  of 
other-,,  and  exercise  sorrow  for  their 
existence. 


3:17 

And  if  °;odly  sorrow  do^s  not  consist  in 
sorrow  for  the  existence  of  their  own  sins, 
it  dors  nut  of  coin--<>  c.o,-.>i-t  in  sorrow, 
that  they  committed  those  sins;  for  sor- 
row, tint  thrij  committed  tho>e  sin-;, 
\N  o  Id  he  .-orrow,  that  th< 
since  the  existence  of  tho-e  sins  depended 
on  their  committing  them.  Those  iden- 
tical sins  could  never  exist,  Unless  they 
\vere  the  acts  of  the  identical  |" •: 
who  committed  them.  And  if  it  would  he 
int'oiiM-lent  \\  iih  t!,  <  »f  (  iod.  for  an y 

of  mankind  not  to  di^-hey  i!i^  l.i\\.  in  all 
tho-e  instances  in  whieh  they  do  disohey 
it  :  thc'n  as  it  would  he  ineon-i-'enl  \\ith 
\\\^  «^lory  lor  any  imt  I.  :it  the  iden- 

tic: 1 1  -in-  \\  hieh  tliey  do  commit,  the\ 
honnd     to    rejoice,    ih.H    //,,  v  <|0    coiiunit 
6    identic1. d    -ins  \\  Inc 

mit 

!)<•  lo   sorr<>w  ! 

\\ere  committed    h\  lead    i>f 

hf  ino    committc'd    by  others   of  mankind, 

•  -on-.e,1.  trom  ))nre 

T!ie\    could    not   de-ire    that  -     - 

>!,ou!d     hai  «'    heen  committed    h\   oti, 

hemselvea,  for  <er  rea- 

BOfl  than  th  tt  the  e\  iK   r  :  ";       a 

t  fall  on  others,  in.-ti  ad  of  falling  on 

themselves;  and  sorrow  arising  from  such 


328 

a  source,  must  surely  be  the  sorrow  that 
worketh  death,  and  not  godly  sorrow. 

Thirdly.  Nor  can  it  be  sorrow  that  the 
overt  acts  of  sin  were  committed  from 
such  motives.  First,  because  probably 
only  a  small  proportion  of  the  sins  of 
men  involve  any  overt  acts.  They  are 
simple  exercises  of  the  heart  unaccom- 
panied by  any  external  act.  Thus  the 
simple  exercise  of  hatred  to  God,  and 
malevolence  to  men,  does  not  involve 
any  overt  act.  And  since  therefore  men 
are  under  obligation  to  exercise  godly 
sorrow  for  all  their  sins,  whether  they  in- 
clude overt  acts  or  not,  it  is  absurd  to 
suppose  that  godly  sorrow  consists  sim- 
ply in  sorrow,  that  the  overt  acts  of  sin 
were  committed  from  wrong  motives. 
Next,  because  it  is  absurd  to  suppose, 
that  many  of  the  overt  acts  of  sin  should 
not  be  performed  from*  wrong  motives. 
Can  the  overt  act  of  worshipping  an  idol 
be  performed  from  any  other  than  wrong 
motive*?  And  thirdly,  because  sorrow 
that  the  overt  acts  of  sin  were  committed 
from  wrong  motives,  would  be  sorrow 
that  those  acts  were  sinful;  since  it  is 
their  being  performed  from  wrong  mo- 
tives that  constitutes  their  sinfulness.  To 
exerei-e  sorrow  that  those  sins  were  corn- 


329 

mitted  from  wrong  motives,  would  there- 
fore be  to  exercise  sorrow  that  those  sins 
exist:  since  some  of  the  overt  acts,  such 
as  those  of  idolatry,  could  not,  from  their 
nature,  be  committed  except  from  wrong 
motives;  and  the  others  could  not  be 
sinful  acts,  unless  performed  from  wrong 
motives.  But  sorrow  that  those  sins  ex- 
ist would  not  be  godly  sorrow.  because 
ii  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  exercise 
of  joy  on  account  of  their  existence*  If 
men  are  bound  to  rejoice  that  they  com- 
mitted tho-c  identical  sinful  overt  acN; 
and  if  those  identical  o\ert  acts  could 
not  have  been  committed  except  from 
wrong  motives:  then  tln-y  are  bound  to 
rejoice  that  they  committed  them  from 
u:  motive-,  and  hound  therefore  not 
to  exercise  MHTOW  that  they  committed 
them  from  tho-e  motives. 

/•'<>;trthh/.  Nor  can  it  be  sorrow  for  sin 
in  itself  considered  Sin,  in  itself  con-i- 
dered,  is,  as  we  have  already  shown,  sin 
idered  in  respect  to  its  whole  nature, 
as  being  in  all  that  pertains  to  it  and  con- 
stitutes it  precisely  such  a  thing  as  it  is. 
Thus  any  particular  sinful  act  in  itself 
considered,  is  that  act  considered  in  re- 
spect to  all  which  pertains  to  it,  and  con- 
stitutes its  nature ;  that  is,  its  being  the 
28* 


330 

act  of  the  person  who  exercises  it,  and 
being  pei  formed  at  the  time  and  in  the  cir- 
cumstances, in  respect  to  knowledge,  mo- 
tives, and  every  thing  else,  in  which  it 
took  place ;  and  its  being  the  violation 
of  that  particular  command,  of  which  it 
is  a  violation,  and  precisely  such  a  viola- 
tion of  that  command  as  it  is ;  and  its  be- 
ing of  a  nature  adapted  to  produce,  or 
to  be  employed  to  produce,  precisely  the 
effects  which  it  is  adapted  to  produce,* 
as  exciting  the  divine  displeasure,  occa- 
sioning God  to  display  His  justice,  or 
grace,  or  other  attributes  ;  and  the  cause 
of  punishment,  or  of  penitence,  or  of  other 
effects  to  the  person  who  performed  it, 
and  of  good  or  of  evil  to  other  beings; 
and  so  its  being  in  all  respects  precisely 
the  thing  which  it  is.  It  is  having  all  that 
belong  to  its  nature,  which  really  belongs 
to  it,  that  constitutes  it  the  identical 
thing  which  it  is;  and  to  consider  it  in 
itcHf  as  the  very  identical  thing  which  it 
is,  is  to  consider  it  as  having  all  that  be- 
long to  its  nature  which  really  does  be- 
long to  it.  And  the  same  is  true  of  all 
the  sins  which  mankind  commit. 

Now  from  this  it  is  manifest,  that  if 
mankind  are  under  obligation  to  rejoice, 
that  all  the  sins  which  they  have  com- 


331 

inittcd  c\i-t.  ijoilly  sorrow  for  sin  cannot 
consist  in  Borrow  for  sin,  in  itself  consi- 
dered. For  sorrow  for  those  sins,  in 
themselves  considered,  would  be  sorrow, 
that  those  sins  exist. 

Sorrow  for  those  sins,  in  themsehes 
considered,  must  be  sorrow,  either  that 
those  sins  possess  such  a  nature  as  (hey 
do:  or  sorrow  that  they  were  committed 
by  themselves,  and  not  by  others  <^f  man- 
kind ;  or  else  sorrow  that  they  uere  com- 
mitted at  all. 

If  it  be  sorrow,  that  those  sin* 
such  fi  nature  as  they  do,  then   it  i- 
row    that    thosr  r\M.       F«»r    ;• 

identical  sins  could  nol  e\i>t.  m,!<  -  i  .<  v 
<1  th<.»  nature  which  they  do:  it 
is  Irixini:  preeisely  all  tlio.-e  tlji.'L-,-  be- 
long to  their  nature,  which  do  h< 
it.  that  constitutes  them  the  idenl: 
which  they  are.  Were  their  nature  dif- 
nt  to  any,  even  the  least  dr^ree.  lioni 
what  it  now  is,  they  would  not  be  the 
identical  sins  thoy  now  are,  but  dillerent 
^ins.  Sorrow  then,  tint  they  pQBMSfl  the 
id-'ijtieal  nature  they  do  possess  is  sor- 
row tli  ;t  they  do  not  |  a  dillerent 
nature;  and  tl:  -w  that  they  are 
dentical  sirs  l1  .  and  not  diiler- 
ent  sins.  But  sorrow  that  they  are  the 


332 

identical  sins,  which  they  are,  and  not 
different  sins,  is  sorrow  that  those  iden- 
tical sins  exist  that  do  exist. 

Such  also  is  the  fact,  if  sorrow  for 
those  sins,  in  themselves  considered, 
be  sorrow  that  they  were  committed  by 
themselves,  instead  of  others  of  mankind. 
For  it  constitutes  a  part  of  the  nature  of 
those  sins,  that  they  were  committed  by 
the  identical  persons  by  whom  they  were 
cotirnitted,  and  those  identical  sins  would 
not  exist,  except  as  the  acts  of  the  iden- 
tical persons,  whose  acts  they  are.  Were 
they  thtt  acts  of  other  persons,  they  would 
not  be  the  same,  but  different  sins.  Sor- 
row, therefore,  that  they  are  the  acts  of 
the  identical  persons,  whose  acts  they 
are,  is  sorrow  that  those  identical  sins 
exist. 

And  such  of  course  is  the  fact,  if  sor- 
row for  those  sins  be  sorrow  that  they 
were  committed  at  all.  Since,  then,  sor- 
row for  the  sins  mankind  have  commit- 
ted, in  themselves  considered,  would  be 
sorrow  that  those  sins  exist ;  it  is  mani- 
fest, that  if  mankind  are  bound  to  rejoice 
that  all  the  sins  exist,  which  they  have 
committed,  godly  sorrow  for  those  sins 
cannot  be  sorrow  for  them,  in  themselves 
considered.  If  joy  that  they  exist,  is 


333 

godly  joy  ;  sorrow  that  they  exist,  cannot 
be  godly  sorrow. 

Fifthly.  Neither  can  godly  sorrow  for 
sin  be  the  hatred  of  sin.  First,  because 
the  hatred  of  a  thing  is  not  sorrow  for  it. 
Hatred  and  sorrow  aro  exercises  essen- 
tially diilt'rent.  Hatred  of  a  thing  is  no 
more  sorrow  for  it.  than  the  love  of  it,  or 
fear  of  it,  is.  And  a  person  may  hate 
many  things,  without  having  any  sorrow 
that  those  things  exist.  We  may,  for  in- 
stance, hnte  particular  kinds  of  food, 
without  feeling  any  sorrow  that  they 
exist.  Since,  then,  hatred  is  not  sorrow, 
the  hatred  of  sin  cannot  be  godly  sorrow 
for  MIL  Secondly,  because,  if  the  hat  ml 
of  sin  were  sorrow  for  it,  still  if  mankind 
are  under  ol  to  t*>  uince  that  all 

the  sins  cxi-t,  \v!,irh  they  commit,  the 
hatred  of  lh'kir  nnot  be  trmlly  sor- 

ro\\  for  them:  for  if  their  hatred  of  them 
is  sorrou  for  them,  it  must,  as  in  some  of 
the  preceding  cases,  either  he  sorrow  for 
the  existence  of  sin  in  general :  or  sorrow 
for  the  exigence  of  their  own  sins;  or 
sorrow,  that  the  overt  acts  of  their  sins 
were  committed  from  wrong  motives;  or 
else  sorrow  far  sin,  in  itself  considered. 
But  sorrow  for  their  si,;s.  in  either  of 
those  respects,  would,  as  already  shown. 


334 

be  sorrow  for  the  existence  of  their  sins, 
which  is  inconsistent  with  joy  for  their 
existence. 

Sixthly.  Nor,  therefore,  is  godly  sorrow 
for  sin.  sorrow  for  it  in  part  or  all  of  those 
respects  united.  For  if  sorrow  for  sin  in 
each  of  those  respects  involves,  as  has 
been  shown,  sorrow  that  sin  exists,  and 
is  therefore  inconsistent  with  rejoicing  in 
its  existence;  then  sorrow  for  it  in  any 
two  or  more  of  th^se  respects  united, 
must  also  be  sorrow  for  its  existence,  and 
therefore  be  inconsistent  with  rejoicing 
in  its  existence. 

If  then  mankind  are  under  obligation 
to  rejoice  in  the  existence  of  all  the  sins 
they  commit,  it  is  apparent,  that  they  can- 
not exercise  any  godly  sorrow  for  them. 

Now  this  consideration  demonstrates 
the  truth  of  our  proposition,  that  did 
mankind,  in  the  circumstances  in  which 
they  are  placed,  yield  a  perfect  obedi- 
ence to  God,  it  would  be  as  good  mate- 
rials as  their  disobedience  is,  for  a  dis- 
play of  His  glory.  For  mankind  are  un- 
der obligation  to  exercise  godly  sorrow 
for  their  sins:  since  it  is  that  sorrow 
which  vvorketh  repentance  unto  salva- 
tion. But  if  they  are  under  obligation  to 
exercise  godly  sorrow  for  their  sins;  then 


335 

they  are  not  under  obligation  to  rejoice 
in  the  existence  of  their  sins;  since  joy 
in  the  existence  of  their  sins  is,  as  has 

;j  shown,  inconsistent  with  godly  sor- 
row for  them.  But  if  they  are  not  under 
obligation  to  rejoice  in  the  existence  of 
thoir  sins,  then  their  sins  cannot  be  ne- 
cessary to  the  glory  of  God  by  a  natural 
necessity:  For  if  their  sins  were  ne< •<•-- 
Kiry  to  the  glory  of  God  by  a  natural  ne- 

il\.  they  would,  as  ha-  hern  -ho\\  Q, 
be  under  obligation  to  rejoice  in  their 
existence.  I'.eing  under  obligation  to  re- 
j  ice  in  the  perfect  dis|)lay  of  the  divine 
glory.  they  are.  it'  their  sin.-  arc  neC4  -sary 
to  the  divine  glory,  by  a  natural  nece--i- 
ty,  under  e<|iial  obligation  to  rejoice  in 
the  exigence  of  their  sins,  by  w  hieh  alone 
a  perfect  di-play  of  llie  di\ine  i^lory  can 
be  made.  lint  if  their  sins  are  not  IK  - 
ee^ary  to  the  gl«>ry  ol'Ciod.  l>\  a  natural 
necessity,  then,  did  mankind  yield  a  per- 
fect obedience  in  their  p!aee,  the  glory 
of  God  would  he  displayed  to  the  same 
perfection  as  it  now  is.  For  if  their 
are  not  necessary  to  the  glory  of  God  by 
a  natural  neces-ity.  then  the  necessity  of 
their  existence  doe-  not  arise  from  any 
thing  peculiar  to  their  nature;  but  sim- 
ply from  the  circumstance,  that  men 


336 

choose  to  commit  those  sins,  instead  of 
performing  acts  of  obedience.  But  if  all 
that  renders  their  sins  necessary  to  a 
perfect  display  of  the  divine  glory  is, 
that  mankind  choose  to  commit  those 
sins,  instead  of  performing  acts  of  obedi- 
ence, then  demonstratively,  if  mankind 
were  to  yield  a  perfect  obedience  to  God, 
their  sins  would  not  be  necessary  to  a 
perfect  display  of  the  divine  glory.  And 
if  by  their  yielding  a  perfect  obedience, 
their  sins  would  not  be  necessary  to  a 
perfect  display  of  the  divine  glory,  then 
their  obedience  would  be  as  good  mate- 
rials as  their  disobedience  is,  for  a  per- 
fect display  of  the  divine  glory;  and, 
thence,  the  same  sum  of  glory  would  re- 
sult to  God,  from  the  system  of  events, 
which  would  then  exist,  as  redounds  to 
Him  from  the  system  of  events  which  now 
exists. 

In  the  seventh  place — 

Our  proposition  is  demonstrated  to  be 
true  by  the  consideration,  that  unless  it 
be  true,  men  cannot  perform  any  act  from 
benevolence  either  towards  God  or  other 
beings. 

If  the  proposition  be  not  true,  then  the 
converse  of  it  is  true,  that  all  the  sins 


337 

which  mankind  do  and  shall  commit,  are 
necessary  to  the  glory  of  God  by  a  natu- 
ral necessity.  But  if  all  the  sins  which 
mankind  do  and  shall  commit,  are  neces- 
sary to  the  glory  of  God  hy  such  a  neces- 
sity, then  mankind  can  never,  in  any  case, 
possess  any  certainty,  previous  to  their 
acting,  whether  an  act  of  obedience  or 
of  disobedience  is  necr^ary  to  the  glory 
of  God  in  ti  ive  no  rule 

of  determining,  pre\  i<>n>lv  to  their  noting, 
what  is  necessary  to  the  glory  of  God. 
The  divine  law  is  not  sued  a  rule.  It 
does  not  show  what,  in  an;.  ces- 

sary  to  the  glory  of  God.  nor  what  lie  do- 

B  them  to  do;  for  His  requiring  obe- 
dience to  Hi-  l.tw.  is  no  proof  that  it  is 
necessary  to  His  glory,  or  consistent  uith 
it;  neither  i-  iva-on  nor  COHSC  ueh 

a  rule.  Mankind  are  left  in  the  most  ab- 
solute uncertainty,  until  their  action-  have 
come  into  existence,  what  are  nec< >*ary 
to  the  divine  glory,  and  what  are  incon- 
sistent with  it.  In  any  given  case,  ante- 

'•ntly  to  their  acting,  there  is,  as  far  as 
are  able  to  decide,  at  least  as  great 
a  probability  (and  perhaps  a  much  great- 
er, for  undoubtedly  much  the  largest  por- 
tion of  the  actions  of  mankind  are  sinful) 
that  the  glory  of  God  demands  a  sinful 
29 


338 

action,  as  that  it  demands  an  act  of  obe- 
dience. 

But  mankind  being,   antecedently   to 
their  acting,  in  total  uncertainty  whether 
the  glory  of  God  requires  them  to  act  in  a 
sinful  or  obedient  manner,  demonstrative- 
ly, can  never  act  from  benevolence  towards 
God  or  other  beings.    For  to  act  from  be- 
nevolence to  a  being,  is  to  act  from  good 
will  towards  him — with  a  desire  to  pro- 
mote his  well-being.     But  if  mankind,  in 
every  case  antecedently  to  their  acting, 
are  in  total  uncertainty  how  they  must  act 
in  order  to  promote  the  glory  of  God,  they 
cannot  act  from  benevolence  to  Him.     If 
they  yield  an  act  of  apparent  obedience 
to  His  law,  they  cannot  do  it  from  bene- 
volence to  Him,  for  they   must  do  it    in 
perfect  uncertainty  whether  it  is  not  utter- 
ly inconsistent  with  His  glory.     And  they 
cannot  be  actuated   by  benevolence  to 
Him,   in   performing  an   act  wrhich   they 
have  no  assurance  is  not  totally  inconsist- 
ent with  His  glory.     If  they  commit  an 
overt  transgression  of  His  law,  they  can- 
not do  it  from  benevolence  to  Him ;  since, 
as  in  the  other  case,  they  must  commit  it 
in  absolute  uncertainty  whether  it  is  not 
incompatible  with  His  glory;  and  bene- 
volence could  never  lead  theni  to  perfornj 


an  act  respecting  which  they  were  uncer- 
tain, whether  it  was  not  totally  incompati- 
ble with  His  glory. 

In  like  manner,  they  can  never  perform 
an  act  from  benevolence  to  other  beings. 
For  as  that  course  of  conduct  is  best  for 
the  universe  which  promotes  the  glory  of 
:  in  bring  uncertain  how  they  must 
act  to  promote  the  glory  of  God,  they  are 
uncertain  how  they  must  act  to  promote 
the  good  of  other  bei;. 

>r  can  they,  from  benevolence  to  God 
or  other  beings,  pause,  and  suspend  act- 
ing till  they  c:\n  ascertain  in  what  manner 
they  must  act,  in  order  to  promote  the 
glory  of  God  and  the  good  of  His  king- 
dom; both  br<  ey  must  be  in  total 
uncertainty,  but  that  to  Mi-pend  actii 
entirely  incompatible  with  the  di\ 

•u!  the  good  of  His  kingdom  :  and  be- 
cause, if  they  suspended  acting  fo:  the 
purpose,  they  could  never  ascertain,  pre- 
viously to  their  acting,  in  what  manner 
they  should  act,  in  order  to  glorify  God, 
and  promote  the  well-being  of  His  king- 
dom. 

And  brinK  thus  totally  unrtMe  to  do  anv 
thing  from  l»ene\  olence  to  God  or  other 
briiigs,  or  to  do  any  tiling  for  (he purpose 
of  promoting  the  glorv  of  God  and  the 


340 

good  of  His  kingdom,  all  motives  to  ae- 
tion  derived  from  the  glory  of  God  and 
the  good  of  His  kingdom,  are  entirely  ex- 
cluded from  access  to  their  minds.  They 
are  forced  to  act  in  all  cases  from  pure 
selfishness.  The  only  motive  to  action 
that  can  have  access  to  their  minds,  is 
the  desire  of  their  own  happiness;  and 
the  only  rule  of  determining,  in  every 
ease,  whether  it  is  best  to  perform  any 
given  act  or  not,  is  the  dictate  of  selfish- 
ness. God  and  His  government  are  ab- 
solutely annihilated  as  it  respects  any  mo- 
ral influence  on  mankind;  .and  they  are 
under  a  natural  necessity  of  acting  on  the 
principles  of  Atheism.  And  being  under 
a  natural  necessity  of  acting,  in  all  their 
conduct,  from  perfect  selfishness,  they  are 
of  course  perfectly  justifiable  for  all  their 
selfish  conduct.  None  of  their  violations 
of  the  divine  law,  arising  from  selfishness^ 
involve  any  guilt.  If  they  possess  any 
moral  character,  it  is  virtuous.* 

Since,  then,  if  all  the  sins  which  man- 


*  How  frequently  do  men  of  learning  hold  principles  entirely 
subversive  of  each  other*  Those  whom  we  oppose,  are  noted 
as  the  warmest  holders  and  defenders  of  the  position,  in  our 
judgment  manifestly  true,  that  all  sin  consists  in  the  exercise  of 
selfishness.  Yet  in  holding  the  position,  that  all  the  sins  man- 
kind do  and  shall  commit,  are  necessary  to  the  glory  of  God, 
itui-al  necessity,  they  hold,  as  we  have  shown,  that  al* 


341 

fcind  do  and  shall  commit,  are  necessary 
to  the  glory  of  God  by  a  natural  necessi- 
ty, it  is,  as  we  have  shown,  absolutely  im- 
possible that  they  should  perform  any  act 
from  benevolence  towards  God,  or  other 
beings;  and  absolutely  impossible,  by  a 
natural  necessity,  that  they  should  not.  in 
all  their  conduct,  act  from  entire  selfish- 
ness ;  it  is  demonstrable,  that  the 
which  mankind  do  and  shall  commit,  an* 
not  neee^ary  to  the  ^Inry  of  God  by  a 
natural  ncce-<ity.  For  if  it  is  absolutely 
impo>sih!e.  by  a  natural  n<-<  that 

mankind,  in  any  of  their  conduct,  should 
act  from  benevolence  towards  God  or 
other  beings,  then  they  plainly  cannot  he 
under  any  ohli^ufinn,  in  anv  of  their  eon- 
duct,  to  act  from  benevolence.  But  man- 
kind are  under  perfect  obligation,  in  all 
their  conduct,  to  act  from  he,ir\ol< 
towards  God  and  other  bein^.  For  God 
requires  them,  in  all  their  conduct,  to  act 
from  benevolence  towards  Himself  and 
other  beings.  His  law  is,  "  Thou  shalt 
love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart, 

r*»ankind  are  under  a  perfect  iiatur  .  in  all 

from  mere  -  ;ind  therefore  h<»ld  virtually,  that 

all  hoi, 

ness  ;  or  else,  that  mankind  never  exercise  any  holiness :  and 
hold  also  virtually,  that  men  aie  perfectly  excusable  ami 
fiable  in  acting  from  pure  selfishness. 

29* 


342 

and  with  all  thy  soul,  and  with  all  thy 
strength,  and  with  all  thy  mind ;  and  thy 
neighbour  as  thyself."  And  an  apostle 
assures  us,  that  "  love  is  the  fulfilling  of 
the  law."  That  this  love  is  benevolence, 
arid  not  the  love  of  character,  is  apparent 
from  our  being  required  to  exercise  it  to- 
wards all  mankind,  without  respect  to 
their  character.  As  the  character  of  most 
of  them  is  entirely  sinful,  God  cannot  have 
required  us  to  love  their  character.  The 
love  He  requires  must  be  good  will;  or 
love  to  them  as  beings  simply,  consider- 
ed abstractly  from  their  character.  That 
tin*  Ime  to  God  is  benevolence,  is  seen 
too  from  our  being  directed,  whether  we 
eat,  or  drink>  or  whatever  we  do,  to  do 
all  to  His  glory. 

But  if  mankind  are  under  perfect  obli- 
gation to  be  actuated  in  all  their  conduct 
by  benevolence  towards  God  and  other 
beings,  then  there  can  be  no  natural  im- 
possibility that  they  should  act  from  be- 
nevolence, and  no  natural  necessity  of 
their  acting  in  all  their  conduct  from  pure 
selfishness;  since  such  a  necessity  woukl 
be  inconsistent  with  that  obligation.  And 
if  there  is  no  natural  impossibility  of  their 
acting  from  benevolence  towrards  God 
and^other  beings,  in  any  case,  then  there 


can  be  no  natural  necessity  that  mankind 
should  commit  all  the  sins  which  they  dof 
and  shall  commit,  in  order  to  a  perfect 
display  of  the  divine  glory;  since,  as  we 
have  shown,  were  there  such  a  necessityt 
that  mankind  should  commit  all  those 
sins,  it  would  render  it  impossible,  by  a 
natural  necessity,  that  they  should  in  any 
case  act  from  benevolence  towards  God. 
or  other  beings.  But  il  there  is  no  natural 
necessity  that  mankind  should  commit  all 
the  sins  they  do  and  shall  commit,  in  or- 
der to  a  perfect  display  of  the  divine 
glory;  then  the  ne<  -rs>ity  of  their  sins 
does  not  arise  from  any  thing  peculiar  to 
their  nature,  but  solely  from  the  consider- 
ation, that  mankind,  in  the  circumstances 
in  which  they  are  placed,  rhoo-e  to  com- 
mit them,  in-lead  oi '  \ieldi:«g  obedience 
to  the  divine  law.  Hut  it'  all  that  render* 
their  Blflfl  m  cessary  to  a  perfect  di-play 
of  the  divine  glory  is.  that  mankind  choose 
to  commit  ttu  m,  instead  of  yielding  obe- 
dience to  the  divine  law.  then  it  follows, 
that  were  mankind  to  yield  a  perfect  obe- 
dience to  the  divine  law,  their  sins  would 
not  be  necessary  to  the  di\  ine  glory  ;  and 
if,  by  their  yielding  a  perfect  obedience, 
th^ir  sins  would  not  be  necessary  to  a 
perfect  display  of  the  divine  glory,  then 


344 

their  obedience  would  be  as  good  mate- 
rials as  their  disobedience  is,  for  a  perfect 
display  of  the  divine  glory ;  and  thence 
the  same  sum  of  glory  would  redound  to 
God  from  the  system  of  events  which 
would  then  exist,  as  results  to  Him  from 
the  system  of  events  that  now  exists. 

The  question  may  perhaps  be  asked  in 
regard  to  the  whole  of  our  reasoningin  sup- 
port of  this  proposition — If  a  perfect  obe- 
dience from  mankind  would  constitute  as 
good  materials  as  their  disobedience  does, 
for  a  perfect  display  of  the  divine  glory; 
and  if  the  same  sum  of  glory  would  re- 
dound to  God  from  the  system  of  events, 
which  would  then  exist,  as  does  from  the 
present  system — why  does  not  God  cause 
them  to  yield  Him  a  perfect  obedience? 
Why  does  he  suffer  them  to  rebel,  and  all 
that  evil  to  exist,  which  is  the  conse- 
quence of  their  rebellion  ?  If  no  more 
good  now  exists  than  would  exist,  if  man- 
kind yielded  a  perfect  obedience  to  His 
law,  would  it  not  be  much  better  to  make 
them  yield  such  an  obedience,  and  not 
permit  any  moral  or  natural  evil  to  exist 
in  our  world  ? 

To  this  we  reply,  that  our  proposition 
is,  that  were  mankind,  in  the  circumstances 


345 

in  which  they  are  actually  placed,  to  yield  a 
perfect  obedience,  then  their  obedience 
would  be  as  good  materials  as  their  dis- 
obedience is,  for  a  perfect  display  of  the 
divine  glory;  that  is,  if  they  would  yield 
that  obedience,  while  He  employs  only 
that  specific  quantity  of  means  which  He 
now  employ?,  to  induce  them  to  \  ieKI  such 
an  obedience;  and  while  an  obedience 
is  attended  with  all  ihr  difficulties  with 
which  it  is  now  attended.  Our  proposi- 
tion dues  not  affirm,  that  any  suppbsa- 
ble  obedience  whatever  from  mankind 
would  be  as  good  nriteri  U  us  their  dis- 
obedience is  for  a  perfect  display  of  the 
glory  of  God,  without  any  consideration, 
whether  or  not  lie  must  place  them  in 
different  cirriimstunres  from  -those  in 
which  they  now  exist,  in  order  to  lead 
them  to  that  obedience ;  that  i-.  whether 
or  not  He  must  use  a  much  greater  quan- 
tity of  means,  than  He  now  employs,  to 
lead  them  to  yield  that  obedience.  I  If 
r  iiinot  use  any  more  means  than  He  now 
employs  to  induce  them  to  yield  Him  a 
perfect  obedience,  without  placing  them 
in  circumstances  different  from  those  in 
which  they  now  exist.  And  since,  if  they 
are  not  disposed,  under  the  influence  of 
that  quantity  of  means  He  now  employs 


346 

to  yield  Him  obedience,  He  cannot  lead 
them  to  yield  Him  obedience  without  ern-  , 
ploying  a  larger  quantity  of  means — He 
cannot  lead  them  to  yield  Him  obedience 
without  placing  them  in  new  circumstan- 
ces. 

The  reason,  therefore,  that  although 
were  they  to  yield  Him,  in  the  circum- 
stances in  which  they  are  now  placed,  a 
perfect  obedience,  it  would  be  as  good 
materials  as  their  disobedience  is  for  a 
perfect  display  of  His  glory,  still  God 
does  not  cause  them  to  yield  a  perfect 
obedience,  is,  that  He  cannot  cause  them 
to  yield  such  an  obedience  without  plac- 
ing them  in  circumstances  different  from 
those  in  which  they  now  exist.  The  obe- 
dience, which  would  be  as  good  mate- 
rials for  a  perfect  display  of  His  glory,  as 
their  disobedience  is,  is  an  obedience 
rendered  in  the  precise  circumstances  in 
which  they  now  exist;  that  is,  an  obe- 
dience rendered  while  they  are  subjected 
to  the  precise  quantity  of  influence  of 
every  kind  to  which  they  are  now  sub- 
jected. An  obedience,  therefore,  render- 
ed in  any  other  circumstances,  were  He 
supposed  to  lead  them  to  render  it,  would 
not  he  the  obedience  which,  according 
to  the  proposition,  would  be  as  good  ma- 


847 

terials  for  a  perfect  display  of  His  ^l 
as  their  disobedience  is. 

Is  the  question  asked,  Granting  that 
God  in  order  to  lead  mankind  to  yield  a 
perfect  obedience,  must  use  a  greater 
quantity  of  means  to  lead  them  to  yield 
it,  than  He  now  employs;  and  that  by 
using  a  greater  quantity  of  means,  lie 
Would  place  ihrm  in  circumstances  dif- 
ferent from  those  in  \\lii,  h  they  now  ex- 
ist; still  if,  were  th"y  to  yield  a  periect 
obedience,  in  t!ie  cin  ?  ?efl  in  wfiich 

they  no\v  <-\i-t.  it  uo'iM  he  as  ^ood  ma- 
ils as  their  di-ohrdirnre  i^,  for  ;i  per- 
fect display  of  Jlis  glory,  why  would  not 
an  obedience  al>o.  vieltled  in  those  cir- 
cumstances in  which  Me  niu^t  place  mnn- 
kinil,  in  order  that  the)  may  be  induced 
to  yield  that  obedienc 

To  this  we  reply,  that  the  value  of  an 
obedience  from  mankind,  as  a  means  of 
diftplayiag  the  divine  glory,  depends  on 
the  degree  of  love  to  God  which  is  in- 
volved and  expressed  in  that  obedience. 
An  obedience  expressing  or  involving  the 
exercise  of  an  hundred  cl  of  love 

to  God,  is  worth  an  hundred  times  more 
than  an  obedience  involving  the  exercise 
of  only  one  degree  of  love  to  Him.  Thus 
the  obedience  of  Abram,  in  offering  his 


348 

son  Isaac,  because  it  involved  and   ex- 
pressed a  high  degree  of  love  to  God, 
was  of  much  greater  value  than  a  com- 
mon act  of  obedience.     But  the  degree 
of  love  involved  and  expressed  in  an  act 
of  obedience  depends  on  the  quantity  of 
means,  or  of  influence,  which  is  employ- 
ed to  br\>i%  that  act  into  existence.     An 
act  performed  under  only  one  degree  of 
influence  to  excite  to  its  performance,  is 
worth  an  hundred   times  as  much  as  a 
similar  act  performed  under  an  hundred 
degrees   of  influence  to  excite  to  its  per- 
formance.    Thus  a  given  overt  act  of  per- 
fect obedience  to  God  from  a  h'eathen, 
would  involve  a  much  higher  degree  of 
love   to  God,   than   a   similar    overt  act 
from  one  enjoying  the  knowledge  of  the 
gospel.      A   heathen   seeing  only  a  dim 
vision  of  the  divine  Being,  must  love  what 
lie  sa\v,  in  order  to  yield   Him  a  perfect 
obedience,  much   more  strongly   than  a 
person  enjoying  the   knowledge  of   the 
gospel  would  a  similar  exhibition  of  the 
divine  Being,  if  aH  he  saw  of  Him  was 
only  sufficient  to  lead  him  to  perform  that 
act.     Were  the  whole  heathen  world,  in 
the  circumstances  in  which  they  exist,  to 
yield  a  perfect   obedience  to  the    Most 
High,  observing  the  law  of  beaevolence 


349 

in  all  their  conduct;  that  ohedience 
would  involve  and  express  a  much  high- 
er degree  of  love  to  God,  and  much  high- 
er moral  excellence,  than  a  similar  obe- 
dience would  from  those  who  live  under 
the  reign  of  the  gospel,  if  all  the  know- 
ledge they  possess,  and  all  the  influence 
exerted  on  them  to  induce  them  to  obey, 
were  only  sufficient  to  induce  them  to 
yield  that  obedic:  <  <k.  For  it'  all  the 
knowledge  of  God,  His  will,  and  His  pur- 
poses, which  they  possess,  and  all  the  in- 
fluence exerted  on  them  to  induce  them 
to  obey,  were  only  sufficient  to  induce 
them  to  yield  that  obedience;  then  place 
them  in  circumstances,  in  which  they 
should  be  subjected  to  a  less  iniluence, 
prompting  them  to  obedience,  as  in  cir- 
cinn-tances  like  those  of  the  headien, 
and  they  would  not  \ield  obr'dioncc.  On 
the  other  hand,  place  the  heal-  en,  sup- 
posed in  their  present  circumstances  to 
yield  such  an  obedience,  under  all  the 
light  and  influence  exerted  on  the  others, 
and  which  are  barely  sufficient  to  pro- 
duce obedience  in  them;  and  tin.*  hea- 
then would  rise  to  a  more  exalted  obe- 
dience, and  display  a  higher  degree  of 
moral  excellence.  They  would  love  all 
the  divine  character,  then  revealed  to 
30 


350 

their  view,  as  intensely  as  they  did  that 
part  of  it  they  saw  before. 

As  then  the  value  of  an  act  of  obedi- 
ence, as  a  means  of  displaying  the  divine 
glory,  depends  on  the  degree  of  love  in- 
volved and  exercised  in  it,  and  the  de- 
gree of  love  depends  on  the  quantity  of 
influence  which  is  employed  to  excite  to 
its  performance ;  it  is  apparent,  that  the 
value  of  an  act  of  obedience  depends  on 
the  quantity  of  means  employed  to  excite 
to  that  act.  An  act  which  only  the  influ- 
ence of  a  given  quantity  of  means  was  re- 
quired to  excite,  is  of  greater  worth  than 
a  similar  act  which  the  influence  of  a 
greater  quantity  of  means  was  required 
to  excite. 

Were  mankind  then  to  yield  a  perfect 
obedience  under  that  share  of  influence 
now  exerted  on  them  to  excite  them  to 
obedience,  their  obedience  would  be  of 
greater  worth,  as  a  means  of  displaying 
the  divine  glory,  than  an  obedience  which 
a  more  powerful  influence  was  required  to 
excite  them  to  perform.  An  obedience  in 
their  present  circumstances  would  involve 
and  express  a  higher  degree  of  love  to  the 
Most  High,  it  being  more  spontaneous, 
than  an  obedience  which  a  larger  quan- 
tity of  influence  was  required  to  excite ; 


351 

it  would  be  a  much  more  strong  and  ex- 
pressive testimony  to  His  worthiness  of  a 
perfect  obedience  from  mankind,  and 
constitute  a  larger  tribute  of  praise  to 
lli^  character  and  His  government,  and 
therefore  be  more  glorious  to  Him. 

The  reason,  then,  that  though  an  obe- 
dience from  mankind  in   the  circumstan- 
ces in  which  they  now  e\i-t.  would  h 
good  materials  ns   tin  ir  di-<»hedi«ince  is 
for  a  perfect  display  of  the  divine  glory; 
still   an  obedience  rendered  under  that 
increased  degree  oT  influence,  which  God 
im:-t  use  to  lead  them  to  that  obedi< 
would  not  be,  is,  that   from   the 
quantity  of  influence  that  would   be  re- 
quired to  excite  that  obedience.it  \\ 

[Ve  :uid  express  a  i  ^ree  of  love 

to  God,  and  therefore  be  less  gloriou 
Him. 

These  several  arguments  then,  demon- 
strate the  truth  of  the  position,  that  did 
mankind  yield,  in  the  circumstances  in 
which  they  exist,  a  perfect  obedience  to 
the  divine  government,  their  obedience? 
would  be  as  good  material-  as  their  dis- 
obedience is,  for  a  perfect  display  of  the 
divine  glory;  and  the  same  sum  of  glory 
would  result  to  the  Most  High  from  the 
system  of  events  which  would  then  exist 


352 

as  redounds  to  Him  from  the  system  of 
events  that  now  exists.  And  if  this  be 
true  of  mankind,  it  is  likewise  true,  un- 
doubtedly, of  all  sinful  beings. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  show,  by 
deductions  from  the  truth  thus  esta- 
blished, the  erroneousness  of  the  peculiar 
views  entertained  by  those  whom  we  op- 
pose, on  the  subject  of  moral  evil.  We 
shall  also  take  the  liberty  of  directing 
the  eye  of  our  readers  from  the  point,  to 
which  we  have  conducted  them,  over 
some  other  fields  of  theological  truth,  in- 
volved, according  to  the  ordinary  exhibi- 
tions of  them,  in  some  obscurity  ;  in  the 
persuasion  that,  contemplated  in  their 
relation  to  this  subject,  they  will  be  seen 
somewhat  more  clearly.  We  shall  pre- 
sent for  consideration,  likewise,  some 
thoughts  as  conclusions  from  the  whole 
subject. 

First.  If  the  position  we  have  endea- 
voured to  demonstrate  be  true,  then  it  is 
apparent,  that  the  sins  of  mankind  are 
not  necossary  to  the  glory  of  God  by  a 
natural  necessity.  The  reason  of  their 
existing  is  not  that  they  are  from  their 
nature  necessary  to  the  glory  of  God, 
and  that  His  glory  could  not  possibly  by 
any  means  be  perfectly  displayed,  if  those 


353 

sins  were  not  to  exist:  for  we  have 
shown,  that  a  perfect  obedience  from 
mankind,  in  the  circumstances  in  which 
they  exist,  would  be  as  good  materials  as 
their  disobedience  is,  for  a  perfect  dis- 
play of  the  divine  glory.  Their  disobe- 
dience, therefore,  is  no  more  necessary 
on  account  of  its  nature  to  the  divine 
glory,  than  their  obedience  is.  And  were 
mankind  to  yield  a  perfect  obedience, 
their  disobedience  would  not  be  neces- 
sary to  the  divine  glory,  by  any  nece-M- 
ty  whatever.  The  only  ground  of  neces- 
sity, that  either  their  obedience  or  diso- 
bedience should  exist, in  order  to  adisplay 
of  the  divine  glory,  is,  that  materials  are 
necessary  to  a  display  of  that  glory.  And 
since  their  obedience  would  be  as  £ood 
materials  as  their  disobedience  is,  for  a 
perfect  display  of  that  glory,  no  necessi- 
ty arises  out  of  the  nature  of  either  of 
them,  that  that  should  exi<t  instead  of:  he 
other,  in  order  that  that  display  might  be 
made.  And  si.  (-••  o  '  oi  them  is,  m  far 
as  it  respects  its  natin  '''ri- 

als ns  the  other,  for  (hat  displ  .  \.  :!»r-n  if 
either  of  them  eiitted  there  u. :?.!(!  then 
exiM  all  the  materials  uhich  are  IK- 
sary  to  a*  perfect  dispL  y  of  the  divine 
glorv ;  and  there  would  be  no  necessity 
30* 


354 

that  the  other  should  exist  in  order  to  that 
display.  If,  therefore,  mankind  were  to 
yield  a  perfect  obedience  to  God,  their 
disobedience  would  riot  then,  by  any  ne- 
cessity whatever,  be  necessary  to  a  per- 
fect display  of  His  glory. 

The  sins  of  mankind,  therefore,  exist, 
not  because  from  their  nature  they  are 
indispensable  to  a  perfect  display  of 
the  divine  glory ;  but  simply,  because 
mankind,  in  the  circumstances  in  which 
they  exist,  choose  to  commit  them,  in- 
stead of  yielding  a  perfect  obedience  to 
the  divine  government.  That  is,  they 
exist  only  by  a  mora/,  not  a  natural  ne- 
cessity. And  the  only  reason  that  God 
permits  them  to  come  into  existence  as 
they  do  is,  that  He  cannot  lead  mankind 
to  yield  a  perfect  obedience,  without  em- 
ploying such  a  quantity  of  means  as  is 
inconsistent  with  a  perfect  display  of  His 
glory. 

Sin  is  of  no  more  value  to  the  extent  to 
which  it  exists,  nor  to  any  extent,  than 
holiness  as  a  means  of  displaying  the  di- 
vine glory.  It  is  no  more  necessary,  that 
mankind  should  commit  the  sins  they  do, 
nor  that  they  should  commit  any  sins, 
that  the  glory  of  God  may  be  perfectly 
displayed,  than  it  is,  that  they  should  sin 


355 

in  all  the  instances  in  which  they  yield 
obedience,  that  His  glory  may  be  dis- 
played. All  that  can  be  said  in  favour 
of  it  is,  that  existing  to  the  extent,  and  in 
the  circumstances  in  which  it  does  in  our 
world,  the  evils  naturally  resulting  from 
it,  are  not  irremediable;  God  is  able  to 
and  does  overrule  it,  in  such  a  manner, 
that  on  the  whole  the  same  sum  of  glory 
re-nits  to  Him  from  the  system  of  events 
that  now  eiiaUh  as  would  result  to  Him 
WITO  mankind  to  yield  Him  a  perfect 
obedience. 

If  then,  the  sins  of  mankind  are  not  ne- 
cessary to  the  glory  of  God,  mankind  are 
not  under  any  obligation  to  rejoiee  in 
their  e\i  As  neither  the  glory  of 

God  is  displayed,  nor  the  L:ood  of  His 
kingdom  promoted  to  an\  greatrr  extent, 
than  they  would  be.  were  none  of  those 
sins  committed  ;  no  ground  of  rejoicing 
that  they  are  committed  exists. 

And  godly  sorrow  for  sin,  therefore, 
does  not  exclude  sorrow  for  the  existence 
of  sin,  but  actually  includes  it.  For  god- 
ly sorrow  for  sin  must  bo,  either  sorrow 
for  the  existence  of  sin  in  general,  or  sor- 
row for  the  existence  of  our  own  sins,  or 
sorrow  for  sin,  in  itself  considered,  or  sor- 
row for  the  motives  from  which  sinful  acts 


356 

are  committed,  or  part  or  all  of  them  uni- 
ted. But  sorrow  for  sin  in  any  of  those 
respects  would,  as  we  have  shown,  in- 
clude sorrow  for  the  existence  of  sin. 
And  since  godly  sorrow  for  sin  necessa- 
rily includes  sorrow  for  its  existence, 
mankind  are  under  all  the  obligation  to 
exercise  sorrow  for  the  existence  of  sin, 
that  they  are  to  exercise  godly  sorrow 
for  sin.  The  obligation  of  mankind  to  sor- 
row that  they  have  committed  the  sins 
which  they  have  committed,  is  as  great 
as  their  obligation  was  not  to  have  com- 
mitted those  sins.  For  whatever  consti- 
tutes a  ground  of  obligation  not  to  have 
committed  those  sins,  constitutes  a  rea- 
son for  sorrow  that  they  have  committed 
them. 

The  fact  that  God  institutes  such  a 
system  of  measures  in  regard  to  their 
sins,  that  He  secures  as  large  a  display 
of  His  glory  as  would  exist,  were  man- 
kind perfectly  obedient,  no  more  annihi- 
lates, nor  diminishes  their  obligation  most 
deeply  to  lament  that  they  have  commit- 
ted those  sins,  than  it  does  their  obliga- 
tion not  to  have  committed  them. 

They  cannot,  indeed,  if  they  have  a 
proper  sense  of  their  obligations,  avoid 
feeling  a  lively  sorrow,  that  they  have 


357 

violated  them.  As  a  proper  sense  of 
their  obligations  will  awaken  an  ardent 
desire  to  comply  with  them,  so  it  will  ex- 
cite an  ardent  wish  that  they  always  had 
complied  with  them,  and  therefore  a  live- 
ly sorrow  for  the  violation  of  them.  And 
as  mankind  are  bound  to  feel  a  proper 
sense  of  their  obligation  to  yield  a  period 
obedience  to  the  Most  Hi^h.  they  are 
therefore  ccjnnlh  hound  to  lament  deeply 
that  they  have  not  yielded  ih;  I  obedi- 
c  nee.  Thus  the  |M'-ifinn  of  those  whom 
we  oppose,  respecting  the  ncccs-ii- 
sin,  is  shown  to  bo  en'moous;  HIM! 
the  several  they  deduce  from 

it,  respecting  the  feelings  \\ith  which  mo- 
ral evil  should  be  contemplated  by  iii''n. 
Secondly.     If  a  perfect  obedience  from 
kind,  in   the  circum-i 

*  ould  be  as  good  material-  for 
n   perfect  dUplay  of  the  glory  of  Go.1 
their  disob*  is;   and  if,   therefore, 

sin  is  not  n<  v   to  His  glory  by  a  na- 

tural  itv.  then  mankind  are  not. 

those  teaeh  \\houi  we  oppose,  under  obli- 
gation to  be  willing  to  be  everlastin^lv 
the  enemies  of  (i<>-l.  in  order  that  Hi- 
glory  may  be  pnn-oiod.  A>  all  the  sins 
they  \\ould  couj:>,it.  were  they  to  be  for 
ever  the  enemies  of  God,  are  not  at  all 


358 

necessary  to  His  glory,  and  would  not 
promote  it  to  any  greater  degree  than  a 
pr.-foct  obedience  from  them  would,  no 
ground  exists  for  desiring  that  those  sins 
should   be  committed,  in  order  that  the 
glory    of  God    may    be    promote  I,    and 
therefore  no  motive  for  being  willing  to 
be  enemies  to  God  for  ever  for  that  pur- 
pose.    And  as  there  is  no  reason  or  mo- 
tive whatever  for  being  willing  to  be  ene- 
mies to  God  for  ever  to  promote  His  glo- 
ry, mankind  are  not  under  obligation  to 
be  willing  to  be  His  enemies  for  ever  to 
promote  His  glory.     They  are  no  more 
under  obligation  to  be  willing  to  be  His 
enemies  to  promote  His  glory,  than  they 
are  to  be   willing  to  be  any  thing  else 
which  is  not  at  all  necessary  to  promote 
His  glory.    But,  on  the  contrary,  they  are 
under  the  highest  obligation  not  to  be  wil- 
ling to  be  His  enemies  for  ever.     They 
are  under  all  the  obligation  not  to  be  wil- 
ling to  be  His  enemies,  that  they  are  to  be 
willing  to  be  His  friends.     They  are  un- 
der all  the  obligation  not  to  be  willing  to 
commit  all  the  sins  they  would  commit 
should  they  be  His  enemies  for  ever,  that 
they  are  to  be  willing  to  exercise  all  the 
holiness  they  would  exercise  should  they 
yield  Him  a  perfect  obedience  for  ever. 


339 

As  they  are  under  the  highest  obligation 
never  to  sin  against  Him,  so  they  are  un- 
der the  highest  obligation  never  to  be 
willing  to  sin  against,  but  ever  to  choose 
to  yield  Him  a  complete  obedience.  For 
not  being  willing  to  be  His  enemies,  and 
to  sin  against  Him,  and  being  willing  to 
be  His  friends,  and  ever  to  yield  Him  a 
perfect  obedience,  are  precisely  the  same 
tiling. 

Those,  therefore,  whom  we  oppose,  err 
in  teaching,  that  unconditional  submis- 
sion to  God  includes  a  willingness  to  be 
1 1  is  enemies,  and  the  objects  of  His  wrath 
for  ever,  to  promote  His  glory.  For  since 
mankind  are  under  the  highest  obligation 
not  to  exercise  a  willingness  to  be  the 
enemies  of  God  for  ever,  to  ex<  rabc  such 
\viHiniM;r  —  i-  rebellion  against  Him.  in- 
stead of  submission  to  Ili>  \\ill.  And  they 
err  also  in  making  a  willingness  to  be  His 
rnrmies  for  ever,  lor  the  promotion  of  His 
glory,  a  test  of  piety ;  since  the  exercise 
of  such  a  willingness  is  the  most  unmixed 
rebellion  against  Him,  instead  of  obedi- 
ence. And  therefore  all  the  conclusions 
respecting  Christian  character,  which 
have  been  formed  by  making  that  willing- 
ness a  test  of  piety,  have  been  false  con- 
clusions; and  all  the  hopes  of  heaven, 


360 

which  have  been  built  on  the  exercise  of 
that  willingness  as  an  evidence  of  piety, 
have  been  false  hopes. 

Thirdly.  The  atonement  was  made  for 
all  mankind.  It  constituted  a  provision 
for  the  pardon  of  ail  of  them,  if  they  would 
accept  it.  It  was  made  for  them  as  mo- 
ral agents;  and  removed  every  obstacle 
out  of  the  way  except  the  enmity  of  their 
hearts,  and  left  nothing  to  do  to  gain  sal- 
vation, but  to  change  their  conduct  from 
rebellion  to  obedience,  by  complying  with 
the  Gospel.  In  proof  of  this  it  rn^iy  be 
observed,  that  salvation  through  the 
atonement  is  offered  to  all  mankind,  and 
all  arc  required  to  accept  it;  and,  as  we 
have  shown,  were  all  to  comply  with  that 
requisition,  it  would  be  perfectly  consist- 
ent with  the  highest  glory  of  God.  But 
the  compliance  of  all  with  the  Gospel, 
would  not  be  consistent  with  His  glory, 
unless  the  atonement  was  made  for  all. 
For  God  has  promised  to  save  all  who 
yield  obedience  to  the  Gospel ;  and  were 
all  mankind  to  yield  UK  obedience  re- 
quired, He  would  be  u:uJer  obligation, 
from  His  promise,  to  confer  the  blessings 
of  salvation  on  them  all.  Were  the  atone- 
ment then  made  for  only  a  part  of  man- 
kind, He  would  be  necessitated  to  save 


361 

the  rest,  did  they  obey  the  Gospel  as  they 
are  required  and  bound  to  do,  without  an 
atonement.  But  that  would  not  be  con- 
sistent with  His  glory,  but  would  spread 
clouds  of  impenetrable  darkness  over  the 
whole  glory  of  the  work  of  redemption, 
and  destroy,  in  the  view  of  His  creatures, 
the  proofs  of  the  perfection  of  His  moral 
character.  For.  I  st.  in  -a\  iiiir  a  part  of  man- 
kind without  an  atonement  lor  their  sins, 
He  would  virtually  declare  that  no  atone- 
ment was  nece.^ary  for  the  salvation  of 
the  others,  and  exhibit  Him-clf  as  having 
acted  unwisely  iri  providing  an  atonement 
for  them.  If  the  sins  of  a  part  of  mankind 
could  be  forgiven  without  expiation, 
where  could  he  the  necessity  of  an  expi- 
ation for  those  of  the  other  pr.rt?  If  He 
could  open  the  <;atcs  of  heaven  to  a  part 
of  our  race  without  a  Mediator,  why  not 
to  the  re 

2dly.  Were  He  to  grant  salvation 
lo  any  without  an  atonement  for  their  sins, 
He  would  violate  the  pledge  given  to  this 
and  other  worlds,  in  the  penalty  of  the 
law.  that  sin  should  not  escape  the  ex- 
pression of  His  displeasure.  In  annexing 
the  penalty  to  the  law,  He  expressed  the 
purpose,  were  it  violated,  of  vindicating 
His  rights,  and  maintaining  the  honour  oi* 
His  government.  But  where  would  be 
31 


362 

the  execution  of  that  threatening,  if  part 
of  mankind  were  saved  without  an  atone- 
ment ?  Would  such  an  omission  of  it,  and 
such  a  disregard  to  the  claims  of  justice, 
be  consistent  with  His  glory  ?  Would  it 
not  occasion  the  rest  of  the  universe  to 
ask,  Where,  in  respect  to  those  of  man- 
kind whose  sins  are  thus  left  unexpiated 
and  unpunished,  are  the  proofs  that  the 
moral  Governor  regards  rebellion  as  such 
an  infringement  of  His  rights  as  His  law 
exhibits  it ;  or  that  it  is  necessarily  incom- 
patible with  the  happiness  of  creatures; 
or  that  the  penalty  shall  be  executed  on 
those  who  may  in  future  choose  to  trans- 
gress ? 

3dly.  In  saving  any  with  their  guilt 
unexpiated,  He  would  pronounce  a  sen- 
tence of  justification  on  their  guilt.  No 
atonement  having  been  made  for  them, 
He  could  not  save  them  from  respect  to 
any  thing  out  of  themselves  ;  and,  regard- 
ing their  character  solely,  to  accept  them 
as  meet  for  the  heavenly  inheritance, 
would  be  to  pronounce  on  them  a  sen- 
tence of  entire  approbation.  But  would 
it  be  consistent  with  His  glory  so  to  jus- 
tify rebellion,  and  declare  it  to  be  worthy 
of  such  a  reward  ?  or  thus  to  abandon 
His  law,  and  pronounce  the  institution  of 
it  unwise?  or,  by  exhibiting  such  a  pros- 


363 

perl  not  only  of  impunity  but  of  approba- 
tion ai  !  r  'svarJ,  to  present  to  the  rest  of* 
the  uiii\  ment  to  rebellion  ? 

I'ii'v.      In   Caving  them  for  accepting 
Christ  Ji  -i:s  as  their  atoning  sacrifice,  in 
obedience  to  the  requisition  of  the  Gos- 
pel, He  would  act  precisely  as  though  He 
saved  them  out  of  respect  to  the  atone- 
ment of  Christ  :    ;,:<  !  thereby  virtually  de- 
clare,  f  was 
made  for  them  as  well  as  tl 
kind.     But  if  the  atoir 
no  relation  whatever  to  them,  wuuld  it  be 
consistent  \\ith  His  glory  to  save  ti 
from  respect  t<,                            t.  or  to  de- 
clare that  He  did  ?   \Vouid  ii.  ' 
for  accepting  a                          ;•  -ovided  for 
prafi  not  provided  for  them? 

"Is  to  accept  ofChr 
atonement  ,  lor  th< 

,'iy  on  the  ^rrinid  of  ttieir 
acceptance,  grant  them  u  an  i-.ihcritanco 
among  them  that  are  sanctified  ?"' 

It  would  not  then  be  consistent  with 

the  glory  of  God   to  save    all   mankind, 

they  to  yield  a  perfect  obedience  to 

the  Gospel,  unless  the  atonement  of  Christ 

was   made   for  all.      Hut  we  have*  proved 

it  to  be  consistent  with  His  glory  (<» 

all,  should  they  actually  comply  with  the 

pel.     Our  proof  of  that  truth,  tiirre- 


364 

lore,  involves  proof  that  the  atonement 
was  made  for  all. 

Fourthly.  Since  it  is  an  obedience  from 
mankind,  in  the  identical  circumstances 
in  which  they  exist,  that  would  be  per- 
fectly glorious  to  God,  and  not  an  obe- 
dience in  other  circumstances,  it  is  appa- 
rent that  no  objection  can  be  made  to  his 
bettevoleuce,  because  he  does  not  cause 
them  to  yield  him  a  perfect  obedience. 
As  mankind  are  not  disposed  to  yield  him 
a  perfect  obedience,  in  the  circumstances 
in  which  they  now  exist,  He  cannot  cause 
them  to  yield  Him  a  perfect  obedience 
without  employing  a  more  powerful  iri- 
iluence,  exciting  them  to  obedience,  and 
thereby  placing  them  in  different  circum- 
stance?. But  an  obedience,  which  such 
an  increased  ii}fh»oncc  was  required  to 
excite,  would  not,  as  has  been  shown,  be 
as  good  materials  for  a  display  of  His 
glory,  as  an  obedience  rendered  under 
only  that  degree  of  influence  which  is  now 
exerted  on  them.  It  would  not  express 
so  much  love  to  him,  nor  be  so  high  a  tes- 
timony to  the  rectitude  of  his  authority, 
and  the  reasonableness  of  his  laws,  and  to 
His  worthiness  of  such  a  service  from  man- 
kind. Nor,  since  it  would  not  be  as  good 
materials  for  the  display  of  His  glory,  as 
an  obedience  in  their  present  circum- 


365 

stances,  would  it  be  as  good  materials  as 
their  present  disobedience  is  for  that  end. 
It  would  not  be  consistent  with  His  glory, 
therefore,  to  exert  on  them  an  influence 
causing  them  to  yield  Him  a  perfect  obe- 
dience, nor  any  greater  influence  of  that 
kind  than  that  to  which  they  are  now 
subjected  ;  for  it  would  prevent  a  per- 
fect display  of  His  glory.  The  system  of 
events  which  would  then  exi-t  would  not 
be  as  good  materials  foradUplav  of  His 
glory  aa  cither  the  system  \\hich  now 
is,  or  that  Astern  which  would  exist, 
were  mankind,  in  their  present  circum- 
btances  to  yield  a  perfect  obedience  to 
His  will. 

And  as  it  would  be  inconsistent  with 
'l's  glory*  so  >t  would  be  with  His  h< 
volence,  to  exert  on  mankind  such  an  iri- 
tlueiu  r.  t  anting  them  t<>  \  ieK!  i  lim  B  per- 
fect obedience.  Perfect  benevolence 
will  k'ad  Him  to  (hat  course  «>f  adminis- 
tration which  shall  secun  .ret  dis- 
play of  His  ijory.  For  He  displays  His 
glory  by  doing  good,  or  promoting  happi- 
ness; and  promoting  happiness  is  exer- 
cising benevolence.  The  display  of  His 
glory  and  the  exercise  of  His  benevolence 
are  precisely  commensurate;  and  that 
course  of  administration  therefore,  which 
secures  a  perfect  display  of  His  glory, 


366 

will  involve  the  exercise  of  perfect  bene- 
volence. As  then,  to  exert  on  mankind 
an  influence  causing  them  to  yield  a  per- 
fect obedience,  would  be  inconsistent  with 
a  perfect  display  of  His  glory,  so  it  would 
be  equally  inconsistent  with  the  exercise 
of  perfect  benevolence.  Benevolence 
forbids,  instead  of  requiring  that  He 
should  exert  such  an  influence  on  them. 

God  has  thus  made  all  the  provision  for 
the  perfect  obedience  of  cpankind,  which 
perfect  benevolence  required  Him  to 
make.  He  exerts  on  them  all  the  in- 
fluence exciting* them  to  holiness,  which 
it  is  consistent  with  benevolence  to  exert. 
No  objection,  therefore,  against  His  per- 
fect benevolence  can  be  made  from  His 
not  causing  men  to  yield  Him  a  perfect 
obedience,  by  exerting  on  them  a  more 
powerful  influence.  He  has  raised  all 
the  barriers  against  the  introduction  of 
e*in  into  the  world  which  benevolence 
could  rear. 

It  may  perhaps  be  still  objected  that, 
granting  that  as  mankind  are,  existing  in 
the  circumstances  in  which  they  do  exist, 
it  is  inconsistent  with  perfect  benevolence 
for  God  to  exert  on  them  any  greater  in- 
fluence than  He  now  exerts  on  them,  ex- 
citing them  to  obedience;  yet  may  it  not 
have  been  inconsistent  with  perfect  bene- 


367 

volence  to  have  placed  them  in  circum- 
stances in  which  it  would  be  incompati- 
ble with  benevolence  to  exert  on  them 
an  influence  that  should  cause  them  to 
yield  a  perfect  obedience? 

To  this  we  reply — If  (led  conducts  to- 
wards mankind  with  perfect  benevolence, 
in  the  circumstances  in  which  they  now 
exist,  we  are  bounl  to  draw  the  conclu- 
sion, that  K  1  with  perfect  benevo- 
lenee  al-o  in  placing  them  in  tlm^e  cir- 
cum-ta,  !f  we  see  nothing  in  his 
conduct  which  is  not  perfectly  hen- 
lent,  we  have  no  ground  to  infer  that  any 
of  His  conduct  i^  not  peiv-ctlv  do.  If  all 

that  we  understand  of  His  administration 

rfectly  benevolent,  we  arc  hound  to 
conclude,  that  all  that  \\ith  which  we  are 
not  entirely  acquainted  i-  also  prrfrctly 
l)ene\olent.  \'.  inkiml  indeed  the 

Only  ord'T  of   h  IQ    the  uni\<-iM  .  \\e 

are  unahle  to  decide  that  benevolence 
would  not  demand  their  bein^  placed  in 
precisely  the  circum-tanee>  in  \\  Inch  they 
are  placed.  The  rijrht  belongs  to  the 
Most  Hi^h.  as  their  Creator  ;,nd  Moral 
(iosernor.  of  placing  them  in  circumstan- 
ces of  trial,  that  it  may  be  seen  by  expe- 
riment whether  they  love  Him  as  they 
ou^lit,  and  will  choose  Him  above  every 
thing  else.  And  there  is  a  necessity  of 


368 

His  exercising  that  right,  since  there 
would  be  an  impropriety  in  His  bestow- 
ing on  them  the  gift  of  His  everlasting 
favour  before  they  had  given  any  proof 
that  they  would  yield  Him  their  everlast- 
ing love.  And  who  can  say  that  a  fair 
and  decisive  trial  of  their  character  could 
be  made  without  placing  them  in  circum- 
stances like  those  in  which  they  are  plac- 
ed. In  order  that  they  should  be  deci- 
sively tested,  would  it  not  be  necessary 
that  God  should  withdraw  from  them  all 
the  assisting  influences  of  His  Spirit,  and 
leave  them  under  all  the  influence  which 
the  devil  and  the  world  could  exert  in 
them,  to  make  their  choice  between  Him 
and  His  works,  of  their  portion?  Could 
it  be  shown,  that  they  would  love  Him 
with  all  their  hearts  in  all  circumstances, 
and  were  therefore  worthy  to  be  crowned 
with  the  high  rewards  of  His  kingdom, 
unless  they  had  shown  that  they  would, 
by  actually  loving  Him  with  all  their 
hearts,  when  subjected  to  the  most  pow- 
erful temptation  that  could  be  presented 
to  them. 

But  if,  were  mankind  the  only  order  of 
beings  in  the  universe,  benevolence  would 
not  require  that  they  should  be  placed  in 
circumstances  of  trial  like  those  in  which 
they  are  now  placed ;  yet,  as  there  are 
undoubtedly  innumerable  other  orders, 


309 

each  of  which  is  probably  placed  in  cir- 
cumstances peculiar  to  itself,  who  can 
find  it  difficult  to  believe  that  benevo- 
lence should  require  mankind  to  be 
placed  in  those  peculiar  circuipstan<  *  s 
in  v.  Inrh  t!  -t. 

Fifthlj.  If  our  proposition  be  true,  th'-n 
it  mil  be  secii  at  the  day  of  judgment, 

:1    ll'i*    ?:'  or.ll 

and 

.  and  the  bi 

1  of  all  iM-ii.kiui!.  ha\r  always  ! 
;  t  with  c,  l-'or 

the  course  whi«  i      in  ,/,!   the  <  IK 

in  \N  iiicii  lhc\    h -i\c  bee. i    pl.-.rrJ,   He 
iiicd  them  to  pur-'u  .  \»'onld.  hud  they 

io  [Mir-  ;  ueto'l  them 

all    io   perfect   and    eternal    ' 
and  at  tl  ae  been  perfect  U 

riou-   to  Him.     The   f.  im  of  j; lory 

Mou!d  1,  '    t  )  1  !i:  Milts 

from  the  prrsmt  .-v.-l.-m  of  events;  and 
they.  in?teivl  of  liein^.  without  exception, 
the  victims  of  misery  in  this  world,  and 
perishing  for  ever  in  iimnin<T;tI>ie  multi- 
tudes, would  all  have  been  crowned  with 
perfect  and  e\  (  i  I,;-lini(  safety  and  happi- 

As  He  required  them  to  be  actuated 
by  perfect  benevolence  to  Him  and  all 
other  beings,  so  lie  will  be  seen  to  have 


370 

been  actuated  by  it  towards  them  in  all 
the  measures  of  His  moral  and  providen- 
tial government. 

He  will  be  seen  to  have  made  as  ample 
provision  in  all  those  measures,  for  their 
happiness,  in  proportion  to  its  value,  as 
He  did  foi'His  own  and  the  happiness  of 
His  kingdom.  Such  provision  indeed  He 
must  have  made,  if  actuated  towards  them 
by  benevolence. 

Benevolence  must  have  led  H:»n  to 
place  precisely  that  value  on  their  per- 
fect happiness  which  really  belongs  to 
it;  and  that  is  precisely  the  value  which 
belongs  to  the  same  sum  of  happiness, 
enjoyed  by  any  being  or  beings.  It  must 
have  led  Him,  therefore,  to  consult  their 
happiness  as  much,  according  to  its  value, 
as  His  ovn  and  the  happiness  of  other 
beings,  and  to  make  as  good  provision 
for  it.  Their  perfect  happiness  is  as  de- 
sirable, according  to  the  quantity  of  it,  as 
is  the  perfect  happiness  of  any  being  or 
beings.  It  would  have  been  inconsistent 
with  benevolence  to  have  made  no  pro- 
vision for  their  perfect  happiness,  but  to 
have  placed  them  in  circumstances  in 
which  they  were  subjected  by  a  natural 
necessity  to  perfect  and  eternal  misery; 
for  that  would  have  been  placing  a  less 
value  on  their  happinees  than  belongs  to 


371 

it,  and  than  was  placed  on  an  equal  por- 
tion of  the  happiness  of  other  beings. 

Benevolence  also  must  have  led  Him 
to  place  precisely  that  value  on  His  own 
perfect  happiness,  and  on  that  of  all  other 
beings,  which  belongs  to  it;  and  to  have 
consulted  His  own  happiness  and  that  of 
His  kingdom,  in  proportion  to  their  value, 
as  much  as  lie  did  the  perfect  happiness 
of  mankind. 

And  lie  did  thus  consult  His  own  and 
the  happiness  of  His  kingdom,  and  the 
happiness  of  mankind.  each  according  to 
their  value,  by  requiring  mankind  to  pur- 
sue a  course  of  conduct,  which  if  pur- 
sued would  have  secured  the  perfect 
happiness  both  of  God  and  His  kingdom, 
and  of  themselves.  And  in  doin^  that. 
lie  made  all  the  proviso?!  it  belonged  to 
Hiia  to  make  for  the  perfect  happiness  of 
mankind. 

\Ve  sec  then,  that  all   the  object! 
made  by  men  against  the  divine  benevo- 
lence, on  the  ground   that  they  are  not 
perfectly  happy,  are  entirely  ground!' 
For  if  He  has  given  to  their  interest*  all 
the  attention  to  which,  compared  with  His 
own  and  the  interests  of  all  other  beings, 
they  are  entitled,  if  He  has  made  all  the 
provision    for    their    perfect    happiness 
which  it  belonged    to    perfect    benevo- 


372 

lence  to  make,  then  their  not  being  per- 
fectly happy  is  no  ground  for  the  conclu- 
sion, that  He  is  not  perfectly  benevolent. 
If  He  has  consulted  their  highest  good, 
as  much  in  proportion  to  its  value  as  He 
has  His  own,  they  have  no  ground,  if  they 
are  not  perfectly  happy,  to  complain  that 
He  has  wantonly  and  unjustly  sacrificed 
their  happiness  to  promote  His  own  glo- 
ry. If  He  has  placed  their  perfect  hap- 
piness within  their  attainment,  and  placed 
them  under  the  obligation  and  under  the 
influence  of  powerful  motives  to  accept 
it;  and  if  the  only  reason  that  they  do 
not  possess  it  is,  that  they  voluntarily  re- 
ject it,  they  surely  have  no  reason  to  as- 
cribe their  unhappiness  to  a  want  of  be- 
nevolence in  Him.  Benevolence  cer- 
tainly is  not  obliged  to  force  beings  to  be 
happy.  It  is  enough  for  it  to  make  suit- 
able provision  for  their  happiness,  and 
cause  their  attainment  of  it  to  depend  on 
their  complying  with  their  obligations. 

Sixthly:  We  see  from  the  truth  which 
we  have  established,  that  all  mankind,  if 
they  will  yield  obedience  to  the  gospel, 
may  be  saved,  notwithstanding  God  has 
elected  only  a  part  of  them  to  be  the  heirs 
of  salvation. 

For  since,  were  they  to  yield  a  perfect 
obedience,  that  obedience  would  be  as 
good  materials  as  their  disobedience  is, 


373 

for  a  perfect  display  of  God's  glory,  it  is 
perfectly  consistent  with  His  glory  that 
they  should  all  accept  salvation,  and  be- 
come partakers  of  its  blessings.  He  will 
not  be  glorified  any  more  in  consequence 
of  the  sins  which  they  shall  commit,  and 
by  which  they  shall  perish,  than  He  would 
be  by  their  yielding  a  perfect  obedience 
to  the  gospel,  and  partaking  of  its  salva- 
tion. 

And  his  having  elected  only  a  part  of 
mankind  to  salvation,  does  not  throw  any 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  other's  being 
saved.  His  purpose  of  election  is  sim- 
ply the  purpose  of  bestowing  on  a  cer- 
tain portion  of  mankind,  besides  the  other 
mrans  of  grace,  the  renewing  influences 
of  His  spirit,  by  which  they  shall  be  led 
to  comply  with  the  offers  of  the  gospel. 
It  is  not  a  purpose,  that  the  others  shall 
not  without  those  influences  accept  sal- 
vation; nor  that  if  they  do,  they  shall  not 
be  saved.  Nor  did  God  form  the  pur- 
pose of  applying  the  atonement  of  Christ 
to  only  a  part  of  mankind  by  the  renew- 
ing influences  of  the  Spirit,  because  it 
was  inconsistent  with  His  glory,  that  the 
rest  should  be  saved,  if  they  would  ac- 
cept salvation  without  the  Spirit's  influ- 
ences ;  but  simply  because  it  was  incon- 
sistent with  His  glory  to  bestow  those  in- 
32 


374 

fluences  on  any  more  of  mankind.     Were 
all  the  impenitent,  therefore,  immediately 
to  reform  and  comply  with   the  gospel, 
God   would    be   perfectly    glorified,  and 
they  would  all  be  saved,  His  purpose  of 
election   notwithstanding;  for  it   is   per- 
fectly consistent  with  His  purpose  of  elec- 
tion, that  all  mankind  should  comply  with 
the  gospel    and   be   saved,  if  they   will, 
\vithout  the  influence  of  the  Spirit.     The 
door  of  the  divine   kingdom   is   entirely 
open  to  the  access  of  all  who  are  not  the 
objects  of  His  electing  grace,  if  they  are 
disposed  to  enter  it.     JNo  obstacle  exists 
on  the  part  of  the  divine  glory,  nor  of  the 
divine  will,  but  only  in  their  choice.     All 
objections,  therefore,  to  the  doctrine  of 
election,  as  though  it  were  an  obstacle  to 
the  salvation  of  those  who  are  not  the  ob- 
jects of  election;    or  as   though   it  pre- 
sented discouragements  to  all  efforts  on 
their  part  to  obtain  salvation,  are  entire- 
ly groundless.     Since  it  is  not  at  all  God's 
purpose  of  election  that  forms  the  ground 
of  certainty,  that  they  shall   not  obtain 
salvation,  but  wholly  their  choice  to  re- 
ject salvation,  that  constitutes  that  ground 
of  certainty.     God's   purpose  respecting 
the  elect  has  no  influence  whatever  on 
the  non-elect.      They  stand  on  precisely 
the  same  ground  respecting  the  possibl- 


lily  of  their  gaining  salvation,  and  the 
ground  of  certainty,  that  they  will  not 
gain  it,  on  which  they  would  stand,  if  no 
such  purpose  existed. 

Seventhly.  We  see  from  the  truth  of 
our  proposition,  that  God  does  not  create 
the  sinful  volitions  of  mankind.  If  God 

•  ted  the  sinful  volitions  of  mankind, 
then  the  reason  of  their  <  instead 

of  holy  volitions,  would  not  lie  at  all  in 
mankind  themselves,  a-  mankind  them- 
selves would  not  be  in  any  the 
cause  of  the  exi-ience  of  their  volitions; 
of  course  they  would  not  be  the  e 
their  nature.  As  their  volition-  would 
owe  their  existence  solely  to  God,  so  they 
would  of  course  he  indebted  to  Him 
solely  for  their  Ho  would  he  the 
soli-  author  of  them  :  and  ue  ^Imuld  look 
to  Him  alone  for  tin-  i,  that  they 
were  sinful.  in-tead  of  holy  volition- 

But  if  God  created  all  the  volitions  oi 
mankind,  since,  as  we  have  -liown.  the 

fence  otVm  is  not  at  all  necessary  to 
the  perfect  display  of  His  glory,  He  would 
never  create  any  hut  holy  volitions :  for 
no  possible  reason  could  c\i-t  lor  Hi- 
ever  creating  sinful  volitions.  If  He 

ted  all  the  volitions  of  mankind,  then 
the  reason  of  His  creating  one  kind,  in- 
stead of  the  other,  must  lie  wholly  in  the 


376 

nature  of  those  volitions.  No  reason  for 
creating  one  kind  instead  of  the  other, 
could  be  found  in  the  means  necessary  to 
give  them  existence ;  since  precisely  the 
same  means,  His  own  omnipotent  voli- 
tion, and  that  alone,  would  be  necessary 
in  each  case ;  and  therefore  the  reason 
for  creating  one  kind,  instead  of  the  other, 
must  arise  wholly  from  the  nature  of  the 
volitions  themselves.  And  if  any  thing 
in  the  nature  of  one  class  constituted  a 
reason  for  creating  that  class  instead  of 
the  other,  it  must  be  either  a  superior 
adaptation  to  promote  His  glory;  or  if 
they  were  equal  in  that  respect,  an  in- 
trinsic excellence  of  that  class  above  the 
other.  But  God  could  never  create  the 
sinful  volitions  of  mankind,  because  they 
are  better  adapted  than  holy  volitions,  as 
materials  for  displaying  His  glory ;  for 
as  we  have  shown  they  are  not.  No 
higher  sum  of  glory  can  result  to  Him 
from  the  existence  of  the  sinful  volitions, 
than  would  result  to  Him  from  the  exis- 
tence of  holy  volitions  in  their  place.  If 
then  He  were  to  create  one  kind  of  voli- 
tions in  preference  to  the  other,  it  must 
be  on  the  ground  of  its  possessing  a  su- 
perior intrinsic  excellence.  But  God 
could  never  create  sinful  volitions  in  pre- 
inrence  to  holy  ones,  on  the  ground  of 


377 

their  possessing  the  greatest  intrinsic  ex 
cellence,  since  they  do  not  possess  any 
intrinsic  excellence  at  all,  but  are  intrin- 
sically vile  and  odious,  and  the  object  of 
His  supreme  hatred.  But  holy  volitions 
are  intrinsically  excellent,  and  the  objects 
of  His  entire  love.  Since  then,  if  God 
created  the  volitions  of  mankind,  He 
could  never  create  one  kind  iu  prefer- 
ence to  another,  except  il  ue;e  on  the 
ground  of  their  superior  inti,  •  \cel- 
lence;  and  since  He  could  never  on  that 
ground  create  any  except  holy  voliti- 
we  have  an  infallible  certainty  that  lie 
does  not  create  the  sinful  volition 
mankind. 

The  theory,  therefore,  of  Doctor  Km- 
m<m-  re-pccfm^  Cud'-  agency  on  man- 
kind, by  uhich  he  represents  the  Most 
Uiii'li  as  creating  all  their  actions,  holy 
and  >inful,  is,  at  least  as  1-ir  afritl 
their  sinful  actions,  entin-lv  « 

AVu/«//i/y.  And  since  God  doe-  not  cre- 
ate any  of  the  sinful  actions  of  rnunki  id, 
the  proper  method  of  exhibiting  IT 
cy  respecting  the  existence  of  their  sins, 
is,  after  the  manner  of  President  Rd  wards 
and  most  Calvinistic  divines,  that  of  re- 
pre-enting  Him  as  permitting  mankind  to 
exert  their  sinful  actions.  As  C-Jod  does 
not  create  any  of  their  sinful  actions.  He 
32* 


378 

is  not  the  efficient  cause  of  those  actions  ; 
that  is,  they  are  not  exerted  by  His  power. 
Of  course  they  are  exerted  by  the  power 
of  mankind  themselves,  and  mankind  are 
therefore  the  efficient  causes  of  them;  for 
that  being  is  the  efficient  cause  of  an  ef- 
fect, who  possesses  and  exerts  the  power 
by  which  that  effect  is  produced.  As  then 
mankind  are  the  efficient  causes  of  all 
their  sinful  actions,  it  is  literally  true  that 
God  permits  them  to  exert  those  actions, 
and  philosophically  correct  to  exhibit  His 
agency  as  concerned  in  that  mariner  in 
the  existence  of  their  sins.  For,  in  the 
first  place,  God  upholds  mankind  in  exist- 
ence, and  in  the  possession  of  all  the  pow- 
ers which  are  exerted  in  the  exercise  of 
those  actions,  and  thereby  gives  them  op- 
portunity to  act.  Next,  He  places  them 
in  the  circumstances  in  which  they  exist 
at  the  time  of  exerting  their  sinful  actions, 
and  subjects  them  to  all  the  influences  of 
every  kind  to  which  they  are  subjected ; 
and  thereby  gives  them  opportunity  to 
exert  those  particular  actions  which  they 
do  exert.  And  thence,  thirdly,  the  rea- 
son that  they  exercise  those  sinful  actions 
instead  of  others,  is,  that  He  leaves  them 
to  act  under  precisely  those  influences  to 
which  they  are  subjected,  instead  of  ex- 
erting on  them  a  different  influence  that 


379 

would  prevent  their  sinning,  and  lead 
them  to  yield  Him  a  perfect  obedience. 
He,  therefore,  permits  them  to  exercise 
their  sinfui  actions. 

He  determines  the  existence  before 
their  minds  of  all  the  motives  that  exist 
there  at  the  time,  and  in  the  circumstan- 
ces in  which  they  exist,  and  determines 
also  the  precise  kind  and  degree  of  influ- 
ence exerted  by  those  motives;  and 
thereby  constitutes  a  ground  of  certainty 
that,  unless  some  preventing  influence  is 
interposed,  they  will  exert  nil  their  sinful 
actions.  And.  as  it  is  His  prerogative  to 
exert  that  influence  which  would  prevent 
their  sinning,  and  lead  them  to  yield  a 
perfect  obedience;  in  withholding  that 
influence.  He  permits  them  to  sin  in  the 
mariner  in  which  they  do. 

No  valid  objection,  therefore,  can  be 
made  to  His  conduct,  in  regard  to  the  sins 
of  mankind,  on  the  ground  that  it  repre- 
sents mankind  thomsi  Ives  as  the  efficient 
causes  of  their  sinful  actions,  instead  of 
ascribing  the  efficient  causation  of  them 
to  God  ;  since  mankind  are  the  efficient 
causes  of  their  sinful  actions,  and  truth 
and  the  divine  glory  demand  that  they 
be  represented  as  such.  For  to  deny 
that  they  are  the  efficient  causes  of  their 
actions,  is  not  only  to  deny  the  fact  in  re- 


380 

spect  to  the  efficient  causation  of  them, 
but  is  also  to  deny  that  mankind  are  mo- 
ral agents,  and  worthy  of  blame  on  ac- 
count of  their  sins.  And  to  exhibit  God 
as  the  efficient  cause  of  their  sinful  ac- 
tions, is  not  only  to  contradict  the  fact 
respecting  their  efficient  causation,  but  is 
also  to  ascribe  all  the  guilt  of  those  sins 
to  Him. 

Nor  can  this  mode  of  exhibiting  His 
conduct,  respecting  the  sins  of  mankind, 
be  justly  or  plausibly  charged  with  re- 
presenting mankind  as  exempted  from  the 
Divine  control  in  all  their  sinful  actions, 
and  thereby  contradicting  the  doctrine  of 
God's  universal  government.  For  man- 
kind are  no  more  exempted  from  the  Di- 
vine control  by  being  the  efficient  causes 
of  their  sinful  actions,  than  they  would  be 
were  God  the  efficient  cause  of  those  ac- 
tions. 

Though  they  are  the  efficient  causes  of 
their  sinful  actions,  yet  they  are  univer- 
sally and  absolutely  dependent  on  God, 
and  entirely  under  His  control.  They 
are  entirely  dependent  on  Him  for  exis- 
tence, and  for  all  the  powers  and  proper- 
ties which  belong  to  their  constitution. 
It  is  He  who  upholds  them  and  every 
thing  pertaining  to  their  constitution  by 
the  word  of  His  power.  They  are,  there- 


fore,  wholly  under  His  control,  as  u 
spects  their  existence  and  all  the  powers 
and  properties  of  their  constitution.  They 
are  also  entirely  dependent  on  Him  for 
the  mode  in  which  they  exercise  their 
powers.  He  lays  the  foundation  of  the 
certainty,  that  all  those  motives  shall  exist 
before  their  minds  that  do  exist  there,  and 
at  the  time  and  in  the  circumstances  in 
which  they  exist,  and  that  they  shall  pos- 
precisely  that  kind  and  degree  of 
influence  which  they  do  possess;  and 
thereby  lays  the  foundation  of  the  cer- 
tainty that  mankind  shall  act  in  precisely 
that  mode  in  which  they  do  act.  Man- 
kind are  therefore  wholly  under  His  con- 
trol in  respect  to  the  mode  of  their  act- 
ing. And  being  thus  entirely  under  His 
control  in  regard  to  their  existence  and 
all  that  pertains  to  their  constitution,  and 
in  regard  to  the  mode  in  which  they  act; 
they  are  as  universally  and  absolutely 
under  His  control  as  they  can  be.  For. 
their  existence  and  the  powers  and  pro- 
perties of  their  constitution,  and  the  ex- 
ercise of  their  powers  in  their  actions, 
are  all  that  can  be  predicated  of  them. 
And  if  they  are  entirely  under  His  con- 
trol in  regard  to  every  tiling  that  can  be 
predicated  of  them,  they  are  as  universally 


382 

and  absolutely  under  His  control  as  they 
can  he,  and,  therefore,  as  much  so  as 
they  would  be  were  He  the  efficient 
caus°  of  their  sinful  actions. 

God's  government  of  mankind  consists 
in  His  placing  them,  (as  moral  agents,)  by 
an  agency  direct  or  indirect,  under  pre- 
cisely all  those  influences  in  kind  and 
degree  to  which  they  are  subjected,  and 
under  no  others  whatever ;  and  thereby 
laying  the  foundation  of  a  certainty  that 
they  sh?ill  act  in  precisely  the  mode  in 
which  they  do  act.  Or  it  consists  in  His 
subjecting  them  to  precisely  those  influ- 
ences, and  no  others  whatever,  under 
which  they  voluntarily  exercise  their  own 
powers  in  exerting  precisely  that  series  of 
actions  which  they  do  exert ;  and  does 
not  consist  in  His  creating  their  actions. 
And  such,  from  the  nature  of  moral  agents, 
must  be  the  nature  of  a  moral  govern- 
ment over  them ;  and  such  is  the  uniform 
decision  of  common  sense  on  the  subject. 
We  presume  no  one  whose  common  sense 
had  not  been  strangled  by  the  hand  oi 
false  philosophy,  ever  conceived  of  God?s 
government  of  moral  agent*,  as  consist- 
ing in  any  thing  else  than  His  determin- 
ing the  mode  in  which  they  act,  or  His 
exerting  such  an  agency  respecting  them, 
fhat  they  in  consequence  of  it  voluntari- 


383 

ly  exercise  their  own  power  in  exerting: 
precisely  that  series  of  actions  which 
they  do  exert. 

No  foundation  whatever,  therefore, 
exists  for  the  objections?,  made  by  those 
\\liom  we  oppose,  to  this  mode  of  exhi- 
biting the  conduct  of  God  respecting  the 
sins  of  mankind. 

Finn/ly.     This    subject  has   been   the 
theme  or  much  erroneous  reasoning  and 
incorrect  belief.     The  number  of  the 
not  small,  \\  ho  have  held  the  position,  nor 

"iilv  ;i  sin, ill  number  of  conversations 
and  serm  >n>  been  employed  to  prove  it, 
that  all  the  sin  which  exists,  and  shall 

t  in  the  universe,  is  necessary  to  the 
calory  of  God  1>>  a  natural  necessity;  and 
thai  had  mankind  orde\i.'s  yielded  a  per- 
fect obedience,  in  place  of  committing  the 
sins  vvhiclrthey  havu  committed,  or  were 
they  hereafter  to  yield  obedience,  instead 

inning,  as  they  will  sin,  iln-\  would 
ea-1  a  veil  over  the  glories  of  Jehovah, 
and  dry  up  the  streams  of  bles-et!. 
which  How  to  His  creatures  from  His 
throne :  and  who,  therefore,  as  a  conse- 
quence of  that  position,  have  held,  that 
God  absolutely  desires  mankind  and  de- 
vils to  sin  in  all  the  instances  in  which 
they  do  and  shall  sin  ;  and  have  laboured 
to  vindicate  His  benevolence,  or  illustrate 


384 

His  wisdom  in  desiring  and  permitting 
sin  to  exist,  in  order  that  a  perfect  display 
of  His  glory  might  be  made ;  and  who 
thence  have  also  held,  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  men  and  devils  to  rejoice  in  the  exist- 
ence of  their  sins,  as  the  necessary  means 
of  displaying  the  divine  glory.  And  in 
holding  and  advocating  these  positions, 
they  have  virtually  embraced  and  advo- 
cated a  mass  of  other  appalling  errors. 
In  holding  that  the  sins  of  mankind  are 
necessary  to  the  glory  of  God  by  a  natural 
necessity,  they  have  virtually,  as  we  have 
shown,  denied  the  perfections  of  God,  by 
affirming,  that  He  has  required  mankind 
to  pursue  a  course  of  conduct  which 
would  be  unspeakably  dishonourable  to 
Him,  and  destructive  to  His  own  and  the 
happiness  of  His  kingdom.  In  holding, 
that  God  does  not  really  desire  mankind 
to  yield  Him  obedience  in  any  of  the  in- 
stances in  which  they  do  not,  and  that  He 
absolutely  desires  them  to  commit  all  the 
sins  they  do  commit,  they  deny  his  vera- 
city by  charging  Him  with  uttering  a  de- 
claration that  is  not  true,  in  affirming  that 
He  has  given  to  mankind  in  the  sacred 
volume  a  revelation  of  His  will  respecting 
their  conduct;  and  in  affirming  explicitly 
in  various  declarations  in  that  volume,  and 
Impliedly  in  all  its  requisitions  of  obe- 


385 

dience,  that  lie  does  not  de.-ire  mankind 
to  sin  against  Him  in  any  instance  what- 
ever, but  absolutely  desires  them  to  yield 
him  a  perfect  obedience.  In  holding,  that 
mankind  are  under  obligation  to  rejoice 
in  the  existence  of  all  the  sins  which  they 
commit,  they  hold,  as  we  have  sho  ui, 
that  they  are  under  obligation  not  to  ex- 
ercise any  godly  sorrow  for  sin;  and 
therefore  charge  God  with  inconsistency 
in  requiring  them  to  exercise  that  sorrow. 
In  holding,  that  it  would  be  inconsistent 
with  the  glory  of  God  for  mankind  to  yield 
a  perfect  obedience  to  Hi-  hw,  they  hold, 
as  we  have  shown,  that  mankind  might,  in 
the  exercise  of  perfect  benevolence,  do 
infinite  injury  to  Him  and  His  kingdom, 
and  thereby  imolve  themselves  in  the 
contradiction  of  affirming,  that  perfect 
science  to\\ard>  God  and  His  king- 
dom is  not  perfect  benevolence  towards 
them,  but  malevolence.  In  holding,  that 
it  is  utterly  inconsistent  with  the  divine 
y  for  mankind  to  yield  a  perfect  obe- 
dience to  the  divine  government,  they 
hold,  as  has  been  demonstrated,  that 
mankind  are  totally  destitute  of  any  rule 
of  determining,  prerioteljto  their  acting, 
what  they  must  do  in  order  to  promote 
the  glory  of  God.  and  thereby  declare  it 
to  be  utterly  impossible,  by  a  natural  im- 
33 


386 

possibility,  for  mankind  to  do  any 
from  benevolence  towards  God  or  any 
other  being;  and  thence,  that  they  -ire 
under  the  most  absolute  natural  necessity 
of  acting  in  all  their  conduct  from  perfect 
selfishness,  and  so  involve  themselves  in 
the  contradiction  of  affirming,  that  man- 
kind are  perfectly  justifiable  in  all  their 
sinful  conduct.  And  in  attempting  to  de- 
monstrate and  justify  these  several  views, 
they  have  involved  themselves  in  various 
other  absurdities;  as  that,  there  is  a  dif- 
nce  between  a  thing,  in  itself  consi- 
dered, and  all  things  considered;  that  a 
thing  mny  be  absolutely  good,  and  abso- 
lutely evil,  at  the  same  time;  that,  a  thing 
may  be  absolutely  desirable,  and  abso- 
lutely undesirable  at  the  same  time;  that 
God  may  desire  a  thing,  and  not  desire  it, 
at  the  same  time;  and  that  men  may,  at 
the  same  time,  be  under  two  opposite 
and  equal  obligations. 

And  they  have  not  merely  held  these 
contradictions  to  be  the  truth  of  God,  but 
have  contended  for  them  as  the  most  im- 
portant part  of  divine  truth,  as  the  very 
bnsis  on  which  many  of  the  other  truths 
of  the  Gospel  rrst,  and  from  which  they 
derive  their  harmony  and  efficiency:  have 
made  them  the  most  essential  articles  in 
a  creed  of  orthodoxy,  and  poured  a  storm 
of  invective  on  all  who  ventured  to  reject 


387 

them,  as  babes  in  knowledge,  weak  in  the 
faith,  heretics.  They  have  thus  dese- 
crated religion,  by  attempting  to  rend 
away  from  her  the  robes  of  her  simplicity 
and  purity,  and  compelling  her  to  the  pa- 
rentage of  these  abortions  of  science, 
falsely  so  called. 

We  are  aware  thnt  we  impose  an  un- 
grateful   task  in  calling   them  to   fix  the 
itimacy  on  the  ir.o-t  I'M  oinvd 

ollsprmir  of  their  tbeologtcafepecul 

to  renounce,  as  unsound,  th«M 
on  which  they  have  reared  no  mean  rcpu- 
tatini   for  logical  depth  and    adroitness  ,- 
to  doom  to  the  tlan:  u<-o;l.  hay.  ;u,d 

stubble,"  the  multitude  of  sermon^ 
logues,  essays,  dieaoiBitiOMt  pam|»!d(Ms, 
and  volumes,  they  have  <!e\  oted  to  this 
Mihjeel,  and  ptM'haps  fondly  regarded  ;LS 
(be  Choicest  *-^old.  silver,  and  precious 
Stoned  among  their  work-. 

I5ut  we  are  ;i\vare  like\\  isc\  that  it  is  the 
part  of  their  Christian  meeknckss  and  hu- 
mility to  weigh  with  attention  every  dis- 
pa^ionate  <-\amination  of  their  \ie\\s; 
and  the  part  of  their  enlightened  zeal  to 
seek  and  embrace  the  truth,  however 
much  at  variance  it  may  be  with  the  opi- 
nions they  have  heretofore  field  ;  and  the 
part  of  their  love  to  the  Redeemer,  to 
shrink  from  no  sacrifices  involved  in 
abandoning  errors  injurious  to  Him  and 


388 

His  cause,  and  in  gaining  just  views  of  His 
character  and  will.  And  we  repose  on 
their  intelligence  and  piety  the  hope,  that 
the  views  we  have  exhibited,  however 
subversive  of  those  they  have  been  accus- 
tomed to  entertain,  will  commend  them- 
selves to  their  consciences  in  the  sight  of 
God,  as  the  truth,  and  command  from 
them  an  unreluctant  acceptance. 

We  conjure  them  not  to  scorn  our  rea- 
sonings, nor  disregard  them,  till  they  shall 
be  able  with  the  weapons  of  indubitable 
truth  to  refute  them;  and  we  conjure 
them  by  all  the  regard  that  should  be 
cheiished  for  the  truth  as  it  is  in  Jesus; 
and  by  all  the  injuries  which  it  may  in- 
flict on  the  cause  of  God,  virtually  to  de- 
ny His  attributes  and  misrepresent  His 
government;  and  by  the  fears  of  being 
found  to  have  turned  from  the  simplicity 
of  the  Gospel,  and  taught  for  doctrines  the 
commandment*  of  men;  henceforth  to 
chain  the  hand  of  sacrilege,  with  which 
this  subject  has  been  assailed,  and  re- 
strict their  speculations  and  belief  within 
the  limits  of  truth  and  soberness.  We 
recommend  them,  as  brethren,  to  God 
and  to  the  word  of  His  grace,  which  is 
able  to  build  them  up,  and  to  give  them 
an  inheritance  among  all  them  which  are 

sanctified. 

THE  END. 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  SO  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $1.OO  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


OCT    17  1933 

OCT   18  1933 

OCT    19  1933 

9  Mays 

REC'D  LD 

APR  25  1959 

6Nov'6C 

.'D  LD 


NOV 


SFNTONILL 


>r 


MAY  2  6 


U.  C.  BERKEL 


LD  21-100m-7.'33 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  UBRARY 


I  1 

|P     §   ••:•  '^./.V        | 

' 


•MHB9 


ltll$P* 


